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Islamic banking and finance have received a considerable attention from academics and practitioners after the 
global financial crisis. Drawing insights from the theoretical and empirical studies about the resilience and the 
relative stability of Islamic financing alternatives - compared to their conventional peers- during turbulent 
economic and market conditions, I found that Islamic alternatives are not as less risky and stable as previously 
presented.  
This thesis makes a contribution to the asset management literature by examining whether Shari‘ah compliant 
exchange traded funds (ETFs) have potential diversification benefits to a volatile portfolio of investments in 
emerging markets. The portfolio consists of three asset classes: conventional and fixed-income securities in 
emerging markets and Shari‘ah compliant equity. I utilise a dynamic optimisation strategy to capture the 
time-variability in correlations between Islamic ETFs and other ETFs and find the optimal portfolios accord-
ingly. I back test the results by using a static optimisation strategy and estimating optimal portfolios over two 
sample periods. The results are new to the literature, since previous empirical evidence is either comparing 
Islamic and conventional equity or Islamic and conventional bonds using static asset allocation strategies.  
Furthermore, this thesis contributes to the literature by taking a holistic approach and analyses the role of 
Islamic banks on both the micro and macro levels. I examine the effect of Islamic banks‘ financial distress on 
other financial institutions and the financial system in 10 Muslim majority countries. The research sample 
comprises 352 conventional and Islamic financial institutions. I do not consider only Islamic banks‘ specific 
characteristics and macroeconomic variables, but I also take in consideration the financial linkages and the 
spillover effects of financial institutions‘ distress. This research is pivotal, because it fills a research gap when it 
comes to identifying the systemic relevance and role of Islamic banks in financial systems. Previous research 
has adopted a top down approach and has identified the effect of the system on Islamic banks. Given the liter-
ature about increasing business risks in the Islamic banking sector, I hypothesise that Islamic banks contribute 
to systemic risk. In addition, I identify whether the effect of Islamic banks‘ distress on the system is due to the 
change in their business risks over time.  
The findings of this thesis are new to the literature and provide implications of great importance. Institutional 
investors should consider the religion effect when they manage their assets, given the evidence regarding the 
outperformance of Shari‘ah compliant equity relative to their conventional peers. They should also be cautious 
when using dynamic strategies, because they can be more costly to apply specially in volatile markets such as 
emerging markets and during crisis periods. For central banks and regulator, they should consider Islamic banks 
as genetically modified conventional banks). If Islamic banks and financial authorities did not address the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background of the Research Questions 
The effects of religions on economics vary within and across religions (Gay, 1991; Kuran, 
1993). In this regard, Shari‘ah compliant investments and Islamic banks have been promoted 
as more stable financing alternatives, particularly after the global financial crisis (Al-Rifai, 
2012; Lean and Parsva, 2012). This is when their conventional comparable were hit signif-
icantly due to excessive speculation, low-quality credit and toxic investments.  
Islamic banking was established in the middle of the 20
th
 century, with the intention of 
providing financial services which are compliant to the Islamic law ―Shari‘ah‖ and empha-
sise on values such as fairness, equity and social welfare. According to the Islamic law, any 
financial transaction or investment should adhere to the following standards: the prohibition 
of interest rates, avoidance of speculation and uncertainty, and emphasising the necessity of 
asset-backed investments (Al-Qaradawi, 2013).  
 
Despite the said advantages of Islamic financial alternatives, empirical evidence about them 
is mixed. Some studies find that Shari‘ah compliant investments are lower in risk compared 
to their conventional peers (Mansor and Bhatti, 2011; Milly and Sultan, 2012; Abdullah et al. 
2007; Merdad et al. 2010; AL-Zoubi and; Maghyereh, 2007; Hassan and Girard, 2011; Aka, 
2009; Alam et al. 2013; Azmat et al. 2014). Other studies do not (Jawadi et al. 2014; Hakim 
and Rashidan 2002; Hayat and Kraussl 2011).  
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In addition, Islamic banks are experiencing significant business risks such as inefficiency, 
liquidity risk, credit risk, failure risk and operational risk (Bacha, 2008; Khan and Ahmed, 
2001; Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2010; Manlagñit, 2011, Djennas, 2016; Errico and 
Farrahbaksh, 1998; Abedifar et al. 2013). Other studies warn of increasing business risks in 
Islamic banks (Beck et al. 2013; Gheeraert and Weill, 2014; Abedifar et al. 2016; Sorwar et 
al. 2016; Pappas et al. 2016). However, these studies still argue that Islamic banks are more 
stable than conventional ones. Motivated by this evidence, we state the following research 
problem.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Given the previous background, need arises to investigate if Islamic finance and banking 
have any positive implications on the professional asset management practices and the sta-
bility of the financial systems.  
 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
1. Use dynamic and static asset allocation strategies to estimate and evaluate the 
risk-adjusted return of a portfolio which contains three asset classes: conventional equity 
in emerging markets (EM), fixed-income in EM, and Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs in 
EM, USA and the world.  
2. Test whether or not Shari‘ah compliant equity can outweigh EM conventional 
fixed-income securities in an EM portfolio.  
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3. Measure the financial distress of Islamic banks. 
4. Examine how Islamic banks affect other financial institutions and the financial system. 
5. Investigate whether there is a time-variability in the effect of Islamic banks on financial 
systems. 
 
1.4 Research Hypotheses 
Chapter 3 
H1: Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs improve the risk-adjusted returns of a portfolio com-
prising conventional emerging markets ETFs. 
H2: Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs can outweigh emerging markets fixed-income securities 
in the asset allocation, during periods of volatile interest rates.  
H3: Dynamic allocation strategy outperforms static allocation strategy in emerging markets 
during crises periods.  
Chapter 4 
H1: Islamic banks‘ financial distress affects other financial institutions and has spillover 
effect in financial systems. 
H2: Islamic banks are relevant to the financial system and contribute to its systemic risk. 
H3: There is a time-variability in the effect of Islamic banks on the system, due to the vari-
ation in their business performance and bank-level characteristics. 
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1.5 Contribution of the Research 
Economic theorists have argued that there is a relationship between religion and economics 
and many studies proved that this relationship exists (Ulbrich and Wallace, 1983 and 1984; 
Neuman, 1986; Barro and McCleary (2003); Samuelsson, 1993; Grief, 1994; Beit-Hallahmi 
and Argyle, 1997; among others). This research is positioned in the existing literature about 
norm-restricted investing as argued by ―the neglect effect hypothesis‖ by Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) and how it affects the performance of religion restricted investments and 
other investments. It is also based on the literature about how social factors affect individu-
als‘ economic behaviour, and economic systems as argued by Becker‘s (1957) theory ―the 
negative effect of social norms‖ and Kuran‘s (19935) theory ―preference falsification‖. 
 
My first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) investigates the diversification effect from adding 
Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs to a portfolio which contains a broad range of emerging 
market assets during the period 2009 to 2015. In Chapter 3, my contribution to the previous 
literature is twofold. First, I estimate and evaluate the riskiness of a portfolio which has a 
mixture of three asset classes: conventional equity, conventional fixed income, and Shari‘ah 
compliant equity. Previous studies only compared conventional assets with Shari‘ah com-
pliant assets (Jawadi et al. 2014; Arouri et al. 2013; Dharani and Natarajan, 2011; Ho et al. 
2013; Hoepner et al. 2011; Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh, 2007; Aka, 2009; Sukmana and Kolid, 
20102; Cakir and Raei, 2007).  
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Second, standard finance theory suggests that the inherited risk in fixed-income securities is 
usually less than any form of equity (Cakir and Raei, 2007). Nonetheless, Islamic scholars 
claim that the relative absence of interest rates in financing businesses makes Islamic assets 
less risky and more resilient in market downturns. I address this argument by testing whether 
or not Shari‘ah compliant equity can out-perform emerging markets fixed-income securities. 
Third, Chapter 3 contributes to the wider literature in asset allocation and portfolio optimi-
sation by investigating Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs‘ performance using dynamic asset 
allocation strategies. Prior empirical evidence on Islamic assets‘ performance and their di-
versification benefits on a global level is mixed (Arouri et al. 2013; Hassan and Girard, 2011; 
Hayat and Krauessl 2011). 
 
My second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) contributes to the literature about Islamic banks‘ 
performance and financial systems‘ stability in two ways. I examine the effect of Islamic 
banks‘ financial distress on other financial institutions, by jointly considering their own 
specific characteristics, macroeconomic variables and financial linkages. Previous research 
has either focused on Islamic banks‘ characteristics solely or modeled their propensity to 
failure risk compared to those for conventional banks (Gheeraert, 2014; Wanke et al. 2016). 
My research is different from these studies in terms of the selection of the possible relevant 
drivers of Islamic banks‘ performance. I do not consider only bank-level variables and 
macroeconomic variables, but I also take into consideration the linkages and the effect of 
tail-risk spillovers from and to Islamic banks. 
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Lastly, I contribute to the literature by examining the relevance of Islamic banks to the sta-
bility of financial systems. Previous research follows top-down approach, where they analyse 
the effect of economic stress and financial instability on the business risks of Islamic banks 
(Sorwar et al. 2016; Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013; Djennas, 2016; Beck et al. 2013; and Khan, 
1991). I follow a bottom-up approach where I tests the effect of Islamic banks on the finan-
cial system. The advantage of my approach is that I estimate Islamic banks‘ financial distress 
using conditional VaR and given their specific characteristics, macroeconomic variables, and 




I use in Chapter 3 the daily logarithmic returns of 17 ETFs traded in three of the largest 
international markets (the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany). It covers the 
period from September 2009 to the end of 2015. My sample period and asset combination 
helps us to further assess the validity of such arguments. In Chapter 4, research data consists 
of weekly balance-sheets, macroeconomic and market data of 352 financial institutions in 10 
Muslim majority countries and covers the period from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 
2015. This period is important to investigate the marginal contribution of the Islamic banking 
sector to the system. 
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1.7 Significance of the Study 
The significance of this thesis emanates from the empirical investigation of the viability of 
Islamic financial assets and Islamic banks as options for enhancing the performance of in-
vestment portfolios and stabilising financial systems. Previous studies are comparative rather 
than experimental. They compared different religions and their effect on different economic 
aspects and they compared Islamic finance to its traditional (conventional) comparable. I 
create a context in this thesis to move one step forward and ask a simple question: Does 
Islamic finance work as it is intended to? 
Findings from Chapter 2 are of particular interest to international portfolio managers looking 
for investment alternatives to improve the risk-adjusted return for a portfolio of emerging 
markets investment. It provides evidence about the effect of Shari‘ah compliant investments 
on stabilising an emerging market portfolio. In addition, I provide evidence about the per-
formance of dynamic and static optimisation strategies during tranquil and volatile periods in 
emerging markets. This helps portfolio managers in deciding the appropriate strategy to 
follow, and which one would be more costly to implement. 
 
Moreover, the findings in Chapter 4 are of a great importance to financial authorities, regu-
lators and risk managers. I find that Islamic institutions generally have significant effects on 
conventional and other Islamic financial institutions, where network connections are the 
most influential factor when it comes to financial institutions‘ distress. Also, Islamic banks 
are found to contribute to the instability of financial systems as their conventional peers do. 
Finally, I find that there is a time-variability in the effect of a number of Islamic banks due to 
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their own specific-characteristics. These results indicate an urgent need for enforcing clear 
risk management practices in Islamic banks. It also builds upon the literature in risk man-
agement in Islamic finance and financial stability.  
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis starts with the general literature review in Chapter 2, which will demonstrate the 
theories and empirical evidence about the relationship between religion and economics, 
explain what Islamic economic framework is and critically discuss the existing empirical 
evidence about Shari‘ah compliant assets an Islamic banks.   
In Chapter 3, I will focus on empirically testing the diversification effect from adding Sha-
ri‘ah compliant equity to a portfolio of conventional emerging market assets. 
In Chapter 4, I will investigate the financial distress of Islamic banks, determine their role in 
the financial system, and make conclusions about whether Islamic banks help in stabilising 
financial systems in different countries.  
Finally, Chapter 5 will provide a summary of my research findings, and I will conclude the 
thesis by outlining the future areas of scholarship, the problems and implications to re-





Chapter 2: General Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates whether Islamic assets and banks reap potential benefits from an 
investment and risk management perspectives. There has been a considerable expansion 
worldwide in Islamic banking sector, and Islamic financial markets over the last decade. 
According to Ernest and Young (2016), the Islamic banking sector has exponentially grown 
by over 47% since 2014. This was in line with the prediction which has been made by UK 
Trade and Investment (UKTI, 2013) about the increase in Islamic finance industry, where the 
total value of Shari‘ah compliant assets has grown by 150% since 2006. There are two pos-
sible reasons behind this growth. First, there is an increasing Muslim population which 
represents the main base of clientele for Islamic banks and Islamic investments. According to 
the Pew Research Centre‘s report (2015) on Religion and Public Life, Muslims are the fastest 
growing population, expected to grow by 73% over the next 4 decades. Muslims represented 
23.2% of the world‘s population in 2010, and are expected to represent 30% of the world‘s 
total population by 2050. Second, the wake of the global financial crisis in 2008 has shifted 
the attention of many academics and practitioners to Islamic finance and banking alterna-
tives. This is because Islamic financial services and investments are theoretically promoted 
as safer, more stable and equitable financing source.  
 
In this chapter, I start by discussing the theoretical facets and empirical evidence about the 
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relationship between religion and economics motivate which this research. Then, I will 
demonstrate the underpinning rules of the Islamic economic framework and the different 
types of Islamic assets and financial services. Finally, I will provide an extensive and critical 
comparison between Islamic banks / assets and their conventional peers, given the existing 
empirical evidence.  
 
2.2 Religion and Economics  
The role of religion in decision making has been widely documented theoretically and em-
pirically. Before outlining the key theories and empirical research covering this matter, one 
should understand what a religion is. Religion is a doctrine which comprises a set of values 
and beliefs followed by a group of agents (institutions and individuals). This group is said to 
be following a particular ―faith‖ (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). There are many theoretical 
underpinnings which argue that emotions and feelings affect economic behaviour, judgement 
and decision making. Loewenstein et al. (2001) argue that when people face situations which 
involve high uncertainty and risk, their emotions often affect their decisions. This makes 
emotional reactions direct decision making and dominate behaviour (Simon, 1967). Ac-
cording to Gay (1991), Kuran (1993), Pryor (1990) and Siddiki (1981), religious economics 
have emerged when Christian theologians, national council of churches, clerics, Islamic 
economists and Evangelical Protestant economists seek to analyse and explain the reasons 
behind implementing taxation, banking and redistribution of income. Webber‘s (1930) the-
ory is that Protestants in particular are the ones who motivated modern capitalism by pro-
moting for values such as thrift, risk taking, and individual financial responsibility. In his 
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view, Protestants wanted reformation in taxation, banking and redistribution of income 
which led to capitalism. However, no empirical evidence supports this theory and it was 
falsified by Samuelsson (1993) who finds that early Protestants theologians did not have 
interest in understanding economic matters or markets.  
 
The question remains: how religion affects the economic behaviour of people? From positive 
psychology literature, religion promotes feelings such as social support and encourages so-
cial participation and optimistic behaviour. This extends to economic and investment deci-
sions of followers (Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle, 1997). Similarly, Grief (1994) argues that 
individualist (as opposed to ―collectivist‖) cultural beliefs encourage economic growth, 
exchange and innovation.  
 
Nonetheless, the impact of religion on economic behaviour and thinking is far from uniform. 
There is a considerable variation in economic thinking and behaviour across and within 
religions. Gay (1991) and Kuran (1993) posit that economic statements issued by repre-
sentative religious bodies are widely different in a specific religion. For example, in Chris-
tianity, the economic positions for Fundamentalists, Liberals, Protestants and Catholics are 
different. Pyle (1993) finds also that Evangelical Protestants are less conservative regarding 
income redistribution than average Americans.  
 
Moreover, many economists have tried to model how variation in religious beliefs affects 
income in particular. Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) argue that religious activities occur at the 
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expense of productive activities. So, they propose a household production framework which 
assumes that religiosity increases by age (when capacity to work decreases) and directs more 
focus on the rewards which will be gained in the afterlife.  
 
Literature shows mixed evidence from different religions about this model. Ehenberg (1977) 
confirms Azzi and Ehrenberg‘s model. Neuman (1986) use data for Jewish male workers in 
Israel and his results support the model too. On the other hand, Ulbrich and Wallace (1983, 
1984) and Sullivan (1985) find insignificant results to prove this model. In addition, Barro 
and McCleary (2003) developed upon Azzi and Ehrenberg‘s model, and separate between 
religious beliefs and physical religious activity (i.e. church attendance). They find that an 
increase in church attendance without strengthening beliefs could depress income.  
More studies have broken down the relationship between religiosity and income levels to 
control for low and high-income countries. Some characteristics of a particular religion 
suggest that negative effects are larger in low-income countries and the positive effects are 
smaller when there is less capital (Desdoigts, 1999). This theory has been empirically tested 
by various studies. However, empirical evidence is mixed. Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2010) 
hypothesise based on Desdoigts‘s theory that positive effects on income in high-income 
countries are driven by religion. Using panel data for 25 Western countries, Bettendorf and 
Dijkgraaf (2010) findings support this hypothesis. Barro and McCleary (2003) state that 
beliefs affect income positively and church attendance affects income negatively in 41 
countries. Studies such as Chiswick (1983, 1993), Tomes (1985), Heath et al. (1995) and 
Steen (1996) find positive effect of Judaism on income. Tomes (1985) find insignificant 
effect of religion on the income of Protestants and Catholics. Also, Heath et al. (1995) find 
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insignificant effect on the income for liberal Protestants and negative effect on that for 
Catholic and Orthodox Protestant). Whereas, Steen (1996) finds negative effect of religion 
on the income of Protestants. This considerable variation in evidence has continuously posed 
the question regarding the direction of the relationship between religion/beliefs/moods and 
income.  
 
There are theories which view religion as an establishment whose followers (institutions and 
individuals) can profit from it, punish disobedient, and view any secular economic aspect as a 
threat. Adam smith in 1786 stated straightforwardly that market forces constrain churches 
just as they constrain secular firms. This makes religions perceive monopoly, government 
regulations as real threats for them as for other sector of the economy.  
On the prohibition of interest rates, Ekelund et al. (1989) argue that the church‘s usury from 
medieval Catholicism drove it towards too monopolistic positions similar to a firm which 
controls all borrowing and lending. Ekelund et al. (1989) theorise that usury rules made 
churches exploit people and borrow at low rates and lend at higher rates. Opposite to that, 
Carr and Landa (1983) and Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998) argue that usury rules protected 
the society by providing insurance against unexpected shocks. This raises again the issue of 
the heterogeneous economic positions within and across religions. For example, Liberal 
Christians, Fundamentalists and Protestants would disobey the Catholic Church if they were 
charged higher rates for their loans. In all cases, this creates two scenarios when such reli-
gious competition exists. The first scenario: it can benefit societies by forming a Unitarian 
faith which promotes prosperity, the existence of one regulator and help people prosper 
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(Healey, 1984). The second scenario: based on David Hume, religious competition can lead 
to clashes amongst people, intolerance of differences and superstition (Anderson, 1988).  
 
Distinctiveness and exclusivity of specific beliefs or norms may benefit or detriment their 
followers. Becker (1957) argues that agents pay more for their discriminatory preferences 
arising from social norms. Such discriminatory preferences make people select specific 
things and refrain from other things. In the context of stock markets, Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2009) develop the neglect effect hypothesis, which argues that neglecting specific stocks by 
big investors means that the prices of these stocks will be lower than their fundamental 
values, because of limited risk sharing. Merton (1987) shows that Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) does not hold true anymore. This is because pricing is no longer based only 
on beta but on idiosyncratic risk too. There are two assumptions underlying Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) hypothesis. First, when neglecting specific stocks, investors limit their 
arbitrage opportunities, because of a set of constraints and risks (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Second, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) also witnessed that the neglect effect of by institu-
tional investors was stable over their sample period. Interestingly, Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2009) test their hypothesis by investigating whether sin stocks
1
 outperform their compara-
ble in US, Europe and Canada from 1965 to 2006. They find that expected returns of sin 
stocks outperform their counterparts (except for tobacco companies which face litigation 
risks). Also, the market to book ratio and earning per price of sin stocks are 15% to 20% 
                                                          
1
 Sin stocks are equity for companies which operate in alcohol, tobacco and gaming industries.  
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lower than their comparable. This implies that there is a significant financial costs related to 
norm-constrained investing.  
In addition, social norms can have a negative impact on economics. Kuran‘s (1995) theory of 
―preference falsification‖ explains the reasons behind why some cultural norms are eco-
nomically inefficient. Kuran (1997) argues that Islamic countries have isolated itself and 
have lagged that of the west for most of the millennium, due to Islam‘s static world view.  
 
Nevertheless, based on evidence proposed by Loewenstein et al. (2001), many empirical 
studies provide weak support for the above theories and prove that religious norms can have 
positive effects on stock markets. Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2004) examine the Jewish 
sentiment on US equity market, by analysing return and volume around major Jewish High 
Holy Days, during which the stock market is open. They find that stock returns are consid-
erably higher during Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year) and the prior two days, but 
significantly lower the day after (Somber Day). For trading volume, it is found to be lower on 
both days. Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2004) justify this by the sentiment of Jewish inves-
tors and their trades around these holidays.  
 
For Muslim investors, given that Ramadan (the holy Islamic month) is characterised by 
positive mood and social interaction, Bialkowsi et al. (2012) examine whether religious 
practice influence investors‘ psychology. In particular, they examine the stock market effects 
of Ramadan in 14 Muslim majority countries from 1998 to 2007. They find that Ramadan 
promotes the feeling of solidarity and self-reflection and stock returns in Ramadan are on 
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average much higher and less volatile compared to the rest of the year. Also, Gavriidies et al. 
(2015) examine the religion effect on investors‘ behaviour in 7 Muslim majority countries. 
They find that investors tend to herd during Ramadan, and herding is more significant in 
Ramadan days compared to non-Ramadan days. Although, studies such as Al Hajeh et al. 
(2011) and Al-Khazali (2014) are in line with Bialkowsi et al. (2012). However, Seyyed et al. 
(2005) document no significant change in expected returns in the Saudi Arabian stock market 
during (Ramadan) from 1985 to 2000. They find also a considerable decline in volatility in 
the same market.  
 
Given this theoretical and empirical evidence, there is certainly a religion effect on different 
economic aspects and on financial markets performance. That is said, the next section shows 
the main questions addressed and positions this thesis in the existing literature.  
 
2.3 Research Gaps 
Motivated by this evidence, I will examine the effect of Islamic finance on: i) the decision 
making of assets allocation and ii) financial system‘s stability. The well documented rela-
tionship between religion and economics focuses on the micro-level of the economy or the 
financial system. Given ―the neglect effect hypothesis‖ by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and 
―the negative effect of social norms‖ argued by Becker (1957), this thesis is adding to the 
bigger scope of the literature by questioning the viability of Islamic finance as an alternative 
for portfolio managers, and whether it can have positive implications on the professional 
asset management practices (Chapter 3). It will also test the validity of ―theory of preference 
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falsification‖ by focusing on the role of Islamic banks in stabilising the financial systems by 
taking a micro and macro-economic perspectives (Chapter 4). To my knowledge, these 
contributions are new to the literature in Islamic finance, portfolio management and meas-
uring stability of financial systems.   
 
2.4 Islamic Economic Framework 
The Islamic economic framework has four major features which are enforced on Islamic 
investments and banking operations by the Islamic law or Shari‘ah. These features are i) 
avoidance of excessive uncertainty, ii) interest prohibition, iii) Profit-and-Loss Sharing 
(PLS) and iv) necessity of asset backing (Ayub, 2002). 
 
First, Islamic law prohibits excessive uncertainty or (Gharar) about the price, quantity or 
quality of a product or service provided, and prohibits (Mysir or gambling) in the form of 
games of chance Al-Qaradawi (2013). This is to encourage parties involved in any kind of 
contract to conduct due diligence before committing to it; hence, any party involved becomes 
more responsible and accountable, and maintains fairness in all commercial transactions. 
Jurists are greatly responsible for determining the extent of Gharar in a transaction, and 
based on the circumstances of a particular transaction, they may or may not invalidate the 
contract. For example, when it comes to stock investing, many people question; why stock 
investing is permissible in the Islamic framework?  
 
The raised concerns came from the idea that the trading in the stock markets is based on 
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speculation. However, trading in stock markets is partly based on fundamental analysis of 
economic variables and historical performance of certain business instead of pure specula-
tion. In contrast, trading in derivatives
2
 or short sale for example is not permitted, because it 
is based on an analyst‘s or an investor‘s expectations and it involves trading assets which are 
not initially in their possession (Kamali, 2000).  
 
Theoretically, if I refer back to Expected Utility Hypothesis (EUH) and Modern Portfolio 
Theory (MPT) developed by Bernoulli (1954) and Markowitz (1952) respectively, I also find 
that they are based on the risk-averse attitude in decision making under uncertainty. In 
practice, when Iqbal (2010) examines whether the variance for a given investment decreases 
if it is financed by equity rather than by a mix of equity and debt. He finds that 1% increase in 
the debt-equity ratio increases the investment‘s risk at an increasing rate without increasing 
its overall expected return.  
 
Second, the rationale behind interest prohibition in Islam is very similar to the prohibition of 
interest imposed on the medieval churches. Money is considered as a tool for exchanging 
goods and services, but it has no value in its own. It cannot be exchanged at any cost, because 
it eventually exploits the borrower economically (Pryor, 2007). Even lending money with 
interest is not fair in case of using the funds productively or unproductively by the borrower. 
For example, when the funds lent are used productively in a way that creates additional 
wealth, the lender will not get any additional wealth, but instead a fixed return regardless of 
the outcome of the business. The lender in this case surrendered his property rights to the 
                                                          
2
 Derivatives can be used for hedging fundamentals-based risks as well, speculation aside.  
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borrower, and in case the funds lent are not used productively, no additional wealth is cre-
ated, and no one should claim any additional property rights (Saleh, 1992).  
 
The difference between the interest rate offered by conventional banks and the rate of return 
offered by Islamic banks is that the former is predetermined, whereas the latter is expected 
but not pre-agreed. In other words, returns of Islamic investments are not known until the end 
of the investment period, and if the prevailing yields in the market change, investors may 
expect similar yields from Islamic banks (Saleh, 1992). That is why the propensity of Islamic 
banks to business risks is higher (Ahmad, 2009). Islamic banks come under pressure when 
they are expected to pay their investment depositors a rate of return higher than that under the 
actual investment contract‘s terms. This makes them more vulnerable to withdrawal risk 
when the expectations of their investment depositors are not met and depositors withdraw 
their money (Zineldin, 1990). In addition, the limited access to leverage and the absence of 
interest in the operations of Islamic finance institutions exposes them to higher credit risk 
(Azmat et al. 2014; Abedifar et al. 2013).  
 
According to Dar and Presley (2000), there are mainly three financial transactions which lead 
to higher credit risks in Islamic banks. First, credit risk happens in Murabaha when the bank 
delivers the asset to the client but does not receive payment from the client at the same time. 
In a non-binding Murabaha, the client has a right to refuse the delivery of the product bought 
by the bank, hence the bank becomes exposed to price and market risks (Siddiqui, 2008). 
This implies that the cost-to-income ratio will be higher and there will be a negative effect on 
the Islamic bank‘s efficiency. Second, in Bay al-salam or Istisna contracts, there is the pos-
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sibility that the bank fails to deliver the goods on time or deliver the quality of goods as the 
contract specified (Iqbal and Llewellyn, 2002).  
This could result in a delay or a default in payment by the client, and the bank faces signif-
icant financial losses. Third, in Mudarabah investments, the bank represents the principal and 
work along with an external mudarib (agent). Beside the principal / agent conflicts, this type 
of contract does not give the bank proper rights to observe the agent‘s activity or participate 
in the business management (Siddiqui, 2008).  
 
The problem is that Islamic financial institutions are helpless when it comes to the case of 
default by the counterparty (Bashir, 1996). They are not allowed to charge any accrued in-
terest or impose a penalty, except in the case of deliberate negligence. Indeed, the bank‘s 
capital during the delay is not productive and its investors and depositors do not earn any 
additional income. In case of proven negligence or misconduct of the agent or the managing 
partner in participation contracts, the bank‘s share in capital invested will be recovered fol-
lowing the same rules applied for debt recovery, however it is difficult to prove negligence or 
keep evidence of misconduct (Archer et al. 1998). In addition, many developing countries 
lack official records of credit data and banks depend solely on clients‘ track credit record. 
Thus, Islamic financial institutions cannot maintain good quality data on past performance of 
the counterparty and determine the probability of default. The non-existence of an Islamic 
index rate of return is another problem, because Islamic banks often use LIBOR as the 




Overall, this makes the assessment and management of credit risk very difficult, because 
there are insufficient regulations by financial authorities when it comes to the required level 
of financial disclosure and monitoring the agent‘s performance (Obaidullah, 2002). There-
fore, the importance of credit-risk management becomes more critical. This leads us to 
question whether bank-specific characteristics of Islamic banks make it more or less finan-
cially distressed.  
 
The third feature of the Islamic economic framework is Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS). Is-
lamic law promotes PLS, where the Islamic financial instruments such as Mudharabah 
partnership and the Musharakah facility are not interest based and allow the lender to become 
a partner in the business and shares in its risk. The lender also becomes liable for its debts as 
a shareholder, and receives a return (a dividend) only when the business is profitable. The 
main problem with PLS financing is moral hazard (Nienhaus, 1983; Noman, 2002). In some 
situations, the owner of the business is not known to the financer. Other time, the entrepre-
neur submits different accounting books are presented to the financer and eliminate major 
costs that would make the business look disadvantageous. Accordingly, Islamic banks avoid 
them and mainly use non-PLS financing alternatives (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Baele et 
al. 2014). The percentage of finance which is based on PLS principles is very low. In Ma-
laysia it represents only 0.5% of total Islamic banking sector‘s financing (Chong and Liu 
(2009). Even in Indonesia (the largest Muslim country), the Bank Indonesia Report (2009) 
shows that PLS financing represented only 35.7% of total Islamic banking sector‘s financing 
by the end of 2008.  
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The fourth and last feature of the Islamic economic framework is the necessity to base any 
economic activity on a real asset or productive activity. This brings us to the point that any 
debt-based financial instrument should be based on an asset or a productive business, where 
owners share the risk and return. For example, Islamic Sukuk or Islamic bonds should be 
directly related to a real asset. They may appear to be similar to conventional bonds, because 
they are issued based on a wide range of asset types, and provide a predictable level of return. 
However, the assets‘ types under conventional bonds include mortgages, auto loans, ac-
counts receivables, and home equity loans which involve interest payment. On the contrary, 
Sukuk qualify its holder (investor) for a partial ownership of an asset for a certain period of 
time, during which the holder is accountable for the risk and return of the generated cash 
flows of the underlying asset.  
 
In addition, while a bond creates a lender / borrower relationship, the relationship in Sukuk 
depends on the nature of the underlying contract. For example, if the underlying contract is a 
lease (Ijarah), this creates a lessee / lessor relationship. Creating Sukuk starts when the issuer 
(government) assigns a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which is a legal entity to administer 
the payments made to the investors and hold the title to the assets on which the Sukuk is 
based (Dommisse and Kazi, 2005). Then the SPV issues certificates of participation to the 
investors who want to hold their liquid assets in a Shari‘ah complaint form such as Islamic 
banks, investment companies and Islamic insurance companies ―Takaful‖.
3
 In return, in-
                                                          
3
 Takaful or Islamic insurance is a financial service some Islamic banks and Takaful institutions provide. It 
enables policyholders to mutually protect each other from losses. In Takaful, there should be separation be-
tween policyholders‘ fund and shareholders‘ fund. This protects shareholders who may need their fund in case 
they face underwriting losses. Accordingly, policyholders will not be able to use except their fund to support 
any insurance operations. 
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vestors pay the SPV in advance, and the certificate entitles them to a future refund on the 
investment plus a pre-agreed expected mark-up. Another point of concern regarding Sukuk is 
there are many arguments that Sukuk are similar to conventional bonds, because of the matter 
of mark-up. However, the mark-up in case of Sukuk is expected and calculated based on the 
expected potential business or asset performance and it can be changed (Al-Amine and 
Al-Bashir, 2001). 
 
Therefore, any Sukuk issuer should be careful with their investors‘ expectations, and make 
sure of their understanding of the right nature of Sukuk and its expected returns. In addition, 
the Shari‘ah acceptability of the underlying assets acquired by the SPV should be taken in 
consideration, while the tradability and negotiability of issued certificates is determined 
based on the nature of the underlying assets (Al-Amine and Al-Bashir, 2001). It is critical for 
investors to know who owns the underlying or securitised assets in a particular Sukuk type, 
because risks can change depending on the contract type (El-Din and Ibrahim, 1991). 
 
The Accounting and Auditing Organisation of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
recognises the following four basic Sukuk structures: Ijarah, Head-lease and sub-lease, 
Wakalah and Istisna‘ (Usmani, 2007):  
 
- Ijarah Sukuk must have underlying tangible assets such as plant, machinery, and 
buildings or have usufruct rights pertaining to tangible assets, and involve a sale and 
lease back of tangible assets (or their usufruct rights). This is the most commonly 
used type of Sukuk, because it is widely accepted by Shari‘ah, and their documenta-
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tion is relatively easier than the other types. While the main concern for them is that 
the underlying assets should be identified, where 100% of the assets have to be tan-
gible and remain in the ownership of investors till maturity and available at time of 
sale (Wilson, 2004).  
 
- Head-lease and sub-lease Sukuk are similar to Ijarah Sukuk in that they must have 
underlying tangible assets. Though, instead of including a sale transaction, they in-
volve long and short term leases of tangible assets. This type of Sukuk is tradable in 
secondary markets, widely accepted by Shari‘ah standards and involve easy docu-
mentation of the contracts, because of the absence of any sale transactions. Similar to 
Ijarah Sukuk, tangible assets should be identified to enforce any operating rights and 
evaluate their Shari‘ah compliance. Also, the contract should cover at least a period 
of five years to be in line with Shari‘ah standards and avoid any short term price 
speculation (Wilson, 2008). 
 
- Wakalah Sukuk, for which the underlying asset should be managed by an investment 
manager called ―Al-wakeel‖ who manage the assets for a fee. The underlying asset 
can be tangible assets such as these under Ijarah Sukuk, investments compliant to 
Islamic law -excluding media, alcohol, porn, pork and gambling industries-, or Sukuk 
certificates. The main benefit of Wakalah Sukuk is they are easily executable if 
Shari‘ah compliant assets are available. Whereas, the main concerns are the identi-
fication of assets and substitution, and that assets need to have a value at or greater 
than the amount raised (El-Din and Ibrahim, 1991). 
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- Finally, Istisna‘ Sukuk either have revenue generating agreements as underlying as-
sets or they should be linked to a business activity. The issuer has certain rights and 
obligations and can use the income generated from the investment to service the pe-
riodic payments. This type of Sukuk has no tangible assets‘ requirements, assets can 
be long-term agreements, and issuers do not give up operating control of the business. 
However, the identification of assets and their suitability should be taken with great 
concern, and significant due diligence on business risks should be maintained (Wil-
son, 2004).  
 
Overall, there is a shortage of supply in Sukuk market, because investors to buy and hold the 
contract, rather than trading it in the market (Jobst et al. 2008). This has created serious 
liquidity issues in the market which I will discuss in section 2.5. In the next section, I criti-
cally discuss the previous empirical evidence regarding the performance of Shari‘ah com-
pliant equity and Sukuk in the financial markets.  
 
2.5 Performance of Shari’ah Complaint Investments 
The current debate about Islamic financial instruments (equity and fixed-income securities), 
identifies an interesting viewpoint on how they are performing relative to the conventional 
ones during bullish and bearish markets. Generally, Islamic markets outperform conven-
tional ones in terms of risk-adjusted returns during financial crises.  
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The empirical evidence regarding their risk levels is rather mixed. Back to the dot-com crisis 
and global financial crisis, evidence from the United states, the United Kingdom, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Hong Kong, Switzerland, India and France shows that the majority of Islamic 
indices are more rewarding than conventional ones (Mansor and Bhatti, 2011). Also, Ho et 
al. (2013) find that Dow Jones, MSCI, Russell, S&P, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Hong Kong 
and Swiss Shari‘ah compliant equity Indices are more resilient towards the 2008 financial 
crisis relative to conventional stock index (MSCI all World Index). Milly and Sultan (2012) 
report similar findings when comparing Islamic stocks listed globally with conventional 
stocks and socially responsible investment stocks during the same crisis. Even after the crisis, 
the analysis of the Dow Jones, FTSE, MSCI indices on the global level (World, US and 
Europe) reveals that Shari‘ah compliant equity outperforms their conventional ones but 
maintains higher levels of risks (Al-Rifai, 2012; Lean and Parsva, 2012; Arouri et al. 2013, 
Jawadi et al. 2014).  
 
Various studies further confirm that Islamic investments over-perform during bearish mar-
kets and underperform during bullish ones. This result was depicted by the performance of 
Malaysian Islamic mutual funds and unit trust funds (Abdullah et al. 2007), HSBC Islamic 
mutual funds from Saudi Arabia (Merdad et al. 2010), and Dow Jones and MSCI Islamic 
indices (Hassan and Girard, 2011) over the period from 1995 to 2001. Similarly, the relative 
risk performance of the Dow Jones Islamic index (DJIS) to the DJI Market World Index from 
1995 to 2005 was significantly lower than the market basket of stocks (AL-Zoubi and Ma-
ghyereh, 2007). Additionally, Hoepner et al. (2011) find that six Islamic finance centres in 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Malaysia perform better than international 
37 
equity market. In Indonesia, the risk performance of the Jakarta Islamic stock index 
(JAKISL) was better than that for Jakarta Composite index (JCI) (Sukmana and Kolid, 
2012). Aka (2009) find that the MSCI World Islamic index significantly outperform its 
conventional counterpart by over than 15% between 2004 and 2009.  
 
This possibly can be explained by the characteristics of permissible Islamic investment 
which are previously mentioned in section 2.4. First, according to Hasan and Dridi (2010) 
and Al-Rifai (2012), Shari‘ah principles and compliant screens protect Islamic banks and 
markets from financing and investing in the kind of instruments which are built on layers of 
debt and highly leveraged firms. Second, Islamic Investments have relatively avoided in-
dustries that were drastically affected by the trough and peeks of business cycles such as 
financial services, entertainment and media. They have been giving more investment weight 
to industries such as technology, oil and gas, and healthcare (Al-Rifai, 2012). This possibly 
leads to making their volatility levels lower in some markets as Aka (2009), and Sukmana 
and Kolid (2012) find Islamic investing is less prone to market swings, relative to conven-
tional investment. The volatility argument presented in these studies is debatable. It may hold 
true given the period during which the research was conducted (before the global financial 
crisis). However, the oil sector is currently heavily affected by high oil price volatility. This 




2.6 Diversification Benefits of Islamic Assets 
When it comes to risk reduction and diversification benefits for Islamic assets, again em-
pirical evidence is mixed. Arouri et al. (2013) perform a portfolio simulation in three major 
regions (the US, Europe and the World) using MSCI and FTSE Shari‘ah equity indices. The 
identified investment weights given to Islamic assets indicated that investors reoriented their 
investments to such new financial products, indicating an increase in Islamic fund investment 
of 67% for Europe, 23% for the US and 138% for the World. They conclude that the enlarged 
portfolios lead to less systematic risk and generate more significant diversification benefits. 
Similarly, Jawadi et al. (2014) find that Islamic investments are riskier for the US and the 
world but, they provide higher returns for the Euro area during the 2001 to 2011 period. 
Al-Khazali et al. (2013) posit that Islamic indices dominate only in the European market. 
This was driven by the increasing linkage between Europe and the areas where the devel-
opment of Islamic finance originated initially such as Qatar (Jawadi et al. 2014).  
 
On the other hand, an analysis of Malaysian unit trust funds finds that both conventional and 
Islamic funds were unable to achieve at least 50 percent market diversification levels. 
However, conventional funds are found to have a marginally better diversification level than 
the Islamic funds (Abdullah et al. 2007). Meanwhile, the risk-adjusted returns and beta for 
Kuala Lumpur Shariah Index (KLSI) are lower than Kuala Lumpur Composite index (KLCI) 
in the short-run (Mansour and Bhatti, 2011). Equally, Hakim and Rashidan (2002) find that 
the conventional Wilshire 5000 (W5000) index risk-return characteristics are better than the 
Dow Jones Islamic Market (DJIM) index.  In another study, Hayat and Kraussl (2011) 
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compare the performance of Shari‘ah compliant equity funds and conventional equity funds 
from the Malaysian market, Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Middle-East, and North America. 
They find that Shari‘ah compliant equity fund underperformed compared to Islamic as well 
as the conventional equity benchmarks, especially during the recent financial crisis. They 
claim that the lack of hedging strategies in Islamic markets hinders their competitiveness. 
Also, they suggested that Islamic index tracking funds may offer better diversification ben-
efits compared to Shari‘ah compliant equity funds.  
 
Moreover, Haasan and Girard (2011), Albaity and Mudor (2012), and Elfakhani and Kabir 
(2005) find similar reward to risk and diversification benefits between Islamic and conven-
tional investments. According to Jawadi et al. (2014) and Hassan and Girard (2011), the 
correlation between Islamic and conventional markets is positive more specifically after the 
global financial crisis. Similarly, Ajmi et al. (2014) assure that Shari‘ah compliant equity 
markets are not isolated from external shocks from different regions and that the Islamic 
finance system may not mitigate financial shocks affecting the conventional markets or 
provide large diversification benefits for portfolio managers.  
 
There are two possible reasons for this expected underperformance or similar performance 
by Islamic markets. First, there is a linkage between Islamic and conventional markets in 
Europe and Asia, where Islamic markets are larger in terms of size but still lack hedging 
strategies (Ajmi et al. 2014). Second, the net returns may be negative, due to the incurred cost 
for screening investments based on Shari‘ah standards Thus, the lack of diversification may 
outweigh the advantage of the low leverage level in Shari‘ah compliant equity.   
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Regarding Islamic fixed-income securities, Sukuk (Islamic bonds) are found to provide di-
versification benefits for investors. This is proved by Cakir and Raei (2007) by using a 
sample of sovereign Sukuk and Eurobonds. They find that sovereign Sukuk reduce portfolio 
risk (VaR) in comparison with conventional sovereign bonds. Nonetheless, other research 
findings offer a different view about Sukuk and find that there is no noticeable difference 
from conventional bonds in terms of risk and return (Miller et al. 2007; Wilson, 2008). Also, 
Sukuk market is still a shallow secondary market where the transaction costs - as measured 
by bid-ask spreads - are much higher than conventional bond markets, because of the serious 
liquidity issues for Sukuk. This is due to the fact that Sukuk holders hold the contract until its 
maturity, instead of trading it in the market (Central Bank of Malaysia and Securities 
Commission Malaysia, 2009). This makes investors more exposed to liquidity risk and 
transparency risk. They will be unable to manage their portfolios in an efficient and cost 
effective way (Derigs and Marzban, 2008), and the ambiguity in the legal structuring of 
Sukuk can be problematic to Sukuk holders and may lead to disputes (El Alaoui et al. 2015). 
In this regard, there is a research gap when it comes to the performance of Shari‘ah compliant 
investments. Most studies are comparative in nature. However, to my knowledge, there is no 
study which tried to utilise modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952) and theory of neglect 
effect by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), to find whether Shari‘ah compliant equity can im-
prove risk adjusted returns or not. Therefore, I hypothesise that: 
H1: Shari’ah compliant equity ETFs improve the risk-adjusted returns of a portfolio com-
prising conventional emerging markets ETFs 
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H2: Shari’ah compliant equity ETFs can outweigh emerging markets fixed-income securities 
in the asset allocation, during periods of volatile interest rates. 
 
2.7 Islamic Banks versus Conventional Banks 
There is extensive empirical evidence regarding the difference in performance of Islamic 
banks and conventional banks. The literature under this point has two strands; one strand 
focuses on the difference in performance of Islamic and conventional banks in terms of their 
bank-specific characteristics and their effect on economic development and financial inno-
vation. The second strand addresses the impact of economic stress and financial instability on 
Islamic banks. In general, the literature review about the performance of Islamic Banks in 
relation to conventional banks differs considerably across countries. This is due to the sig-
nificant variation in the application of Shari‘ah standards by Islamic banks across countries. 
Some Islamic banks follow the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), others follow The 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), and the 
rest follow the central bank for the country where they operate.  
 
For the first strand of literature, the effect of Islamic banks within and across countries has 
been dependent on bank-specific characteristics, cultural differences and regulatory limita-
tions. Gheeraert and Weill (2015) find Islamic banking in general improves macroeconomic 
efficiency in 70 countries. Beck et al. (2013) contrast between Islamic banks and conven-
tional banks in terms of business orientation, efficiency and stability in 141 countries over 
the period of 1995 to 2007. They find that: i) the business model of Islamic banks is similar to 
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that of conventional banks, ii) the quality of Islamic banks‘ assets is higher because they 
invest in real economic activities, and iii) their market capitalisation is bigger. This makes 
them better off during financial crises and iv) Islamic banks are closer to insolvency than 
conventional banks. Neither study however, looked further into the variation cross-country, 
cross-Islamic banks‘ characteristics nor their effect on financial and economic development.  
 
Empirical evidence about the efficiency of Islamic banks relative to conventional banks 
across countries is not conclusive. Abedifar et al. (2016) expand upon the earlier mentioned 
studies and compare the efficiency of Islamic banks and conventional banks in 22 Muslim 
majority countries based on their size (small, medium and large) over the period of 1999 to 
2011. They study whether or not the coexistence of Islamic and conventional banks improves 
country‘s financial development in terms of economic growth, income inequality and re-
ducing poverty. They find that there is a little relationship between the presence of Islamic 
banks of any size and economic growth. They also find a positive relationship between the 
market share of medium size Islamic banks and the mobility of funds, reduction in poverty, 
and credit allocation, whereas only large Islamic banks improve the efficiency of conven-
tional banks.  
 
The possible explanation for these findings is that small Islamic banks may not survive in 
environments of fierce banking competition (Katib and Kent, 2000; Weill 2011). Also, when 
an Islamic bank has not reached a sizeable market share, its effect is negligible. When me-
dium size Islamic banks have bigger market share, their positive effect on the banking sys-
tem‘s development happens through their transition. They expand their market share in the 
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economy, improve their redistribution of profits from PLS projects to depositors and ease 
credit standards for borrowers and entrepreneurs. Also, Islamic banks cannot develop fi-
nancial services unless they reach sizeable market share, or cooperate with other Islamic 
banks in a Shari‘ah compliant sector. This financial innovation and development can em-
power Islamic banks competitiveness. However, when the market share of Islamic banks gets 
larger, large Islamic banks may become in an unfavorable position due to the competitive 
pressure from large Conventional banks.  
 
Moreover, Wanke et al. (2016) compare between domestic and foreign Islamic and conven-
tional banks‘ efficiency and financial distress in Malaysia. Malaysian domestic Islamic 
banks are found to be less efficient than domestic conventional banks, since they had sig-
nificantly greater loss provision and expenses in relation to their assets, net profits, and eq-
uity. The higher expenses result from i) the enforcement of Shari‘ah complaint screening by 
Islamic banks on financial products and services, and ii) the low leverage in the operations of 
domestic Islamic banks. Also, foreign banks - either Islamic banks or conventional banks - 
are less efficient than domestic banks, because of the existence of extreme cultural and reg-
ulatory limitations against them, which limit their efficiency. As I mentioned earlier, the 
inefficiency of foreign Islamic banks in Malaysia is due to the significant variation in the 
Islamic jurisdiction across countries and different social traditions. This greatly affects the 
Islamic guidelines in relation to the leverage and profit and loss ratios, which Islamic banks 
should enforce in their financial services and operations. In addition, the weak performance 
of IBs in some countries such as Qatar, Turkey, and the UAE is associated with ―sector 
concentration‖; where they focus on investing in certain sectors such as the real estate and 
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construction sectors (Abedifar et al. 2016). This implies that Islamic banks are more exposed 
to systematic components of risk. Also, Islamic banks‘ inefficiency is associated with ―name 
concentration‖; as having either a small portfolio or an exposure to specific individuals, like 
what happened with Global Finance House in Dubai and their relatively large provisions for 
real estate projects. This happens as a result of the economic structure in Middle Eastern 
countries, where there is significant state intervention in banking operations distress (Mizaei 
et al. 2013).  
 
For the second strand of literature, previous research focuses on the effect of economic stress, 
financial instability and market risk on Islamic banks. Overall, Islamic banks are found to be 
negatively affected by the economic state and financial instability of financial systems. 
Sorwar et al. (2016) adopt a top-down approach to investigate the effect of market‘s systemic 
risk on portfolios of Islamic and conventional banks, by considering the capital structure of 
both types. They use Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) measures to measure 
market‘s systemic risk. Their analysis covers 20 countries, and they find that the market has 
an equal effect on Islamic and conventional banks. They also find that during the financial 
crisis, Islamic banks are less risky than conventional banks. This is due to the different cap-
ital structure of Islamic banks compared to their conventional peers, and the lower depend-
ence on leverage by the former. This implies that traditional capital structure models may be 
―unfair‖ to Islamic banks, because they include many proxies for debt financing and might 
magnify the leverage levels in Islamic banks. 
 
Further, Cihak and Hesse (2010) analyse the financial stability of conventional banks and 
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Islamic banks in terms of their probability of failure in 18 countries. They find that small 
Islamic banks are financially stronger than small conventional banks, while large conven-
tional banks are financially stronger than large Islamic banks. This is due to the better the-
oretical capacity of Islamic banks for handling economic stress according to Khan (1991) and 
Beck et al. (2013). However, a recent study by Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) disagree with this 
proposition. They suggest that financial distress has an equal impact on both conventional 
and Islamic banks and there is no significant difference in their financial stability.  
 
It is important to understand the role of Islamic banks‘ specific risks and the spillover effects 
of their financial distress on the systemic risk. In fact, numerous studies on financial liber-
alisation have pointed out the relevance of bank competition to financial stability (Blackburn 
and Forgues-Puccio, 2010; Manlagñit, 2011). Djennas (2016) assesses the efficiency of 
Islamic finance in an entire banking system in eight Islamic countries and six newly indus-
trialised countries. He finds that some of the countries, which apply Islamic finance princi-
ples, may be unable to access financing sources. Beck et al. (2013) and Olson and Zoubi 
(2008) find that Islamic banks‘ preclusion of leverage hinders them from achieving similar 
profitability levels compared to conventional banks. Islamic banks have to be either involved 
in risky projects with high return or fail to compete in the market.  
 
This again draws my attention to the viability of the Islamic banking sector and its func-
tionality in the conventional financial system. That is said, I hypothesise that:  
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H1: Islamic banks’ financial distress affects other financial institutions and has spillover 
effect in financial systems 
H2: Islamic banks are relevant to the financial system and contribute to its systemic risk. 
H3: There is a time-variability in the effect of Islamic banks on the system due to the varia-
tion in their business performance and bank-level characteristics. 
  
2.8 Research Philosophy 
In finance, a theory is a well-proved assumption about the economy or financial markets. 
Theories are usually based on confirmed evidence or facts produced by experiments and/or 
analysis data. Theory must be based on proof and validation, and should allow people to 
validate it. The process of validating a theory by doing research differs considerably based on 
the way the researcher tries to find answers for a given research question.  
 
There are three main research philosophies a researcher can follow. First, positivism directs 
the researcher to derive information in a logical and measurable way, rather than by deducing 
subjectively through impression, perception or reflection (Remenyi, 1998). Reality or the 
subject under consideration in positivism is regarded in an objective and singular way. The 
researcher does not affect the research subject, and the research subject does not affect the 
researcher (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991). According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), when a 
researcher follow a positivistic approach, he/she seeks to explain and predict what happens in 
the social world by searching for regularities and causal relationships between its compo-
nents. The end result of the positivistic research can be generalised to similar social realities, 
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if another researcher use similar quantifiable observations and same statistical analysis 
(Remenyi, 1998). Positivism is better dealt with through quantitative methods. Second, the 
philosophy of critical realism shares a lot of common foundations/principles with positivism. 
The researcher believes that reality exists and independent to any perceptions or impressions. 
Realism also assumes that the universe is composed of empirical independent entities re-
gardless of the observer‘s appreciation of them (Goles and Hirschheim, 2000).  
 
Third, interpretivism argues that reality is not known and the researcher should investigate 
the details of the situation in order to understand what reality is. Under this philosophy, 
reality or a particular situation can be interpreted differently by people. Interpretation is 
dependent on their perceptions and reflections, because situations are complex and unique to 
a particular set of circumstances and individuals. Therefore, the research which follows 
interpretivism tries to understand motives, actions and intentions of other people to derive a 
social construct (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Interpretivism is better dealt with through 
qualitative methods. 
 
In this research, I test concepts such as diversification, by utilising Shari‘ah compliant equity 
ETFs in an emerging market portfolio. This is driven by Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) 
proposed by Markowtz (1952), which argues that the larger the number of assets used in the 
allocation of wealth the better the return and risk of the investment portfolio. I also examine 
an econometric concept called ―financial distress‖ -measures as marginal Conditional Value 
at Risk ΔCoVaR)- proposed by Adrian and Brunnermier (2011), which assumes that an 
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institution can become financially distressed and have spillover effects on other institutions 
when it exceeds its standard level of Value at Risk (VaR). These concepts are positivist in the 
sense that, I will use quantitative analysis to validate these concepts. Additionally, I collect 
financial data such as daily returns, total assets, total debts and total equity and macroeco-
nomic data such as interbank rates, treasury-bill rates, budget surplus/deficit and foreign 
currency reserve. I collect such data from financial statements and financial databases. 
Therefore, the epistemological assumption I will follow in this research is positivism. This 
choice is guided by my research questions, data availability, and hypotheses to be tested to 
answer the research questions.  
 
Given the nature of my research, I will follow the deductivist approach by Popper (2005). 
Deductive research is most appropriate for this thesis, because it allows me to solve the re-
search problem by reviewing the literature and deducing hypotheses which are tested through 
estimation models. The estimation models are analysed using econometric measurements to 
derive the research findings. Then I will be able to confirm whether the research findings 
confirm or reject the research hypotheses (Bryman and Bell, 2015; Saunders et al. 2009). The 
advantage of this approach is, it ensures objectivity and reliability by using quantitative 
methods (Kuhn, 1962). Also, quantitative researcher is considered external to the research 
subject and his/her results can be replicated regardless of who conducts the research (We-
erd-Nederhof, 2001).  
2.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I demonstrated the theories which related between religion and economics 
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and the empirical evidence which supported or falsified these theories. I provided an ex-
planation for the key characteristics of the Islamic economic framework, the performance of 
Shari‘ah compliant investments relative to conventional investments and the key differences 
between Islamic banks and conventional banks. Chapter 3 contribution to the previous lit-
erature is twofold. First, I will estimate and evaluate the riskiness of a portfolio which has a 
mixture of three asset classes: conventional equity, conventional fixed income, and Islamic 
equity. Previous studies only compared conventional equity to Islamic equity or bonds to 
Islamic Sukuk. Standard finance theory suggests that the inherited risk in fixed-income se-
curities is usually less than any form of equity. Nonetheless, Islamic scholars claim that the 
relative absence of interest rates in financing businesses makes Islamic assets less risky and 
more resilient in market downturns. I will address this argument by testing whether or not 
Islamic equity can out-perform EM fixed-income securities. Second, my chapter contributes 
to the wider literature in asset allocation and portfolio optimisation by investigating Islamic 
assets‘ performance using dynamic asset allocation strategies.  
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature about the Islamic banks‘ financial instability in two 
ways. First, I will examine the effect of Islamic banks‘ financial distress on other financial 
institutions, by jointly considering their own specific characteristics, macroeconomic varia-
bles and market structure. Second, given the lack of research in identifying the role of Islamic 
banks in decreasing/increasing financial stability, I will examine the systemic risk relevance 
of Islamic banks on the financial system in terms of realised systemic risk. I will investigate 
further if there is a time-variability in Islamic banks‘ effect on the system, due to their own 




Chapter 3: Diversification Benefits of Islamic ETFs in Emerging Markets 
 
3.1 Introduction   
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis 2008-09, there has been an increased academic 
interest in the performance of Islamic financial assets and their use as a hedging instrument 
during financial downturns. Prior literature shows mixed evidence about whether or not the 
characteristics
4
 of Islamic assets can potentially lead to a risk reduction when incorporated 
within a portfolio of conventional assets (e.g. Cakir and Raei 2007; Arouri et al. 2013;  
Jawadi et al. 2014). Also, existing empirical studies focus on Islamic assets‘ diversification 
benefits in developed markets (Europe, US and the world) (e.g. Ajmi et al. 2014; Saiti et al. 
2014). This research contributes to the literature by empirically testing the diversification 
effect from adding Shari‘ah compliant equity to a portfolio which contains a broad range of 
emerging market assets for the period 2009 to 2015. This has not been investigated so far. 
Two important questions should be answered to explain the rationale behind this research. 
First, why would one focus on emerging markets? In recent years, emerging markets have 
been suffering from a significant economic turbulence. This is due to crises coming from 
advanced economies such as quantitative easing, the European debt crisis and the large 
withdrawals of foreign capital which have a considerable effect on emerging markets‘ sta-
bility (Kose et al. 2006; Moshirian, 2008). The issue I posit here is showcasing the diversi-
                                                          
4
 Some of the most important characteristics of Islamic assets are (i) the sharing of risk and profit by all con-
tractual parties, (ii) the avoidance of any excessive uncertainty as all contract terms should be known to all 
parties involved in the agreement, and, (iii) the whole transaction is not interest-based. 
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fication benefits of Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs. The reason driving the association 
between Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs and emerging markets is, Shari‘ah compliant equity 
can be a good option to consider in the asset allocation, because preliminary analysis show 
that they are weakly correlated with emerging markets‘ ETFs. As Wang and Nguyen (2013) 
suggest, it is important to select diversified portfolios during financial crises and periods of 
high volatility as contagion risk tends to be strongly prevalent.  
 
Second, why, would one care about the role of Shari‘ah compliant equity in enhancing the 
risk-return profile of an emerging market portfolio? Emerging markets have been posting 
increased correlations/co-movements in their returns (Balakrishnan et al. 2011) for some 
decades now courtesy of globalization (Stulz, 2005). Hence investing in Islamic (and ethical 
investments in general) may help reduce this correlation.  
 
It is important to note that the selected Islamic ETFs are Islamic in practice, not origin, so 
basically they invest in selected portfolios of shares that adhere to certain rules ―Shari‘ah 
percepts‖. The selected ETFs are not related to majority Muslim countries- which are mostly 
emerging markets- but track Islamic indices. The indices comprise businesses which comply 
with Shari‘ah. The ETFs included mimic the allocation of MSCI emerging markets Islamic 
index, MSCI US Islamic index and MSCI world Islamic index. The constituents for the 
emerging market index and the equity‘s origin are not focused on one region like MENA, 
Latin or Asia pacific.  
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Thus, this portfolio exercise is a mix of styles (emerging markets and Shari‘ah compliant 
equity investments) brought together to investigate the diversification benefits of Shari‘ah 
compliant equity. 
 
This study is of interest to institutional investors who combine two styles ―emerging mar-
kets‖ and ―Islamic funds‖ in a single portfolio, to minimise its risk in the long-run. According 
to various theoretical propositions, Islamic assets‘ features can potentially lead to a risk 
reduction when incorporated within conventional assets‘ portfolios (Al-Rifai, 2012). How-
ever, at the empirical level the evidence is rather mixed. Many studies report Islamic assets 
exhibit increased resilience during market downturns (Arouri et al. 2013; Jawadi et al. 2014). 
Other studies such as Hayat and Krauessl (2011) find contradictory findings, where Islamic 
assets do not seem to have any diversification benefits.  
 
This research has two main contributions to the literature. Firstly, the portfolio under ex-
amination will have a mixture of three asset classes: conventional equity, conventional fixed 
income, and Shari‘ah compliant equity. Previous research only compared conventional eq-
uity to Shari‘ah compliant equity (Jawadi et al. 2014), or bonds to Sukuk (Islamic Bonds) 
(Cakir and Raei, 2007). I am aware that technically fixed-income securities are safer in-
vestments than any equity. However, Islamic scholars claim that the relative absence of 
interest rates in financing businesses makes them less risky and more resilient in market 
downturns. So, it will be interesting to decide whether or not Islamic equity can over-perform 
emerging markets fixed-income securities.  
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Secondly, I will investigate the earlier mentioned question, by using the symmetric dynamic 
mean-variance and the asymmetric dynamic mean-variance strategies. The first strategy 
incorporates the time-variability in correlations based on the symmetric Dynamic Condi-
tional Correlation (DCC) model as explained in Engle and Colacito (2006). The second 
strategy incorporates the asymmetry in correlations based on the Asymmetric Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation (A-DCC) model by Sheppard (2002). Both dynamic strategies will 
be compared to the static mean-variance strategy by Markowitz (1952). Portfolio perfor-
mance evaluation will be conducted for both strategies, to find which strategy results in better 
portfolio performance.  
 
The results suggest that Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs lead to a better portfolio perfor-
mance and risk-adjusted returns across all samples. This indicates that Shari‘ah compliant 
equity ETFs lead to a risk reduction. The modified-Sharpe ratio for all portfolios consisting 
of Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs is higher than those for portfolios without them. The 
results are in line with those of Arouri et al. (2013) who show that investors across different 
regions reorient their asset allocation to include more Islamic assets in their portfolios. Also, 
Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs receive more weight than conventional EM fixed income 
ETFs in the estimated optimal portfolio after the out-of-sample period. This again confirms 
that Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs have a positive effect on the portfolio‘s diversification. 
This can possibly be attributed to the i) the lower risk of Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs 
during this period; as well as, ii) the increased volatility of the fixed-income markets driven 
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by excessive speculation on the possible increase of the FED‘s rate in the early 2013. The 
findings suggest that institutional investors would find Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs less 
sensitive to the turbulence in financial markets; hence, they are important in stabilizing an 
emerging market portfolio.  
 
Furthermore, dynamic strategies generate higher returns when portfolios are monthly re-
balanced in the in-sample period. This is attributed to the market recovery with high market 
volatility during the end of the US financial crisis in the first half of 2009, and the escalation 
of the European debt crisis in 2011.
5
 It further confirms prior studies suggesting that time 
varying variances and time varying correlations between assets are higher and more favoured 
during turmoil period than tranquil periods (Longin and Solnik 2001). Therefore, the ap-
proach in rebalancing the asset portfolio each period is the most appropriate so as to adjust 
the asset allocation to the new information reflected on the time-varying covariance matrix.  
In the next section, I will demonstrate the theoretical background and the findings of the 
relevant literature about emerging markets characteristics, the performance of Shari‘ah 
compliant equity ETFs, and the performance of dynamic versus static portfolio management 
strategies.  
                                                          
5
 This finding corroborates with Alexeev and Dungey‘s (2015) study on conditional correlation 
during bear and bull markets who report a steady rise in average conditional correlation during the 
first half of 2009 and the Greece debt crisis in 2010 and 2011. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
Emerging markets have received considerable attention in theory and practice. However, 
discussing their nature and contemporary challenges is essential for supporting the intuition 
of this study. Emerging markets can be defined as the markets with fast economic growth, 
and continuous development in their regulatory bodies and market exchanges. They have two 
prevailing characteristics in the pertinent literature. First, emerging markets‘ swings are 
dramatic, where their highs are pleasurable and lucrative, their lows are painful and slip your 
money away. De Santis and Imrohoroglu (1997) show emerging markets‘ volatility is con-
siderably higher than developed markets, both at the conditional and the unconditional lev-
els. Hanna et al. (2001) find the Istanbul stock exchange in particular exhibits more than 
twice the volatility of a developed market such as the German stock market. These high 
volatility levels make emerging markets not attractive to investors with high risk-aversion, 
and make them less willing to invest in them (Stevenson, 2001). Therefore, it is important to 
investigate here if a hybrid style of emergind markets and Islamic funds would benefit In-
stitutional investors and reduce portfolio‘s risk level.  
 
Second, emerging markets cannot hide from regional or global financial turbulence due to 
financial integration. In this regard, Park and Mercado (2014) study the causes of financial 
stress in emerging markets. They find shocks from developed and other emerging countries 
cause the same impact or more on the domestic financial stress as a regional shock. However, 
most emerging Asian markets are more vulnerable to regional shocks than shocks from de-
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veloped and other emerging markets. For example, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 left 
many financial institutions insolvent in Far East Asia, after they used to borrow from abroad 
to finance real estate and equity investment. What makes the story worse; the Thai gov-
ernment for example decided to not support or bail out such institutions. They also failed to 
stop speculative attacks on the Thai Baht which resulted in a fall in its value by 20%. Similar 
markets were not safe from these attacks. In 1998, the Russian Ruble collapsed and the 
government imposed restrictions on capital flows into and out of the country and rescheduled 
domestic debt. This led to the loss of a 100 billion US Long Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) hedge fund. In 1999, the same happened in Brazil, but this time the collapse in the 
currency and the rapid capital outflow were due to the reckless political and economic de-
cisions regarding debt payments and real interest rate. 
 
More recently, the empirical evidence realise the aftermath of the recent financial crisis 
2008-09, and the negative effects it left on emerging markets (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2010; 
Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Dovern and Van Roye, 2013). Reasons include the dramatic fall of 
international trade, excessive dependence on foreign financing, currency devaluation, 
freezing credit markets and the Fed‘s asset repurchase programmes. This led to an increased 




3.2.1 Islamic Assets, Emerging Markets and Financial Crises 
In the previous section, I showed how emerging markets‘ assets are sensitive to changing 
global economic and financial conditions due to financial integration. In this section, I will 
discuss how Islamic assets‘ performed during market downturns. In particular, I will focus on 
the relevant literature about whether or not other asset classes such as Islamic assets may 
provide diversification advantage for emerging markets‘ investors. Various theoretical 
propositions state that Islamic assets‘ characteristics can potentially lead to a risk reduction 
and can be used as a hedging instrument during financial downturns when incorporated 
within a portfolio of conventional assets (Cakir and Raei, 2007; Arouri et al. 2013; Jawadi et 
al. 2014). At the empirical level, evidence is rather mixed. In emerging markets, empirical 
evidence provides findings about the performance of individual Islamic assets or markets, 
but Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs‘ diversification benefit in emerging markets‘ portfolios 
is not sufficiently addressed. Dharani and Natarajan (2011) find no difference between the 
performance of the Nifty Shariah index and the Nifty index in India. Ho et al. (2013) compare 
the effect of the dotcom and global financial crises on Islamic and conventional indices from 
developed markets (US, UK, France, Switzerland, Hong Kong) and emerging markets (In-
dia, Malaysia and Indonesia). Their results show that Islamic indices are less drastically 
affected by the crises than conventional indices. In addition, Hoepner et al. (2011) find GCC 
and Malaysia Islamic financial centres outperformed international equity markets.
6
 
                                                          
6
 Islamic finance products can possibly offer diversification benefits because much of Islamic finance is un-
dertaken in frontier markets which include markets of rather limited integration with the rest of the worlds. 
However, not all Islamic finance products are launched or traded in frontier markets. 
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On the global level, Arouri et al. (2013) use portfolio simulation in three major regions (US, 
Europe and the World), represented by MSCI and FTSE equity indices from 2006 to 2008. 
They find investors‘ appetite to invest in Islamic assets increased after the global financial 
crisis. In particular, optimal investment proportions in Islamic assets increased by 67 percent 
for Europe, 23 percent for the US and 138 percent for the World. As the authors propose, 
these new portfolios reduce the exposure to systematic risk while generating more eco-
nomically significant diversification benefits. This can be explained by the limited correla-
tion between Islamic financial assets as mentioned earlier. In terms of returns, Dow Jones 
Islamic indices appear to outperform conventional ones especially during the period of the 
financial crisis across the Euro region. They argue that this is driven by the increasing linkage 
between Europe and areas where the development of Islamic finance initially originated in 




In a similar manner, Cakir and Raei (2007) report an increased diversification advantage for 
investors using Islamic bonds (Sukuk) by showing that the inclusion of these bonds in a 
portfolio of conventional fixed income securities (Eurobonds) reduces significantly the 
Value at Risk (VaR) of the portfolio. Three common reasons in the literature justify this 
relative outperformance of Islamic assets. These include their lower volatility, and system-
atic risk component, which make them less prone to market swings (Aka, 2009; Sukmana 
and Kolid, 2012). Furthermore, the principle of profit-and-loss sharing of Islamic finance 
                                                          
7
 This was in line with previous studies such as that of Al-Khazali et al. (2013) who argue that Islamic indices 
dominate only in the European market. 
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(Al-Zoubi and Maghyereh, 2007), and investing in productive industries with real economic 
value-added, such as technology, oil and gas, and the healthcare (Al-Rifai, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, various studies find Islamic investments either underperform during 
bearish market conditions or have similar reward-to-risk and diversification benefits relative 
to their conventional peers (Elfakhani et al. 2005; Hassan and Girard, 2011; Hayat and 
Krauessl, 2011; Albaity and Mudor, 2012). Two possible explanations for such results are 
provided by Bauer et al. (2006) and Hayat and Krauessl (2011). These are (i) the lack of 
diversification potential given that ethical portfolios should be viewed as a subset of the 
market portfolio, and (ii) the possible negative impact on the portfolio performance due to the 
extra costs incurred by selecting and monitoring stocks according to ethical screening. Also, 
the positive correlation between Islamic and conventional markets led to similar performance 
especially after the global financial crisis (Hassan and Girard, 2011; Jawadi et al. 2014). In 
this regard, Ajmi et al. (2014, p.225) claim that the Islamic equity market should not be 
perceived as being isolated from external shocks across different types, regions and sources 
given that the Islamic financial system probably cannot mitigate financial shocks affecting 
conventional markets globally.  
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In general, Islamic assets have different performance independently or within portfolios 
across different markets and time periods. However, it is interesting to find whether or not 
they will have any potential benefits when they are added to an emerging markets‘ portfolio. 
Therefore, I hypothesise that:  
H1: Shari’ah compliant equity ETFs improve the risk-adjusted returns of a portfolio com-
prising conventional emerging markets ETFs 
 
In addition, there is a research gap here, since no research to my knowledge investigated 
whether Shari‘ah compliant equity can be a better option relative to conventional 
fixed-income securities. Thus, the second hypothesis I test in this research is: 
H2: Shari’ah compliant equity ETFs can outweigh emerging markets fixed-income securities 




3.2.2 Portfolio Management 
Hicks (1935) propose the theory of investment which states if investing only a proportion of 
total assets in risky enterprises, and investing the remainder in ways which are considered 
more safe, it will be possible for the individual to adjust his whole risk situation to that which 
he most prefers, more closely than he could do by investing in any single enterprise. Hicks 
(1935) was a frontrunner of Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1952) in seeking to explain the 
demand for money as a consequence of the investor‘s desire for low risk as well as high 
return. But he did not designate standard deviation or any other specific measure of disper-
sion as representing risk for the analysis. Also, he did not distinguish between efficient and 
inefficient portfolios, did not show any drawing of an efficient frontier and did not know 
about any theorem to the effect that all efficient portfolios that include cash have the same 
proportions among risky assets. 
 
In the classical Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) by Markowitz (1952), the investor is as-
sumed to reduce risk through portfolio diversification, subject to a required rate of return. It 
established that there is a risk reduction benefit through portfolio diversification with little or 
no negative impact on return. In relation to deciding how much wealth should be invested in 
monetary assets, Tobin (1958) provide an improved theory of holding of cash ―monetary 
assets‖ marketable fixed in money value, free of default risk. His theory assumed that in-
vestors seek mean-variance efficient combination of monetary assets using the expected 
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return and standard deviation as criteria. He also assumes that that the risk for monetary 
assets is market risk not default risk. Similarly, Hicks (1962) assumes that all correlations are 
zero and present the general formula for portfolio variance written in terms of correlations, 
rather than covariance matrix. Hicks (1962) also derive from the Tobin conclusion that 
among portfolios that include cash, there is a linear relationship between portfolios mean and 
standard deviation and that the propositions among risky assets remain constant along this 
linear portion of the efficient frontier. In the next section, I will demonstrate the different 
portfolio management strategies based on the aforementioned theories.  
 
3.2.3 The Naive (Mean-Variance) Strategy 
Mean-variance strategy addresses an investor who estimates the expected returns and the 
covariance matrix using sample mean and variance over the estimation period and holds 
these parameter estimates constant over the allocation period. Interestingly, many studies 
show that simple strategies such as 1/N rule
8
 and mean-variance can result in better portfolio 
performance. The first study about the 1/N rule is considered Brown (1976). There have been 
many arguments that this strategy can outperform more sophisticated ones due to estimation 
errors. Jobson and Korkie (1980) say that such naive rule can outperform the Markowitz rule. 
Similar results are found by Duchin and Levy (2009).  
DeMiguel et al. (2009) compare 1/N rule by many sophisticated extensions of the Markowitz 
rule, and argue that none of the strategies in the literature outperforms the naive strategy in 
                                                          
8 The 1/N strategy is a simple rule used by Markowitz (1952), which allocates portfolio weight equally across 
all N funds under consideration. 
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terms of out-of-sample Sharpe ratio. In this regard, DeMiguel et al. (2009) and Tu and Zhou 
(2011) claim to develop portfolio strategies achieving consistently higher Sharpe ratios than 
1/N, but Tu and Zhou (2011) results are without statistical implications. Also, Behr et al. 
(2013) and Fletcher (2009) examine a broad range of minimum-variance portfolios against 
the findings by DeMiguel et al. (2009) and find that there is no established portfolio strategy 
which outperforms 1/N rule significantly.  
I should note that Behr et al. (2013)
9
 develop a minimum-variance portfolio strategy with 
flexible weight constraints, and compare its performance to 1/N rule. They find that their 
strategy outperforms 1/N rule with consistently increased Sharpe ratio, and low turnover.  
 
However, in light of emerging markets‘ increased volatility, asymmetric returns and 
time-varying correlations (Claessens et al. 1995; Bekaert et al. 1998; Stevenson, 2001), there 
is a growing consensus recognising the drawbacks of mean-variance strategy. It is a static 
diversification strategy which may lead to considerable underperformance.  
  
                                                          
9




3.2.4 Dynamic Strategies 
This has encouraged the development of new portfolio strategies, which does not necessarily 
provide good out-of sample performance, but there have been trials by many researchers to 
offer better results.  
Emerging markets suffer from financial contagion which is addressed by previous studies 
like Calvo and Reinhart, (1996), Dornbusch et al. (2000), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, 
2000) and Moser (2003). Contagion can be defined as the co-movement between financial 
asset prices and capital flows when economies share similar fundamentals, and are strongly 
interdependent in terms of international trade and financing. Such similarity triggers com-
parable response when a shock happens among markets. As a result, the variation in corre-
lations has been widely found to be positive and stronger in the variance of asset returns, 
which may lead to undesirable portfolio losses.
10
 Engle and Colacito (2006) argue that 
correlation accuracy increases the efficiency of mean-variance portfolios, and it is costly to 
assume constant correlation during volatile correlation phases.  
 
In my knowledge, empirical research has largely focused on estimating conditional correla-
tions in different markets, but less attention has been given to the shocks persistence in 
emerging markets. Longin and Solnik (2001) find that in bear markets, correlations tend to 
increase. Ang and Bekaert (2002) find high correlations are linked to higher volatility in the 
                                                          
10
 Emerging markets have been through an evolutionary trajectory over the years that have allowed them to 
integrate deeply within the international financial architecture. This justifies the high correlations between them 
and global markets. 
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US, UK and Germany, which coincide with a bear market and refute the benefits of inter-
national diversification. Lastly, Cappiello et al. (2006) find support for asymmetry in the 
correlations of international equity and bond returns. Accordingly, the Dynamic Conditional 
Correlation (DCC) Model and Asymmetric Dynamic Conditional Correlation (A-DCC) 
model have been proposed. These models consider time-varying information in the returns of 
individual assets unlike the univariate models which use information already synthesised in 
the portfolio returns (Engle, 2002). Mean-variance strategy assumes constant correlations 
between assets overtime, while DCC assumes that correlations between assets change over 
time. 
 
In this research, I use a dynamic strategy -DCC in particular-, because Engle and Sheppard 
(2001) find that DCC model outperforms the industry standard Risk Metrics exponential 
smoother, because they provide better predictability in terms of residual normality and lower 
portfolio standard deviations. Engle and Colacito (2006, p. 293) state that it is significantly 
important to estimate the time-varying variance covariance matrix, especially when the as-
sets are highly correlated. Though, using dynamic correlations leads to increasing the re-
quired return for portfolios, because they result in more accurate information, unlike vola-
tility timing strategies  
 
In an investigation of the effect of returns‘ non-normality on portfolio optimisation from the 
perspective of an unhedged US investor, Jondeau and Rockinger (2012), compare three 
strategies: dynamic higher moments, dynamic mean-variance and the naive mean-variance 
using weekly data of major stock market indices from the Unites States (US), the (UK), 
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Germany, Japan, and France. They find that dynamic mean-variance strategy performed 
better than the naive mean-variance. In addition, Kalotychou et al. (2014) examine the 
profitability of using a dynamic asset allocation strategy by predicting time-varying corre-
lation between domestic sector portfolio in three markets (US, UK, and Japan), over three 
periods (1996:2012, pre-crisis 2005:2007, during crisis 2007:2009, post-crisis 2009:2012). 
Their research motivation is driven by the fact that the simple sector correlations over the 
same period were significantly positive. The analysis follows active asset allocation strategy 
by the recursive construction of optimal mean-variance portfolio in the three markets based 
on incremental utility and risk-adjusted returns.  
 
In order to estimate the covariance matrix used in the portfolio optimisation, they estimate 
the conditional correlation afterwards using the DCC model, and A-DCC model. The DCC 
model turns out to be the most parsimonious model. In comparison with static mean-variance 
strategies, they find dynamic asset allocation strategies deliver more performance gains in all 
markets because of the increased Sharpe ratio. Dynamic correlation models also forecast 
covariance matrix more accurately, since their efficient frontiers lie above that for the static 
strategy.  
 
Furthermore, the researchers evaluate both strategies based on the annualised performance 
fees. It was revealed that investors are willing to pay higher performance fees in all three 
markets to switch from the static to the dynamic strategy and capture the asymmetric effects 
in correlations and structural breaks. It is important to note that lower rebalancing frequency 
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is essential if daily traders engage in dynamic correlation strategies, because higher turnover 
can be very costly. However, Jondeau and Rockinger (2012) and Kalotychou et al. (2014) 
focus solely on developed markets. This implies that their results may not be generalised on 
other markets like emerging markets as in my research.  
 
In this study, I will use the Dynamic mean-variance framework with dynamic conditional 
correlations by Engle (2002) and Engle Colacito (2006). My contribution to the literature is 
examining whether or not conditional correlation in dynamic mean-variance optimisation is 
beneficial for emerging markets investors.  
Accordingly, I hypothesise that:  
H3: Dynamic allocation strategy outperforms static allocation strategy in emerging markets 
during crises periods. 
Considering asset allocation with Islamic assets, recent studies have been advanced from 
simple mean-variance strategy (Arouri et al. 2013) to using more sophisticated models such 
as the DCC model. For example, Saiti et al. (2014) study the diversification benefits of Is-
lamic assets for a US based investor by considering international market integration and the 
time variability in correlations. They use MSCI conventional and Islamic stock indices from: 
(Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, GCC region ex-Saudi Arabia) and Far East (Japan, China, 
Korea, and Hong Kong, Taiwan) countries. Then, they compare them with the MSCI con-
ventional index of US. They estimated the conditional volatilities using the GJR-GARCH 
model to estimate the time-varying correlation matrix. In general, the researchers find the 
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correlations between conventional US MSCI index and other conventional markets are more 
or less similar to those of the Islamic markets. More specifically, there is a high correlation 
between US conventional MSCI index and Turkey, China and Hong Kong Islamic MSCI 
indices, there is relatively less correlation between the US conventional MSCI index and the 
GCC ex-Saudi and Japan Islamic indices.  
 
Although Saiti et al. (2014) try to present new findings in this area; they conclude that Is-
lamic markets do not offer any extraordinary diversification opportunities to the US-based 
investors without any allocation strategy. Also, the research background is built on a con-
ceptually misleading information by reporting evidence on the co-integration between Is-
lamic stock markets and developed markets (Marashdeh, 2005; Bley and Chen, 2006; Majid 
et al. 2007; Majid and Kassim, 2010). Co-integration happens when the difference between 
markets or financial assets‘ movements is fixed over time. This means that co-integration 
cannot tell whether or not markets‘ movement move in a similar direction. Thus it is not 
statistically valid to imply that there are diversification benefits when markets are less or not 
co-integrated.  
69 
3.3 Research Data   
The research data consists of 17 exchange traded funds (ETFs) which are traded in three of 
the largest international markets (the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany).  
Table 1 –Chapter 3 Research Data 
 
 













Tracks the MSCI TR emerging markets index, No 














Tracks the MSCI emerging markets index, distrib-
utes income to shareholders. Inception 21/11/2005. 
EWX:US  
Emerging Mar-
kets Small Cap 
Tracks the S&P emerging markets under USD2 



















East & Africa 
Tracks the S&P Mid-East and Africa BMI index. 
Inception 23/03/2007. 
GUR:US  Emerging Europe 
Tracks the S&P European emerging BMI Capped 






























Tracks J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Core index, Fol-
lows FINRA authority and automated system. Es-
tablished on 15/02/2008. Invest in government and 






Tracks J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Core index, traded 
in NASDAQ. Established on 05/07/2008. Invest in 
corporate bonds across sectors (industrials, utilities 






Tracks the J.P. Morgan EMBI Global Core index, 
traded in NYSE, Established on 19/12/2007. Invest 
in government and quasi-government bonds grade 
and high yield bonds. 
EEMB:LN  
Emerging Mar-
kets Bond (for 
UK and Ireland 
Investors Only) 
Tracks the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond 
Index Global Core Index. Inception 07/04/2008. 
Open only to investors from UK and Ireland unlike 
EMB: US, UT and UD. 
The table shows the ETFs I use in my sample categorized by their investment style (Conventional/Islamic) and 
asset class. It shows also, the ticker name and information for each ETF. 































Tracks the MSCI World Islamic index. Distributes 




Tracks the MSCI USA Islamic index. Distributes 







Tracks the MSCI Emerging Markets Islamic Index. 







Tracks the MSCI Emerging Markets Islamic Index. 
Inception 25/03/2008 and traded in Germany 
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Studies such as Jondeau and Rockinger (2012), Saiti et al, (2014), and Kalotychou et al. 
(2014) use indices in investigating asset allocation. I use ETFs instead of indices because it is 
intuitive that you cannot trade indices but you can trade ETFs when it comes to trading. ETFs 
are a combination of open-end and close-end funds combining the advantages of both types 
of funds into one product. More specifically, an ETF is a fund, investing in a basket of stocks, 
whose aim is to replicate a benchmark index; nevertheless, it can be traded as a stock itself. 
The key feature which makes us use the ETFs is risk diversification and liquidity. Curcio et 
al. (2004) suggest that ETFs can be attractable to retail investors, who are the main target of 
my study. 
 
The ETFs focus on three asset classes: conventional equity, conventional fixed-income se-
curities, and Shari‘ah compliant equity. My selection of the data was constrained with its 
availability. Though, after extensive search, I found ETFs which track the performance of 
major indices such as MSCI, FTSE, S&P and JP Morgan. This will provide rigorous find-
ings.  
 
I obtain the daily close price for the ETFs shown in the table above from 02/09/2009 to 
23/10/2015 with no missing observations. The research methodology will be applied on the 
full sample and two subsamples, to check if the results will significantly change. I divide the 
full sample into two subsamples in order to avoid in-sample overfitting and spurious results. 
The first sample is the estimation period from 2-1-2009 to 3-5-2012 (869 observations), 
72 
where I will fit the DCC models to the data. The second sample is the allocation period from 




All historical prices obtained from Bloomberg terminal are adjusted to reflect abnormal cash 
changes and capital changes. Most ETF dominated currency is USD; however few are traded 
in different markets and dominated in Euro or Pound Sterling. In order to unify the currency 
base for all ETFs, non-USD ETFs' closing prices were multiplied by the daily (GBP/USD) 
and (EUR/USD) exchange rates. The daily logarithmic returns are used in this research. 
Again, the investor I am targeting in this study does not need risk free assets in the asset 
allocation, because risk-free rates are less important here due to the fact that part of the 
portfolio is fixed-income in orientation (courtesy of the inclusion of fixed income ETFs).  
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 Out-of-sample estimation reliability is validated. The variance between the estimated portfolios and the asset 




Earlier test of autocorrelation in financial time series revealed that most of the assets' data has 
autocorrelation even at the first-difference of log-returns. Therefore, GARCH model is the 
most suitable to be used, since I am interested in examining the diversification benefits of 
Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs in emerging markets. I consider the time variability of as-
sets‘ correlations and find optimal portfolios accordingly. To do so, I use Dynamic Condi-
tional Correlation (DCC) model, and Asymmetric Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
(A-DCC) model. These models are chosen, because they have been largely used in empirical 
estimating conditional correlations (Colacito et al. 2011) and introduced the asymmetry 
element in large panel data (Cappiello et al. 2006; Jondeau and Rockinger, 2012; Kalotychou 
et al. 2014; among others). They have been proven that they work and provide statistically 
significant results for the given research questions.  
 
Before any further explanation, it is important to briefly demonstrate the reasons behind 
developing these models and show that they are empirically valid. Before the DCC-GARCH 
model, there has been a complexity in using multivariate-GARCH models such as BEKK
12
 
by Engle and Kroner (1995). BEKK-GARCH model stems from the first class of multivar-
iate Vector Error Correlation (VEC-GARCH) model, which was developed by Bollerslev et 
al. (1988) as an extension of the univariate GARCH. There are several advantages for the 
BEKK model. First, it provides semi-positive definiteness for the correlation matrix and 
                                                          
12
 The acronym comes from the names of authors proposing this model: Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner. 
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allows different assets‘ returns and volatilities to interact. Second, it is parsimonious when it 
comes to the number of parameters required.  
 
Nonetheless, it has a serious disadvantage. If many assets (more than 2) are to be examined, 
the BEKK model will contain too many parameters that cannot be interpreted, or do not 
directly represent the lagged residuals or lagged volatility estimates of the assets. Such dif-
ficulty in estimating the BEKK model made it unusable in my research due to the large 
number of assets I are using (17 assets). The number of parameters in the BEKK (1, 1, and 
17) model is K (5K+1)/2 (i.e. I would have 731 parameters in the 17-asset case). 
 
Afterwards, the constant conditional correlation (CCC) model was proposed by Bollerslev 
(1990) to calculate the time-varying covariance and overcome the problem of estimating a 
large number of parameters. In this model, investors are proposed to believe that changes in 
covariance are driven by the changes in conditional standard deviation, where correlations 
are assumed to be constant through time. However, there is empirical evidence which refuses 
the assumption of constant correlations over time (ex: Engle and Sheppard 2002; Jondeau 
and Rockinger, 2012). Thus, the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model is more 
preferable than the CCC model. Longin and Solnik (1995) examine the constant conditional 
correlation model, and reject the assumption that international correlations between devel-
oped markets are constant over time.  
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Moreover, Chevallier (2012) investigate the adequacy of BEKK-GARCH and CCC-GARCH 
models and estimate the time-varying correlations between oil, gas and CO2, using daily 
prices from April 2005 to December 2008.  They find that residuals generated by the models 
are auto-correlated which means that the models are not correctly specified and fail to cap-
ture adequately the correlations between the three time series.  Furthermore, they find many 
parameters statistically insignificant, which indicate that the model may be 
over-parameterised. As a result, Engle (2002) and Tse and Tsui (2002) overcome the CCC 
model's constant correlation disadvantage by developing the DCC model.  
 
3.4.1 Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model 
I use the Engle (2002) model which is estimated in two steps (i) volatility modelling to find 
the standardised errors, and (ii) correlation modelling to estimate the time-varying correla-
tion matrix and covariance matrix to be used in the portfolio optimisation. The 2 steps are 
explained below: 
Step 1) Estimate mean equation for each asset's return rt (k x 1 vector of asset returns), where 
εt (k x 1) (vector of asset returns' innovations) with mean equal zero depending on the in-
formation available at time t-1: 
                 (1) 
  |       (    )                                                                 (2)
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First, I follow Fleming, Kirby, and Ostdiek (2001, 2003) and assume constant expected 
returns.  
 
After that, I fit the asymmetric GJR-GARCH model developed by Glosten, Jagannathan, and 
Runkle (1993), to obtain the conditional variance     
  for each asset and the standardized 
errors     : 
    
             
          
          
   {        }              
(3) 
where 1A is an indicator function which has value 1 if it is true and 0 otherwise.  
A negative value of ‗ ‘ implies that periods with negative residuals would be immediately 
followed by periods of a higher variance compared to the periods of positive residuals.    
indicates the asymmetry in volatility, and      assures that the variance process is sta-
tionary.  
I decided to use a univariate GARCH model for the first step. Alexander (2001, chap.7) notes 
when the coefficients are diagonal matrices, each variance/covariance term follows a uni-
variate GARCH model with the lagged variance/covariance terms and squares and cross 
products of the data become more simple (Ledoit et al. 2003). Though, complicated re-
strictions on the coefficient parameters are needed to guarantee their positive-definiteness. 
These restrictions are often too difficult to satisfy in the course of iterative optimisation of the 
likelihood function, even when the number of assets is five or more. Consequently, for large 




Step 2) Use the normalized standardised errors it  from the fitted GARCH model to com-
pute     {     }         as a       diagonal matrix which is the symmetric positive defi-
nite time-varying correlation matrix using Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) (assum-
ing that asset returns are conditionally Gaussian). Afterwards, I estimate    the conditional 
covariance matrix using    {    }       which is a k x k diagonal matrix with conditional 
standard deviations on the diagonal: 
          (5) 
Following the specification made by Engle and Sheppard (2001), and Engle (2002) the 
correlation matrix is computed as:  
       (  )
  
 ⁄        (  )
  
 ⁄  (6) 
   (       ) ̅    (        
 )         (7) 
Given that      
        is the standardized errors scaled by their conditional variance es-
timated in the first step,  ̅ is the unconditional covariance of the standardized errors   , and 
   is a k * k symmetric positive definite matrix. I impose the non-negativity and stationarity 
restrictions          , and         . 
 
Accordingly, The DCC model gives more stylised facts about correlations such as 
time-variation and asymmetry (Engle, 2000). Engle and Sheppard (2001) state, the signifi-
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cance of correlation asymmetry will be decided by looking at the log-likelihood function 
estimated based on GJR GARCH parameters from the first step: 
   
  
 
∑ ( (  )    
 
   
|  |     (|  |)    
   
    
 )  
(8) 
 
3.4.2 Asymmetric Dynamic Conditional Correlation (A-DCC) model  
I use the extension of the DCC model; The Asymmetric DCC (A-DCC) model developed by 
Sheppard (2002). It allows for asymmetries in the conditional covariance matrix as follows: 
       
         
    
        




where      [    ]     represents the element-by-element Hadamard product (Davis, 
1962) ,    ̅=    
  ̅     
  ̅    
  ̅  and  ̅  = [   
 ], where the expectation is replaced 
by its sample analogue. The model allows joint negative shocks to have a stronger impact on 
correlation than positive shocks of the same size and nests the symmetric DCC. Model es-
timation is by quasi-maximum likelihood (QML). Inferences are based on 
Bollerslev-Wooldridge non-normality robust standard errors (Bollerslev and Wooldridge, 




3.4.3 The Integrated GARCH Model (IGARCH) 
For the robustness analysis, I will investigate the time variability in assets correlations by 
estimating the volatility using the Integrated GARCH (IGARCH) model, and estimate the 
time-varying variance-covariance matrix using DCC model. The advantage of using 
IGARCH model is that it allows for highly persistent volatility, which is intuitively assumed 
in emerging markets returns, and found by empirical evidence.  
In the case         where, the GARCH (1, 1) model becomes: 
  
     (    )    
        
  (10) 
The integrated GARCH model
13
 (Engle and Bollerslev, 1986) assumes that the persistence P 
= 1 (squared shocks are persistent), and imposes this during the estimation procedure. So, the 
variance follows a random walk with a drift   . Since I generally do not observe a drift in 
variance, I will assume     . Because of unit persistence, none of the other results can be 
calculated (i.e. unconditional variance, half-life etc). When        , and     , the 
l-step ahead forecast that I derived for a GARCH (1, 1) model becomes:  
 ̂   
     (     ) ̂     
  
  ̂     
  




                                                          
13
 The stationarity of the model has been established in the literature, but it does not encounter the possibility of 
omitted structural breaks. Structural breaks are not investigated in this research. 
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3.4.4 Out-of Sample Forecasting  
I perform out-of sample forecasting to evaluate the performance of the dynamic strategy 
during different time periods. The DCC and A-DCC are re-estimated over a rolling window 
of length-100 days to generate one-step-ahead covariance matrix forecasts.  
 
3.4.5 Performance Evaluation for the Dynamic and Static Strategies 
I use the Modified Sharpe ratio (1994) to evaluate the performance of the optimal portfolios. 
Originally, Sharpe ratio represents the excess return per unit of risk, where the unit of risk is 
the standard deviation of the returns. The Sharpe ratio used is useful when assets are nor-
mally distributed.  
             




However, in this research assets‘ returns are far from being normal as shown in Tables 2, 3, 4 
(p.111-114) and Figure 2 (P.82). This is the reason behind using the Modified Sharpe ratio 
which represents the excess return divided by the modified Value-at-Risk:  
                        
    
        
 
(13) 
where the modified Value-at Risk equals to: 
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3.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, I will demonstrate the stylised facts about my sample data.  
 
3.5.1 Data Description  
Table 2 (p.111), Table 3 (p. 112), and Table 4 (P. 114) report several distributional statistics 
for the logarithmic returns of ETFs for three periods. All daily returns in all samples are 
non-normally distributed. The kurtosis is either less than three or more than three for all 
ETFs.  
 
Regarding autocorrelation, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test t-statistic is significant for all 
ETFs in the three samples, which indicates the data stationarity and strong rejection of the 
null hypothesis of unit root. Ljung box Q-statistics show that squared daily returns have 
autocorrelation for all ETFs. This means that there is more predictability in conditional vol-
atility than returns. This can be explained by the time-varying risk premia model or what is 
called volatility feedback by Campbell and Hentschel (1992). They find that negative shock 
in returns causes larger increase in variance because expected return should be sufficiently 
high to compensate investors for the increased volatility. Therefore, this creates more vola-
tility. According to Cappiello (2006), volatility feedback applies for both bonds as well as 
stocks through the CAPM, which treats bonds as risky assets. Accordingly, I employ gen-
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eralised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models to detect any 
asymmetric volatility in the first step of the DCC model estimation. 
 
 
Figure 1 Full Sample Log Returns (05/09/2009 to 23/10/2015) 
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As seen in the plot, most ETF returns in the three samples are significantly negatively 
skewed, and the Jarque Bera test for non-normality strongly rejects the null hypothesis of 
normal distribution at 1% level. So, there is a similarity in the distribution patterns between 
Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFS, emerging markets conventional equity and fixed income.  
 
For the full sample Table 2 (p. 111), Shari‘ah compliant equity ETF traded in USA has the 
highest average daily return (0.00043), followed by emerging markets fixed-income in 
London (0.000346), World Shari‘ah compliant equity (0.000328), and Asia and Pacific 
emerging markets equity (0.000327). Latin America emerging markets have the lowest av-
erage return (-0.00006) among all ETFs. Emerging markets fixed-income ETFs (EMBUD, 
EMBUS, EEMBLN) are characterised by the lowest volatility levels (0.0058, 0.0059, 0.009) 
respectively. Whereas, European emerging markets equity have the highest volatility level. 
Shari‘ah compliant equity volatility levels are not significantly different than that for 
emerging markets conventional equity.  
 
Over the in-sample and out-of sample periods, I observe many changes in the average return. 
In the in-sample Table 3 (p. 112), emerging market conventional equity from all regions has 
relatively higher average returns. World Shari‘ah compliant equity (ISDW) has the lowest 
return (0.000342) unlike the rest of Shari‘ah compliant equity which have similar average 
returns compared to emerging fixed-income ETFs. ETFs volatility levels are similar to the 
levels I mentioned for the full sample.  
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Over the out-of-sample period Table 4 (p.114), most ETFs have negative average returns, 
including emerging markets Shari‘ah compliant equity. Emerging Latin American markets 
(GMLUS) record the lowest level of (-0.00083). However, USA Shari‘ah compliant equity 
(ISDULN) and world Shari‘ah compliant equity (ISDWLN) have the highest average returns 
(0.0003665, 0.00022) respectively.  
 
The research analysis is based on the interaction between all ETFs, so all unconditional 
correlations are of relevance. For the full sample Table 2 (p.111) emerging markets small cap 
ETF (EWXUS) has very low correlation with all other ETFs because of its different holdings. 
Generally, emerging markets conventional equity from different regions is strongly corre-
lated. This can be intuitively explained by the general downturn in emerging markets due to 
capital withdrawals and the negative signals of the asset purchases programmes by the Fed 
and European central bank. In addition, some of the ETF top holdings are common in the 
major indices they are mimicking such as FTSE EM, MSCI EM and S&P EM. On the other 
hand, Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs are weakly correlated with the all other conventional 
ETFs. This is due to equity screening based on Islamic law; therefore their top holdings are 
different. However, Shari‘ah compliant equity from World, the US and emerging markets 
equity traded in London are moderately correlated due to similar top holdings. Other corre-
lations in the subsamples do not show any specific differences from the full sample.  
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3.5.2 GJR-GARCH Empirical Results 
Below is a summary of the main findings regarding the estimation results of the 
GJR-GARCH as reported in Table 5 (p. 114). 
a)  Results for Conventional Emerging Markets Equity ETFs 
The variance equation (4) for the full sample shows the asymmetry in volatility parameter γ 
is significantly positive for general emerging markets ETFs: EEMUS, VWOUS, IEEMLN at 
(1%), and GMMUS at (5%) conventional levels. Also, these strong results apply to emerging 
Middle East and Africa (GAFUS), and emerging Europe (GURUS) at 1% level. This indi-
cates that bad news had a stronger effect on volatility than good news and volatility persists 
for a longer time. Though, there is an absence of volatility persistence in emerging Asia 
pacific (GMFUS) and emerging Latin America (GMLUS), since the persistence parameter β 
is insignificant. The rise in the effect of short-term volatility can be explained by the insig-
nificance of the constant term ω in the variance equation for all conventional equity except 
for GAFUS and IEEMLN.  
 
For the in-sample, results do not differ greatly from the full sample, but two main things 
changed. Firstly, the asymmetry in volatility parameter for GMMUS is insignificant. Sec-
ondly, instead of having a significance level at 1% for EEMUS, VWOUS, GURUS, and 
IEEMLN asymmetry in volatility, it turned out to be significant at 5% for EEMUS, VWOUS 
and 10% for IEEMLN. The constant term ω is insignificant for all conventional equity, ex-
cept GAFUS, GMLUS and IEEMLN at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. This is an 
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interesting result since insignificant omega-term means that the unconditional average vol-
atility is zero and indicates that the ETFs have become more stable on the long-run (or in this 
case the ETFs started to recover after the global financial crisis) 
 
The out-of-sample also shows similar results to the full sample. However, all previously 
mentioned ETF parameters are significant at 1% level, with the emerging Asia Pacific 
(GMFUS) ETF joining the list with significant asymmetry in volatility at 1% level. The 
constant term ω is significant for GMFUS, EWXUS, GMMUS, GAFUS, and IEEMLN at 
different conventional levels. Here the unconditional volatility has become higher, since it 
captured the shock caused by the European debt crisis.   
 
b)  Results for Conventional Emerging Markets Fixed-Income Securities ETFs 
In the full sample, only JP Morgan emerging markets bond ETF (EMBUS) has significant 
asymmetry in volatility at 10% level. Whereas none of fixed-income ETFs shows any 
asymmetry in the in-sample, and only JP Morgan emerging market bond ETFs (EEMBLN) 
traded in London, and JP Morgan emerging markets bond (EMBUT) (NASDAQ intraday) 
have significant asymmetry at 5% and 10% level respectively. The constant term ω is in-
significant for all ETFs in the full sample and the in-sample period. However, it turns out to 




c)  Results for Shari’ah Compliant Equity ETFs 
Generally, Shari‘ah compliant equity show significant asymmetry in volatility across the 
three research samples at all conventional levels. More specifically, there is no presence of 
asymmetry in volatility for only world Shari‘ah compliant equity (ISDWLN), since the pa-
rameter is insignificant. For the in-sample period all Islamic ETFs show significant asym-
metry but at different levels. ISDWLN and IUSEGR parameters are significant at 10%, 
ISDULN asymmetry parameter is significant at 5% and ISDELN parameter is significant at 
1%. Lastly, all Islamic ETFs‘ asymmetry parameter in the out-of-sample is significant at 1% 
level. The constant term ω is significant at 1% level for only the United States Shari‘ah 
compliant equity in the full sample, World Shari‘ah compliant equity at 10% level for only 
the in-sample, World Shari‘ah compliant equity and Shari‘ah compliant equity in emerging 
markets at 1% and 5% level respectively.  
 
Overall, for the GJR-GARCH model estimation, the in-sample shows weak or insignificant 
asymmetry in volatility for most of the ETFs analysed in this research, while the 
out-of-sample period shows strongly positive asymmetry in volatility for most conventional 
equity and all Shari‘ah compliant equity on the highest probability level (1%). The in-sample 
estimation tackles a recovery period after the global financial crisis which explains the 
weakening of the asymmetry in ETFs‘ volatilities. On the other hand, courtesy to the Euro-
pean debt crisis in 2011, all ETFs‘ long-term volatility increased and most of them had 
negative average returns. This explains the stronger asymmetries in volatility and the 
stronger response to negative shocks in returns relative to the positive ones. This is in-line 
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with prior literature which shows the negative impact of the European debt crisis on 




3.5.3 Goodness of Fit Tests 
DCC model fit turned to be a good fit after performing several tests. First, I tested for pos-
sible heteroskedasticity using the root-mean-square error (RMSE), the mean absolute error 
(MAE). These tests are measures of how different are the values predicted by a model and the 




Second, I performed Pearson's product-moment correlation to test for the significance of 
correlation between the Fitted DCC (in-sample) and the forecasted DCC (out-of-sample). 
The p-value of the correlation is significant at 1% level. Figures 3 and 4 below show how the 
movement of the fitted and forecasted DCC are similar for two different couple of ETFS. 
Pearson's product-moment Correlation 
Data: Fit and Forecast  
T 2038.5 df 259520 
p-value < 2.20E-16   




Figure 3 DCC fit and DCC Forecast for EEMUS – VWOUS 
 
Figure 4 DCC fit and DCC Forecast for – EEMBLN- ISDWLN 
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Figure 3 (p. 91) shows the time-varying correlations between two general EMETFs traded in 
the US (EEMUS and VWOUS), while Figure 4 (p. 91) shows the time varying correlation 
between EM conventional equity and Shari‘ah compliant equity traded in the UK. I selected 
the ETFs to be traded in the same market to control for any time difference. As I can see, the 
movement of the conditional correlation of the fitted and forecasted DCC are similar. This 
means that the predictability of the model is good. 
 
Moreover, Table 8 (p. 120) shows the empirical log-likelihood function and Akaike Infor-
mation Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). These information criteria 
are designed explicitly for the model selection. Model selection criteria generally involve 
information criteria function calculations for each of the models. I pick the model for which 
the function is minimized. There is a slight increase in the log-likelihood when the asym-
metric parameter is added in the A-DCC model. On the other side, AIC and SIC information 
criteria are smallest for the DCC model, and this indicates that the DCC is more parsimo-
nious than the A-DCC.  
 
3.5.4 In-Sample Estimation Results  
In equation (7), the first parameter δ1 measures the short-run persistence. If its value in-
creases, this means that recent news have a bigger impact on conditional correlation. As 
Table 7 (p. 119) shows, the parameter is strongly significant at 1% level. 
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The second parameter δ2 represents the dynamic structure of conditional correlations. If 
increased and significant, this means that conditional correlations become more persistent 
which implies that joint ETFs shocks have longer lasting effects on the conditional correla-
tions. The parameter turns out to be strongly significant also at 1% level. Thus, the condi-
tional correlations can be concluded to be changing over time, and their variability is per-
sistent. Intuitively, this will have an effect on the optimal portfolios under the dynamic 
strategy compared to static mean-variance strategy.  
 
The asymmetric version of DCC (A-DCC) model adds an additional parameter δ3, to measure 
the asymmetry of correlations as shown in equation (9). The results in Table 7 (p. 119) show 
that the parameter is significant at 1% level. This indicates that ETFs joint negative shocks 
have a stronger impact on correlation than positive shocks of the same magnitude. There is 
little explanation for the asymmetric response to joint bad returns (bad news) in correlations. 
A possible explanation by Cappiello et al. (2006) is not formalised yet in a multivariate 
model. This explanation is backed by the time-varying risk premia. In particular, when there 
is a negative shock and the variance of two assets increase in a CAPM world, investors will 
typically expect higher returns to compensate the larger variance. As a result, both assets‘ 
prices will decrease and asset correlation will go up. This is usually the case in down markets 
as observed in emerging markets over the past 7 years. Thus, correlation may be higher after 
a negative than a positive innovation of the same magnitude, indicating its sensitivity to the 
sign of past shocks. They also have another likely explanation which is that dependence in 
returns is higher for large negative returns, and possibly nonlinear. In this case, the increased 
correlation observed is simply a linear approximation to the nonlinear dependence.  
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The rise in correlations during down markets may also be due to cross market herding, 
courtesy of the enhanced globalisation process which allows for free movement of capital 
internationally. When markets internationally do badly, international investors tend to 
modify their positions in tandem. Again, the fact that the period under consideration is a 
crisis one further supports this argument, as investors tend to often resort to herding when 
crises break out.  
 
3.5.5 Time-Varying Optimal Weights Based on the Dynamic Strategy (DCC/A-DCC) 
This research tries to answer whether or not Shari‘ah compliant equity decreases the risk for 
a portfolio of conventional emerging markets investments. To investigate this issue, I use the 
two dynamic strategies following DCC and A-DCC models. Considering the estimated 
variance-covariance matrix from the DCC and A-DCC model, Table 9 (p. 121) shows the 
time varying optimal allocation for the ETFs being investigated. Portfolio optimisation is 
conducted using daily data with the objective of minimising portfolio risk (standard devia-
tion), by solving a non-linear programming problem. The DCC and A-DCC models result in 
similar results, and the optimisation output reveals the following main empirical results: 
 
a)  Optimal Weights: Full Sample 
Both the DCC and A-DCC models favour the USA Shari‘ah compliant equity (ISDULN) 
with allocated weights equal to 86.62% and 87.36% respectively. The rest of portfolio 
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weights are distributed over the fixed income ETF (EEMBLN), and the conventional 
emerging Asia Pacific ETF. When I take out the Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs from the 
portfolio optimisation, the dynamic strategy favours emerging markets fixed-income 
(EEMBLN) and (EMBUT) with approximate weights equal to 48.77% and 32.24%. 
 
b)  Optimal Weights: In-Sample 
Since ETFs return/risk characteristics and time-varying correlations become different in the 
in-sample, the optimal asset allocation changes as well. Nearly 50% of the portfolio full 
investment goes to conventional emerging fixed income (EEMBLN) and 37.39% to the 
conventional emerging small cap stocks (EWXUS). The emerging Shari‘ah compliant equity 
ETF (IUSEGR) comes in the third place with 17.39% of the total portfolio. When Shari‘ah 
compliant equity is excluded, time-varying optimal weights are similar to the previous 
portfolio, but the 17.39% for IUSEGR is now divided between conventional general 
emerging equity ETF (IEEMLN) and conventional emerging Latin America (GMLUS). 
  
c) Optimal Weights: Out-of- Sample 
I do not impose any weight restrictions on the asset allocation. Surprisingly, the dynamic 
strategy put the full investment in the USA Shari‘ah compliant equity (ISDULN). When the 
optimisation is repeated without Shari‘ah compliant equity, the full investment is divided 
between conventional emerging fixed-income securities only. The highest weight goes to 
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emerging markets fixed income ETF (EMBUD) with approximately 70% of total portfolio 
weight.  
 
3.5.6 Optimal Weights Based on the Static Strategy 
It is interesting to see how the naive mean-variance strategy will allocate the assets in the 
optimal portfolios compared to the dynamic strategy mentioned earlier. Based on the results 
in Table 10 (p. 122), I report below the main results under the three samples: 
 
a) Optimal Weights: Full Sample 
Generally, the mean-variance strategy favours the least risky assets which are the conven-
tional emerging markets fixed-income ETFs. EMBUD, EMBUT, EMBUS received the 
highest weights in the portfolio in the full sample. On the other hand, Shari‘ah compliant 
equity ISDULN and IUSEGR weights are equal to 7.57% and 4.23% respectively.  
 
b) Optimal Weights: In-Sample 
Similar results to the full sample are reported in the in-sample. However, the weights given to 
Shari‘ah compliant equity become less, and the more weight goes to the most favourite asset 
class in the mean-variance strategy; the conventional emerging fixed-income ETFs. 
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c) Optimal Weights: Out-of sample 
The results are similar to the full and in-sample, but the weights for Shari‘ah compliant eq-
uity increased slightly. In particular, the weight for ISDULN and IUSEGR increased from 
the in-sample by 1.24% and 1.84% respectively.  
 
Overall, the optimisation process under dynamic and static strategies excluded many ETFs 
for the three asset classes under investigation. The major ETFs which are significantly pre-
sent in the portfolio are all conventional Fixed-Income ETFs, and only The USA Shari‘ah 
compliant equity ETF (ISDULN) and the emerging market Shari‘ah compliant equity ETF 
(IUSEGR). For conventional emerging market equity, only emerging equity (IEEMLN), 
emerging Latin America market (GMLUS), and emerging small-cap stocks (EWXLN) re-
ceive small weight in the optimal portfolio.  
 
3.5.7 Portfolio Performance Evaluation under Dynamic Strategy and Static Strategy  
After reporting the findings about the optimal weights under the dynamic and static strate-
gies, it is important to assess the portfolios‘ performance with and without the Shari‘ah 
compliant equity ETFs in the three samples.  
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a) Portfolio’s Risk Level 
Regarding portfolios‘ risk level (measured by standard deviation), the portfolio optimisation 
is performed with the objective of minimising portfolio risk. The results in Table 9 (p. 121) 
show that portfolios‘ risk is more than double for the dynamic strategies compared to the 
static strategy Table 10 in all research samples. Under the dynamic strategies, the inclusion 
of Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs in the portfolios leads to higher risk in the full sample 
(from 0.59% to 0.72%), and doubles the standard deviation in the out-of sample (from 0.32% 
to 0.70%). The accounting for the asymmetries in conditional correlations does not result in 
noticeable difference in portfolios‘ risk level.  
 
b)  Performance Gains: Modified Sharpe Ratio (mSR) 
Continuing the results, Table 11 (p. 123) shows the modified Sharpe ratios for the optimal 
portfolios under the dynamic and static strategies for three samples. In all, adding Shari‘ah 
compliant equity ETFs to the portfolios results in higher modified Sharpe ratio under the 
in-sample and out-of sample only under the dynamic strategies (DCC and A-DCC). For the 
static strategy, Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs‘ inclusion led to better return per risk in all 
samples. Comparing the dynamic and static strategies, estimated modified Sharpe ratios are 
higher for the optimal portfolios under the static strategy in the full sample and in-sample. 
However, in the out-of sample the dynamic strategies result in better portfolios. More par-
ticularly, the static strategy over-performs the dynamic strategy in the full sample by 0.02 for 
conventional and Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs portfolio, and 0.01 for conventional 
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portfolio. Also, it leads to a rise of 0.01 for both portfolios under the in-sample. On the other 
side, the dynamic strategy outperforms the static strategy by 0.03 for the mixed portfolio of 
conventional and Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs and 0.01 for the conventional portfolio.  
The results also suggest that there is no difference in portfolios performance between the 
symmetric and asymmetric DCC models.  
 
3.6 Robustness Analysis 
As I discussed in the previous section, I divided the full sample into two subsamples to avoid 
over-fitting for the parameter estimation and asset allocation.  
 
For further confirmation of the Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs diversification benefits, I 
decided to choose another conditional volatility model, to estimate the volatility matrix and 
standardised residuals. I repeated the analysis using IGARCH instead of GJR-GARCH 
model, to estimate the volatility matrix and standardised residuals to be used in the DCC 
model estimation. I re-estimated the model for the three research samples (full sample, 
in-sample and out-of sample). I chose the IGARCH model, because it captures the high 
volatility persistence, which is empirically found in emerging markets returns‘ behaviour. I 
used it in the first step of the symmetric version of DCC model only, because the A-DCC was 
less parsimonious than the DCC.  
 
Based on the variance equation (11), the results in Table 6 (p. 117) suggest that the volatility 
persistence for all assets in all samples are significantly strong except for EMBUD. The 
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volatility persistence of the ETFs ranges between (0.93, 0.99) in the full sample, (0.94, 0.98) 
in the in-sample, and (0.90, 0.99) in the out-of sample. The DCC-IGARCH results in Table 7 
(p. 119) are in line with DCC-GJR GARCH and A-DCC-GJR-GARCH. δ1 indicates that 
there is persistent effect of shocks on conditional correlations and it is strongly significant in 
the three samples at 1% level. While δ2 parameter estimates are very similar to those esti-
mated by DCC-GJR-GARCH and A-DCC-GJR-GARCH and indicates that recent news 
have bigger impact on the conditional correlations (Short-term persistence). However, as you 
see in Table 8 (p. 120), the log-likelihood function, the AIC and SIC information criteria for 
the DCC-IGARCH model indicates that it has less predictability of time-varying correla-
tions. 
 
Talking about portfolio optimization results in Table 9 (p.121), the ETF weights estimated 
from the time varying variance –covariance matrix from the DCC-IGARCH are very similar 
to those under the DCC-GJR GARCH model. Though, it seems to result in better portfolios 
in terms of risk-adjusted returns for the portfolios with Shari‘ah complaint equity ETFs in the 
full sample and in-sample. The remaining portfolios show similar modified Sharpe ratios to 
those under the DCC-GJR-GARCH.  
 
3.7 Portfolio Rebalancing 
I calculate rebalanced portfolios, in particular during market volatility to understand better 
the advantages and disadvantages of the dynamic strategy and static strategy. I construct a 
portfolio to be monthly rebalanced, where no short sales are allowed and all capital to be 
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invested at all times. As my objective, I seek to minimise the variance of the portfolio. In 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 (p. 102), I can see that during the period from 2009 until mid-2010, the 
monthly rebalanced portfolios with Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs under both strategies 
have similar cumulative return and drawdown risk because the market was rebounding after 
the financial crisis. In the first period, the dynamic strategy (using DCC models) outperforms 
the static strategy (mean-variance model).  
 
However, in the second period the static strategy outperforms the dynamic strategy. This 
suggests that there is a value in considering the time variability in correlations and use the 
dynamic strategy in high volatility periods. Looking closely to both charts, I find that the 




Figure 5 Sample 1 Portfolio performance using DCC and Mean-Variance covariance matrices 
 
 
Figure 6 Sample 2 Portfolio performance using DCC and Mean-Variance covariance matrices
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3.8 Discussion  
In this section, I will discuss my empirical results and their contribution to the research upon 
two main points. These are the diversification benefits of Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs, 
and the performance gains of dynamic mean-variance strategy in the context of emerging 
markets. One of the most important findings of my research is that the inclusion of Shari‘ah 
compliant equity ETFs in an emerging markets portfolio can lead to higher portfolio gains. 
After applying Engle and Colacito (2006) methodology, and using the DCC model which is 
introduced by Engle (2002), I tried to investigate whether or not Shari‘ah compliant equity 
ETFs are a good investment choice for an investor in emerging markets. The results I found 
cannot be generalised all the time with all strategies.  
 
The inclusion of Shari‘ah complaint equity ETFs results in higher modified Sharpe ratios 
under the dynamic and static strategies. They receive proportionally significant weight and 
are favoured over the conventional equity in the asset allocation across samples. However, 
the different results from both strategies are attributed to the accounting of the significant 
role of correlation time-variability in deciding the optimal portfolio weights.  
 
Going in further depth into the time-varying optimal weights of Shari‘ah complaint equity 
ETFs versus conventional fixed-income securities, I believe it is interesting also to examine 
whether Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs can beat emerging markets fixed income securities. 
Islamic finance scholars claim that the zero-interest investment makes it more resilient 
103 
during financial crises. My results indicate that Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs can be fa-
voured over the latter in the optimal portfolios. If the investor added Shari‘ah compliant 
equity ETFs to the emerging market portfolio in the recent years (05/2012-10/2015), he/she 
can put more weight on them than fixed-income securities. Though, this is not the case in the 
first sample (01/2009- 05/2012).  
 
Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs help in improving the risk-adjusted return of the portfolio, 
but this does not necessarily mean they get the highest proportion in the portfolio. Conven-
tional EM small cap (EWXUS) and conventional EM fixed-income (EEMBLN) received 
higher weights in the first sample, which indicates that Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs are 
not necessarily more resilient in the aftermath of the European financial crisis. In fact, Sha-
ri‘ah compliant equity had similar risk levels to conventional equity straight after the finan-
cial crisis. This can be justified by the fact that the Shari‘ah compliant ETFs I selected are 
traded in European markets (UK and Germany), which suffered from the European sovereign 
debt crisis. My justification is in line with the argument of Ajmi et al. (2014) that the Shari‘ah 
compliant equity markets are not isolated from external shocks.  
 
What is more, my results regarding the time-varying weights of Shari‘ah compliant equity 
ETFs and their effect on portfolios‘ modified Sharpe ratio, remain robust (across samples), 
using different models (DCC-GJRGARCH, DCC-IGARCH and A-DCC-GRGARCH). 
Previous arguments regarding the diversification benefits of Islamic assets are mixed; for 
example, on the global level, Arouri et al. (2013) find that Islamic assets weights increased 
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after the global financial crisis, which result in better overall portfolio performance. On the 
emerging markets level, Saiti et al. (2014) study whether or not financial integration and 
time-varying correlations will affect a US investor preference to invest in Shari‘ah compliant 
equity to minimise the risk of an emerging markets portfolio. They find that Islamic 
emerging markets do not offer diversification benefits to the US investor compared to their 
conventional counterparts.  
 
My research as a result confirms part of the previous empirical literature, because of the 
mixed findings found across samples and using different portfolio optimisation strategies. As 
discussed in the theoretical part of this research, the methodology applied in my research is 
relatively similar to that applied in Saiti et al. (2014). The different findings can be attributed 
to several reasons. First of all, I use ETF returns instead of indices‘ returns. ETF returns can 
incorporate more information about their variability because they are actually traded unlike 
indices which represent only general market trends. Furthermore, I believe that my results are 
stronger, because they extend my investigation by including different markets and different 
asset classes.  
 
The ETFs selected cover a broad range of emerging markets such as emerging Latin America 
(GMLUS), emerging Middle East and Africa (GAFUS), emerging Asia Pacific (GMFUS), 
emerging Europe (GURUS), and general emerging market ETFs (EEMUS, IEEMLN, and 
others). They represent also conventional equity, conventional fixed-income and Shari‘ah 
compliant equity. With such range, I believe that my findings are strong, because such 
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sample allows me to form a diversifiable emerging markets portfolio, and form a clear idea 
about the role of Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs in minimising portfolios‘ risk.  
 
Finally, my approach in fitting the DCC-GARCH model is different, since I specified the 
DCC model with multivariate normal (MVNORM) distribution instead of skewed student-t 
(SSTD) distribution.
 14
 My findings are in line with previous research regarding the pre-
dictability of dynamic conditional correlation models by Kalotychou et al. (2014). More 
specifically, their research is about testing dynamic sector allocation in developed markets 
(US, UK, Japan, and Germany) from 1996 to 2012. They find that the DCC model is better in 
terms of the predictability of portfolio gains, and forecasting the time-varying variance co-
variance matrix in in-sample and out-of-sample estimation.  
 
My results are relatively different because of the different characteristics of markets I am 
examining. Moreover, it should be mentioned that, the portfolios resulted from the 
DCC-GJRGARCH and A-DCC-GJRGARCH are very similar. Although, the asymmetry 
parameter in the A-DCC model is significant in all samples, it did not help us get more in-
formation about whether or not its inclusion may affect the optimal portfolios. 
 
Overall, dynamic portfolio optimisation strategies are not intended to work perfectly eve-
rywhere and all the time. Sometimes it is more efficient to use simple strategies, and it is 
costly to account for the time-varying correlations; while under different economic condi-
                                                          
14
 I tried investigating my research question using skewed student-t distribution, but the problem in using it is 
that Islamic assets‘ were completely absent in all samples‘ optimal portfolios. Therefore, this definitely does not 
help me in answering the main research question. 
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tions it is more profitable to use the dynamic strategies. In this research, the subsamples have 
different trends due to different economic conditions, which allowed us to reach material 
conclusions. In my first sample, I have the European debt crisis which affected ETFs returns. 
Whereas, in the second sample I have the recent economic turbulence happening in the 
emerging markets due to many reasons. These include: the dramatic fall in international 
trade, excessive dependence on foreign financing, currency devaluation, freezing credit 
markets and Fed‘s printing of dollars in the US. According to Park and Mercado (2014), 
regional shocks and shocks from developed markets have the same impact on domestic fi-
nancial stress in emerging markets. With this in mind, Investors should deal with Shari‘ah 
compliant equity ETFs with caution, not as they are often promoted as ―the resilient in-
vestment‖.  
 
After demonstrating a detailed discussion about my research findings, in the next section I 
will provide the concluding remarks of this chapter.  
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3.9 Conclusion and Implications 
Islamic finance has been promoted more often as a less risky and more resilient investment 
alternative during financial downturns, because of the profit-loss sharing, the absence of 
interest rate in business financing, avoidance of speculation, and other reasons. Since the 
relevant literature shows mixed results regarding the performance of Islamic assets in de-
veloped and emerging markets, I identified a gap in the relevant literature. This gap was 
about whether or not adding Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs to a portfolio of emerging 
market investments would improve its risk-adjusted return. In recent years, I can see how 
emerging markets have absorbed many regional and international shocks. This made their 
investments suffer extensive losses, and become very volatile. To do so, I used ETFs data 
from a broad range of conventional emerging equity and fixed income securities alongside 
Shari‘ah compliant equity representing from World, USA and emerging markets. More 
specifically, I used daily returns for a period of seven years, namely from 01/2009 to 
10/2015.  
 
I performed dynamic portfolio optimisation using two models: the DCC and A-DCC, and 
static portfolio optimisation using the Mean-Variance model. The optimisation was repeated 
three times for three sample periods, to back-test my findings. My results indicate that Sha-
ri‘ah compliant equity can help in improving the risk-adjusted return of an emerging market 
portfolio. They lead to improving portfolio performance. Talking about asset allocation, 
under the dynamic portfolio strategies, Shari‘ah compliant equity may be preferred by in-
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vestors over conventional emerging equity and fixed income-securities in more recent years 
from 2012 to 2015. Particularly, Many ETFs in my sample experienced negative average 
returns during this period. However, this was not the case in the post global financial crisis 
and the European debt crisis period, from 01/2009 to 04/2012, where fixed-income ETFs got 
the highest weight in the portfolio. On the other hand, the mean-variance strategy favours 
fixed-income ETFs mostly in all sample periods. After performing monthly portfolio re-
balancing, I find that dynamic strategy over-performs the static mean variance during the 
in-sample period, while static mean-variance optimisation results in more performance gain 
in the out-of-sample period. 
 
Concluding, what one can infer from findings of this research is that Shari‘ah compliant 
equity ETFs can improve the performance gains for an institutional investor in emerging 
markets. The benefits of Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs in the portfolio appear more in 
turbulent market conditions. Also, considering different portfolio optimisation strategies, one 
should be cautious when considering dynamic strategies. Although the dynamic strategies 
used in this research gave me more stylized facts about the assets‘ behaviour, they provided 
better performance only during the in-sample period. Dynamic strategies can also be more 
costly to apply in emerging markets, since they result in portfolios with higher risk levels. 
Future research can investigate further the economic value of these strategies in emerging 
markets by considering measures such as transaction costs due to rebalancing, and perfor-
mance fees of switching from one strategy to another. The results are expected not to change 
if I encountered transaction cost, because the monthly portfolio rebalancing has provided 
extra piece of information about which strategy is favourable and when a dynamic strategy is 
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favourable during recovery periods after strong hit. It has provided better risk-adjusted re-
turns for my portfolios. However, when there is a crisis effect such as that during the second 
sample period, a static strategy outperformed. Logically, a dynamic strategy would be more 
costly during such period due to the extreme shocks in returns and the increased uncertainty. 
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Table 3 Distributional properties of daily ETFs returns (Full Sample 02/01/2009 : 23/10/2015) 
 
EEMUS VWOUS GMFUS EWXUS GURUS GMMUS GAFUS GMLUS EMBUD EMBUT EMBUS EEMBLN IEEMLN ISDWLN ISDULN ISDELN IUSEGR 
Mean 0.00014 0.00019 0.000327 0.00028 -3.19E-0 0.0002 9.27E-0 -6.21E-0 0.00025 0.000249 0.000249 0.000346 0.0002369 0.000328 0.000437 0.000118 0.000232 
Std.Dev. 0.01628 0.01596 0.014971 0.01435 0.02115 0.01502 0.01659 0.01706 0.00583 0.006198 0.005969 0.009486 0.014597 0.010982 0.010077 0.014836 0.013559 
Skewness -0.06 -0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.42** -0.20*** -0.25*** -0.10*** -3.16** -3.27*** -3.50*** -0.20*** -0.07 -0.19*** -0.27*** 0.03 0.04 
Ex.kurtosis 3.37* 3.44*** 3.54*** 4.58*** 5.02*** 4.04*** 1.84*** 2.61*** 55.4** 52.2*** 63.82** 1.64*** 1.84*** 2.40*** 2.73** 2.55** 2.79** 
Jarque bera 







ADF test -20.11*** -20.04*** -20.11*** -43.99*** -19.58*** -44.2*** -45.15*** -24.72*** -9.45*** -21.1*** -9.34*** -25.34*** -42.1*** -41.89*** -41.87*** -42.02*** -42.15** 
Jarque Bera is a test statistic for the null hypothesis of normality. ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the null hypothesis of a unit root with 1% and 5% critical values.  
The truncation lag = 24 and a downward selection procedure based on the AIC is performed until there is no presence of autocorrelation.  
(*) indicate significance at 10% level. 
(**) indicate significance at 5%level. 
(***) indicate significance at 1% level. 
 
Correlation coefficients, using the observations  
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0466 for n = 1767 
 
EEMUS VWOUS GMFUS EWXUS GURUS GMMUS GAFUS GMLUS EMBUD EMBUT EMBUS EEMBLN IEEMLN ISDWLN ISDULN ISDELN IUSEGR 
EEMUS 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.05 0.88 0.96 0.61 0.87 0.32 0.03 0.32 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 
VWOUS  1.00 0.94 0.05 0.88 0.96 0.60 0.87 0.33 0.04 0.32 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 
GMFUS   1.00 0.04 0.79 0.92 0.56 0.78 0.32 0.03 0.31 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 
EWXUS    1.00 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.02 
GURUS     1.00 0.86 0.58 0.79 0.31 0.01 0.31 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 
GMMUS      1.00 0.59 0.85 0.35 0.03 0.34 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.02 
GAFUS       1.00 0.57 0.19 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 
GMLUS        1.00 0.30 -0.01 0.29 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04 
EMBUD         1.00 0.23 0.96 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 -0.04 
EMBUT          1.00 0.24 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.08 
EMBUS           1.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.04 
EEMBLN            1.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IEEMLN             1.00 0.74 0.72 0.84 0.14 
ISDWLN              1.00 0.96 0.89 0.12 
ISDULN               1.00 0.83 0.13 
ISDELN                1.00 0.16 
IUSEGR                 1.00 
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Table 4 Distributional properties of daily ETF returns (in-sample) 02/01/2009 : 02/05/2012 
 
EEMUS VWOUS GMFUS EWXUS GURUS GMMUS GAFUS GMLUS EMBUD EMBUT EMBUS EEMBLN IEEMLN ISDWLN ISDULN ISDELN IUSEGR 
Mean 0.000489 0.00056 0.00054 0.000702 0.000425 0.000538 0.000576 0.000595 0.000406 0.00046 0.000406 0.00059 0.00060 0.000342 0.000435 0.00052 0.00059 
Std.Dev. 0.019894 0.01935 0.01818 0.017442 0.026006 0.018202 0.018354 0.020136 0.006993 0.007554 0.007195 0.010151 0.016872 0.013251 0.011806 0.017891 0.015337 
Skewness -0.099** -0.10*** 0.14*** 0.05*** -0.48*** -0.21*** -0.35*** -0.22*** -3.76*** -3.75*** -4.11*** -0.05 -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.32*** -0.02 0.11*** 
Ex.kurtosis 2.30*** 2.50*** 2.42*** 3.11* 3.67*** 3.01 1.8068 2.16*** 53.22*** 47.30*** 60.40*** 0.41*** 1.23*** 1.31*** 1.77*** 1.44*** 2.41*** 
Jarque bera 194.01*** 227.72*** 215.26*** 351.61*** 523.03*** 335.43*** 135.96*** 176.05*** 104515*** 82976.5*** 134413*** 6.78** 58.36*** 67.85*** 128.75*** 75.22*** 213.03*** 
ADF test -19.46*** -19.38*** -19.44*** -43.24*** -18.89*** -43.31*** -25.36*** -41.26*** -9.00*** -20.53*** -8.89*** -40.77*** -40.58*** -40.20*** -40.26*** -40.44*** -41.42*** 
 
Correlation coefficients, using the observations  
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0665 for n = 869 
 
EEMUS VWOUS GMFUS EWXUS GUFUS GMMUS GAFUS GMLUS EMBUD EMBUT EMBUS EEMBLN IEEMLN ISDWLN ISDULN ISDELN IUSEGR 
EEMUS 1 0.98 0.94 0.08 0.91 0.95 0.86 0.92 0.26 0.02 0.25 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03 
VWOUS   1 0.93 0.08 0.91 0.95 0.85 0.91 0.26 0.03 0.25 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.028 
GMFUS     1 0.06 0.84 0.91 0.79 0.85 0.28 0.01 0.27 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.063 0.02 
EWXUS       1 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.08 -0.026 0.03 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 0 0 -0.01 0.04 
GURUS         1 0.89 0.81 0.85 0.24 0 0.24 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 
GMMUS           1 0.83 0.90 0.29 0.02 0.28 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.03 
GAFUS             1 0.82 0.26 0.025 0.26 0.026 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.02 
GMLUS               1 0.24 -0.01 0.21 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.05 
EMBUD                 1 0.31 0.95 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 -0.04 
EMBUT                   1 0.32 -0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.11 
EMBUS                     1 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.11 -0.03 
EEMBLN                       1 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
IEEMLN                         1 0.76 0.76 0.84 0.21 
ISDWLN                           1 0.96 0.92 0.17 
ISDULN                             1 0.87 0.19 
ISDELN                               1 0.24 
IUSEGR                                 1 
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Table 5 Distributional properties of daily ETF returns (out-of sample) 04/05.2012 : 23/10/2015 
 
EEMUS VWOUS GMFUS EWXUS GURUS GMMUS GAFUS GMLUS EMBUD EMBUT EMBUS EEMBLN IEEMLN ISDWLN ISDULN ISDELN IUSEGR 
Mean -0.00029931 -0.00027 5.0673E-0 -0.00015 -0.00059 -0.00024 -0.00044 -0.00083 0.00009 0.000081 0.00009 0.000151 -0.00015 0.00022 0.00036 -0.00037 -0.00043 
Std. 0.011886 0.011892 0.01113 0.010635 0.015228 0.011235 0.014697 0.013471 0.004461 0.0045193 0.00452 0.0086009 0.012279 0.0083806 0.0081727 0.011279 0.01282 
Skewness -0.0019 -0.052 -0.23*** -0.48*** -0.04 -0.18*** -0.08 0.119*** -0.106*** -0.008 -0.05 -0.22*** 0.08 -0.19*** -0.07 0.04 -0.21*** 
Ex.kurtosis 0.98*** 0.99*** 1.86*** 3.54** 1.25*** 1.417*** 1.2022*** 0.70*** 6.38*** 5.94*** 6.30*** 2.27*** 2.44*** 2.51*** 3.07 2.73** 2.01*** 
Jarque bera 37.51*** 38.94*** 143.11*** 521.88*** 61.08*** 82.93*** 57.06*** 21.46*** 1577.65*** 1364.39*** 1536.33*** 208.71*** 231.79*** 249.95*** 366.08*** 289.67*** 163.93*** 
ADF test -16.12*** -16.24*** -29.44*** -30.14*** -31.21*** -16.40*** -31.72*** -19.57*** -11.22*** -14.50*** -11.45*** -8.37*** -30.40*** -13.01*** -15.92*** -14.74*** -28.71*** 
Correlation Coefficients, using the observations  
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0644 for n = 898 
          EEMUS VWOUS GMFUS EWXUS GURUS GMMUS GAFUS GMLUS EMBUD EMBUT EMBUS EEMBLN IEEMLN ISDWLN ISDULN ISDELN ISDELN 
EEMUS 1.00 0.99 0.94 -0.04 0.76 0.96 0.12 0.74 0.48 0.04 0.48 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.03 
VWOUS  1.00 0.94 -0.04 0.76 0.97 0.12 0.74 0.49 0.05 0.49 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.03 
GMFUS   1.00 -0.03 0.66 0.93 0.09 0.60 0.41 0.05 0.41 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.03 
EWXUS    1.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
GURUS     1.00 0.75 0.11 0.61 0.48 0.03 0.47 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 
GMMUS      1.00 0.11 0.72 0.48 0.03 0.48 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.01 
GAFUS       1.00 0.12 0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
GMLUS        1.00 0.45 0.00 0.44 0.13 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
EMBUD         1.00 0.01 0.98 0.12 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
EMBUT          1.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 
EMBUS           1.00 0.13 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
EEMBLN            1.00 0.09 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
IEEMLN             1.00 0.68 0.64 0.83 0.00 
ISDWLN              1.00 0.94 0.81 -0.01 
ISDULN               1.00 0.73 0.00 
ISDELN                1.00 -0.01 
IUSEGR                 1.00 
 
113 
Table 6 GJR-GARCH Model Parameter Estimates     
             
          
          
   {        }              
 





Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|)  Estimate std.Error t-value Pr(>|t|)  Estimate std.Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
EEMUS 
µ 
-0.0003 0.0003 -1.1133 0.2656  -0.0001 0.0005 -0.1882 0.8507  -0.0003 0.0004 -0.9465 0.3439 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 0.6680 0.5041  0.0000 0.0000 0.7941 0.4271  0.0000 0.0000 1.0830 0.2788 
α 
0.0000 0.0157 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0109 0.0003 0.9997  0.0000 0.0122 0.0000 1.0000 
β 
0.9489 0.0156 60.8496 0.0000  0.9334 0.0233 40.0767 0.0000  0.9465 0.0117 81.2404 0.0000 
γ 
0.0924 0.0152 6.0991 0.0000   0.1071 0.0435 2.4624 0.0138   0.0882 0.0202 4.3662 0.0000 
VWOUS 
µ 
-0.0002 0.0003 -0.8542 0.3930  0.0000 0.0006 -0.0036 0.9971  -0.0003 0.0004 -0.7988 0.4244 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 0.6337 0.5263  0.0000 0.0000 0.4347 0.6638  0.0000 0.0000 0.4568 0.6478 
α 
0.0000 0.0173 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0101 0.0008 0.9993  0.0000 0.0342 0.0000 1.0000 
β 
0.9466 0.0197 48.1057 0.0000  0.9353 0.0384 24.3526 0.0000  0.9376 0.0496 18.8953 0.0000 
γ 
0.0947 0.0154 6.1431 0.0000   0.1042 0.0582 1.7883 0.0737   0.0975 0.0293 3.3298 0.0009 
GMFUS 
µ 
0.0000 0.0004 0.0363 0.9710  0.0000 0.0006 0.0104 0.9917  0.0000 0.0003 0.1523 0.8789 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 0.1352 0.8925  0.0000 0.0000 0.2453 0.8062  0.0000 0.0000 6.5935 0.0000 
α 
0.0053 0.0631 0.0841 0.9330  0.0089 0.0300 0.2955 0.7676  0.0000 0.0086 0.0000 1.0000 
β 
0.9393 0.1156 8.1287 0.0000  0.9366 0.0763 12.2730 0.0000  0.9135 0.0092 99.0688 0.0000 
γ 
0.0968 0.0866 1.1184 0.2634   0.0932 0.0756 1.2333 0.2175   0.1152 0.0273 4.2231 0.0000 
EWXUS 
µ 
0.0000 0.0006 -0.0466 0.9629  0.0003 0.0005 0.5069 0.6122  -0.0001 0.0003 -0.2731 0.7847 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 0.1080 0.9140  0.0000 0.0000 0.1713 0.8640  0.0000 0.0000 6.9466 0.0000 
α 
0.0120 0.0715 0.1673 0.8672  0.0252 0.0128 1.9661 0.0493  0.0000 0.0075 0.0000 1.0000 
β 
0.9390 0.1077 8.7221 0.0000  0.9197 0.1032 8.9122 0.0000  0.9043 0.0135 67.0905 0.0000 
γ 
0.0873 0.0657 1.3281 0.1841   0.0792 0.0777 1.0196 0.3079   0.1299 0.0331 3.9186 0.0001 
GURUS 
µ 
-0.0005 0.0004 -1.4480 0.1476  0.0000 0.0010 0.0271 0.9784  -0.0007 0.0004 -1.5482 0.1216 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 1.5678 0.1169  0.0000 0.0000 0.8324 0.4052  0.0000 0.0000 0.4267 0.6696 
α 
0.0000 0.0087 0.0000 1.0000  0.0059 0.0264 0.2240 0.8228  0.0000 0.0291 0.0000 1.0000 
β 
0.9543 0.0083 114.8073 0.0000  0.9327 0.0177 52.7031 0.0000  0.9622 0.0298 32.3090 0.0000 
γ 
0.0770 0.0160 4.7992 0.0000   0.0969 0.0476 2.0350 0.0419   0.0585 0.0177 3.2979 0.0010 
GMMUS 
µ 
-0.0002 0.0005 -0.3734 0.7088  0.0000 0.0005 0.0289 0.9769  -0.0002 0.0003 -0.6563 0.5116 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 0.1155 0.9081  0.0000 0.0000 0.2278 0.8198  0.0000 0.0000 2.0841 0.0371 
α 
0.0000 0.0623 0.0003 0.9998  0.0104 0.0250 0.4176 0.6762  0.0000 0.0109 0.0000 1.0000 
β 
0.9507 0.0896 10.6128 0.0000  0.9346 0.0862 10.8390 0.0000  0.9254 0.0133 69.5658 0.0000 
γ 
0.0861 0.0415 2.0774 0.0378   0.0852 0.0819 1.0401 0.2983   0.1032 0.0244 4.2313 0.0000 
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GAFUS 
µ 
-0.0002 0.0003 -0.4499 0.6528   0.0003 0.0005 0.5281 0.5975   -0.0004 0.0004 -0.9266 0.3541 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 4.6824 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 3.8940 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000 2.2020 0.0277 
α 
0.0000 0.0069 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0119 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0129 0.0000 1.0000 
β 
0.9434 0.0067 140.3181 0.0000  0.9293 0.0122 76.2660 0.0000  0.9650 0.0096 100.9682 0.0000 
γ 
0.0778 0.0170 4.5793 0.0000   0.0973 0.0298 3.2691 0.0011   0.0503 0.0184 2.7397 0.0062 
GMLUS 
µ 
-0.0004 0.0010 -0.4427 0.6580  -0.0001 0.0007 -0.1080 0.9140  -0.0005 0.0009 -0.5433 0.5869 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0694 0.9447  0.0000 0.0000 0.6804 0.4963  0.0000 0.0000 0.0571 0.9544 
α 
0.0000 0.1445 0.0000 1.0000  0.0130 0.0255 0.5118 0.6088  0.0000 0.2495 0.0000 1.0000 
β 
0.9460 0.2334 4.0533 0.0001  0.9112 0.0261 34.9231 0.0000  0.9500 0.3232 2.9398 0.0033 
γ 
0.0952 0.1263 0.7537 0.4510   0.1192 0.0564 2.1126 0.0346   0.0837 0.0742 1.1269 0.2598 
EMBUD 
µ 
0.0003 0.0004 0.8418 0.3999  0.0005 0.0018 0.3022 0.7625  0.0001 0.0003 0.3237 0.7462 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0836 0.9334  0.0000 0.0000 0.0271 0.9784  0.0000 0.0000 0.0981 0.9218 
α 
0.0617 0.2438 0.2533 0.8001  0.0559 0.7660 0.0730 0.9418  0.0744 0.2920 0.2547 0.7989 
β 
0.7917 0.1096 7.2264 0.0000  0.7807 0.3516 2.2206 0.0264  0.7927 0.0364 21.7661 0.0000 
γ 
0.2221 0.4139 0.5367 0.5915   0.2790 1.4297 0.1951 0.8453   0.1548 0.2772 0.5586 0.5764 
EMBUT 
µ 
0.0003 0.0002 1.3277 0.1843  0.0005 0.0012 0.4327 0.6652  0.0000 0.0001 0.2086 0.8348 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 0.2260 0.8212  0.0000 0.0000 0.0453 0.9638  0.0000 0.0000 1.9153 0.0555 
α 
0.0665 0.0895 0.7435 0.4572  0.0361 0.4379 0.0825 0.9342  0.1300 0.0329 3.9547 0.0001 
β 
0.8046 0.0555 14.4947 0.0000  0.8144 0.0898 9.0713 0.0000  0.7094 0.0409 17.3432 0.0000 
γ 
0.1679 0.1236 1.3590 0.1741   0.2385 0.5632 0.4234 0.6720   0.1302 0.0684 1.9023 0.0571 
EMBUS 
µ 
0.0003 0.0001 2.7338 0.0063  0.0006 0.0015 0.3800 0.7040  0.0001 0.0001 0.6745 0.5000 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 0.4496 0.6530  0.0000 0.0000 0.0270 0.9785  0.0000 0.0000 0.1711 0.8642 
α 
0.0528 0.0393 1.3445 0.1788  0.0396 0.5369 0.0738 0.9411  0.1138 0.1330 0.8558 0.3921 
β 
0.8248 0.0509 16.1895 0.0000  0.8121 0.3908 2.0777 0.0377  0.7538 0.1053 7.1599 0.0000 
γ 
0.1790 0.1025 1.7464 0.0808   0.2420 1.1735 0.2062 0.8366   0.1467 0.1862 0.7876 0.4309 
EEMBLN 
µ 
0.0004 0.0002 1.9457 0.0517  0.0006 0.0003 1.6905 0.0909  0.0003 0.0003 0.9940 0.3202 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 0.5855 0.5582  0.0000 0.0000 0.3957 0.6923  0.0000 0.0000 0.2743 0.7839 
α 
0.0314 0.0156 2.0180 0.0436  0.0276 0.0304 0.9088 0.3634  0.0290 0.0457 0.6341 0.5260 
β 
0.9420 0.0128 73.5489 0.0000  0.9501 0.0318 29.9022 0.0000  0.9283 0.0471 19.7264 0.0000 
γ 
0.0398 0.0169 2.3525 0.0186   0.0188 0.0244 0.7684 0.4423   0.0632 0.0246 2.5690 0.0102 
IEEMLN 
µ 
-0.0002 0.0003 -0.4499 0.6528   0.0003 0.0005 0.5281 0.5975   -0.0004 0.0004 -0.9266 0.3541 
ω 
0.0000 0.0000 4.6824 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 3.8940 0.0001  0.0000 0.0000 2.2020 0.0277 
α 
0.0000 0.0069 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0119 0.0000 1.0000  0.0000 0.0129 0.0000 1.0000 
β 
0.9434 0.0067 140.3181 0.0000  0.9293 0.0122 76.2660 0.0000  0.9650 0.0096 100.9682 0.0000 
γ 
0.0778 0.0170 4.5793 0.0000   0.0973 0.0298 3.2691 0.0011   0.0503 0.0184 2.7397 0.0062 
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ISDWLN 
µ 0.000158 0.000205 0.767648 0.442697  0.000234 0.000459 0.511144 0.60925  0.000148 0.000235 0.627553 0.530297 
ω 0.000002 0.000012 0.130746 0.895976  0.000003 0.000006 0.430931 0.666519  0.000004 0 37.37054 0 
α 0.000003 0.052022 0.00006 0.999952  0 0.022781 0.000004 0.999997  0 0.009528 0.000017 0.999986 
β 0.915415 0.170726 5.361881 0  0.925637 0.032083 28.85149 0  0.827529 0.022818 36.26599 0 
γ 0.142547 0.209095 0.681732 0.495409  0.114851 0.067947 1.690299 0.090971  0.222374 0.050199 4.429805 0.000009 
ISDULN 
µ 0.00024 0.000189 1.271273 0.203632  0.000398 0.000321 1.240528 0.21478  0.000208 0./000229 0.909534 0.363068 
ω 0.000002 0.000001 4.0446 0.000052  0.000002 0.000003 0.674117 0.500237  0.000005 0 216.75 0 
α 0 0.010668 0.000023 0.999982  0 0.024444 0.000008 0.999994  0.000001 0.004818 0.000117 0.999907 
β 0.882257 0.014338 61.53353 0  0.914763 0.029202 31.32528 0  0.792156 0.021547 36.76358 0 
γ 0.187603 0.029892 6.276016 0  0.136281 0.058528 2.328464 0.019887  0.26808 0.051027 5.253686 0 
ISDELN 
µ -0.00037 0.000388 -0.94962 0.342305  0.000054 0.000525 0.101884 0.918849  -0.00044 0.000348 -1.26442 0.206078 
ω 0.000001 0.000005 0.258357 0.796132  0.000003 0.000004 0.886399 0.375402  0.000002 0.000002 1.06542 0.286686 
α 0 0.029272 0.000001 0.999999  0.014619 0.012938 1.12993 0.258506  0 0.015642 0 1 
β 0.951309 0.045478 20.91792 0  0.92813 0.022138 41.92563 0  0.953527 0.018493 51.56157 0 
γ 0.08443 0.028116 3.002947 0.002674  0.090635 0.034917 2.595719 0.009439  0.067222 0.025158 2.672007 0.00754 
IUSEGR 
µ -9.3E-05 0.000283 -0.32922 0.741992  0.000174 0.000436 0.398949 0.689931  -0.00026 0.000355 -0.72242 0.470034 
ω 0.000003 0.000003 0.863137 0.388062  0.000003 0.000004 0.782788 0.433751  0.000003 0.000001 2.411548 0.015885 
α 0.022975 0.014485 1.586151 0.112705  0.037187 0.022384 1.661314 0.09665  0.000001 0.008166 0.000155 0.999877 
β 0.92362 0.02692 34.30968 0  0.910581 0.038043 23.93526 0  0.939926 0.008933 105.2209 0 
γ 0.074439 0.027216 2.735153 0.006235  0.074798 0.043033 1.738131 0.082188  0.078934 0.022808 3.460847 0.000538 
This table shows the estimation output for GJR-GARCH model. 
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Table 7 Integrated GARCH (iGARCH) Model Parameter Estimates   
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 Estimate std.Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
 
Estimate std.Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
 
Estimate std.Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
EEMUS 
µ 0.000133 0.000289 0.461955 0.644114 
 
0.00052 0.000527 0.98619 0.324039 
 
0.00001 0.000355 0.02709 0.978388 
ω 0.000001 0.000012 0.121604 0.903212 
 
0.000003 0.000004 0.79936 0.424083 
 
0.000001 0.000003 0.325469 0.744826 
α 0.083635 0.119177 0.701767 0.482825 
 
0.091448 0.029798 3.06898 0.002148 
 
0.076337 0.030405 2.51063 0.012052 
VWOUS 
µ 0.00022 0.000286 0.767723 0.442652 
 
0.000582 0.00052 1.11796 0.263586 
 
0.000089 0.00035 0.254367 0.799212 
ω 0.000001 0.000011 0.14062 0.88817 
 
0.000003 0.000004 0.70552 0.480484 
 
0.000001 0.000003 0.351617 0.725126 
α 0.082523 0.10446 0.789995 0.42953 
 
0.08725 0.031929 2.73264 0.006283 
 
0.080432 0.032863 2.447484 0.014386 
GMFUS 
µ 0.000433 0.000424 1.021521 0.307007 
 
0.000535 0.000511 1.04835 0.294475 
 
0.000396 0.000317 1.250624 0.211072 
ω 0.000001 0.000068 0.019191 0.984689 
 
0.000002 0.000006 0.38551 0.699857 
 
0.000001 0.000004 0.298846 0.765058 
α 0.084172 0.722524 0.116497 0.907259 
 
0.084192 0.04997 1.68486 0.092016 
 
0.091975 0.047978 1.917039 0.055233 
EWXUS 
µ 0.000343 0.000958 0.357835 0.720467 
 
0.000635 0.000503 1.2613 0.207201 
 
0.000275 0.000271 1.016043 0.309609 
ω 0.000001 0.00007 0.019351 0.984561 
 
0.000003 0.000006 0.52522 0.599429 
 
0.000001 0.000006 0.233641 0.815264 
α 0.085521 0.771684 0.110823 0.911756 
 
0.088278 0.046873 1.88336 0.059652 
 
0.111568 0.093096 1.198411 0.230757 
GURUS 
µ -7.1E-05 0.000383 -0.18633 0.852188 
 
0.000774 0.000676 1.1455 0.252002 
 
-0.00037 0.000464 -0.80434 0.4212 
ω 0.000003 0.000006 0.432151 0.665632 
 
0.000006 0.000005 1.21649 0.2238 
 
0.000001 0.000003 0.339401 0.734308 
α 0.077096 0.044154 1.746073 0.080798 
 
0.095422 0.025664 3.71815 0.000201 
 
0.046146 0.017536 2.631512 0.008501 
GMMUS 
µ 0.000225 0.000344 0.654555 0.512754 
 
0.000524 0.000551 0.94955 0.342342 
 
0.000122 0.000328 0.371094 0.710568 
ω 0.000002 0.000034 0.043748 0.965105 
 
0.000003 0.000007 0.39716 0.691248 
 
0.000001 0.000004 0.304775 0.760537 
α 0.083944 0.352374 0.238225 0.811707 
 
0.086948 0.056982 1.52588 0.127038 
 
0.091492 0.051574 1.773986 0.076065 
GAFUS 
µ 0.000276 0.000332 0.831999 0.40541 
 
0.000741 0.000502 1.47392 0.140503 
 
-9.2E-05 0.000448 -0.20557 0.837124 
ω 0.000002 0.000005 0.414768 0.678312 
 
0.000004 0.000007 0.55473 0.579082 
 
0 0 0.831993 0.405413 
α 0.069956 0.039352 1.777686 0.075455 
 
0.098313 0.053875 1.82485 0.068024 
 
0.020882 0.002385 8.755782 0 
GMLUS 
µ 0.000091 0.000503 0.181568 0.855922 
 
0.000564 0.000576 0.9791 0.327531 
 
-0.00013 0.000412 -0.30701 0.758834 
ω 0.000002 0.000018 0.089184 0.928936 
 
0.000004 0.000005 0.7455 0.455972 
 
0.000001 0.000003 0.230465 0.817731 
α 0.07614 0.153213 0.496956 0.61922 
 
0.102519 0.039393 2.60249 0.009255 
 
0.054417 0.026611 2.044933 0.040861 
EMBUD 
µ 0.000523 0.000142 3.688199 0.000226 
 
0.000813 0.000222 3.66348 0.000249 
 
0.00023 0.000125 1.831359 0.067047 
ω 0.000001 0.000001 0.54142 0.588218 
 
0.000001 0.000002 0.3704 0.711082 
 
0.000001 0.000001 0.71488 0.474683 
α 0.228943 0.05522 4.146043 0.000034 
 
0.215438 0.075966 2.83598 0.004569 
 
0.252638 0.04811 5.251211 0 
EMBUT 
µ 0.000438 0.000123 3.56849 0.000359 
 
0.000765 0.000195 3.92468 0.000087 
 
0.00013 0.000129 1.01361 0.310769 
ω 0.000001 0.000001 0.598795 0.54931 
 
0.000001 0.000002 0.36441 0.715548 
 
0.000001 0.000001 1.052891 0.292391 
α 0.220927 0.056246 3.927886 0.000086 
 
0.207166 0.06902 3.00153 0.002686 
 
0.303008 0.05287 5.731201 0 
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Table 6 (Continued) Integrated GARCH (iGARCH) Model Parameter Estimates   
     (    )    
   
 
 
   
  
EMBUS 
µ 0.000489 0.000137 3.580199 0.000343 
 
0.000782 0.000242 3.2322 0.001228 
 
0.000222 0.000127 1.756877 0.078939 
ω 0.000001 0.000002 0.352624 0.72437 
 
0.000001 0.000003 0.27623 0.782369 
 
0.000001 0.000001 0.597792 0.549978 
α 0.195881 0.067024 2.922558 0.003472 
 
0.185361 0.081593 2.27179 0.023099 
 
0.262843 0.060867 4.318284 0.000016 
EEMBLN 
µ 0.000503 0.000189 2.655878 0.00791 
 
0.000665 0.000337 1.9745 0.048325 
 
0.000424 0.000231 1.838479 0.065992 
ω 0 0.000001 0.33233 0.73964 
 
0 0.000001 0.1898 0.849467 
 
0.000001 0.000004 0.144429 0.885162 
α 0.062112 0.013312 4.665951 0.000003 
 
0.043805 0.006734 6.50502 0 
 
0.081456 0.056687 1.436955 0.150731 
IEEMLN 
µ 0.000355 0.000291 1.220722 0.222191 
 
0.000743 0.000517 1.43744 0.150592 
 
0.00015 0.000362 0.414788 0.678297 
ω 0.000001 0.000004 0.265577 0.790565 
 
0.000002 0.000009 0.17629 0.860066 
 
0.000001 0.000002 0.509868 0.610144 
α 0.070664 0.040277 1.754458 0.079352 
 
0.07627 0.070398 1.08341 0.278625 
 
0.058865 0.013811 4.26208 0.00002 
ISDWLN 
µ 0.000492 0.000202 2.430523 0.015077 
 
0.000595 0.000434 1.37017 0.170633 
 
0.000502 0.00024 2.093044 0.036345 
ω 0.000001 0.000005 0.18328 0.854579 
 
0.000001 0.000012 0.10928 0.912978 
 
0.000002 0.00001 0.156949 0.875285 
α 0.088292 0.06543 1.349414 0.177204 
 
0.086718 0.131746 0.65822 0.510394 
 
0.12771 0.1615 0.790772 0.429077 
ISDULN 
µ 0.000612 0.000195 3.143034 0.001672 
 
0.00074 0.000307 2.40926 0.015985 
 
0.000565 0.000234 2.416561 0.015668 
ω 0.000001 0.000004 0.358433 0.720019 
 
0.000001 0.000003 0.33182 0.740026 
 
0.000003 0.000003 0.963354 0.33537 
α 0.129375 0.072417 1.786537 0.074012 
 
0.10183 0.048338 2.10663 0.035149 
 
0.203875 0.06079 3.353755 0.000797 
ISDELN 
µ 0.000051 0.000281 0.182093 0.85551 
 
0.000491 0.000508 0.96484 0.334625 
 
-0.00013 0.000344 -0.39009 0.696473 
ω 0.000001 0.000009 0.121391 0.903382 
 
0.000002 0.000005 0.38867 0.697517 
 
0.000001 0.000002 0.27943 0.779915 
α 0.065867 0.077709 0.847614 0.396653 
 
0.07853 0.038461 2.04182 0.04117 
 
0.051144 0.019461 2.627948 0.00859 
IUSEGR 
µ 0.000176 0.000309 0.569187 0.569229 
 
0.000427 0.000416 1.02533 0.305209 
 
0.000012 0.000346 0.033869 0.972981 
ω 0.000001 0.000059 0.023574 0.981192 
 
0.000002 0.000009 0.20883 0.834583 
 
0.000001 0.000003 0.29706 0.766421 
α 0.07919 0.607061 0.130449 0.896212 
 
0.093131 0.093669 0.99426 0.320096 
 
0.060158 0.025467 2.362202 0.018167 
This table shows the estimation output for IGARCH model.  
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Table 8 Estimated Parameters of Dynamic Conditional Correlation Models   (       ) ̅    (        
 )         
 DCC-GJRGARCH  ADCC-GJRGARCH  DCC-iGARCH   
  Estimate std.Error t-value Pr(>|t|)  Estimate std.Error t-value Pr(>|t|)  Estimate std.Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
Full 
Sample 
   0.014 0.001 8.2 0  0.013 0.001 8.368 0  0.013 0.001 12.53 0 
   0.970 0.005 179.281 0  0.968 0.006 156.6 0  0.975 0. 1078 0 
    - - - -  0.002 0.001 1.922 0.054  - - - - 
In-sample    0.024 0.003 7.384 0  0.021 0.004 5.054 0  0.023 0.004 5.77 0 
   0.872 0.034 24.96 0  0.877 0.032 27.03 0  0.887 0.028 31.2 0 
    - - - -  0.008 0.002 3.462 0  - - - - 
Out-of 
sample 
   0.012 0.001 6.554 0  0.010 0.001 5.789 0  0.012 0.001 8.03 0 
   0.945 0.011 80.54 0  0.941 0.012 72.84 0  0.953 0.007 133.9 0 
    - - - -  0 0.002 2.669 0.007  - - - - 
The table presents parameter estimates for the DCC and A-DCC conditional correlation models. The full sample period is January 5, 2009–October 13, 2015, in-sample period is January 5, 2009–May 3, 2012, and out-of sample period 
is May 6, 2012–October 13, 2015  
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Table 9 Empirical Log-likelihood Function and Information Criteria (Model Fit Diagnostics)   
Full LLF AIC SIC Parameters  Inference  
DCC-GJR GARCH 112082.8 -126.59 -125.85 240 
 
Time variation  
A-DCC-GJR GARCH 112087.3 -106.59 -111.55 241 Asymmetry  
DCC- iGARCH 111822.5 -126.33 -125.7 206 
 
Time variation  
In-sample 
   
   
DCC-GJR GARCH 53594.5 -122.8 -121.48 240 
 
Time variation  
A-DCC-GJR GARCH 53598.25 -112.61 -109.38 241 Asymmetry  
DCC- iGARCH 53483.8 -122.62 -121.49 206 
 
Time variation  
Out-of sample 
   
   
DCC-GJR GARCH 59212.91 -131.34 -130.06 240 
 
Time variation  
A-DCC-GJR GARCH 59218.18 -103.35 -127.21 241 Asymmetry  
DCC- iGARCH 58949.72 -130.83 -129.73 206 
 
Time variation  
K is the number of parameters and LLF the log-likelihood function value, AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion, AIC = 2 x k - 2 x ln(LLF), SIC is the Schwarz Information Criterion, SIC = k x ln(LLF) – 2 x ln(LLF). 
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 Table 10 Optimal portfolio with the objective of minimizing portfolio risk under Dynamic conditional correlation models 
 Optimal portfolio under DCC-GARCH  
(GJR-GARCH) 
Optimal portfolio under Asymmetric DCC-GARCH 
(GJR-GARCH) 








































































               
GMFUS 2.76% 11.89%   
   
2.33% 11.82% 
    
6.40% 15.33% 
    
EWXUS 
 
4.10% 34.80% 37.39% 
   
4.01% 34.84% 37.44% 
   

















    
4.40% 7.41% 


















32.00%   
    
32.02% 
     
31.86% 






     
20.38% 
      
EEMBLN 10.62% 48.77% 41.32% 50.68% 
 
7.71% 10.31% 48.76% 42.14% 50.92% 
 






    
1.86% 4.23% 






























     
16.76% 
     
19.16% 






































Mean 0.04% 0.03% 0.06% 0.06% 0.04% 0.01% 0.04% 0.03% 0.06% 0.06% 0.04% 0.001% 0.04% 0.03% 0.06% 0.06% 0.04% 0.01% 
 
Std.DEV 0.72% 0.59% 0.59% 0.65% 0.70% 0.32% 0.72% 0.59% 0.61% 0.65% 0.70% 0.32% 0.74% 0.60% 0.56% 0.61% 0.90% 0.31% 
 (C+I) indicates portfolio of conventional and Shari‘ah compliant equity ETFs 
(C) indicates portfolio of conventional assets only 
StdDev Sharpe (Rf=0.1%, p=95%): 
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VWOUS 
      
GMFUS 
      
EWXUS 3.75% 4.25% 2.45% 2.34% 6.39% 6.89% 
GURUS 
      
GMMUS 
      




      
EMBUD 29.82% 36.04% 30.51% 43.50% 1.96% 14.70% 
EMBUT 34.63% 38.83% 36.37% 38.88% 35.09% 38.16% 
EMBUS 12.10% 11.34% 13.19% 6.34% 34.56% 28.78% 
























Total Weight 100.0% 100.0% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Std.Dev. 0.216% 0.23% 0.222% 0.229% 0.197% 0.212% 
The table shows the optimal weights under the static Mean-Variance strategy for three research samples using daily data. The full sample period is January 5, 2009–October 13, 2015, In-sample period is 
January 5, 2009–May 3, 2012, and out-of sample period is May 6, 2009–October 13, 2015. (C+I) indicates portfolio of conventional and Islamic ETFs, and (C) indicates portfolio of conventional ETFs only 
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Table 12 Performance of DCC/ A-DCC and Mean-Variance Strategies: Modified Sharpe Ratio (mSR) 
 
DCC-GJRGARCH A-DCC-GJRGARCH Mean-Variance DCC-IGARCH* 
Full sample (C+I) 0.048 0.047 0.069 
0.052 
Full sample (C) 0.056 0.056 0.061 
0.055 
In-sample (C+I) 0.081 0.081 0.092 
0.085 
In-sample (C) 0.077 0.077 
0.085 0.079 
Out-of sample (C+I) 0.053 0.053 
0.027 0.053 
Out-of sample (C) 0.023 0.023 
0.015 
0.022 
The table shows the modified Sharpe ratios for the optimal portfolios under the dynamic and static strategies for three samples, using daily returns. 
The full sample period is January 5, 2009–October 13, 2015, In-sample period is January 5, 2009–May 3, 2012, and out-of sample period is May 6, 2009–October 13, 2015. (C+I) indicates portfolio of 








Islamic banks have been promoted as a safe and equitable banking alternative, which 
promotes fairness and social welfare. Theoretically, the operations of Islamic banks 
embrace values such as fairness, avoidance of speculative behaviour and investing in 
industries in productive activities with real economic value. Over the years, Islamic banks 
have succeeded in offering financial services and allowing more people to engage with 
banks and get their money circulated in the economy from ―depositors / investors‖ to 
―borrowers or entrepreneurs‖. These services mainly are very appealing to religiously 
conscious clients because of their tailored services.  
 
In the previous chapter, I investigated the effect of Islamic ETFs on improving the 
risk-adjusted returns for a portfolio of ETFs in emerging markets. In this chapter, I con-
tinue my investigation but I will focus on the banking side and examine the effect of 
Islamic banks on systemic risk. Systemic risk is a large-scale disorder, which may happen 
in the financial system and may affect economic growth and welfare. Literature shows 
that financial sectors such as the banking, insurance and other financial services sectors 
have led to an increase in systemic risk. The rational of this research stems from the 
evident exponential growth rate Islamic banking sector due to the increasing demand for 
Islamic banks‘ services and financial assets, and the growing Muslim population.  Ac-
cording to Ernst and Young (2016), Islamic banks have become key players in the 
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banking sector, since they have grown by around 47% since 2014. I argue that this ex-
ponential growth would have an effect on the risk of the financial system. Recently, there 
has been an extensive empirical evidence available about the relative stability of Islamic 
banks compared to conventional banks during the global financial crisis in 2008 (e.g. 
Sorwar e al. 2016; Beck et al. 2013). However, the empirical evidence regarding the 
unaddressed and significant inefficiency, insolvency, withdrawal, operational risks in 
Islamic banks (e.g. Pappas et al. 2016; Abedifar et al. 2016; Bacha 2008), is alarming in 
light of their rapid growth rate.  
 
Accordingly, this research contributes to the literature about the Islamic banks‘ financial 
instability in two ways. First, to examine the effect of Islamic banks‘ financial distress on 
other financial institutions by jointly considering their own specific characteristics, 
macroeconomic variables and market structure. Previous research has either focused on 
Islamic banks‘ characteristics solely, or modelled their propensity to failure risk com-
pared to those of conventional banks. For example, Khediri et al. (2015) find that Islamic 
banks in GCC countries are liquid, better capitalised, more profitable and have lower 
credit risk than conventional banks. Abedifar et al. (2013) find no difference between 
large Islamic and conventional banks in terms of insolvency risk. Gheeraert (2014) and 
Wanke et al. (2016) investigate the effect of efficiency and market share of Islamic banks 
on competitiveness and financial innovation. My research is different from these studies 
in terms of the selection of the possible relevant drivers of Islamic banks‘ performance. I 
do not consider only bank-level variables and macro-economic variables, I also take into 
consideration the linkages and effect of tail-risk spill-overs from and to Islamic banks. 
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Linkages are one of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) four ―Ls‖ in financial sectors, which can 
cause a financial crisis: leverage, liquidity, losses and linkages. 
 
Second, given the estimated financial distress of Islamic banks, I examine the systemic 
risk relevance of Islamic banks on the financial system in terms of realised systemic risk. 
Previous research follows a top-down approach, where they analyse the effect of eco-
nomic stress and financial instability on Islamic banks. For example, Sorwar et al. (2016) 
study the effect of market risk on conventional and Islamic banks using Value-at Risk 
(VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) as measure of financial distress, and find that the 
effect is indistinguishable.  Bourkhis and Nabi (2013) argue that financial systems‘ dis-
tress has an equal impact on both conventional and Islamic banks. More particularly, 
Djennas (2016) find that the up and down movements in the economic activity has sig-
nificant impact on the efficiency of Islamic banks.  Whereas, Beck et al. (2013) and 
Khan (1991) argue that Islamic banks have better capacity of risk sharing and handle 
economic stress better than their conventional peers. I contribute to the literature in this 
research by following a bottom-up approach instead. The advantage of this approach is 
that I estimate Islamic banks‘ financial distress using conditional VaR and given their 
specific characteristics, macroeconomic variables, and financial system structures. Then, 
I determine whether their financial distress is systemically relevant. Moreover, I inves-
tigate further if there is time-variability in Islamic banks‘ effect on the system, due to their 




The research data consists of weekly balance sheets, macroeconomic and market data of 
352 financial institutions in ten majority Muslim countries. The data covers the period 
from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2015. This period is important to investigate the 
systemic risk contribution of the Islamic banking sector, as the sector has exponentially 
grown after the financial crisis, and this may lead to have more rigorous results about 
their realised systemic risk. The countries selected met my three selection criteria; they 
have stock markets, their financial systems include both Islamic and conventional insti-




For the research methodology, I partially follow Hautsch et al. (2015) and Adrian and 
Brunnermier (2011) methods in estimating Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR) and 
network analysis to determine Islamic banks‘ systemic risk contribution. The difference 
in my model specification and their specifications stems from the different economic 
structure of my selected countries (mostly emerging countries) (Mirzaei et al. 2013; 
Pappas et al. 2016), compared to their analysis of the financial system in the USA. 
 
CoVaR estimation and financial networks structures show that Islamic banks and 
takaful generally have significant tail-risk spillovers on conventional and other Islamic 
                                                          
15
 The selection is based on the market share not the number of institutions. I select a country if Islamic 
banks represent at least 10% of total market share of the banking sector (the portion of the market controlled 
by Islamic banks). Hence, if Islamic banks are few but very large in a certain country, this country would 
satisfy this selection criteria. In addition, size of Islamic banks is proxied by the logarithm of total assets 
which is used as a micro-variable for financial institutions investigated in this research. According to my 
empirical results, size does not have significant effect on the direction of risk channelling and driving 




financial institutions. I find that network connections or loss exceedances are the main 
drivers of Islamic banks financial distress across countries, and this finding is confirmed 
by my robustness tests.  
 
Regarding the role of Islamic banks in financial networks, I find a variation in the role of 
Islamic banks in the financial system across countries. I find that there is at least one 
Islamic bank, which acts as a risk driver or risk channel as conventional banks do within 
the financial system. Whereas, other Islamic banks appear to act as risk recipients. Fur-
thermore, my research generally finds that Islamic banks contribute to systemic risk as 
their conventional peers do. The joint significance test shows that most Islamic banks are 
systemically relevant. I find also a time-variability in systemic risk contribution of a 
number of Islamic banks due to their own specific-characteristics. I intuitively justify 
both situations primarily by the insufficient risk management practices Islamic banks 
have, their limited access to finance due to Shari‘ah standards, and the unclear rules and 
penalties in case of the default of their counterparties. These results are concerning when 
it comes to the development of the Islamic banking sector, the growing Muslim popula-
tion and the increasing appetite for Islamic financial instruments. They imply that a close 
supervision by financial authorities is needed and clear risk management practices in 
Islamic banks should be enforced. The implications of this research are crucial for eco-
nomic policy discussions, regulators and risk managers.  
In the next section, relevant theoretical background and empirical evidence about the 
performance of Islamic banks, financial network analysis and systemic risk measurement 




4.2 Literature Review 
Islamic finance has recently received substantial interest from academics, practitioners, 
and many governments of non-Islamic countries. Islamic banks allow Muslim investors 
and firms to access financial alternatives, which are compliant with Shari‘ah (the Islamic 
law). The existence of Islamic banks alongside conventional banks creates a dual finan-
cial system. This may increase competition, offer better financial services to clients, and 
provide strategic solutions for poverty problems (Rajan, 2006). In such a system, my 
main investigation is finding whether Islamic banks increase systemic risk and the size of 
their systemic risk contribution. The literature behind this question is two sided. One 
strand of studies compares Islamic banks and conventional banks in terms of many 
firm-specific characteristics,
16
 their role in developing country‘s financial systems and 
their performance during financial crises. The other strand of studies about financial 
networks and systemic risk contribution use various proxies for firm-specific character-
istics to determine whether the financial institution is distressed and how much is their 
systemic contribution. However, there is no bridge between these strands of the literature. 
Therefore, I expand upon the existing comparison between Islamic banks and Conven-
tional banks to investigate how Islamic banks and Conventional banks work together to 
either build up or reduce systemic risk.  
 
                                                          
16
 There are many firm-specific characteristics present in the literature in relation to comparing Islamic 
banks and conventional banks‘ performance. These include efficiency, stability, insolvency, maturity 
mismatch, profitability, and volatility (see Pappas et al. (2016), Abedifar et al. 2016, Abedifar et al. 2013, 
Khediri et al. (2015), Beck et al. 2013, Gheeraert, 2014, Wanke et al. 2016, Baele et al. 2014, El-Gamal and 
Inangolo, 2005, Bacha, 2008, Errico and Farrahbaksh (1998), and Saeed and Izzeldin, M (2016). 
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In the first part of this section, I review studies which compare Islamic banks with con-
ventional banks and form a potential idea about whether or not Islamic banks would 
increase or decrease systemic risk in financial systems. When it comes to systemic risk 
measurement, I present in the second part empirical evidence about different systemic 
risk measures and discuss their advantages and disadvantages.  
 
4.2.1 The Relevance of Islamic banks to Economic and Financial Development 
There has been a variation in the effect of Islamic banks on countries‘ financial systems 
and economic development. Islamic banks‘ effect within and across countries has been 
dependant on their size, efficiency, bank-specific characteristics and cultural and legal 
limitations. Gheeraert and Weill (2015) find Islamic banking in general improves mac-
roeconomic efficiency. Beck et al. (2013) contrast between Islamic banks and Conven-
tional banks in terms of business orientation, efficiency and stability and find that: i) the 
business model of Islamic banks is similar to that of Conventional banks, ii) the quality of 
Islamic banks‘ assets is higher by investing in real economic activities, and iii) their 
market capitalisation is bigger. This makes them better off during financial crises.  Is-
lamic banks are closer to insolvency than conventional banks. Neither studies however, 
looked further into the variation cross-country and cross-Islamic banks‘ characteristics 
and their effect on financial and economic development.  
 
Abedifar et al. (2016) address the shortcomings of Beck et al. (2013) and Gheeraert, and 
Weill (2015) by comparing the efficiency of Islamic banks and Conventional banks based 
on their size (small, medium and large). They study whether or not the coexistence of 
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Islamic banks and Conventional banks improves countries‘ financial development in 
terms of economic growth, income inequality and reducing poverty.  Their research 
focuses on commercial banking with dual financial systems in 22 Muslim countries from 
1999 to 2011. They find that there is little relationship between the presence of Islamic 
banks of any size and economic growth. They also show that there is a positive rela-
tionship between the market share of medium size Islamic banks and the mobility of 
funds, reduction in poverty, and credit allocation, whereas only large Islamic banks im-
prove the efficiency of Conventional banks. The possible explanation for these findings is 
small Islamic banks may not survive fierce banking competition (Katib and Kent, 2000).  
 
More particularly, when an Islamic bank has not reached a sizeable market share, its 
effect is negligible. When medium size Islamic banks have bigger market shares, their 
positive effects on banking system development happens through their transition by in-
creasing i) market penetration, ii) financial innovation, and iii) competition (Gheeraert, 
2014; Wanke et al. 2016). First, Islamic banks thrive to expand their market share in the 
economy, they tend to improve their redistribution of profits from PLS projects to de-
positors, and tend to ease credit standards for borrowers and entrepreneurs. This may 
attract clients who used to get services from Conventional banks. Second, Islamic banks 
cannot develop financial services unless they reach sizeable market share or cooperation 
with other Islamic banks in a Shari‘ah compliant sector. Third, this financial innovation 
and development can empower Islamic banks‘ competitiveness. However, when the 
market share of Islamic banks gets larger, large Islamic banks may find themselves in an 




Opposite to Muslim majority countries, Abedifar et al. (2016) find that the banking sys-
tem is more developed and there is a positive relationship between the presence of Islamic 
banks and economic growth in countries with religiously diverse populations. Both me-
dium and large Islamic banks improve the efficiency of Conventional banks. The greater 
the market share of Conventional banks with Islamic windows or branches, the higher 
their efficiency relative to Conventional banks with no Islamic banking branches or 
windows. This is due to the competitive pressure to improve their efficiency.  
 
Empirical evidence about the efficiency of Islamic banks relative to Conventional banks 
is not conclusive. Wanke et al. (2016) compare between domestic and foreign Islamic 
banks and Conventional banks‘ efficiency and financial distress in Malaysia. Malaysian 
domestic Islamic banks are found to be less efficient than domestic Conventional banks, 
since they had significantly greater loss provision and expenses in relation to their assets, 
net profits, and equity. The higher expenses result from i) the enforcement of Shari‘ah 
complaint screening by Islamic banks on financial products and services, and ii) the op-
erations of domestic Islamic banks are less leveraged. Wanke et al. (2016) find also that 
foreign banks - either Islamic banks or Conventional banks - are less efficient than do-
mestic banks, because of the existence of extreme cultural and regulatory limitations 
against them, which limit their efficiency. The possible explanation for the inefficiency of 
foreign Islamic banks in Malaysia is due to the significant variation in the Islamic juris-
diction across countries and different social traditions. This greatly affects the Islamic 
guidelines in relation to the leverage and profit and loss ratios, which Islamic banks 




In a comparison between various types of banks including Islamic banks in Turkey from 
1990 to 2000, El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) find that there is no considerable difference 
between Islamic banks and conventional banks. Al-Muharrami (2008) compares Con-
ventional banks and Islamic banks from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries from 
1993 to 2002, and finds that Islamic banks are more efficient than Conventional banks. 
Baele et al. (2014) conclude that Islamic banks are inefficient because they offer complex 
Shari‘ah compliant financial products and charge higher fees for their services. This is not 
in line with Abedifar et al. (2013) who find that Islamic banks do not charge rents for 
offering such products. Moreover, the dual nature of Malaysian banking system makes 
the profit rates of Islamic banks and Conventional banks highly correlated. In addition, 
Islamic banks and Conventional banks are not immune against interest rate risks. This 
explains why the reaction of Islamic banks and Conventional banks to financial distress in 
Malaysia is similar. These findings are in line with Abedifar et al. (2013), who find no 
significant difference in the performance of large Islamic banks and Conventional banks 
in Malaysia.  
 
4.2.2 The Relevance of Islamic banks to Conventional Banking Sector 
Gheeraert (2014) measures the effect of Islamic banks and Conventional banks on the 
banking sector development using private credit (deposits) to GDP ratio in twenty Mus-
lim countries from 2000 to 2005. They find whether Islamic banks have a detrimental or 
beneficial effect on the banking sector. Their findings show that only medium Islamic 
banks penetration group has strong complementarity effect on the conventional banking 
sector.  When Islamic banks‘ market penetration is small or large, their effect is insig-
nificant. The findings by Gheeraert (2014) are similar to those found by Beck et al. 
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(2000a), Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt (2010) and Wanke et al. (2016), which suggest that a 
balanced market share of IB and Conventional banks induce banking system develop-
ment. 
 
For the positives, the existence of Islamic banks in general encourages more people 
-especially strong believers - to participate in the banking sector, which helps in the 
overall banking sector development. Religiously concerned clients trust Islamic banks‘ 
financial products. This motivates them to increase their money on deposits due to the 
peace of mind they get (Mckinsey and Company, 2005). In addition, Islamic financial 
services such as Ijarah or Murabaha result in higher participation in the industry, and 
induce Conventional banks to expand their financial products to accommodate different 
clients‘ needs. On the other hand, Gheeraert (2014) highlights three major negatives of 
Islamic banking: i) lack of incentive to lend, ii) adverse selection and moral hazard and 
iii) too high market power. They justify that the conversion of current Conventional 
banks into Islamic banks and the creation of new Islamic banks may lead to increasing 
market power of Islamic banks, which may have negative implications if they do not have 
the incentive to lend. It may affect negatively the development of the banking sector, 
taking into consideration the long way Islamic finance has to go in order to integrate fully 
economically and regulatory in any financial system.    
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4.2.3 Risks in Islamic banks 
Literature suggests that Islamic banks may be exposed to more risks than Conventional 
banks, because they lack liquidity and risk management activities, and their access to 
wholesale funding is limited. According to Bacha (2008), Islamic banks encounter as 
many risks as Conventional banks, although Islamic banks emphasise that their opera-
tions are interest-free, and they fund profit and loss sharing projects. Clients‘ deposits are 
the key source to fund Islamic banks‘ projects, where Islamic banks intermediate to re-
distribute the profit rates to depositors and meet any withdrawal request. Islamic banks 
would be in an unfortunate situation if their projects were not profitable enough and they 
would face higher credit risk.  
 
Further, credit risk may increase because Islamic banks do not require collateral. In ad-
dition, depositors and investors lack knowledge about the function of Islamic loans, 
making them harder to understand. In addition to that, Islamic banks do not have a clear 
and unified penalty for default by, and there are moral hazard incentives in case of PLS 
contracts. Khan and Ahmed (2001) state that Islamic banks are exposed to withdrawal 
risk because they embrace the concept of profit and loss sharing (PLS). I find this argu-
able, because of two reasons. First, most Islamic banks in practice do not apply profit and 
loss sharing (PLS), because they do not have control over a project‘s management such as 
the case of ‗Mudarabah‘. They tend to offer competitive rates of return regardless of the 
underlying projects‘ realised performance. Second, the behaviour and religiosity of de-




If the second argument holds true, withdrawal risk and credit risk for Islamic banks is 
assumed less. I should note that non-Muslims may be interested in Islamic banks‘ ser-
vices also. However, most investors and depositors in Islamic banks are expected to be 
more concerned about their religious beliefs than clients of conventional banks. In theory, 
there is a positive relationship between the individuals‘ religiosity and their risk-aversion 
(Miller and Hoffman, 1995; Osoba, 2003). Depositors‘ behaviour may reduce risky 
banking lending (Diamond and Rajan, 2000; 2001), because they show loyalty to Islamic 
banks. Alternatively, other depositors may expose Islamic banks to higher withdrawal 
risk - eventually credit risk - because they may be more reluctant to keep their deposits in 
Islamic banks when they perform poorly. 
 
In this regard, Bursztyn et al. (2015) conduct a field experiment in Indonesia - the country 
with the largest Muslim population - to find whether morality or religiosity encourage 
Islamic banks‘ clients to repay their credit card. Their experiment involves sending a 
reminder to clients to make the minimum payment of their credit card two days before the 
end of the grace period. In one time, clients receive a text message, which quotes an 
Islamic religious text stating that non-repayment of debts by someone who is able to 
repay is an injustice. In another time, clients receive the same reminder but without the 
religious quote. The results of the experiment showed that a non-religious moral reminder 
had the same effect as the reminder with a religious quote. This suggests that clients‘ 
morality affects their decision to repay their credit cards, not their religiosity. This may 




More recent empirical evidence shows mixed results about Islamic banks‘ profitability 
and risk position in relation to Conventional banks. Abedifar et al. (2013) explore Islamic 
banks‘ credit and insolvency risks. They find that there is a significant variation in the 
performance of Islamic banks across countries. They find that the credit risk of small 
Islamic banks is lower than that for small Conventional banks. This is because Islamic 
banks are capitalised better in terms of investing in real productive activities with low 
uncertainty, and they are less sensitive to domestic interest rate swings because they offer 
better loan quality. For insolvency, Abedifar et al. (2013) find that Islamic banks are not 
different from Conventional banks. Basov and Bhatti (2014) find beneficial impacts 
derived from the limits on the set of Shari‘ah compliant investments. These benefits are 
noticed also by Khediri et al. (2015) who show that Islamic banks are, on average, more 
profitable, liquid, better capitalised, and have lower credit risk than Conventional banks 
in GCC countries. This is in line with Olson and Zoubi (2008) who find that Islamic 
banks are more profitable than Conventional banks in the same region.  
 
In terms of the aggregate propensity of Islamic banks to failure, Pappas et al. (2016) 
developed a new survival analysis model as a warning system to determine whether Is-
lamic banks‘ risk of failure is sensitive to bank-specific, macroeconomic and market 
structure variables. The model recognises failure risk as multifaceted and reflects banks‘ 
insolvency risk, withdrawal risk, liquidity risk and operational risk. They performed their 
analyses on 20 countries in the Middle East and Far East from the period of 1995 to 2010. 
Overall, they find that Islamic banks are more prone to risk failure due to the adverse 
effect of their cost-to-income ratio, high operational risk, and liquidity issues. Although, 
they find that Islamic banks are less risky than their conventional peers are, their results 
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imply that Islamic banks will have a negative impact on the system in the long run due to 
their own characteristics.  
 
Nevertheless, given empirical evidence regarding the significant inefficiency, insolven-
cy, withdrawal and operational risks in Islamic banks and their effect on banking sector 
development, there is a research gap regarding the effect of Islamic banks‘ financial 
distress on other financial institutions in the system. I question whether Islamic banks‘ 
own characteristics drive their financial distress (tail-risk) and lead to affecting other 
financial institutions distress too. To my knowledge, there is no research so far which 
addressed the estimation of Islamic financial stress and its effect in financial networks. 
Therefore, my first hypothesis is: 
 
H: Islamic banks’ financial distress affects other financial institutions and has spillover 
effect in financial systems. 
 
Moreover, Cihak and Hesse (2010) analyse the financial stability of Conventional banks 
and Islamic banks in terms of their probability of failure in 18 countries. They find that 
small Islamic banks are financially stronger than small Conventional banks, while large 
Conventional banks are financially stronger than large Islamic banks. However, the 
question remains, did they contribute to systemic risk? Thus, Khan (1991) and Beck et al. 
(2013) build upon the finding of Cihak and Hesse (2010) and examine the theoretical 
capacity of Islamic banks for handling economic stress. Results show that Islamic banks 
have better capacity of risk sharing. However, a recent study by Bourkhis and Nabi 
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(2013) disagree with this proposition. They suggest that financial distress has an equal 
impact on both conventional and Islamic banks and there is no significant difference in 
financial stability. It is important to understand the role of Islamic banks‘ specific risks 
and the spillover effect of their financial distress on the systemic risk. In fact, numerous 
studies on financial liberalisation have pointed out the relevance of bank competition to 
financial stability (Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2010; Manlagñit, 2011). Djennas 
(2016) assesses the efficiency of Islamic finance in an entire banking system in eight 
Islamic countries and six newly industrialised countries. He finds that some of the 
countries, which apply Islamic finance principles, may be unable to access financing 
sources. Beck et al (2013) and Olson and Zoubi (2008) find that Islamic banks‘ preclu-
sion of leverage hinders them from achieving similar profitability levels compared to 
Conventional banks. Islamic banks have to be either involved in risky projects with high 
return or fail to compete in the market.  
 
However, the effect of the fiscal policy on business cycle volatility;
17
 the periodic ir-
regular up and downs movements in economic activity, in the case of Islamic countries is 
significant. Spillover effects among GCC countries amplify the effect that the fiscal 
policy of one country has on another. In addition, Islamic countries that are classified as 
emerging economies, have less efficient economic systems and continue to fail to allocate 
foreign capital efficiently. The argument of Errico and Farrahbaksh (1998) can reason 
such inefficiency where Islamic banks bear operational risk because there is no proper 
                                                          
17
 Business cycles are generally measured by the fluctuations in real GDP and in some cases other mac-




supervision and regulations when it comes to business performance and information 
disclosure. Although this paper is old, its conclusions hold true. For example, Islamic 
banks are helpless when it comes to the case of default by the counterparty. They are not 
allowed to charge any accrued interest or impose penalties, except in the case of delib-
erate negligence. Indeed, the banks‘ capital during the delay is not productive and its 
investors and depositors do not earn any additional income. 
 
Furthermore, Sorwar et al. (2016) adopt a top-down approach to investigate the effects of 
market systemic risk on portfolios of Islamic banks and conventional banks, by consid-
ering the capital structure of both types. They use value at risk (VaR) and Expected 
Shortfall (ES) measures to measure markets‘ systemic risk. Their analyses cover 20 
countries and they find that the market has an equal effect on Islamic and conventional 
banks. They find that during the financial crisis, Islamic banks are less risky than con-
ventional banks.  In addition, the capital structure of Islamic banks is significantly dif-
ferent from their conventional peers, because of their lower dependence on leverage. This 
implies that traditional capital structure models may be ―unfair‖ to Islamic banks, because 
according to Sorwar et al. (2016) they might magnify the leverage levels in Islamic banks.  
 
Overall, previous research focuses on the effect of economic stress, financial instability 
and market risk on Islamic banks. Researchers mostly followed a top-down approach in 
their analyses. However, there is a gap in the literature when it comes to investigating the 
relevance of Islamic banks to the financial system, and investigating their systemic risk 
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contribution. I contribute to the literature by estimating the realised systemic risk of Is-
lamic banks, and determine their systemic relevance accordingly. So, I hypothesise that:  
 
H2: Islamic banks are relevant to the financial system and contribute to its systemic risk. 
 
Moreover, empirical evidence has shown a variation in Islamic banks‘ performance 
during both financial distress and tranquillity. I argue that they may be due to the pre-
viously outlined risks in Islamic banks, which are more accentuated when markets are 
recovering and there is a relative economic stability.  
 
H3: There is a time-variability in the effect of Islamic banks on the system due to the 
variation in their business performance and bank-level characteristics. 
 
In the next section, I demonstrate the relevant literature review regarding the develop-
ment of systemic risk measures. In addition, I discuss the recent studies quantifying 




4.2.4 Systemic Risk: Institutions’ Relevance and Contribution 
The financial system‘s proper functioning is vital for economic growth and welfare. It 
helps to circulate money within the economy between lenders / investors and borrowers. 
A disorder in the financial system can deter the efficiency of this flow and increase sys-
temic risk. It is essential to understand the definition of systemic risk that I will use in this 
research. The European Parliament (2011) defines systemic risk as the probability of an 
event to unsettle the entire financial system including the real economy and the financial 
markets.  In other words, a disorder may start from a single institution or specific sector, 
and subsequently lead to the collapse of other financial institutions in the financial sys-
tem. The difference between systemic risk and systematic risk is that the latter represents 
the probability of turbulence or instability in specific market or industry risk. Whereas 
systemic risk refers to the contagion effect of a financial institution's distress to other 
institutions due to for example banks‘ vulnerability to a lack of depositors and to the 
default of borrowers.  
 
In recent years, systemic risk has gained a considerable importance in the economic 
policy discussions especially after the global financial crisis. In their survey on systemic 
risk, Benoit et al. (2016) explain how malfunctions in the system are caused by factors on 
the macro and micro levels. The macro factors include but are not limited to: the macro 
imbalances in the private or public sector, the strong correlation in portfolio exposures 
due to herding behaviour, contagions, asset bubbles, negative externalities (some banks 
are too big to fail), and information discrepancies when for example the interbank market 
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freezes. On the micro level, the persistent financial distress of financial institutions can 
trigger a crisis in the system. Given the definition of systemic risk and the macro and 
micro factors, the Dubai debt crisis
18
 for example was not systemic, because the shock 
waves affected few GCC
19
 markets. However, the failure of Lehman investment bank in 
2008 was an event of systemic risk. It affected a wide range of financial institutions and 
put their viability in question. This was due to the low quality of subprime mortgages, and 
their mutation into derivative products.  
 
4.2.5 Financial Network Analysis and Systemic Risk 
Since the factors leading to systemic risk can be macro or micro, the existing literature 
proposes a large number of measures of systemic risk. These measures try to model 
economic meltdowns and are intended to prevent future financial crises. In this section, I 
review the development of the relevant systemic risk measures to my research objectives.  
 
There are two types of systemic risk measures: ―top-down‖ and ―bottom-up‖ measures. 
Bisias et al. (2012) and more recently Benoit et al. (2016) present comprehensive surveys 
about measuring systemic risk. The top-down measure determines the effect of distress at 
the level of the financial system on one or more financial institutions. The bottom-up 
approach on the other hand determines the systemic risk contribution of one financial 
institution or sector‘s distress to the financial system.  
 
                                                          
18
 Dubai debt crisis was due to Dubai World‘s (giant conglomerate owned by Dubai government) delay to 
repay $26 billion (USD) to Sukuk holders on time in end of 2009.   
19
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a political and economic union between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, which was established in 1981.  
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a) Top-Down Systemic Risk Measures 
There are different top-down measures which are used to determine the stability and 
viability of the financial system. Credit default swaps (CDS) spreads are one of the 
commonly used and a good estimator of systemic risk (Rodríguez-Morenoand Pena 
(2013). Researchers have used CDS data differently. For example, Segoviano and 
Goodhart (2009) use CDS data to construct a banking stability index to estimate the in-
terbank dependence on tail events.  Huang et al. (2009) construct the distress insurance 
premium (DIP) which determines the required insurance premium to cover distressed 
losses in the banking system. However, the problem with using CDS data is that it is not 
always indicative of financial system viability, especially where there is a duality be-
tween conventional and Islamic banks, such as in many developing countries. In addition, 
some developing countries do not work with or use CDSs. 
 
The second mostly used top-down measures of systemic risk are principal component 
analysis (PCA) and Granger causality. They are used to reflect and capture the inter-
connectedness and spillover effects between financial institutions. Billio et al (2012) use 
these tests to examine the interconnectedness between different financial sectors such as 
depositors, banks, insurers and other financial institutions. Moreover, Acharya et al. 
(2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2012) introduce the Systemic Expected Shortfall 
(SES), and Systemic Risk measure (SRISK) respectively to model the downside risk of a 
single financial firm in the event of market turmoil. Simply put, they measure the ex-
pected loss of each institution conditional on the poor performance of an entire set of 
institutions or of a specific market. The use of the top-down approach is however not 
appropriate for this research, because I am trying to find the systemic risk contribution of 
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Islamic banks to the overall system. The bottom-up approach is most suitable to my re-
search questions and the reasons are explained in the following section.  
 
b) Bottom-Up Systemic Risk Measures  
Bottom-up systemic risk measures capture the financial distress at the institutional level 
and identify the significance of its contribution to the financial system. These measures 
are useful in providing a warning for a possible financial crisis by knowing institutions‘ 
distress status. Since I will examine the effect of the Islamic banking sector on the fi-
nancial system, I will use marginal Conditional Value at Risk (ΔCoVaR) as the bot-
tom-up systemic risk measure. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) who developed it ini-
tially, also proposed the development of Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR). They 
started measuring and defining financial distress as when one financial institution is at its 
VaR and start affecting other institutions VaR level. If one institution‘s VaR level ex-
ceeds its standard or benchmark level, it is considered to be financial distressed and will 
start affecting other institutions. 
 
However, if financial distress is solely dependent on VaR, CoVaR will not capture any 
increase in systemic risk in non-crisis or low volatility periods. This is simply because 
VaR is dependant and volatility levels and correlations between different sectors tend to 
be higher after volatility shock, not before. More particularly, if there is financial inno-
vation, there will be new connections in the financial system, which may not have expe-
rienced simultaneous losses yet. On the other side, if the market is booming, volatility 
levels are relatively lower than that when there is market turmoil. Therefore, volatility 
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estimates will be low until a volatility shock happens. This means that a measure relying 
on volatility estimates will fail to provide the analyst with an early warning.  
 
From this point, many studies have tried to enhance CoVaR‘s ability to capture an in-
stitution‘s financial distress. Girardi and Ergun (2013) modify the definition of financial 
distress proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010). The former argue that an institu-
tion will be financially distressed when it is close to its standard VaR, rather than being at 
its VaR. They find that CoVaR fails to detect systemic risk where it is most pronounced, 
and any financial regulation based on CoVaR with this distress definition could introduce 
additional instability and set wrong incentives. This implies that their modification would 
help in providing better and earlier warning for any financial institutions‘ distress. 
Rodríguez-Moreno and Pena (2013) use also CoVaR and aggregate CoVaR to measure 
the ability to extract the distribution stress in institutions‘ information, and to calculate 
the system‘s total risk respectively. They find that these are the worst among systemic 
risk measures based on structural credit risk models. This is because in non-Gausian 
setting, tail dependence makes system‘s risk lower than in the Gaussian setting (Puzanova 
and Düllmann, 2013).  
 
Other studies also proposed extensions to CoVaR such as asymmetric CoVaR, which 
considers both positive and negative returns (both sides of tail distribution). 
López-Espinoza et al. (2012) investigate 54 large-scale complex international banks and 
a large sample of U.S. banks in order to evaluate their contribution to the risk of their 
respective financial system. They find that asymmetric CoVaR does not underestimate 
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systemic risk compared to original CoVaR. Whereas, Adrain and Brunnermeier (2011) 
themselves modify their own CoVaR measures to become marginal conditional val-
ue-at-risk (ΔCoVaR). It takes take in consideration not only of the CoVaR, but also its 
marginal change across institutions and during different time. They use quantile regres-
sion to estimate their conditional models and decide whether firms‘ specific characteris-
tics contribute to the entire financial system‘s systemic risk. Using data from 1986 to 
2010 for 1266 financial institutions in the US, they find that size, maturity mismatch, 
leverage and market to book value ratio contribute significantly to systemic risk. 
Roengpitya and Rungcharoenkitkul (2011) utilize Adrain and Brunnermeier (2011) 
ΔCoVaR to quantify the spillover effects of six Thai commercial banks in the Thai fi-
nancial system. They find that individual banks have different impacts on the entire 
system; whereas larger banks contribute more to systemic risk than smaller ones. Bernal 
et al. (2014) also investigate the systemic risk contribution of the banking, insurance, and 
other financial sectors in the Eurozone and the United States, and rank financial institu-
tions according to their contribution to systemic risk. They use also the ΔCoVaR, which 
relies on high frequency data because it is a very responsive measure of distress with a 
particular financial sector. They validate their analysis by using the Kolmogorov-Smirov 
(KS) test to determine whether a given financial sector contributes significantly to sys-
temic risk.  
 
In addition, Wong and Fong (2011) test the ΔCoVaR by investigating the linkage be-
tween eleven economies in Asia-Pacific countries and estimate the ΔCoVaR for the CDS 
of Asia-Pacific banks. Their results mostly indicate that ΔCoVaR value is higher than 
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traditional VaR. This implies that ΔCoVaR captures the effect of the linkages between 
economies and explain Asia-pacific banks‘ financial distress accordingly. 
 
In light of quantifying the systemic risk contribution of an institution, there have been 
numerous advancements in the last decade. For example, Abadie (2002) uses a boot-
strapping procedure to test whether or not the systemic risk contribution of two banks is 
equal. His findings indicate the US insurance industry is the riskiest because its non-core 
activities have increased marginally over the last decade. Castro and Ferrari (2014) 
propose a dominance test to evaluate whether or not a particular bank contributes more to 
systemic risk than another bank.  
 
Most recently, Hautsch et al. (2015) take into consideration CoVaR disadvantages men-
tioned and pointed by López-Espinoza et al. (2012), Girardi and Ergun (2013), 
Rodríguez-Moreno and Pena (2013) and present a methodology which uses network 
analysis with systemic risk contribution measurement. It results in a clear mul-
ti-dimensional interconnected network that shows the direction and the magnitude of the 
spillovers between financial institutions and the system in. This advances the work by 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) which shows the relations only on a pairwise basis, by 
measuring the transmission of volatility spillover from one market to another.  
 
Moreover, Hautsch et al. (2015) present a new concept which is called ―realised systemic 
risk beta‖, which accounts for deviations in institutions‘ marginal systemic relevance 
based on the variation of the firm-specific variables. Their method concentrates on the 
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extreme left tail quantiles rather than the mean of the returns distributions. They follow 
Adrian and Brunnermier (2011) to construct a tail risk financial network based on firms‘ 
specific characteristics, and quantify the systemic risk contribution of significantly in-
terconnected institutions. They use market and balance sheet data for depositors, bro-
kers/dealers, insurers and other firms in the US, and find that the insurance companies are 
the riskiest. I use the approach proposed by Hautsch et al (2015), because measures such 
as the SES, SRISK or earlier mentioned forms of CoVaR cannot capture the spillover 
effects driven by the relationships depicted in risk networks and may underestimate the 
systemic risk contribution when financial institutions are highly interconnected. 
 
In the next section, I explain the selection of research data and how I utilise Hautsch et al. 





This research has three main objectives; i) identify the effect of the interconnectedness 
between Islamic banks, other financial institutions on the financial network structure and 
ii) determine the systemic relevance of Islamic banks and other institutions and quantify 
their systemic risk contribution; iii) test for time-variability in the effect of Islamic banks 
on the financial system. Therefore, the research data includes institution-specific char-
acteristics and macro-level variables in the sampled countries. Previous evidence such as 
provided by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Männasoo, and Mayes (2009) has 
shown that there is a positive relationship between economic downturns and banks‘ fi-
nancial stability. Also, incorporating the accounting profiles for financial institutions 
helps in predicting their financial distress and propensity to failure. For example, Män-
nasoo, and Mayes (2009) found a significant relationship between banks‘ operational risk 
and leverage levels in European economies, and Lane et al (1986) find that using indi-
cators for leverage ratios, liquidity and earnings helps in providing an early warning for 
banks‘ distress in the US.  
 
Accordingly, the advantage of my selected variables is that it enables us to estimate Is-
lamic banks‘ financial distress using conditional VaR, then determine whether their fi-
nancial distress is systemically relevant and investigate any time-variability in Islamic 
banks‘ effect on the system, due to their own specific characteristics. I follow the litera-
ture and select the possible risk drivers of Islamic banks‘ financial distress. Pappas et al. 
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(2016) stress on the importance of incorporating bank-specific characteristics, which 
consider the distinct features of Islamic banks.   
 
I employ four main criteria to select a representative sample. First, I select countries with 
majority Muslim populations. Second, the selected country must have a dual financial 
system (with conventional and Islamic banks). Third, Islamic banking sectors should 
represent at least 10% of the total number of institutions available and selected for this 
research. Fourth, the country must have a stock exchange. I disregard countries such as 
Yemen, because they do not have a stock exchange during the sample period, and Iran, 
because it has only an Islamic banking system in isolation.  
 
Therefore, my research data consists of 10 sampled countries: Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, 
Dubai, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The list 
of institutions differs across countries due to the differences in the leading sectors in the 
financial system. Table 1 (p. 154) shows the number of providers of Islamic banking 
services and Table 2 (p. 206) shows the institutions‘ acronyms used in this research.  
 
My research sample contains total 352 institutions. The institutions included are con-
ventional banks, brokers, investment banks, insurers, and Islamic institutions. I do this to 
capture the real dynamic in financial systems, where conventional and Islamic financial 
institutions co-exist. In addition, it is common in countries such as Malaysia and Indo-
nesia to have Islamic and conventional banks co-existing in one holding company. My 
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sample includes 68 Islamic financial institutions, which are fully-fledged Islamic banks
20
, 
banks with either Islamic windows or branches, or Islamic insurance (Takaful). These 
represent 19% of the total number of institutions. After extensive filtering of institutions 
and countries, this sample is considered more representative of the Islamic banking sector 
compared to other studies in the literature. This is because the study by Čihák and Hesse 
(2010) involves 77 Islamic institutions which represent 16% of total samples, whereas 
Beck et al. (2013) have 88 Islamic institutions, which represent 17% of their total number 
of institutions. 
 
I use publicly available equity market, macroeconomic and balance sheet data. I obtain 
weekly data for the above variables from Bloomberg, DataStream and World Bank. I 
account for listed institutions in the countries‘ stock markets and exclude any delisted 
institutions during the sample period. This criterion excludes institutions if an institution 




Given these conditions, I capture the general state of the economies by considering a set 
of lagged macroeconomic variables, Mt-1, as suggested and used by Hautsch et al. (2015) 
and Adrian, and Brunnermeier (2011). As Table 3 shows, my selected variables are partly 
different from those selected by Hautsch et al. (2015) and Adrian, and Brunnermeier 
(2011), due to the differences between the underlying economies of the sampled countries 
                                                          
20
 Islamic banks are defined as banks whose financial services and operations are subject to Shari‘ah 
standards (Gheeraert, 2014). Islamic windows (a subsidiary of a conventional bank or a department) are 
included as long as it has its own balance sheet data and equity market data. 
21
 This selection criterion may raise the issue of ―survivorship bias‖ in the results, because the financial 
distress of the institutions which survived during my sample period may be lower than the financial distress 
of the excluded institutions. However, this criterion is required as suggested by Hautsch et al. (2015) and 
Wang et al. (2016) to estimate loss exceedances and CoVaRs for the selected institutions.  
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and the USA economic system. The American economy is a developed economy, which 
has the power to manage and control the money supply of the most traded currency in the 
world (USD). Hence, the use of many liquidity indicators is essential to identify the sta-
bility of the American economy. The closest liquidity indicators to the ones suggested by 
the studies above are in Table 3 (p. 165). The selection of liquidity indicators in each 
country is controlled by: i) the differences in the economic structures amongst my se-
lected countries, and ii) the availability of data. This explains the slight variation in var-


















4 2 3 40 49 
Turkey 3 4 - 31 38 
Malaysia 5 - - 30 35 
Abu Dhabi 3 - 3 23 29 
Dubai 3 - 4 17 24 
Oman 2 1 - 26 29 
Jordan 3 - - 33 36 
Pakistan 6 - - 10 16 
Indonesia 8 5 - 61 74 
Bahrain 7 1 1 13 22 
Total 44 13 11 284 352 
 
I obtain weekly equity prices from Bloomberg terminal to calculate their weekly loga-
rithmic returns. Additionally, I utilise the return for the major sector in each country, 
where the economy is either an emerging or a frontier economy whose income is highly 
dependent on natural resources or specific industrial sectors. For example, oil represents 
the main income source for Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Oman, palm oil plan-
tation for Malaysia, and energy and utilities industries for Saudi Arabia. I also use - where 
available - the weekly spread of credit default swap (CDS) of the country, change in 
budget balance to GDP, change budget debt to GDP and international reserves alterna-
tively. I interpolate
22
 any monthly, quarterly or yearly data into weekly data. Implied 
volatility represents the aggregate volatility for all assets in a given country‘s market. It 
implies the willingness and trust of investors to invest in the country‘s stock market. 
Interbank rate and spread of credit default swaps (CDSs) imply confidence in the capa-
                                                          
22
 I perform linear interpolation by approximating values between two known data points using polynomial 
function. This helps in smoothing the estimation of the effect of the balance sheet (micro) variables on an 
institution‘s VaR.  
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bility of the government to repay the loans. The international reserve is a proxy for the 
country‘s liquidity in terms of foreign currency. 
 
Highlights of The Countries’ Financial Sector 
 General background about the economies of Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 
(GCC) 
GCC countries are large producers and exporters of oil. Their banking sector is young as 
the oldest bank was established in 1950s. Most banks are privately owned, but the public 
sector has a substantial role in the banking industry. The public sector can have equity 
participation in the private banks, or establish financial credit institutions to provide 
finance to private and public institutions at a discounted rate. Currencies in the region are 
pegged to the US dollar, which is why the central bank has a limited role to play in setting 
monetary policy and controlling interest rates. However, some monetary and credit con-
trols are exercised through its sale and purchase of certificates of deposits. 
 
The ownership of financial institutions in the region is limited to a few shareholders 
(families). This happens in order to limit any unforeseen disadvantages of corporate 
control. The banking sector in GCC countries in early 21
st
 century used to be fragmented 
and unable to consolidate financial institutions that can be a force in the Arabic region 
and on the international level. According to Al-Muharrami et al. (2006), the banking 
system in the GCC faces diseconomies of scale and there is a significant market share 




Moreover, since GCC countries are large producers and exporters of oil, there has been 
extensive evidence about oil price performance as a driver of business and financial 
variables in their economies (Callen et al. 2015). High oil prices and an increase in 
short-term capital inflows leads to higher liquidity, more government spending, higher 
non-oil output growth and boom in asset prices. For example, in Oman, there was a sharp 
increase in household leverage in the period between 2004 and 2008 (Prasad and Bolo-
gna, 2010). In oil price downturns and after the global financial crisis, these effects can be 
retracted and the systemic risk of the financial sectors can rise and have negative effect on 
the real economy in the GCC region.  
 
With regard to Islamic finance, there are no national Shari‘ah authorities to oversee the 
performance of Islamic financial institutions in GCC countries. In GCC, the central 
bank/monetary agency only give the licence to Islamic banks. Each financial institution 
(bank) has its own board which can issue laws and provide advice on the financial 
products offered.  
Next, I provide a summary about each country financial sector is provided.  
 
1. Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is a member of GCC. It accounts for 55% of oil reserves and over 59% of 
GCC‘s GDP (Mason, 2014). The banking sector in Saudi Arabia is considered to be the 
largest in terms of asset size, asset concentration per bank and number of branches. The 
banking system operates in conditions of perfect competition. It is important to note that 
the three largest banks (National commercial bank, Samba financial group and Al-Rajhi) 
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own 45% of the total assets in the sector (Al-Hassan et al. 2010). Also, the public sector 
has an extensive ownership in the largest banks. This indicates the capital flows are 
mostly circulated and managed either by the government or wealthy families. Commer-
cial banks in Saudi Arabia are depository banks and are separated from non-banking 
commercial activities such as securities market and real estate brokerage. The rest of the 
financial sector comprises credit institutions‘ share of the financial sector is approxi-
mately half the size of the banking sector which offer interest free loans to public and 
private institutions. It also comprises autonomous government institutions, which dom-
inate the primary market for government securities. Finally, the non-banking institutions 
represent marginal share in the Saudi financial system.  
 
2. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Abu Dhabi / Dubai) 
The UAE is a member of GCC and consists of seven separate federal emirates: Abu 
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Qaiwain, Ras Al Khaimah and Fujairah. Ac-
cording to Al-Muharrami et al. (2006), UAE operates in conditions of perfect competition 
and the banking system is the least concentrated. Abu Dhabi and Dubai have independent 
stock exchanges (Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange and Dubai Financial Market) and have 
emerged as the most important emirates. Each emirate has its own economic and political 
characteristics. For example, Abu Dhabi has the largest oil and gas wealth which repre-
sents approximately 90% of the total oil product of the country. Dubai is considered the 
centre and destination for financial services institutions. The UAE banks, along with 
Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti banks, have dominated the GCC and Middle Eastern banking 
sectors. Bank ownership is predominantly owned by the government. However, the banks 
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in the UAE -unlike Saudi Arabia- are not separated from non-banking commercial ac-
tivities.  
The largest banks in UAE are National Bank of Abu Dhabi, Emirates international bank 
and Abu Dhabi commercial bank. Moreover, UAE is a prominent provider of Islamic 
financial products. It has two large Islamic mortgage finance companies which represent 
together aroun16% of banks‘ officially reported real estate lending and 3% of private 
sector credit (Al-Hassan et al. 2010). Despite the homogeneity between GCC countries 
and the significant political and economic affiliations, GGC countries‘ laws restrict in-
tra-region banking. For example, the UAE banks' presence in the GCC countries is lim-
ited to a branch in each Qatar and Oman and two overseas banking units in Bahrain. 
 
3. Oman 
Oman has the smallest banking sector amongst GCC countries, where the economy in 
Oman was not identified as perfect competition or monopolistic, since the largest gov-
ernment projects are directly financed by foreign banks (Al-Muharrami et al. 2006). 
Nonetheless, there are two banks (Bank Muscat and National bank of Oman) controlling 
over 55% of the sector‘s assets. This makes the banking system highly concentrated 
(Al-Hassan et al. 2010). Oman is the only GCC country which follows Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB). 
 
4. Bahrain  
Similar to UAE, Bahrain‘s retail banking sector is the least concentrated amongst the 
GCC systems. It operates in conditions of monopolistic competition. The three largest 
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retail banks (Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, National bank of Bahrain, and Ahli United 
Banks) control 41% of the total sector‘s assets. In addition, Bahrain has the largest 
wholesale banking sector (Al-Muharrami et al. 2006). It offers off-shore investment, 
investment banking and financing corporations in other GCC countries.  This exposed 
the wholesale banking sector to a considerable hit by the global financial crisis 
(Al-Hassan et al. 2010). 
 
When it comes to Islamic finance, Bahrain has its own the Shari‘ah board: Accounting 
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). It issues Shari‘ah 
standards which focus on the practical issues related to Islamic financial products. 
AAOIFI overlaps with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Fiqh Academy 
in Jeddah. However it is arguably the most referenced institution in terms of Shari‘ah 
standards from a practical perspective. The AAOIFI Shari‘ah scholars are the reference 
regarding the financial products offered in local banks and their subsidiaries overseas. 
 
5. Turkey 
According to Investment Support and Promotion Agency of Turkey (2016), the banking 
sector dominates the Turkish financial system, since it accounts for over 70% of overall 
financial services. Turkey has been implementing regulatory and structural reforms since 
early 2000‘s financial meltdown. This has mitigated the negative effects of the global 
financial crisis. Turkey is characterised by good liquidity conditions due to its expanding 
loan base. This allowed the financial sector to maintain a steady growth rate in terms of 
asset size and equity structure. Turkey has a diversified economy. It is a free market 
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economy, where service and industry sectors are its key drivers according to The Central 
Intelligence Agency ―CIA‖ World Factbook. (2017). Turkey‘s two largest banks are 
State-owned bank Ziraat and İş Bank.  
Islamic finance in Turkey started in 1980s and used to be named ―Special Finance 
houses‖. The name changed in 2005 to ―participation banking‖. The Turkish government 
has been reluctant to expand Islamic banking services due to its secular nature, and its 
growth rate has slowed down since the European debt crisis (Hardy, 2012). However, it 
has welcomed Islamic banks from GCC countries (Albaraka Banking Group and Kuveyt 
Türk) to open branches in Turkey.  
 
6. Jordan 
Jordan has one of the smallest economies in the Middle East. Its economy is characterised 
as a free market economy with strong reliance on foreign assistance and foreign invest-
ment. The banking sector in Jordan is a strong pillar in its financial services sector and 
helped the sector alongside the central bank of Jordan to remain resilient in the face of 
regional volatility (Oxford Business Group, 2016). The banking sector in Jordan was 
established in 1948. The largest bank in Jordan is Arab bank. There are regional banks 
such as the Kuwait National Bank, Egyptian Arab Land Bank, Bloom Bank and National 
Bank of Abu Dhabi; and Western multinationals such as Citibank, Bank Audi and 
Standard Chartered. Jordan has four Islamic banks: Jordan Islamic Bank (JDIB,), Al 
Rajhi Bank and Islamic International Arab Bank. There are initiatives under the owner-
ship of the government, to support expanding Islamic finance. According to Reuters‘ 
2015-16 ―State of the Global Islamic Economy‖, Jordan is ranked the ninth among the 
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top-10 Islamic finance industries globally. The other segments (insurance and capital 




According to the CIA World Factbook,(2016) Malaysia has transformed itself since 
1970s from raw materials producer to a multi-sector economy. It is an open economy 
which witnessed resilience in the face of the global financial crisis. The financial sector 
played an important role in supporting the Malay economy. National Banks are well 
capitalised the central bank (Bank Negara) maintains adequate foreign exchange re-
serves. After the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, Bank Negara has developed clear 
and equitable and adequate regulations which limit Malaysia‘s exposure to riskier fi-
nancial products. This has helped the economy to witness a reduction in poverty and 
strong momentum in country‘s GDB due to the robust demand for the financial services. 
The financial services sector has one of the highest levels of inclusion in the world 
(World Bank, 2013) since it offers a wide range of innovative services such as micro-
finance, special loans and financing for small and medium businesses.  However, the 
country has strict supervisory and operational regulations for foreign financial institu-
tions. This may limit foreign banks efficiency.  
 
Moreover, Malaysia is a leader in Islamic finance. It has been developing a whole regu-
latory system to govern Islamic banking and support the real sector. There are national 
Shari‘ah boards which serve the central bank and securities commission. The Kuala 
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Lumpur-based Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) is responsible for issuing rules or 
standards regarding Islamic financial products.  
 
Recently, Malaysia has started sharing its experience in enhancing regulatory policies 
with other developing countries. It established the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) in 2015 along with nine other ASEAN members in order to help mitigate 
risk against any potential crisis and promote economic integration.  
 
8. Indonesia 
Indonesia has the largest economy in Southeast Asia. However, its financial sector is 
small compared to its regional peers. The Indonesian financial sector suffers from inad-
equate regulatory framework which is not in line with global supervisory and regulatory 
practices. It is less diverse than the Malay sector due to the limited financing alternatives 
to the Indonesian population. It does not offer sufficient life wealth options through 
savings or investments to mitigate financial wealth. The banking sector is also dominated 
by a handful of institutions. This played a role in locating rural regional banks in specified 
and concentrated in predetermined geographical areas (Ismail, 2016).  
 
Moreover, Indonesia has an open capital account which contains substantial foreign 
bonds and equities. This threatens the financial system and increases its systemic risk in 
case of an external shock and foreign capital outflow. The largest banks in Indonesia are 
Bank Mandiri, Bank Rakyat Indonesia and Bank Central Asia  
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The country has the largest Muslim population which can form a strong demand for Is-
lamic finance. Islamic banking and Sukuk are reasonably developed and are widely 
growing. The market share of Islamic banks in terms of Shari‘ah compliant assets ac-
counts for half of total Shari‘ah compliant assets in Indonesia. This makes the banking 
sector in Indonesia the largest contributor to the financial system and it is followed by 
Sukuk, funds and insurance firms (Oxford Business Group, 2016).  
 
9. Pakistan 
According to IMF (2004), the banking sector in Pakistan has witnessed a considerable 
privatisation of its public sector commercial banks along with liberalisation of the fi-
nancial system and allowing domestic and foreign competition. Private banks have grown 
rapidly since 1990s. Overall, the market share of state-owned commercial banks dropped 
dramatically over the last two decades. Local private banks‘ market share (Muslim 
Commercial Ban/k (MCB), Allied Bank (ABL), United Bank (UBL) and Habib Bank 
(HBL) has exceeded state-owned commercial bank (National Bank of Pakistan (NBP). 
This happened because the government thought to consolidate the banking sector by 
raising the minimum capital requirement.  
 
Pakistan has an encouraging environment for Islamic banking sector. The central bank 
(the State Bank of Pakistan) offered flexibility for Islamic banks in terms of opening new 
banks and branches. The first fully fledged Islamic bank is Meezan bank which was 
established in 2002.   
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Table 3 Selection of macro-level variables (Mt-1) 
Adrian Brunnermeier (2011) 
Implied volatility index (VIX) 
Short-term liquidity spread: the difference between 3-month collateral repo and 3-month treasury bill rate 
Change in 3-month treasury bill rate 
Change in the slope of the yield curve: the difference between 10-year treasury bill rate and 3-month 
treasury bill rate 
Hautsch et al. (2015) 
Implied volatility index (VIX) 
Short-term liquidity spread: the difference between 3-month collateral repo and 3-month treasury bill rate 
Change in 3-month treasury bill rate 
Change in the slope of the yield curve: the difference between 10-year treasury bill rate and 3-month 
treasury bill rate 
 Credit spread: the between BAA rated bonds and treasury bill rate and both have 10-year maturity 
Equity market difference return 
Real estate sector 1-year cumulative return  
My Research 
Abu Dhabi 
Implied volatility index: USDAED Implied Volatility) (IVOL)  
Change in 3-month interbank rate 
Change in UAE budget balance as percentage of GDP (BUDGET/GDP) 
Spread of UAE CDS (CDS) 
Rate of UAE interest rate swap  
Market equity return: ADSMI Index 
Change in crude oil price (OIL) 
Return of Abu Dhabi banks Index 
Return of Abu Dhabi real estate Index   
Bahrain 
Implied volatility index: BHSEASI Index Historical Vol (IVOL) 
Market equity return: Bahrain securities exchange index (Bahrain index) 
Change in Bahrain central Bank key policy rate  
Dubai 
Implied volatility index (USDAED Implied Volatility) (IVOL)  
Change in 3-month interbank rate 
Change in budget balance to GDP (BUDGET/GDP) 
Spread of UAE CDS (CDS) 
Rate of UAE interest rate swap  
Market equity return: Dubai financial market general index (DFMGI Index) 
Change in crude oil price (OIL) 
Return of Dubai banks Index 
Return of Dubai real estate Index  
Indonesia 
Implied volatility index: JCI Index Historical Volatility (IVOL) 
Change in 3-month interbank rate: bank Indonesia Jakarta interbank offering rate 3-month 
Spread of Indonesia CDS (CDS) 
Market equity return: Jakarta Composite Index (JCI Index) 
Change in Indonesia budget balance as percentage of GDP (BUDGET/GDP) 
Financial sector return: MSCI Indonesia/Financials Index free-float weighted equity index  Continued 
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Table 3 Selection of macro-level variables (Mt-1) (Continued) 
Jordan 
Implied volatility index (ASE Index Vol) (IVOL) 
Change in 3-month interbank rate: Jordan central bank interbank rate 
 Market equity return: Amman stock exchange general index (ASE index) 
Change in monthly treasury bill rate  
Malaysia  
Implied volatility index: FBMKLCI Index Vol (IVOL) 
Change in 3-month interbank rate  
Spread of Malaysia CDS (CDS) 
Change in bank Negara Malaysia LIBOR rate (Klibor)  
Market equity return: FTSE Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur composite index (Malaysia index) 
Change in Malaysia budget balance as percentage of GDP (BUDGET/GDP) 
Oil sector return: FTSE bursa Malaysia palm oil plantation (Palm oil index) 
Oman 
Implied volatility index: MSM30 Index Historical Volatility (IVOL) 
Change in repo rate (REPO) 
Market equity return: Muscat Securities MSM 30 Index 
Change in crude oil price (OIL) 
Pakistan 
Implied volatility index: KSE Index Historical Volatility (IVOL) 
Change in Pakistan main policy rate (indicates the macroeconomic stability of the country)  
Market equity return: Pakistan Karachi all share index (KSE Index) 
Change in 6-month treasury bill rate 
Change in Pakistan 10-year government bond  
Log of Pakistan international reserves (RESV) 
Saudi Arabia 
Implied volatility index (SASEIDX Index Historical Volatility) (IVOL) 
Change in 3-month interbank rate index (SAIB3M Index) 
Spread of Saudi Arabia CDS (CDS) 
Market equity return: Tadawul all share (SASEIDX Index) 
Rate of vanilla interest rate swap (SRSWC) 
Change in Saudi Arabia debt as percentage of GDP (DEBT/GDP) 
Change in Saudi Arabia budget balance as percentage of GDP  (BUDGET/GDP) 
Change in crude oil price (OIL) 
Real estate sector return: Tadawul all Share real estate development industries index (RE) 
Energy and utilities sector return: Tadawul all share energy and utilities industries index (EU) 
Turkey  
Implied volatility index (XU100 Index Historical Volatility) (IVOL) 
Change in 3-month interbank rate index: Bank association of Turkey 3-month rates (TRLIBOR) 
Spread of Turkey CDS (CDS) (CDS) 
Market equity return: Borsa Istanbul 100 Index (XU100 Index) 
Change in Turkey debt as a Percentage of GDP (DEBT/GDP) 
Change in Turkey budget balance as percentage of GDP(BUDGET/GDP) 
Real estate sector return: Borsa Istanbul REITS Sector Index (RE) 






To estimate the possibility of specific institution to become financially distressed, I use 
the suggested institution-specific characteristics     
 
 by Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011). I explain the selected proxies and their abbreviations in Table 4 below:  
 
Table 4 Institution-specific characteristics  
Proxy Calculation Measurement  
SIZE The logarithm of total market valued total assets Market capitalisation  
LEV The book value of total assets divided by the book value of total equity Leverage 
MM Short-term debts net of cash dividends divided by total liabilities Maturity mismatch 
DE Total debts divided by total capital  Debt to equity 
PBV The market value per share divided by the book value per share Price to book ratio 
SYS  The return of the stock exchange index  System return 
 
Since the above balance sheet data is available on DataStream on a quarterly basis only, I 
interpolate the quarterly data to weekly data to be able to detect the changes in the in-
stitution-specific characteristics in a smoother way. After applying my selection criteria, I 
focus on 352 institutions from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2015. The data sample 
consists of 312 weekly observations for each institution-specific characteristic and 
macro-level variable. Table 2 (p. 206) shows the financial institutions‘ names and ab-
breviations used in this study. Before the analysis, I apply Engle and Granger (1987) 
two-step procedure to determine whether the variables I include in my model specifica-
tion are stationary and their inferences are valid. Evidence shows that the included var-





The first objective of this research comprises building the tail risk network and deter-
mining the network effects of Islamic banks. Following Hautsch et al. (2015), the tail risk 
of an institution ―A” with a return    
  at time t is measured by its conditional Val-
ue-at-Risk (      
 ) CoVaR and is different from the commonly used VaR, since the 
latter is determined by a large set of relevant independent variables called ―tail risk 
drivers‖ (  ).  
 
It is expressed as: 
  (   
        
 |  
( ))    (  
      
 |  
( ))     (1) 
with        
        
 (  
( ))        
  which represents the (negative) conditional 
q-quantile of    
 . The negative quantile ensures that the VaR is positive and infers a loss 
position. The relevant A-specific tail risk drivers   
( )
 include the lagged macro-level 
variables Mt-1, institutions‘ specific characteristics     
 , institutions‘ lagged return      
  
and effects of institutions other than A,   
   (  
 )   . These effects are called ―Loss 
Exceedances‖ and defined for institution B as   
    
  (  
      
 ), where     
  is the 
unconditional 10% sample quantile of   . Hence, institution B affects only the VaR of 
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institution A if the former is in distress.
 23
 The network interdependencies are captured 
and built based on the loss exceedances.  
 
Based on these specifications, Hautsch, et al. (2014) model the conditional VaR for firm 
A at time t as a linear function   
( )
;    
   ( )   
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with   (  
 |  
( ))   . I follow Koenker and Bassett, (1978) and estimate the model 
using the standard linear quantile regression. However, this step is not viable until I de-
termine the relevant tail risk drivers for institution A. The determination of the relevant 
  
( )
 is not straightforward, because of the large number of regressors in my sample. I 
cannot use neither individual significance tests because they do not account for possible 
collinearity between variables nor a sequence of joint significance tests which will have 
too many variations. Thus, I follow the two-step procedure suggested by Hautsch et al. 
(2015); i) selection of significant tail risk drivers for institution A using a selection op-
erator and ii) estimation of the 5% conditional VaR of firm A, given the selected signif-
icant drivers. 
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 According to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011), when institution B‘s negative return exceeds its standard 




4.4.1 Selection of Significant Tail Risk Drivers 
I use LASSO (least absolute shrinkage selection operator) which is a useful technique in 
high-dimensional conditional mean regressions (Tibshirani, 1996). It identifies the sig-
nificant variables in a data driven way and was recently adapted to quantile regression by 
Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). It includes a penalty parameter   , which controls the 
variables that I should select. The larger the parameter the more variables will be penal-
ised. I calculate the absolute value of the relevant independent variables  ̂ 
  as follows:  
 ̂ 
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where    (    )   
  is the relevant set of possible regressors for institution A, which 
are minimised by   ̂  
 
 
∑ (    )
  
   , and    is the loss function calculated as 
    (   (   ) where  ( ) is 1 for     and zero otherwise. I eliminate any 
regressors in the penalised regression whose absolute values of their estimated marginal 
effects are close to zero. However, the selection of the relevant regressors is depending on 
the appropriate value of the institution-specific penalty parameter   . I follow the tech-
nique suggested by Hastie and Qian (2014). I use an algorithm, which estimates a se-
quence of models with the objective of minimizing   , and selects the cross-validated 
model fit. Therefore, the relevant regressors are determined based on the data and without 




After, I run the penalised quantile regression to estimate the 5% quantile for all individual 
institutions. A conditional VaR specification is expressed below:   
 
      
 ̂    
( ) 
 ̂ 
 .  (4) 
 
This post-LASSO quantile regression helps us avoid the over-identification problems, 
especially in case of having a large number of regressors (Belloni and Chernozhukov, 
2011). Statistical significance of relevant regressors in the post-LASSO quantile regres-
sion are tested against 10% significance level, i.e. any estimate with a p-value less than 
0.1 shall be deemed statistically significant. 
 
4.4.2 Goodness of Fit of VaR specifications 
I test the predictability of VaR models using the dynamic version of likelihood ratio (LR) 
developed by Engle and Manganelli (2004). The key idea in this test is checking whether 
a VaR specification provides the appropriate empirical evidence of VaR exceptions, and 
checking whether the distribution of exceptions is independent and identically distrib-
uted. By doing so, I ensure that VaR exceptions at time t do not contain information about 
VaR exceptions at time t+1 and that both exceptions have the same distribution. Ac-
cording to Berkowitz et al. (2011), LR is more advantageous than the conventional R
2
 
statistic and plain unconditional level tests such as mean squared error such as those by 
Kupiec, (1995). This is due to the superior properties of LR in capturing the model‘s 




4.4.3 Network Construction of Institutions’ Loss Exceedances 
In addition to detecting the significant risk drivers for each individual institution, I con-
struct a financial network in each country, given the significant loss exceedances, which 
result from the post-LASSO VaR quantile regression. The network shows the strength 
and direction of connections between financial institutions. If institution A‘s loss ex-
ceedance   
  coefficient is relevant and a significant risk driver of institution B‘s finan-
cial distress   
 , this influence represents a network arrow from institution A and B. If the 
loss exceedance of institution A   
  is not selected as a relevant risk driver of institution 
B, there is no network arrow between the two institutions.  
 
I include institution-specific and macroeconomic variables in my model specification. By 
doing this, I rule out any possibility that linkages are driven by overall increasing vola-
tility levels or sudden drop in a country‘s credit rating. Accordingly, tail-risk spillovers 
are likely to be explained by remaining factors such as Islamic banks‘ own risks and 
business model commonalities. 
 
My resulting networks show three types of institutions: risk drivers, risk takers and risk 
distributors. Risk drivers have few incoming network arrows but many outgoing ones. 
This indicates that the financial distress of these institutions may affect many others and 
widespread to the system, so the country‘s central bank and financial authority should 
closely monitor them. The risk takers appear in the network with many incoming network 
arrows and few outgoing ones. These institutions are not necessarily systemically risky 
but they may be financially distressed due to the spillover effects of their own specific 
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characteristics. The risk distributors are these institutions, which act as a risk channel in 
the system and magnify the effect of institutions‘ financial distress by transmitting it to 
new networks. Again, the country‘s authorities should monitor these institutions because 
of their key role in increasing systemic risk. 
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4.4.4 Quantification of Systemic Risk Contributions 
After identifying the significant tail-risk networks, I test whether each institution‘s fi-
nancial distress significantly contributes to systemic. Below, I introduce the concept of 
realised systemic risk beta and the procedure for its estimation.  
 
a) Systemic Risk Beta 
Systems‘ tail risk conditional Value-at risk (CoVaR) is measured in the same way an 
institution‘s tail risk measurement. I measure system tail-risk         
  as the       
  of  
  
  conditional on       
  and other firm-specific control variables. More particularly, 
systemic risk beta is derived by an institution A‘s q-th quantile, given the significant 
networks of loss exceedances, institution specific characteristics and macro-level varia-
bles. Marginal systemic risk is expressed as follows:  
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where the marginal systemic risk contribution is the systemic risk beta (p-th quantile of 
the system) and   
( )
 are institution-relevant risk drivers.  
 
b) Realised Systemic Risk Contribution 
According to Hautsch et al. (2015), realised systemic risk is the total effect of an institu-
tion‘s financial distress (loss exceedance) on the system. It is measured by the realised 
systemic risk beta and the systemic relevance of institution A as determined based on the 
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I capture the partial effect of an increase in       
  on       
  by     
 | 
 and compare the 
systemic relevance of financial institutions in each country.  
 
It is important here, therefore, to make sure that my estimates are not biased because of 
the multi-dimensionality of my analytical procedure and limited data. Thus, for each 
institution I estimate an individual quantile regression of       
  as expressed below:  
      
    
( )   
      
 | 
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where   
( )  (      
        
(  )) is the vector of institution A‘s relevant risk drivers 
(selected post-LASSO in section (4.1)), which contain a constant term, lagged mac-
ro-level variables, lagged institution-specific characteristics and relevant loss exceed-
ances of other institutions. It is unfeasible to run the full model with all institutions 
however, because this will produce unreliable results due to the correlation effects be-
tween my many variables. 
 
c) Systemic Relevance and Time Variability 
Financial institutions‘ importance to the system may change over time, given their ten-
dency to experience financial distress during periods of turbulence. Accordingly, I iden-
tify each institutions‘ relevance to the system to account for time variability in its sys-
temic contribution. This step is important for the regulatory authorities, because it allows 
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them to monitor and supervise the financial system and capture any signs for possible 
instabilities. Therefore, I account for the marginal change in institution A‘s 
vance     
 | 
  to the system. 
 
1) For each institution, I use a wild bootstrap procedure following Chen et al. (2008) to 
generate estimated    ̂ 
 , given the quantile specification.   
2) For each institution, I estimate the realised systemic risk beta using quantile re-
gression at 5%, where systems‘ VaR is dependent on an institution‘s-specific 
characteristics, macro-level variables, loss exceedances of other institutions, and 
   ̂ 
 .  
3) The full marginal effect of VaR for institution A on system‘s VaR is expressed as 
follows: 
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where the lagged form of Z
A 
 helps in predicting systemic beta and maintains stability in 
the estimates, and     
 | 
 are its relevant coefficient.  
 
4) I check whether the systemic risk beta     
 | 
 is significant. I consider an institution 
whether it is systemically relevant; if an increase in its loss position, given its rel-
evant risk drivers, leads to a higher potential systemic loss. This requires that the 
systemic risk beta     
 | 
 is significant and nonnegative. I use Hautsch et al. (2015) 
linear model in lagged observable factors     
 , based on which institution A‘s 
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tendency to become financially distressed is determined. I test whether the realised 
systemic risk beta        
 | 
 is significance, given all relevant and potential risk drivers 
(selected by LASSO) for institution ―A‖. I test the hypothesis: 
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5) If the previous model has significant F-statistic, I test for time-variability by running 
a linear regression model using all institution-specific variables (only) as potential 
drivers of time-variation in systemic risk betas. This to determine whether realised 
systemic risk beta is driven by institutions‘ balance sheet structures. I test for this 
joint hypothesis: 
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6) If I do not reject H2, I re-specify the model and re-estimate a quantile regression 
model with    ̂   
 
 only and specify the systemic risk beta as a constant (  |    
 | 
). I 
test the hypothesis:        | = 0. 
 
Overall, the results from the joint hypothesis tests H1, H2 and H3 should indicate the 
following; any F-statistic with p-value less than 10% is considered statistically signifi-
cant. Under H1, if the p-value of the F-statistic is significant, this means that relevant 
macroeconomic variables, institution-specific characteristics, other financial institutions‘ 
loss exceedances and the VaR of the institution itself all together affect its relevance to 
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the system. After, I test H2 to determine whether the relevance of financial institutions is 
driven solely by its specific characteristics. If the p-value of the F-statistic is significant, 
this indicates that there is a time variability in the effect of an institution on the financial 
system. If p-value of the F-statistic is not significant under H1 and H2, I test for H3 to 
determine whether an institution‘s relevance is dependent on its financial distress solely. 
If p-value is significant, this indicates that the institution is systemically relevant because 
of its financial distress and it contributes to systemic risk. If none of the models are sig-
nificant, the institution is considered to be not systemically relevant. 
 
4.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, I demonstrate the findings regarding: i) the role of the relevant risk factors 
in driving an institution to become financially distressed, ii) the financial network spill-
overs and the role of institutions in driving or transmitting the trail-risk in the system and 




4.5.1 Post-LASSO Quantile Regression Results 
I use the LASSO procedure described in section 4.4.1 to find the relevant tail-risk drivers. 
I find that macro-level variables and institution-specific characteristics are not selected by 
LASSO procedure and loss exceedances (financial linkages) of other financial institu-
tions and are more prevalent. Given post-LASSO results, I test whether financial link-
ages, institution-specific or macro-level variables are more statistically relevant to each 
institution‘s financial distress (CoVaR).  For robustness, I: i) estimate based on quantile 
= 5% the CoVaR of each institution, given all risk drivers selected by LASSO and ii) 
estimate CoVaR, given only institution-specific characteristics and macro-level varia-
bles. Table 5 (p. 178) shows examples of the results from post-LASSO quantile regres-




 Table 5 Exemplary Post-LASSO Quantile Regression: VaR 5% 
  
 This table shows each institution‘s estimated VaR, given the relevant risk drivers selected by LASSO 
 I only include the quantile regression outputs which show at least one significant risk driver.  
Abu Dhabi           Dubai         
  Value Std. Error t-ratio P-value     Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
A6_OBF           D11_DF         
(Intercept) -4.55187 1.51605 -3.00245 0.0029   (Intercept) -430.903 175.1578 -2.46008 0.01446 
A6_OBF_log -0.33467 0.15351 -2.18009 0.03001   D11_size 73.53414 30.06555 2.44579 0.01503 
A14_FHP_LE -1.09522 0.55036 -1.99 0.04747   D11_LEV -73.2028 34.49173 -2.12233 0.03463 
A29_RASK_LE 2.15314 4.00012 0.53827 0.59078   D11_DF_log -0.18357 0.07889 -2.32703 0.02063 
A7_OBR           DFMGI_Index 0.09894 0.04946 2.00061 0.04634 
(Intercept) -1.11576 0.22136 -5.04048 0   D1_DIB_LE -0.54297 0.33412 -1.62509 0.1052 
A7_OBR_log -0.26484 0.08314 -3.18559 0.0016   D6_AJ_LE -0.12839 0.24646 -0.52093 0.6028 
ADSMI_Index 0.08335 0.07214 1.15542 0.24883   D8_DI_LE -0.66491 0.23878 -2.78465 0.0057 
A1_ADC_LE 0.14562 0.12886 1.13007 0.25934   D9_SHC_LE -0.13916 0.16404 -0.84833 0.39694 
A2_ADI_LE -0.8695 0.24107 -3.60687 0.00036   D12_GGI_LE -0.24422 0.13494 -1.80986 0.07133 
A3_BOS_LE -0.51834 0.19363 -2.67701 0.00783   D14_IAI_LE -0.28998 0.10493 -2.76359 0.00607 
A4_CBI_LE -0.73731 0.30874 -2.38814 0.01755   D20_ALEABS_LE 0.31709 1.67764 0.18901 0.85022 
A8_SI_LE -0.48796 0.17078 -2.8572 0.00457   D23_OI_LE -14134.8 17741.52 -0.79671 0.42626 
A9_UOB_LE 0.08474 0.12638 0.67055 0.50302   D25_DALE_LE -0.10335 0.09885 -1.04549 0.29665 
A30_MT_LE 0.21517 0.10841 1.98477 0.04807             
A7_OBR           Pakistan         
(Intercept) -1.32822 0.25238 -5.26272 0   P8_UB         
A5_OB_LE -0.02585 0.16856 -0.15334 0.87823   (Intercept) 15.69103 7.87579 1.99231 0.04726 
A7_OBR_LE -0.47906 0.10283 -4.65852 0   P8_UB_PBV -2.18695 1.12211 -1.94897 0.05224 
A9_UOB_LE -0.38806 0.50923 -0.76206 0.44661   P8_UB_DE 1.29208 1.60101 0.80704 0.42029 
A30_MT_LE -0.19499 0.05959 -3.27226 0.00119   P8_UB_log -0.02666 0.09497 -0.28072 0.77912 
A9_UOB           PK_INT_RESV -3.49941 1.91047 -1.83169 0.068 
(Intercept) -1.68977 0.34265 -4.93148 0   P1_COM_LE -0.39952 0.22047 -1.81213 0.07098 
A9_UOB_log -0.30169 0.08857 -3.4062 0.00075   P3_SB_LE 0.12265 0.16134 0.76019 0.44775 
oil 0.07249 0.03759 1.92867 0.05472   P4_HMB_LE -0.37585 0.21511 -1.74725 0.08163 
ADSMI_Index 0.02391 0.08687 0.27527 0.7833   P5_OBP_LE -0.27013 0.11751 -2.29876 0.02222 
A1_ADC_LE -0.54673 0.18259 -2.99434 0.00298   P7_BAL_LE 0.01107 0.21705 0.05101 0.95935 
A2_ADI_LE -0.10237 0.17931 -0.57088 0.56851   P9_ALB_LE -0.04486 0.35533 -0.12624 0.89963 
A3_BOS_LE 0.0635 0.11468 0.55375 0.58017   P10_BOP_LE -0.16798 0.21646 -0.77602 0.43836 
A5_OB_LE 0.02147 0.15448 0.13901 0.88953   P13_MCB_LE -0.22209 0.48251 -0.46027 0.64566 
A8_SI_LE -0.6907 0.18443 -3.74509 0.00022   P14_NIB_LE -0.16993 0.14167 -1.1995 0.23129 
A13_IBP_LE -0.24844 0.17076 -1.45491 0.14675   P17_HB_LE -0.74311 0.42628 -1.74324 0.08233 
A14_FHP_LE 0.0644 0.09806 0.6568 0.51181             
A17_AAA_LE 0.39071 0.12611 3.09811 0.00213    
A30_MT_LE -0.01297 0.05644 -0.22987 0.81835   continued 
A31_INSUH_LE 0.41261 0.15431 2.67391 0.00791    
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Bahrain 
  
 Value Std.Error t-ratio p-value     Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
Malaysia   (Intercept) 1.76342 1.65899 1.06295 B1_AUB  
      
M5_AMM         
 
0.28866 
(Intercept) -0.70559 0.16944 -4.16422 0.00004 
 
B1_AUB_PBV -0.80484 0.51121 -1.57437 0.11646 
M5_AMM_log 0.07549 0.05978 1.26279 0.20766 
 
B1_AUB_log 0.24369 0.13908 1.75211 0.08078 
Budget_Balance_GDP -0.51795 0.82973 -0.62424 0.53295 
 
BHSEASI 0.47634 0.18514 2.57285 0.01057 
FTFBMPM 0.13783 0.04133 3.33475 0.00096 
 
IMP_VOL -0.06868 0.16181 -0.42443 0.67156 
M3_BIMB_LE 0.20729 0.06585 3.14801 0.00181 
 
B3_BIB_LE 0.14494 0.39679 0.36528 0.71516 
M4_HLF_LE -0.52009 0.13951 -3.72795 0.00023 
 
B6_TBB_LE 0.13308 0.18947 0.70236 0.483 
M6_CIM_LE -0.28436 0.13707 -2.07465 0.03888 
 
B9_IB_LE -0.0117 0.43772 -0.02673 0.97869 
M7_MAL_LE -0.33829 0.21956 -1.54076 0.12444 
 
B10_ALB_LE 0.025 0.08167 0.30614 0.75971 
M8_PUB_LE 0.13212 0.23698 0.5575 0.5776 
 
B14_EI_LE -253.984 221.9872 -1.14414 0.25348 
M9_RHB_LE -0.60859 0.07172 -8.48615 0 
 
B15_SAI_LE 1.09077 3.42192 0.31876 0.75013 
M10_ALL_LE -0.03241 0.15642 -0.2072 0.836 
 
B20_BK_LE -0.16979 0.73827 -0.22999 0.81826 
M13_BUR_LE -0.11684 0.12072 -0.96782 0.33392 
 
B2_AB         
M20_MB_LE -0.01089 0.06749 -0.16132 0.87195 
 
(Intercept) -2.59366 0.42971 -6.03578 0 
M22_HWA_LE 0.15183 0.13231 1.14749 0.25211 
 
BHSEASI 0.93823 0.22288 4.20967 0.00003 
M31_TIH_LE -0.20113 0.11427 -1.76016 0.07941 
 
B4_BBK         
/M9_RHB         
 
(Intercept) 3.23466 1.87606 1.72418 0.08568 
(Intercept) -0.52149 0.1311 -3.97765 0.00009 
 
B4_BBK_PBV -3.30088 1.42567 -2.31531 0.02125 
FTFBMPM 0.07813 0.05457 1.43173 0.15326 
 
BHSEASI 0.18389 0.15824 1.16213 0.24609 
M4_HLF_LE 0.01843 0.13414 0.13739 0.89081 
 
B8_ASB_LE -0.18616 0.10776 -1.7276 0.08507 
M5_AMM_LE -0.14473 0.08035 -1.80119 0.07267 
 
B5_GFH         
M6_CIM_LE -0.28017 0.31459 -0.89059 0.37386 
 
(Intercept) -3.31829 1.61871 -2.04996 0.04122 
M7_MAL_LE 0.03836 0.26127 0.14681 0.88338 
 
B5_PBV -0.15738 0.36551 -0.43057 0.66709 
M10_ALL_LE -0.3358 0.13332 -2.51883 0.01229 
 
BHSEASI 1.39202 0.60063 2.31761 0.02113 
M11_RCE_LE -0.01325 0.19262 -0.0688 0.94519 
 
B2_ABC_LE -2.08991 2.4329 -0.85902 0.391 
M29_AM_LE 0.15589 0.12672 1.23023 0.21957 
 
B9_IB_LE -4.44161 3.04634 -1.45802 0.14586 
M19_ACS         
 
B7_UGB         
(Intercept) 7.66805 3.40791 2.25008 0.02518 
 
(Intercept) 2.33709 13.48271 0.17334 0.8625 
M19_ACS_DE -9.67899 3.61611 -2.67663 0.00785 
 
B7_LEV 0.08696 0.60332 0.14414 0.88549 
M19_ACS_MM 8.45989 4.66721 1.81262 0.07091 
 
B7_DE -0.02543 0.2402 -0.10588 0.91575 
M19_ACS_log 0.07144 0.0744 0.96026 0.33771 
 
B7_MM -0.65939 3.85581 -0.17101 0.86433 
Budget_Balance_GDP 3.50283 2.48042 1.41219 0.15895 
 
B7_PBV -1.3305 2.56539 -0.51864 0.6044 
FTFBMPM 0.09459 0.12834 0.73703 0.46169 
 
B7_UGB_log 0.0877 0.26122 0.33575 0.7373 
M6_CIM_LE -0.02643 0.32948 -0.08023 0.93611 
 
BHSEASI 0.16291 0.24698 0.65961 0.51002 
M9_RHB_LE -0.06185 0.31684 -0.1952 0.84537 
 
B2_ABC_LE 0.02806 0.35264 0.07958 0.93662 
M14_APEX_LE 0.20382 0.14949 1.36344 0.17378 
 
B4_BBK_LE -0.25754 0.39829 -0.64662 0.51838 
M17_JH_LE -0.08193 0.08913 -0.91925 0.35871 
 
B8_ASB_LE -0.4735 0.34853 -1.35857 0.17532 
M18_KUD_LE -0.19576 0.23704 -0.82586 0.40955 
 
B11_KHC_LE 0.04299 0.42114 0.10208 0.91877 
M26_MAA_LE -0.11327 0.19674 -0.57574 0.56523 
 
B14_EI_LE -444.045 391.1136 -1.13534 0.25716 
M27_PAC_LE -0.43086 0.18535 -2.32454 0.02078 
 
B17_INVB_LE -1.84442 0.80589 -2.28868 0.0228 
M30_MHB_LE -0.49382 0.2367 -2.08628 0.03781 
 
B19_AHLINS_LE -0.05374 0.67327 -0.07981 0.93644 
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Generally, my results show that loss exceedances of other financial institutions are sta-
tistically significant in most countries, and are more dominant as drivers of institutions‘ 
CoVaRs. For example, CoVaR estimation outputs for institutions such as Bank Albilad 
(S1_ALB), Bupa Arabia for Cooperation (S22_BUP), Saudi Reinsurance (S40_SREIN)) 
in Saudi Arabia and Bank QNB Indonesia (I6_BQI) and TP bank Bukopin PIN TBK 
(I12_BUKO) and Bank International Indonesia (I15_BII) in Indonesia, contain only loss 
exceedances of other institutions.  
 
On the other hand, Turkey‘s general macroeconomic state variables such as stock market 
index, implied volatility, TLIBOR and real estate sector have shown a significant impact 
on CoVaR compared to other countries. While institution-specific characteristics appear 
to affect Bahraini institutions‘ CoVaR as much as other institutions‘ loss exceedances do. 
I also find that there are some institution-specific variables more prevalent than the others 
are. Lagged-return (log) is significant as a risk driver of a considerable number of insti-
tutions‘ VaRs in Turkey, Indonesia, Dubai and Oman, whereas price-to-book ratio (PBV) 
is more prevalent and significant in Turkey, Indonesia, Bahrain, Oman, and Jordan. For 
macro-level variables, there is a general absence of indices for the countries‘ main in-
dustries. Crude Oil (Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Oman), palm oil (Malaysia), en-
ergy and utilities (Saudi Arabia) are not widely selected by LASSO, and when selected 
they are mainly insignificant and do not affect institutions‘ VaRs. 
 
When it comes to the risk drivers of Islamic institutions CoVaRs, I find that loss 
exceedances are the main drivers in most countries, except in Bahrain and Dubai. Table 6 




Table 6 Significant Risk drivers of Islamic Institutions’ CoVaR 
Abu Dhabi Mainly loss exceedances (only one Islamic bank‘s CoVaR is affected by PBV) 
Indonesia Mainly loss exceedances, few Islamic institutions are affected by (log), PBV, and IVOL. 
Malaysia Only loss exceedances 
Bahrain  ARAB BANKING CORPORATION, GULF FINANCE HOUSE, ITHMAAR BANK 
BSC,  
KHALEEJI COMMERCIAL BANK are mainly affected by stock market index  
Pakistan Mainly loss exceedances 
Oman Mainly loss exceedances and lagged return 
Jordan JORDAN DUBAI 
ISLAMIC BK  
PBV, LEV, DE, MM, IVOL, Inter-bank rate, four loss exceedances 
of other institutions 
JORDAN IS-
LAMIC BANK  
PBV and four loss exceedances 
Dubai DUBAI ISLAMIC 
BANK  
lagged return, market index, banks sector 
AJMAN BANK lagged return and loss exceedances 
TAKAFUL 
EMARAT PJSC 
DE, PBV, Budget Balance to GDP and loss exceedances 
Turkey Only loss exceedances 















Figure 1 Interconnectedness between financial institutions in 10 Countries 



















Continue Figure 1: Interconnectedness between financial institutions in 10 Countries 
This figure shows the network graphs for 10 countries‘ financial systems. Each circle represents an institution in the financial system and their 
acronyms are in Table 2 (p. 204). Network linkages (arrows) indicate tail-risk spillover effects, but does not refer to the size of the effect. If an 
Institution has more outgoing arrows than ingoing arrows, it is considered to be a risk driver in the system. If an institution has more ingoing arrows 
than outgoing arrows it is considered a risk recipient. If an institution ingoing and outgoing arrows are merely equal, it is considered to be a risk 
transmitter or a risk channel.  
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This network topology offers visual illustration for each institution‘s role in the financial 
system, given its financial distress level. Again, when institution A exceeds its standard VaR 
level, I consider it financially distressed, and it starts affecting the other financial institutions. 
According to the networks above, institution B‘s loss exceedance is a relevant risk driver for 
institution A, if the latter affects A‘s distress and there is a network connection between 
them. The focus in this research is on the role of Islamic institutions in the financial system. I 
do not investigate the interconnectedness within sectors, but I focus on how widespread is the 
interconnectedness of institutions between different sectors (conventional banks, Islamic 
banks, insurance companies, Islamic insurance companies, brokers, asset managers and 
investment banks). Generally, the role of Islamic institutions in Table 7 varies across and 
within countries. 
Table 7 Role of Islamic Banks in Systems’ Financial Networks 
Abu Dhabi 
Methaq Takaful (A30) is a risk driver and it affects both Islamic banks and other financial institutions, 
while Sharjah Islamic bank (A8) is a risk channel 
Bahrain All Islamic banks are risk recipient 
Dubai Dubai Islamic Bank (D1) is risk driver and Ajman Bank (D6) is risk recipient 
Indonesia 
Bank Mandiri (I7), Bank Rakayat Indonesia (I8) and PT Bank Mega Terbuka (I9) are risk drivers, Bank 
Central Asia (I10), PT Bank Bumi Arta (I11), Bank Rakayat Industrial (I11), Bank Victoria Interna-
tional (I24), 4 other Islamic windows are risk channels. Only Bank Tabungan Pensiunan Nasional (I22) 
is risk recipient and out of ten network connections, it is affected by five other Islamic banks. 
Jordan Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank (J14) is risk recipient while Jordan Islamic Bank (J11) is risk channel. 
Malaysia Islamic banks are either channels or drivers 
Oman 
Al Madina Investment (O12) and Oman United Insurance (O29) are risk drivers and Bank Nazwa (O4) 
is risk recipient 
Pakistan 
Only Standard Chartered (P6) is risk driver, Bank Al Habib LTD (P1) as a risk channel and Askari Bank 
Limited (P2), Mezan Bank LTD (P6) and Bank Alfalah LTD (P7) are risk recipients. 
Saudi Arabia Weqaya Takaful only is a risk driver, while the rest of Islamic institutions are risk recipients 




Given the publicly disclosed data, I cannot identify the reasons for linkages between Islamic 
institutions and other institutions. The reasoning of these linkages would require compilation 
of comprehensive data sets about credit and liquidity status of the selected institutions. To 
date, product specific data in Islamic institutions is limited and not accessible.    
 
Note also that there are no simultaneity biases i.e. the more the CoVaR of institution A is 
driven by loss exceedances of B, the more the spillover effects from institution A on B. 
Simultaneity biases are very weak, because an increase in A‘s CoVaR may increase the 
―expected‖ loss exceedance of B, but not necessarily affect the ―realised‖ loss exceedance. 
Based on the results outlined in Table 5 (Appendix), supervisory authorities should closely 
observe and monitor the practices of Islamic institutions, especially in countries where they 
act as risk drivers or risk channels. This indicates that Islamic banks‘ financial distress may 
be magnifying the financial distress in the system and contributing to systemic risk. In ad-
dition, if an institution has few network connections, this does not necessarily mean that it 
will not affect the overall system and be systemically relevant. Accordingly, I determine how 
relevant each Islamic institution is to the system, regardless of network connections, and 
show the significance of its systemic contribution, if there is any.  
 
4.5.3 Systemic Risk Relevance (Realised Systemic Risk) 
I run joint significance tests by testing for three hypotheses. First, I test H1 in section 4.4.4 (c) 
to determine whether Islamic institutions are systemically relevant given all relevant risk 
drivers. If models‘ F-statistic is significant, I test H2 to find if there is time variability in their 
systemic risk contribution driven by their institution-specific characteristics. If the model 
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F-statistic is insignificant, I re-estimate the model and test H3, given only the expected VaR 
of Islamic institutions, to know whether each institution‘s distress is significantly affecting 
the system. If none of the tests‘ F-Statistic is significant, the institution‘s effect on the system 
is deemed insignificant. The results of the joint significance test in Table 8 to Table 17 pro-
vide further evidence about the role of financial linkages and institution-specific variables in 
driving Islamic institutions‘ financial distress.    
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Table 8 Bahrain Realised Systemic Risk and Time Variability 
  
H1 H2 H3 
ARAB BANKING CORPORATION++ B2_ABC 2.20E-16 2.20E-16 
 BAHRAIN ISLAMIC BANK ++ B3_BIB 0.09182 0.1224 
 GULF FINANCE HOUSE ++ B5_GFH 3.18E-13 2.72E-07 
 TAIB BANK BSC ++ B6_TBB - - 
 AL SALAM BANK ++ B8_ASB 1.67E-13 1.25E-13 
 ITHMAAR BANK BSC ++ B9_IB 2.20E-16 2.20E-16 
 AL BARAKA BANKING GROUP** B10_ALB 2.20E-16 8.04E-06 
 KHALEEJI COMMERCIAL BANK++ B11_KHC 0.00011 0.0001671 
 TAKAFUL INTL.CO. ++ B22_TAKI 0.02336 0.01791 
  
 
Figure 2 Bahrain: Islamic Institution Systemic risk contribution 
list of figures 2 2 
 











My results for Bahrain show that all Islamic Institutions are systemically relevant, and they 
have time-variability in their effect due to specific characteristics, except for BAHRAIN 
ISLAMIC BANK. The latter does not change in its effect over time due to its specif-
ic-characteristics. These are important results to regulators, since Bahrain is becoming the 
hub of Islamic finance and banking, where regulators should understand Islamic financial 
institutions‘ contributions to the financial system and the reasons behind their relevance. In 
addition, the results about their relevant realised systemic risk confirm the earlier results I 
obtained from the post-LASSO procedure and the penalised quantile regressions. As I show 
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in Table 5 (Appendix), many institution-specific characteristics are significant and play an 
important role in defining Islamic institutions financial distress.  
 
Table 9 Indonesia Realised Systemic Risk and Time Variability 
  
H1 H2 H3 
BANK MANDIRI  ++ I7_BM  0.0001918 4.24E-05 - 
BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA++ I8_BRI  0.0004435 0.09432 - 
PT BANK MEGA TERBUKA ++ I9_PBM  0.7598 0.1608 0.05693 
BANK CENTRAL ASIA ++ I10_BCA  0.02516 0.0928 - 
PT BANK BUMI ARTA ++ I11_BUMI  0.06564 0.06564 - 
PT BANK BUKOPIN TBK ** I12_BUKO  0.0266 0.007713 - 
BANK DANAMON INDONESIA** I14_DAM  0.0184 0.05462 - 
BANK CIMB NIAGA TBK ** I16_BCN  0.09482 0.1781 0.3271 
BANK PERMATA TBK ** I17_PER  0.3228 0.3228 0.3228 
BANK RAKYAT IND ++ I20_AGR  0.1877 0.05885 - 
BANK TABUNGAN PENSIUNAN NASIONAL ++ I22_TAB  0.2622 0.2622 0.2622 
BANK VICTORIA INTL. ++ I24_VIC  0.09273 0.09273 - 
BANK PANIN DUBAI ** I37_PANI  0.7169 0.7169 0.7169 
 
 
Figure 3 Indonesia: Islamic Institution Systemic risk contribution  
list of figures 2 3 
 












For Indonesia, it is considered the largest country in terms of Muslim population with the 
Islamic banking sector representing a large proportion of total market share. My results show 
that ten out of thirteen Islamic financial institutions are systemically relevant except three 
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institutions (BANK PERMATA TBK, BANK TABUNGAN PENSIUNAN NASIONAL, 
and BANK PANIN DUBAI), where two institutions are fully fledged Islamic banks and one 
is a bank with Islamic window. Seven systemically relevant Institutions also showed time 
variability in their effect on the financial system (BANK MANDIRI, BANK RAKYAT 
INDONESIA, BANK CENTRAL ASIA, PT BANK BUMI ARTA, PT BANK BUKOPIN 
TBK, BANK DANAMON INDONESIA, BANK RAKYAT IND and BANK VICTORIA 
INTL).  
 
Table 10 Jordan Realised Systemic Risk and Time Variability 
  H1 H2 H3 
JORDAN ISLAMIC BANK ++ J11_JIB 2.54E-08 1.97E-08 - 
JORDAN DUBAI ISLAMIC BK.++ J14_JDI 0.02141 0.01802 - 




Figure 4 Jordan: Islamic Institution Systemic risk contribution list of figures 2 4  
 






Table 11 Oman Realised Systemic Risk and Time Variability 
 
 
H1 H2 H3 
BANK NIZWA  O4_NIZ 0.9794 0.75 7.50E-02 
AL MADINA INVESTMENT  O12_MADI 0.006886 0.07852 






Figure 5 Oman: Islamic Institution Systemic risk contribution  of figures 2 5 
 






Table 12 Pakistan Realised Systemic Risk and Time Variability 
  
H1 H2 H3 
BANK AL HABIB LTD  P1_COM  7.68E-03 1.89E-05 
 ASKARI BANK LIMITED  P2_AB  0.6521 0.001704 
 NATIONAL BK OF PAKISTAN  P5_OBP  2.67E-03 4.25E-01 
 MEEZAN BANK LTD.  P6_MBL  0.06523 0.002672 
 BANK ALFALAH LTD  P7_BAL  7.70E-02 1.21E-02 
 STANDARD CHARTERED  P16_SC  9.12E-01 2.87E-03 
  
 
Figure 6 Pakistan: Islamic Institution Systemic risk contribution list of figures 2 6 
 
Institution   
  
P1_COM  0.42029 
P2_AB  0.07964 
P5_OBP  0.19406 
P6_MBL  0.4137 
P7_BAL  0.15773 
P16_SC  0.07496 
In Pakistan, three Islamic institutions (BANK AL HABIB LTD, MEEZAN BANK LTD, and 
BANK ALFALAH LTD) are systemically relevant and all have time variability in their 
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effect on the system. While two institutions only are relevant to the system due to their 
characteristics (ASKARI BANK LIMITED and STANDARD CHARTERED).  
Table 13 Saudi Arabia Realised Systemic Risk and Time Variability 
  
H1 H2 H3 
BANK ALBILAD ++ S1_ALB 0.0024 0.000001 
 ALINMA BANK ++ S2_ALI 0.4325 0.2145 0.2145 
AL RAJHI BANKING ++ S3_RAJ 0.8327 0.1143 0.1193 
BANQUE SAUDI FRANSI** S4_SFAR 0.1342 0.1147 0.11547 
BANK ALJAZIRA ++ S6_JAZ 0.1234 0.3214 0.3714 
SAMBA FINANCIAL GROUP** S8_SAMB 0.000012 0.00014 
 ALAHLI TAKAFUL COM  S21_TAK  0.0014 0.00075 
 SABB TAKAFUL S26_SABT  0.000031 0.0014 
 WEQAYA TAKAFUL IN&R. SUSP  S42_WTI  0.70012 0.7714 0.774812 
SOLIDARITY SAUDI TAKAFUL S50_SOL  0.1124 0.221 0.3141 
 
 









S21_TAK  1.5 
S26_SABT  0.6 
 
Table 14 Abu Dhabi Realised Systemic Risk and Time Variability 
  
H1 H2 H3 
ABU DHABI ISLAMIC BANK++ A2_ADI 2.20E-16 2.20E-16 
 BANK OF SHARJAH ++ A3_BOS 2.20E-16 2.16E-12 
 SHARJAH ISLAMIC BANK ++ A8_SI 5.73E-09 1.22E-08 


















Table 15 Dubai Realised Systemic Risk and Time Variability 
  
H1 H2 H3 
DUBAI ISLAMIC BANK ++ D1_DIB 2.20E-16 5.10E-16 
 
EMIRATES ISLAMIC BANK++ D3_EMI 0.003529 0.003249 
 
AJMAN BANK ++ D6_AJ 0.0176 0.7525 
 
ISLAMIC ARAB INSURANCE D14_IAI 0.01089 0.009123 
 
DUBAI ISLAMIC INSURANCE D22_DI 1.56E-02 7.20E-02 
 
TAKAFUL EMARAT PJSC D24_TE 4.56E-01 7.38E-02 0.03981 






















Table 16 Malaysia Realised Systemic Risk and Time Variability 
  
H1 H2 H3 
HONG LEONG BANK M1_HL 2.20E-16 2.20E-16 
 AFFIN HOLDINGS BHD  M2_AFF 2.20E-16 2.20E-16 
 CIMB GROUP HOLDINGS M6_CIM 2.20E-16 2.20E-16 
 RHB BANK BHD M9_RHB 2.20E-16 2.20E-16 




Figure 10 Malaysia: Islamic Institution Systemic risk contribution  of 
figures 2 10 
 






In Malaysia, all Islamic banks are systemically relevant and have time variability, except for 
one institution (ALLIANCE FINANCIAL GP). In Turkey, one Islamic bank is systemically 
relevant and has also variability effect on the system.  
 
 Table 17 Turkey Realised Systemic Risk and Time Variability 
  
H1 H2 H3 












I find that there are commonalities in Middle Eastern countries when it comes to Islamic 
banks systemic relevance, and I find new results about Islamic insurance, which is new to the 
literature. In Saudi Arabia, two Takaful firms (ALAHLI TAKAFUL COM and SABB 
TAKAFUL) and one bank (SAMBA BANK) with an Islamic window, are relevant and en-
counter a time-variability in their effect on the financial system.  
 
Abu Dhabi institutions include three Islamic banks and three Islamic insurance companies. 
All are systemically relevant and have time-variability in their effect on the system. Only one 
institution (ABU DHABI NATIONALTAKAFUL) is systemically relevant due to its char-
acteristics.  
 
For Dubai, most Takaful institutions are systemically relevant and all Islamic banks are 
relevant. In Jordan, two Islamic banks (JORDAN DUBAI ISLAMIC BK and JORDAN 
ISLAMIC BANK) are systemically relevant and have time variability in their effect on the 
financial system, due to the change in their business performance and their risk exposures.  
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For Oman, all three Islamic institutions (BANK NIZWA, AL MADINA INVESTMENT and 
OMAN UNITED INSURANCE) are systemically relevant where one Islamic insurance 
company‘s characteristics have a time variable effect on financial system (OMAN UNITED 
INSURANCE).  
 
Generally, the above results about the Middle Eastern countries (Bahrain, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Jordan, Turkey) in my sample, indicate that the significance 
test done in H1 implies that macroeconomic variables have a significant effect on the rele-
vance of many Islamic institutions. These economies have strong-state intervention on large 
banks. This leads to market concentration, where large banks (either Islamic or conventional) 
become monopolistic or oligopolistic, and tend to negatively affect the profitability and 
efficiency of other financial institutions and promote financial distress (Mizaei et al. 2013). 
 
Moreover, I find interesting results about Islamic insurance companies or ―Takaful‖. Pre-
viously, I find that Islamic insurance companies act as risk drivers or channels in most fi-
nancial networks. They also affect more Islamic banks than conventional banks. My realised 
systemic risk analysis provides further implications about Islamic insurance financial dis-
tress. Apparently, they are systemically relevant and as outlined in the literature about in-
surance business, Islamic Takaful‘s business profiles turn to affect system‘s stability over 
time (Kader et al.2014). Although the nature of their business is different to normal banking, 
they share common problems with Islamic banks. They suffer from poor performance, inef-
ficiency, troubles in handling operational costs and re-investing insurers‘ money in admis-
sible options that will reap high return. Their business has substantial deficiencies in man-
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agement boards, and conflict of interest and transparency problems which make them haz-
ardous. What is worrying is this branch of Islamic banking that is growing and penetrating 
conventional markets without having proper policies and regulations to govern its perfor-
mance. This implies that supervisors in the Islamic banking sector and Islamic insurance 
market should be alert to operational problems and use and allocation of capital. This would 
improve liquidity, minimise cost to income ratio, and reduce propensity to failure and con-
tribution to systemic risk.  
 
To summarise, results indicate that Islamic banks are systemically relevant, and they sig-
nificantly contribute to systems‘ realised systemic risk. Moreover, most Islamic banks‘ 
systemic risk contribution is driven by specific characteristics. In other words, financial 
linkages are not the only factor that explain Islamic banks‘ financial distress, but the change 
in their own risks overtime also plays an important role in magnifying systemic risk. Finally, 
for those Islamic banks with insignificant results in H1 and H2, I test whether their expected 
conditional VaRs have significant impact on the system. I find that most Islamic banks with 
no time variability in their systemic risk contribution, their expected conditional VaRs have a 
significant effect on the financial system.  
 
In the next section, I show the procedure undertaking to validate my model specification and 




4.6 Robustness: CoVaR Model Validity  
For each institution, I test the significance for loss exceedances in VaR specification using 
the quantile regression version developed by Koenker and Bassett (1982). Given the F-test 
for joint significance test, I decide whether each loss exceedance is significant and relevant to 
CoVaR. Results show that the selected loss exceedances are significant in most cases. This 
indicates that connections between institutions are primarily justified by loss exceedances. 
Moreover, I follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) and compare estimated CoVaR model 
with all risk drivers and the estimated CoVaR model with macroeconomic variables only. 
Results confirm the previous validity test, and assure that the model predictability is better 
and has higher back testing p-values when loss exceedances are included.   
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4.7 Discussion  
In this section, I will discuss my empirical results and their contribution to the research upon 
two main points. First, one of the most important findings of post-LASSO quantile regression 
and network analyses show that not only conventional banks have significant tail-risk 
spillover effects, but Islamic banks also do with significant effect on conventional and other 
Islamic banks. Islamic banks turn to act as risk drivers and risk channels as conventional 
banks do within the financial system. Although, publicly available data cannot empirically 
justify the economic reasons for such linkages between the selected institutions, I include 
institution-specific and macroeconomic variables in my model specification. By doing this, I 
rule out any possibility that linkages are driven by overall increasing volatility level or 
sudden drop in a country‘s credit rating. Accordingly, tail-risk spillovers are likely to be 
explained by remaining factors such as Islamic banks‘ own risks and business model com-
monalities.  
 
Possible reasons include the similarity in the business model of conventional and Islamic 
banks (Beck et al. 2013). Other studies also find no difference between the performance of 
Islamic and conventional banks in terms of efficiency and insolvency risk (El-Gamal and 
Inangolo, 2005; Abedifar et al. 2013), and in terms of financial stability (Cihak and Hesse, 
2010; Bourkhis and Nabi (2013). My results are new to the literature, because Islamic banks 
are theoretically promoted as a safe banking alternative and promote financial development 
social welfare (Khediri et al. 2015; Olson and Zoubi, 2008; Abedifar et al 2016). For Islamic 
banks, which appear to act as risk recipients, I intuitively justify that by the insufficiency of 
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risk management practices, and being helpless if the counterparty defaults (Djennas, 2016). 
The competitive pressure Islamic banks face may make them seek high-risk projects to 
overcome their limited access to finance.  
 
Second, my research generally finds that Islamic banks contribute to systemic risk the same 
as their conventional peers do. The joint significance test shows that most Islamic banks are 
systemically relevant. Even more, there is a time-variability in systemic risk contribution of a 
number of Islamic banks, due to their own specific-characteristics. This can be attributable to 
liquidity issues and the larger operational risk in the Islamic banking sector compared to 
conventional banks. According to Pappas et al. (2016), such problems make Islamic Banks 
more prone to financial distress and failure risk. In addition, Muslim countries‘ economies 
are mainly emerging or frontier and have improper supervision and regulations regarding 
information disclosure and business performance (Errico and Farahbaksh, 1998).  
 
Moreover, I find a variation in the role of Islamic banks in the financial system across 
countries. This is possibly explained by two reasons.  
First, the different market structures play important roles in defining network connections. 
Most economies in my research (Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Jordan 
and Turkey) have strong-state intervention on large banks. This leads to market concentra-
tion, where large banks (either Islamic or conventional) become monopolistic or oligopolis-
tic, and negatively affect the profitability and efficiency of other financial institutions and 
promote financial distress (Mizaei et al. 2013). In such countries, macroeconomic variables 
will not be reflective of the general economic state and financial institutions‘ risk and net-
200 
 
work connections are the main drivers of systemic risk. My results confirm this. When I 
incorporate unique macroeconomic variables to Islamic countries‘ economies to the model 
specification (main industries indices, Budget Balance to GDP, Budget Debt to GDP, and 
other variables), they are mostly excluded because the significance of network connections 
outweighs them. Other countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia are mixed economies, with 
minimum intervention by the government.  
 
Second, different Shari‘ah standards are applied by Islamic banks across countries. Some 
follow AAOIFI, others follow Islamic Financial Services Board‘s (IFSB) standards which 
are mainly applied in South-East Asia, and the rest simply follow the Central Banks for the 
countries where they operate. These standards relate to the admissible leverage levels, fi-
nancial contract terms and other operational elements in the Islamic banking sector. Hence, 
Islamic banks‘ relevant risk drivers and financial distress would vary too.  
 
After demonstrating a detailed discussion about my research findings, in the next section I 




4.8 Conclusion and Implications  
Islamic banking sector has witnessed an exponential growth in its market share, due to the 
increasing Muslim population and its theoretical promotion as a more stable and safer 
banking alternative after the financial crisis. However, various studies analysed the charac-
teristics and risks in Islamic banks and find that they suffer from significant liquidity issues, 
operational risks and withdrawal risks. Other studies also find that Islamic banks are ineffi-
cient and prone to failure during financial instability and economic distress. This raises the 
question regarding the viability of interest-free banking and its role in increasing or de-
creasing systemic risk in the financial system.  
 
Accordingly, this research contributes to the literature in three ways. First, I examined the 
effect of the financial distress of Islamic banks on other financial institutions by utilising 
penalised-quantile regressions and financial network analyses. I determined whether a fi-
nancial institution is distressed or not, by considering its specific characteristics, macroe-
conomic variables and the loss exceedances of other financial institutions. Second, I inves-
tigated the systemic relevance of Islamic banks by estimating the realised systemic risks 
given the relevant factors of each institution‘s financial distress. Third, if an Islamic bank 
turned out to be systemically relevant, I examined whether there is a time-variability in its 




I used weekly balance sheet, macroeconomic and market data for 352 financial institutions in 
10 majority Muslim countries from the beginning of January 2010 to the end of December 
2015. I focused on this period in particular, because the Islamic banking sector has witnessed 
47% growth since 2014 (Ernst and Young, 2016). I focused on the period from 2010 to 2015, 
because previous empirical evidence was in favour of Islamic banks and showed that they are 
less vulnerable to instabilities during the peak of the financial crisis. In addition, given the 
market share of the Islamic sector during and after the crisis, this period is significant to 
investigating the given research problem as the sector has exponentially grown after the 
financial crisis. 
My findings showed that Islamic institutions are generally similar to conventional institu-
tions and have significant tail-risk spillovers on conventional and other Islamic financial 
institutions. Islamic banks turned out to act as risk drivers and risk channels the same as 
conventional banks do within the financial system. For Islamic banks, which appear to act as 
risk recipients, I intuitively justified that by the insufficiency of risk management practices, 
and being helpless if the counterparty defaults (Djennas, 2016). 
 
Second, my research generally found that Islamic banks contribute to systemic risk the same 
as their conventional peers do. The joint significance test showed that most Islamic banks are 
systemically relevant. Even more, there is a time-variability in systemic risk contribution of a 
number of Islamic banks, due to their own specific-characteristics. Yet, I found a variation in 




Third, further joint significance tests showed that Islamic banks are systemically relevant and 
in fact, most Islamic banks‘ effects on the system are driven by their specific characteristics 
(significant time-variability). For those Islamic banks with no time variability in their sys-
temic risk contribution, their stress stands to be significant to the financial system. 
 
Overall, this research has important contributions to the systemic risk measurement and 
network analysis literature, with implications for researchers and regulators in Muslim 
countries with dual financial systems. It is important to researchers, practitioners and regu-
lators in light of the exponential growth in the Islamic banking sector.  
Future research may address the financial distress of Islamic banks during the financial crisis.  
Also, combining bottom-up approaches in systemic risk measurement alongside survival 
analysis model such as that suggested by Pappas et al. (2016) would be useful to develop a 
warning system of Islamic banks‘ distress and failure. 
 
Technically, the effect of differences in each country‘s regulatory standards should be re-
flected on the balance sheet variables included in this research. In addition, Indonesian banks 
for example follow AAOIFI, while Saudi Arabia follows IFSB. Indonesian banks cannot 
operate in Saudi Arabia. If they could open, they face difficulty in operating as a foreign 
bank, due to many restrictions. I can account for the differences in the regulatory standards 
by checking which balance sheet accounts are affected by those regulations, and measure the 
significance of variances across banks‘ distress across countries (where banks have overseas 




For regulators, if Islamic banks and financial authorities did not address the routes of inef-
ficiency, insolvency risk, and withdrawal risk in Islamic banks, they will continue to con-
tribute to financial systems‘ distress. With such propensity to failure and high business risks, 
the viability of an interest-free banking scheme is questionable without proper risk man-




Table 2 Financial Institutions Names and Acronyms 
++ fully fledged Islamic bank 
** has an Islamic bank unit 
Financial Institutions in Turkey  
GARANTI FAKTORING  T1_GF AVRASYA PEL.VE TURISTIK TESISLER YTM. T21_AP 
FINANSIAL.KIRALAMA ** T2_FF IS YATIRIM MEN  T22_IYM 
ATLAS MENKUL KIYMETL   T3_AMY TEKFEN HOLDING T23_TH 
GSD DENIZCILIK  T4_GEND ECZACIBASI YATIRIM  T24_EY 
GEN YATIRIM HOLDING  T5_GYH ANEL ELEKTRIK PROJE  T25_AEP 
GLOBAL YATIRIM HLDG. T6_GY CREDITWEST FAK  T26_CF 
ECZACIBASI YATIRIM  T7_EY GOZDE GIRISIM  T27_GG 
GEDIK YATIRIM  T8_GEDY GEDIK YATIRIM MENKUL  T28_GYM 
IS FINANSAL KIRALAMA  T9_IFK MARTI GAYRIMENKUL  T29_MG 
RHEA GIRISIM SERMAYESI YATOTA. T10_RG INFO YATIRIM T30_IY 
SEKER FINANSAL KIRALAMA T11_SFK AKDENIZ GUVENL  T31_AG 
VAKIF FINANSAL KIRALAMA++ T12_VFK AVRASYA MENKUL KIYM  T32_AMK 
TRANSTURK HOLDING  T13_TH ATA GAYRIMENKUL  T33_ATAG 
VAKIF MENKUL KIYMET  T14_VMK MAZHAR ZORLU HOLDING  T34_MZH 
KAPITAL YATIRIM HOLD  T15_KYH GARANTI YATIRIM ORTA  T35_GYO 
METRO GAYRIMENK T16_MG HACI OMER SABANCI HLDG. T36_HOS 
ARTI YATIRIM HOLD  T17_AYH VERUSA HOLDING T37_VH 
FON SINAI YAT  T18_FSY TURKIYE KALKINMA  T38_TK 
GEDIK GIRISIM  T19_GEDG ALTERNATIFBANK T39_AB 
OYAK YATIRIM ORTAKLIGI T20_OYO   
Financial Institutions in Abu Dhabi 
ABU DHABI COMMERCIA  A1_ADC AL BUHAIRA NATIONAL IN. A18_ABO 
ABU DHABI ISLAMIC BANK++ A2_ADI EMIRATES INSURANCE  A19_EI 
BANK OF SHARJAH ++ A3_BOS ABU DHABI NATIONAL IN. A20_ADO 
COMMERCIAL BANK INT  A4_CBI FUJAIRAH NATIONAL IN. A21_AF 
NATIONAL BK.OF ABU DHABI A5_OB AL KHAZ0 INSURANCE  A22_AKI 
NAT.BANK OF FUJAIRAH  A6_OBF AL WATHBA INSURANCE CO. A23_AW 
SHARJAH ISLAMIC BANK ++ A8_SI UNION INSURANCE  A24_UnionI 
UNION NATIONAL BANK  A9_UOB UNITED INSURANCE  A25_UI 
FIRST GULF BANK  A10_FGB ABU DHABI NATIONALTAKAFUL++ A26_ADT 
UNITED ARAB BANK  A11_UAB SHARJAH INSURANCE A27_SINSU 
NATIONAL BANK OF UMM  A12_OBU AL DHAFRA INSURANCE  A28_ADINSU 
INVEST BANK PSC  A13_IBP RAS AL KHAIMAH  A29_RASK 
FINANCE HOUSE PJSC  A14_FHP METHAQ TAKAFUL IN.CO. ++ A30_MT 
AXA GREEN CRES  A15_AGC INSURANCE HOUSE  A31_INSUH 
WATANIYA TAKAFUL ++ A16_WT   
AL AIN AL AHLIA IN.CO. A17_AAA   
Financial Institutions in Bahrain 
AHLI UNITED BANK BSC  B1_AUB BAHRAIN MIDDLE EAST BANK B13_BME 
ARAB BANKING CORPORATION++ B2_ABC ESTERAD INVESTMENT CO. B14_EI 
BAHRAIN ISLAMIC BANK ++ B3_BIB SECURITIES & INVESTMENT B15_SAI 
BBK BSC  B4_BBK UNITED GULF INV.CORP. B16_UG 
GULF FINANCE HOUSE ++ B5_GFH INVESTCORP BANK SA  B17_INVB 
TAIB BANK BSC ++ B6_TBB BAHRAIN COMMERCIAL FACS. B18_BCOM 
UNITED GULF BANK BSC  B7_UGB AL AHLIA INSURANCE CO. B19_AHLINS 
AL SALAM BANK ++ B8_ASB BAHRAIN KUWAIT IN.CO. B20_BK 
ITHMAAR BANK BSC ++ B9_IB BAHRAIN NATIONAL HOLDING B21_BO 
AL BARAKA BANKING GROUP** B10_ALB TAKAFUL INTL.CO. ++ B22_TAKI 
KHALEEJI COMMERCIAL BANK++ B11_KHC ARAB INSURANCE GROUP  B23_ARINS 
NATIONAL BANK OF BAHRAIN B12_OB   
Financial Institutions in Dubai 
DUBAI ISLAMIC BANK ++ D1_DIB ISLAMIC ARAB INSURANCE++ D14_IAI 
COMMERCIAL BANK OF DUBAI D2_CB ALLIANCE INSURANCE D15_ALL 
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EMIRATES ISLAMIC BANK++ D3_EMI DUBAI INSURANCE CO  D16_DIC 
MASHREQ BANK  D4_MB DUBAI NATIONAL INS  D17_DOI 
EMIRATES NBD  D5_NBD NATIONAL GENERAL IN. D18_OG 
AJMAN BANK ++ D6_AJ OMAN INSURANCE COMPANY D19_OIC 
AMLAK FINANCE PJSC  D7_AFP ARABIAN SCANDINAVIAN  D20_ALEABS 
DUBAI INVESTMENTS  D8_DI AL SAGR NAT.INSURANCE D21_ALST 
SHUAA CAPITAL  D9_SHC DUBAI ISLAMIC INSURANCE++ D22_DI 
EMIRATES INVEST  D10_EMI ORIENT INSURANCE  D23_OI 
DUBAI FINANCIAL MARKET D11_DF TAKAFUL EMARAT PJSC ++ D24_TE 
GULF GENERAL INVESTMENT D12_GGI DAR AL TAKAFUL++ D25_DALE 
Financial Institutions in Indonesia  
BANK NUSNT.PARAHYANGAN I1_BN  BANK MASPION INDONESIA I34_MASP  
BANK OCBC NISP  I2_BON  BANK MITRANIAGA TBK  I35_MITR  
BANK PEMBANGUNAN DAERAH BAN-
TEN 
I3_BP  BANK MAYAPADA INTSL. I36_MAYA  
BANK OF INDIA INDONESIA I4_PTB  BANK PANIN DUBAI ** I37_PANI  
BANK MNC INTERNASIONAL I5_BMI  BANK AGRIS TBK PT  I38_BAT  
BANK QNB INDONESIA  I6_BQI  BANK YUDHA BHAKTI I39_BY  
BANK MANDIRI  ++ I7_BM  BANK HARDA INTERNASIONAL I40_BHI  
BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA++ I8_BRI  DANASUPRA ERAPACIFIC  I43_DE  
PT BANK MEGA TERBUKA ++ I9_PBM  SINAR MAS MULTIARTHA  I44_SMM  
BANK CENTRAL ASIA ++ I10_BCA  NUSANTARA INTI CORPORA I45_NIC  
PT BANK BUMI ARTA ++ I11_BUMI  POLARIS INVESTAMA  I46_PI  
PT BANK BUKOPIN TBK ** I12_BUKO  KRESNA GRAHA INVESTAMA I47_KG  
BANK WOORI  I13_WOO  ARTHAVEST TBK PT  I48_ATP  
BANK DANAMON INDONESIA** I14_DAM  MNC KAPITAL INDONESIA I49_MNC  
BANK INTL INDONESIA  I15_BII  TRUST FINANCE INDONESIA I50_TFI  
BANK CIMB NIAGA TBK ** I16_BCN  PACIFIC STRATEGIC FINL. I51_PAC  
BANK PERMATA TBK ** I17_PER  TRIMEGAH SEKURITAS INDONESIA I52_TS  
BANK WINDU KENTJANA I18_KENT  PT PANIN SEKURITAS  I53_PTP  
BANK CAPITAL INDO. I19_CAP  ADIRA DINAMIKA MLT.FIN. I54_AD  
BANK RAKYAT IND ++ I20_AGR  HD CAPITAL TBK PT  I55_HD  
BANK EKONOMI RAHARJA DEAD  I21_EKON  YULIE SEKURINDO  I56_YS  
BANK TABUNGAN PENSIUNAN 
NASIONAL ++ 
I22_TAB  WAHANA OTTOMITRA  I57_WO  
BANK ARTHA GRAHA INTSL. I23_BAG  PANCA GLOBAL SECURITIES I58_PG  
BANK VICTORIA INTL. ++ I24_VIC  RELIANCE SECURITIES I59_RS  
BANK PEMBANG  I25_PMB  MANDALA MULTIFINANCE  I60_MM  
BANK SINARMAS TBK PT  I26_SIO  LIPPO SECURITIES TBK  I61_LS  
BANK PAN INDONESIA  I27_PAN  POOL ADVISTA INDONESIA I62_PAV  
BANK INA PERDANA I28_PERD  EQUITY DEVELOPMENT INV. I63_ED  
BANK PMBGN.DAERAH JAWA TIMUR I29_PEMB  CAPITALINC INVESTMENT SUSP  I64_CI  
BANK DINAR INDONESIA I30_DIOR  BUANA FINANCE TBK PT  I65_BF  
BANK NATIONALNOBU  I31_OTIO  BFI FINANCE INDONESIA I66_BFI  
BANK NEGARA INDONESIA I32_NEG  ONIX CAPITAL TBK PT  I67_ONIX  
BANK MESTIKA DHARMA 
 
 
I33_MEST  VERENA MULTI FINANCE I68_VERO  
CLIPAN FINANCE INDONESIA I69_CLIP  
BATAVIA PROSPERINDO FIN. I70_BATP  
BANK TABUNGAN NEGARA I71_TABU  
EVERGREEN INVESCO  I72_EVR  
RADANA BHASKARA FINANCE I73_RB  
TIFA FINANCE TBK PT  I74_TIFA  
SARATOGA INVESTAMA SEDAYA I77_SARA  
VICTORIA INVEST  I78_VIC  
Financial Institutions in Jordan  
ARAB BANK GROUP  J1_AB NATIONAL PORTFOLIO SECS. J20_OP 
JORDAN KUWAIT BANK  J2_JKB EJADA FOR FINANCIAL  J21_EFF 
BANK OF JORDAN  J3_BOJ UNITED FINANCIAL INV  J22_UFI 
207 
 
ARAB BANKING CORP  J4_ABC JORDANIAN EXPATRIATE  J23_JE 
CAIRO AMMAN BANK  J5_CA SOCIETE GENERALE  J24_SG 
CAPITAL BANK OF JORDAN J6_CB AL J25_AM 
JORDAN COMMERCIAL BANK J7_JC ZARA INVESTEMENT HOLDING J26_ZARA 
HOUSING BANK  J8_HB ARAB EAST FOR RESINV. J27_AEFR 
JORDAN AHLI BANK  J9_JAB AL ISRA FOR EDUCATION J28_ISRA 
BANK AL ETIHAD PSC  J10_BAE BINDAR TRADING  J29_BIND 
JORDAN ISLAMIC BANK ++ J11_JIB JORDAN LOAN GUARANTE  J30_JLG 
CENTURY INVESTMENT GROUP J12_CIG INTERNATIONAL BROKER  J31_IBF 
UNION INVESTMENT  J13_UI THE CONSULTANT & INV.GP. J32_TCI 
JORDAN DUBAI ISLAMIC BK.++ J14_JDI AL MAL J33_AMAL 
JORDAN INVESTMENT TRUST J15_JI AL FARIS NATIONAL IN  J34_FAR 
ARAB FINANCIAL INVES  J16_AFI FIRST FINANCE ++ J35_FF 
SPECIALIZED JORDANIA  J18_SJ BABELON INVESTMENTS  J36_BI 
AL SHARQ  J19_SAQ NOOR CAPITAL  J37_NC 
Financial Institutions in Malaysia   
HONG LEONG BANK++ M1_HL KUCHAI DEVELOPMENT  M18_KUD 
AFFIN HOLDINGS BHD ++ M2_AFF AEON CREDIT SERVICE  M19_ACS 
BIMB HOLDINGS BERHAD  M3_BIMB MALAYSIA BUILDING SOC. M20_MB 
HONG LEONG FIN  M4_HLF ECM LIBRA FINANCIAL GP. M21_ECM 
AMMB HOLDINGS BERHAD  M5_AMM HWANG CAPITAL  M22_HWA 
CIMB GROUP HOLDINGS++ M6_CIM ELK DESA  M23_ELK 
MALAYAN BANKING BHD  M7_MAL K & N KENANGA HDG. M24_K&N 
PUBLIC BANK BHD  M8_PUB SONA PETROLEUM BHD  M25_PET 
RHB BANK BHD++ M9_RHB MAA GROUP M26_MAA 
ALLIANCE FINANCIAL GP. ++ M10_ALL PACIFIC & ORIENT BHD  M27_PAC 
RCE CAPITAL BHD  M11_RCE LPI CAPITAL BHD  M28_LPI 
OSK VENTURES INTN'L  M12_OSK ALLIANZ MALAYSIA  M29_AM 
BURSA MALAYSIA BHD  M13_BUR MNRB HOLDINGS BHD  M30_MHB 
OSK HOLDINGS M14_OSK TUNE PROTECT GROUP M31_TIH 
APEX EQUITY HOLDINGS  M14_APEX MPHB CAPITAL M32_MPHB 
KAF M15_KAF SYARIKAT TAKAFUL MAL. M33_SYA 
HONG LEONG CAPITAL M16_HLC MANULIFE HOLDINGS  M34_MANH 
JOHAN HOLDINGS BHD  M17_JH  
Financial Institutions in Oman  
NATIONAL BANK OF OMAN O1_OT AL OMANIYA FINANCIAL  O19_AMF 
BANK DHOFAR SAOG  O2_DHO SHUROOQ INV.SERVICES O20_SHQ 
BANK SOHAR  O3_SOH THE FINANCIAL CORP. O21_TFC 
BANK NIZWA ++ O4_NIZ TAAGEER FINANCE  O22_TAG 
HSBC BANK OMAN SAOG  O5_HSBC GULF INVESTMENT SERVICE O23_GINV 
BANK MUSCAT O6_MUS OMAN ORIX LEASING  O24_OOL 
FINANCIAL SERVICES O7_FIN OMAN INTERNATIONAL  O25_OI 
AL BATINAH DV&IT. O8_BAT DHOFAR INTL.DEV.& INV. O26_DHO 
MUSCAT FINANCE O9_MUS DHOFAR INSURANCE  O27_DHOIS 
NATIONAL SECURITIES  O10_SEC MUSCAT NATIONAL HOLDING O28_MUH 
AL ANWAR HOLDING O11_ANW OMAN UNITED INSURANCE++ O29_OUI 
AL MADINA INVESTMENT ++ O12_MADI 
 
OMAN AND EMIRATES  O13_OEH 
OMAN NAT.INV.CORP.HLDG. DEAD  O14_OI 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL INV. O15_GF 
UNITED FINANCE CO  O16_UF 
AHLI BANK O17_AB 
National Finance CO  O18_OFC 
Financial Institutions in Pakistan  
BANK AL HABIB LTD ++ P1_COM  
ASKARI BANK LIMITED ++ P2_AB  
SONERI BANK LTD  P3_SB  
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HABIB METROPOLITAN  P4_HMB  
NATIONAL BK OF PAKISTAN ++ P5_OBP  
MEEZAN BANK LTD. ++ P6_MBL  
BANK ALFALAH LTD ++ P7_BAL  
UNITED BANK LIMITED  P8_UB  
ALLIED BANK LTD  P9_ALB  
BANK OF PUNJAB  P10_BOP  
MCB BANK LTD  P13_MCB  
NIB BANK LIMITED  P14_NIB  
STANDARD CHARTERED ++ P16_SC  
HABIB BANK LTD  P17_HB  
SILKBANK LTD  P19_SIL  
FAYSAL BANK LIMITED  P20_FBL  
Financial Institutions in Saudi Arabia  
BANK ALBILAD ++ S1_ALB SALAMA COOP  S27_SAL  
ALINMA BANK ++ S2_ALI ARABIAN SHIELD COOP.IN. S28_ASHI  
AL RAJHI BANKING ++ S3_RAJ SAUDI UTD.COOP.INSURANCE S29_SUC  
BANQUE SAUDI FRANSI** S4_SFAR SANAD COOPERATIVE IN. S30_SADI  
ARAB NATIONAL BANK S5_ARB ALLIANZ SDI.FRNASI COIN. S31_ALL  
BANK ALJAZIRA ++ S6_JAZ ALLIED COOP.IN.GROUP S32_ALLC  
RIYAD BANK S7_RIB SAUDI INDIAN COMPANY  S33_SIC  
SAMBA FINANCIAL GROUP** S8_SAMB SAUDI ARABIAN COOP.IN. S34_ACO  
SAUDI BRITISH BANK  S9_SBB GULF UNION COOPE  S35_GUC  
THE SAUDI INVESTMENT BK. S10_SINV AL-AHLIA INSURANCE S36_AHL  
NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK S12_COM ARABIA INSURANCE COOP. S37_AINS  
AL AHSA DEVELOPMENT  S13_AHS TRADE UNION COOP.IN. S38_TUC  
SAUDI ADVANCED INDS. S14_SADV AL SAGR COPT.IN. S39_SAG  
SAUDI INDUSTRIAL DEV. S15_SC  SAUDI REINSURANCE S40_SREIN  
SAUDI INDL.SERVICES S16_SIND  UNITED COOP.ASSURANCE S41_COA  
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL  S17_IND  WEQAYA TAKAFUL IN&R. SUSP++ S42_WTI  
KINGDOM HOLDING CO  S18_KHC  AL RAJHI FOR COOPERA  S43 FC  
ASTRA INDUSTRIAL GROUP S19_AIG  AXA COOPERATIVE IN. S44_AXA  
ALAHLI TAKAFUL COM ++ S21_TAK  ACE ARABIA COOP.IN. S45_ACE  
BUPA ARABIA FOR COOP.IN. S22_BUP  AL ALAMIYA FOR COIN.CO. S46_ALA  
THE COMPANY FOR COOP.IN. S23_TOC  GULF GENERAL COOP.IN.CO. S47_GGC  
THE MEDIT.& GULF IN&R. S24_MED  BURUJ COOP.IN.CO.ORD S48_BUR  
MALATH COOP.IN.& REIN. S25_MALC  SOLIDARITY SAUDI TAKAFUL++ S50_SOL  





Chapter 5: Conclusion  
 
5.1 Introduction  
Motivated by the theoretical background about the relationship between religion and eco-
nomics, this research aimed to contribute to the literature of Islamic banking and finance by 
investigating two main issues; i) the diversification benefits of Shari‘ah compliant equity and 
the systemic relevance of Islamic banks in dual financial systems. Theoretical and empirical 
literature lacks evidence about the viability of Shari‘ah complaint financing as an alternative 
for better investment performance and stability of financial systems. Previous empirical 
evidence is comparative rather than experimental. It tends to compare risk, returns and 
business risks of Shari‘ah compliant investments or Islamic banks to their conventional 
peers.   
 
I addressed these research gaps by: i) proving whether Shari‘ah investments can offer any 
potential diversification benefits for portfolio managers during turbulent market conditions 
and ii) investigating the systemic relevance of Islamic banks in the financial system. 
 
I started this thesis by demonstrating the general literature and theoretical background of my 
research questions in Chapter 2 and I critically discussed the findings of previous studies 
about the performance of Shari‘ah compliant investments and Islamic banks. However, prior 
literature showed mixed results regarding the performance of Islamic assets in developed and 
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emerging markets. I extended this line of enquiry in Chapter 3 by investigating whether or 
not adding Shari‘ah compliant investments to a portfolio of emerging market investments 
would improve its risk-adjusted return. This is motivated by the ―neglect effect hypothesis‖ 
by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and Modern portfolio theory (MPT) by Markowitz (1952). 
The research motivation was testing the effect and benefits of Islamic investments on a high 
volatility portfolio in emerging markets. I focused on these markets in particular, because 
they have absorbed many regional and international shocks resulting in emerging market 
investments suffering extensive losses and becoming very volatile.  
 
What is more, I took a holistic approach and investigated the effect of Islamic banks‘ finan-
cial distress within 10 Majority Muslim countries‘ financial networks in Chapter 4. This 
research contributed to the literature about financial stability and was driven by the proposed 
framework by Adrian and Brunnermier (2011) and Hautsch et al. (2015). I focused on indi-
vidual financial institutions‘ distress, given their specific characteristics, macro-economic 
variables and linkages. Previous literature focused on the individual risks of Islamic banks or 
the effect of macroeconomic variables on Islamic banks‘ performance. Hence, I contributed 
to the existing literature by identifying ―too-connected to fail‖ institutions (including Islamic 
banks). Again, this enabled me to experiment and identify the role of Islamic banks in fi-
nancial systems, and quantify their systemic risk contributions. Previous research focused 
only on systemic risk measurement in developed markets such as the USA and Germany, and 
found that insurance firms are the greatest contributors to systemic risk.  
No research to my knowledge has questioned the tail-risk spillovers in financial networks by 




In this chapter, I will provide a summary of the main results, implications, recommendations 
and limitations of this thesis.  
 
5.2 Summary of the Main Results 
Using 17 ETFs‘ data from a broad range of conventional emerging equity and fixed income 
securities alongside with Shari‘ah complaint ETFs over the period of 2009 to 2015, I found 
that the inclusion of Shari‘ah compliant ETFs can improve risk-adjusted returns of an 
emerging market portfolio. 
 
In particular, I used dynamic and static portfolio optimisation strategies to find the optimal 
asset allocation over two sample periods. My results indicated that Shari‘ah compliant equity 
may be preferred by investors over conventional emerging market equity and fixed in-
come-securities, especially during the recent years of 2012 to 2015 when most ETFs in my 
sample experienced negative average returns.  
 
However, this was not the case for the post global financial crisis and the European debt 
crisis period (01/2009 - 04/2012) where fixed-income ETFs got the highest weight in the 
portfolio. On the contrary, the statistic strategy favoured fixed-income ETFs mostly in all my 




Using monthly portfolio rebalancing, I found that dynamic strategies over-performed the 
static strategy from January-2009 to April-2012; while, static strategy resulted in more 
performance gains in the out-of-sample period from May-2012 to December-2015.  
 
Moreover, using data of 352 financial institutions in 10 Muslim majority countries, I identi-
fied the exogenous shock to financial institutions caused by the interconnectedness between 
i) Islamic banks, ii) financial market, iii) the economy and iv) other financial institutions. My 
findings showed that there are significant tail-risk spillovers from Islamic banks to other 
financial institutions in the network of most countries in my research, except in Bahrain and 
Turkey where Islamic banks were found to be risk recipients. This is also in line with the side 
of literature which finds no difference between Islamic and conventional banks performance. 
 
I estimated also the relevance of Islamic banks to financial systems using a systemic risk 
measure called marginal CoVaR, and found that most Islamic banks in my sample are sys-
temically relevant and contribute to the risk of financial systems. There were some variations 
in Islamic banks‘ contribution across countries, which stemmed from the differences in the 
economic systems and the regulatory requirements in the selected countries. These findings 
shed light on the need for extensive reforms in the Islamic banking sector.  
 
Finally, I performed a joint significance test to determine whether there is a time-variability 
in the effect of Islamic banks on the system, due to their specific performance characteristics. 
I found that there was a significant time-variability in the effect of many Islamic banks, 
which indicated that individual risks of Islamic banks drive their financial distress and lead to 
213 
 
spillover effects in financial systems. For those Islamic banks with no time variability in their 
systemic risk contribution, their financial distress stood to be significant to the financial 
system. 
 
5.3 Summary of the Main Implications 
Institutional investors should consider the religion effect when they manage their assets, 
given the evidence regarding the outperformance of Shari‘ah compliant equity relative to 
their conventional peers. Particularly, research findings indicated that Shari‘ah compliant 
equity ETFs are less sensitive to the turbulence in financial markets; hence, they are im-
portant in stabilising an emerging market portfolio. For asset allocation strategies, there is no 
perfect strategy which can work all the time. After I considered different portfolio optimi-
sation strategies, one should be cautious when using dynamic strategies, because they can be 
more costly to apply specially in volatile markets such as emerging markets and during crisis 
periods.  
 
For central banks and regulator, they should consider Islamic banks as genetically modified 
conventional banks (Pfeifer, 2001). If Islamic banks and financial authorities did not address 
the routes of inefficiency, insolvency risk, and withdrawal risk in Islamic banks, they will 
continue to contribute to financial systems‘ distress. Otherwise, Islamic banks would be 
money pools of conservative Muslims and a financing alternative for non-Muslims and 




5.4 Recommendations for Further Study 
By connecting the lack of evidence in the literature on the utilisation of Shari‘ah compliant 
finance and banking alternatives in the existing conventional setting, it opens a new door for 
future research about proposing mechanisms Shari‘ah complaint businesses can apply to 
hedge against financial shocks originating not only from advanced economies, but also from 
emerging market economies. Future research should concentrate on the economic value of 
such strategies in emerging markets, by considering elements such as transaction costs due to 
rebalancing and performance fees for switching from one strategy to another. 
 
Furthermore, the research findings showed that crisis effect on returns was due to the re-
gional and global integration between developed and emerging markets, and the growing 
cross-border nature of banking and financial services. This encourages future research to 
identify the extent to which responsible regional institutions are needed to monitor market 
conditions and maintain financial stability. Financial crises in developing countries may not 
necessarily materialise, because of individual financial institutions‘ distress only, but be-
cause of governments‘ failure as well.  
 
Generally, the global financial crisis in 2008 has encouraged the initiation of substantial 
reforms in the financial systems, and motivated many researchers to develop warning sys-
tems of any future crises. Although, it is difficult to establish a global regulator which can be 
enforced in all economies, it is important that we (as researchers and practitioners) 
acknowledge the necessity of a regulatory framework which enforces a minimum con-
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sistency in jurisdictions which would apply in similar markets. With the absence of con-
sistent regulations regarding cross-border information, arbitrage and data sharing, interna-
tional financial systems will remain exposed to systemic risk.  
 
Also, international regulations should consider emerging market economies, because they 
are growing as important financial systems. Accordingly, future research can develop a 
framework, which provides the regulator with a measure of financial distress of an individual 
financial institution and time expectancy if it is going to fail in the near future. This frame-
work can help regulators impose adequate standards and controls over financial institutions, 
to protect them from possible financial turbulence due to macroeconomic reasons. Other-
wise, it can prevent them from taking inadequate and extremely risky positions. It is an early 
idea for a new project, which needs interdisciplinary specialization (computer science, 







 Methodological Limitation 
For Chapter 3, the number of models for initiating and optimising portfolios is very large. 
Some institutional investors employ one or more models which are suitable for their portfo-
lio‘s objectives and business needs. I used two models which represent the two ends of a 
complexity spectrum models. The first is the static model and the second is the DCC model. 
There are other models which can provide further stylised facts to answer my research 
question. However, due to their computational complexity and interdisciplinary nature 
(physics and computer science), I decided to work with the static and DCC models only.  
 
For Chapter 4, modelling systemic risk is a relatively new topic in the financial literature. 
Though, econometrics models are exposed to issues related to standard assumptions about 
data (e.g. normality). Other mathematical based models which are based on complexity 
theory could be used in the future to avoid the standards data assumptions. 
 
 Data Limitations 
I could not include frontier markets as part of my research sample in Chapter 3, because they 
have small market capitalization and they do not offer daily liquidity through ETFs. Also, 
there is only one frontier ETF available during the research sample period (2009-2015); 
Guggenheim Frontier Markets ETF (inception date 06/12/2008). From 2012, only two 
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frontier ETFs became available: iShares MSCI Frontier 100 ETF (09/13/2012), Global X 
Next Emerging & Frontier ETF (inception date 11/06/2013).  
 
Moreover, I could not predict the period until banks fail in Chapter 4, because this requires 
different models and data. The contribution of this chapter is focused more on the scale of 
data I collected and the network effect amongst institutions and the overall financial system. 
Combining the estimation of the period until it fails and its vulnerability to financial distress 
would require data which is currently not available. It is a methodological contribution which 
is not relevant to the research problem under investigation. The problem with data available 
on DataStream and Bankscope is that it assumes that Islamic and conventional banks share 
same traits and their stability is affected by similar factors. In order to realise better results on 
Islamic banks‘ performance, product-specific data (e.g. Murabaha or Musharakah) is re-
quired. However, such data is not available in a structured and organised way, and it is lim-
ited and not accessible by researchers.  
 
5.6 Final Remarks 
In conclusion, this thesis presented two researches, namely in portfolio management, sys-
temic risk measurement and network analysis. In the first research, Shari‘ah compliant ETFs 
improved the risk-adjusted return in the sample period when most ETFs in emerging market 
economies had negative average returns, and emerging markets experienced high volatility 
levels. The second research proved that the Islamic banking sector is wrongly promoted as 
equitable and a promoter of social welfare, because of their propensity to failure and high 
218 
 
business risks. It raises questions about the viability of an interest-free banking scheme, 
without having proper risk management practises and governing rules for Islamic banks‘ 
performance. 
 
The results of both researches are not contradictory, but they rather complement each other. 
The first research focuses on portfolio management, where the main drivers of the optimal 
portfolios are the correlation between assets and their volatility levels. Shari‘ah compliant 
equity was selected, because its risk and return are advantageous in case it is allocated to a 
portfolio of emerging market investments. The second research focused on the whole fi-
nancial system. It investigated the effect of Islamic banks, and found that their financial 
distress is relevant to other financial institutions and the financial system. It also proved that 
risks associated with Islamic banking sector outweigh its positives such as prevention of 
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Chapter 4: Table 5 (Full) Post-LASSO Quantile Regression: VaR 5%  
This table shows each institution‘s estimated VaR, given the relevant risk drivers selected by LASSO.  
I only include the quantile regression outputs with at least one significant risk driver.  
 
Saudi Arabia  
 Value Std. Error t-ratio p-values 
S1_ALB 
Intercept −2.78923 0.996842 −2.7981 0.0055 
CDS −0.000538719 0.00440572 −0.1223 0.9028 
S40_SREIN_LE 0.410084 0.429583 0.9546 0.3405 
S41_COA_LE −0.917759 0.437175 −2.0993 0.0366** 
S51_WAT_LE 0.151451 0.349495 0.4333 0.6651 
S7_RIB 
Intercept −1.47544 0.462463 −3.1904 0.0016*** 
CDS −0.00430657 0.002584 −1.6666 0.0966* 
S41_COA_LE 0.201949 0.105158 1.9204 0.0557* 
S42_WTI_LE −0.243326 0.0635808 −3.8270 0.0002*** 
S8_SAMB 
Intercept −2.08415 0.316634 −6.5822 <0.0001 
RE −0.0168267 0.108654 −0.1549 0.8770 
S39_SAG_LE −0.129953 0.408199 −0.3184 0.7504 
S41_COA_LE 0.260295 0.331559 0.7851 0.4330 
S15_SC 
Intercept −8.19195 1.05077 −7.7961 0.0001*** 
S15_SC_PBV 2.45635 0.353347 6.9517  0.0001*** 
S17_IND 
Intercept −100.901 38.1254 −2.6466 0.0086*** 
SRSWC 2.14791 1.20213 1.7868 0.0750** 
S38_TUC_LE −0.0606886 0.586032 −0.1036 0.9176 
S39_SAG_LE −0.143764 0.233172 −0.6166 0.5380 
S44_AXA_LE 0.0170467 0.339299 0.0502 0.9600 
S45_ACE_LE 0.142746 0.157766 0.9048 0.3663 
S17_IND_PBV 1.52805 0.836008 1.8278 0.0686* 
S17_IND_SIZE 13.2191 5.4129 2.4422 0.0152*** 
S17_IND_Return 0.112273 0.129752 0.8653 0.3876 
S22_BUP 
Intercept −1.67479 1.23118 −1.3603 0.1747 
BUDGET/GDP −0.0811606 0.0796839 −1.0185 0.3092 
oil 0.070006 0.141132 0.4960 0.6202 
S44_AXA_LE −0.418061 0.0843387 −4.9569 <0.0001*** 
S28_ASHI 
Intercept −4.79284 1.37395 −3.4884 0.0006*** 
oil −0.131346 0.239269 −0.5489 0.5835 
EU −0.10388 0.452435 −0.2296 0.8186 
S28_ASHI_Return 0.381647 0.170502 2.2384 0.0259** 
S28_ASHI_PBV −0.176675 0.470694 −0.3753 0.7077 
S4_SFAR_LE 0.941731 0.71019 1.3260 0.1858 
S5_ARB_LE 0.704439 0.852428 0.8264 0.4092 
S7_RIB_LE −0.0848327 1.15359 −0.0735 0.9414 
S12_COM_LE −0.235239 1.62229 −0.1450 0.8848 
S19_AIG_LE −0.663039 0.460398 −1.4401 0.1509 
S33_SIC_LE −0.00367284 0.293883 −0.0125 0.9900 
S37_AINS_LE −0.188091 0.405831 −0.4635 0.6434 
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S39_SAG_LE 0.500294 0.392286 1.2753 0.2032 
S40_SREIN 
Intercept −4.26607 3.28818 −1.2974 0.1955 
S40_SREIN_PBV 0.511464 2.02231 0.2529 0.8005 
S40_SREIN_Return 0.0738178 0.295571 0.2497 0.8030 
IVOL 0.0149 0.0713446 0.2088 0.8347 
CDS 0.00452722 0.00518345 0.8734 0.3832 
DEBT/GDP 0.0241039 0.0898451 0.2683 0.7887 
SASEIDXIndex −0.00270773 0.122897 −0.0220 0.9824 
oil 0.0385613 0.117175 0.3291 0.7423 
EU −0.262365 0.319982 −0.8199 0.4129 
S4_SFAR_LE 0.155333 0.357918 0.4340 0.6646 
S6_JAZ_LE 0.0958543 0.368786 0.2599 0.7951 
S7_RIB_LE −0.212023 0.550137 −0.3854 0.7002 
S13_AHS_LE −0.335365 0.244364 −1.3724 0.1710 
S15_SC_LE 0.599414 0.277985 2.1563 0.0319** 
S31_ALL_LE −0.00516187 0.198955 −0.0259 0.9793 
S41_COA_LE 0.255158 0.291985 0.8739 0.3829 
S43_RFC_LE −0.920878 0.40611 −2.2676 0.0241** 
S52_AFC_LE 0.0774463 0.234182 0.3307 0.7411 
S44_AXA 
Intercept −4.8182 0.832111 −5.7903 <0.0001*** 
S44_AXA_Return 0.248355 0.245845 1.0102 0.3132 
RE 0.615775 0.37241 1.6535 0.0993* 
S4_SFAR_LE 0.418103 1.06118 0.3940 0.6939 
S7_RIB_LE −0.373463 0.850869 −0.4389 0.6610 
S9_SBB_LE 0.397161 1.83752 0.2161 0.8290 
S52_AFC 
Intercept −3.03602 1.43417 −2.1169 0.0351** 
S52_AFC_PBV −0.558654 0.173106 −3.2272 0.0014*** 
S52_AFC_Return 0.221965 0.12648 1.7549 0.0803* 
Budge balance to GDP −0.166686 0.0742423 −2.2452 0.0255** 
S14_SADV_LE 0.23746 0.187766 1.2647 0.2070 
 
Turkey  
 Value Std. Error t-ratio p-values 
T1_GF 
Intercept 0.0799172 0.66556 0.1201 0.9045 
T1_GF_PBV −1.68064 0.386474 −4.3487 <0.0001*** 
T1_GF_return 0.241217 0.0477039 5.0565 <0.0001*** 
XU100 Index −0.0330624 0.121978 −0.2711 0.7865 
DEBT/GDP −0.0137019 0.113228 −0.1210 0.9038 
CDS −0.0692018 0.0467052 −1.4817 0.1395 
T5_GYH_LE −0.0729578 0.18893 −0.3862 0.6997 
T18_FSY_LE −0.0634098 0.185528 −0.3418 0.7328 
T20_OYO_LE −0.00760866 0.066625 −0.1142 0.9092 
T22_IYM_LE −0.469216 0.234612 −2.0000 0.0464** 
T24_EY_LE −0.172588 0.247852 −0.6963 0.4868 
T25_AEP_LE −1.16047 0.571373 −2.0310 0.0432** 
T27_GG_LE −1.29768 0.358948 −3.6152 0.0004*** 
T28_GYM_LE −0.561366 0.263469 −2.1307 0.0339** 
T30_IY_LE −0.0240392 0.121305 −0.1982 0.8430 
T32_AMK_LE −0.0293866 0.388386 −0.0757 0.9397 
T34_MZH_LE −0.284214 0.278967 −1.0188 0.3091 
T35_GYO_LE −0.219722 0.253774 −0.8658 0.3873 
T2_FF 
Intercept −2.83606 0.851205 −3.3318 0.0010*** 
T2_FF_return −0.0533536 0.0414225 −1.2880 0.1987 
T1_GF_LE −0.775947 0.0637499 −12.1717 <0.0001*** 
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T4_GEND_LE 0.00589 0.0227161 0.2593 0.7956 
T2_FF_LEV 0.439434 0.262746 1.6725 0.0955* 
T2_FF_DE −0.574468 0.460375 −1.2478 0.2130 
T3_AMY 
Intercept −16.4118 5.51541 −2.9756 0.0032*** 
T3_AMY_SIZE 0.0911808 0.723158 0.1261 0.8998 
T3_AMY_PBV 14.7811 2.57667 5.7365 <0.0001*** 
Banks Sector −0.0603779 0.0487064 −1.2396 0.2161 
RE Sector 0.060915 0.0431454 1.4119 0.1591 
IVOL −0.0296875 0.0660308 −0.4496 0.6533 
CDS −0.00153026 0.0256705 −0.0596 0.9525 
T3_AMY_return 0.0786991 0.039811 1.9768 0.0490** 
T2_FF_LE −0.77963 0.0307684 −25.3387 <0.0001*** 
T4_GEND_LE −0.00527901 0.0185675 −0.2843 0.7764 
T6_GY_LE 0.00419003 0.140358 0.0299 0.9762 
T7_EY_LE 0.364313 0.214682 1.6970 0.0908* 
T12_VFK_LE −0.0103507 0.0633622 −0.1634 0.8704 
T13_TH_LE 0.107754 0.198105 0.5439 0.5869 
T14_VMK_LE 0.0108114 0.0884236 0.1223 0.9028 
T15_KYH_LE −0.0055257 0.0459249 −0.1203 0.9043 
T20_OYO_LE −0.0711935 0.0814299 −0.8743 0.3827 
T22_IYM_LE −0.0836877 0.190332 −0.4397 0.6605 
T26_CF_LE 0.0250614 0.203549 0.1231 0.9021 
T27_GG_LE −0.0317074 0.132462 −0.2394 0.8110 
T32_AMK_LE −0.144252 0.175057 −0.8240 0.4106 
T34_MZH_LE −0.0464638 0.18677 −0.2488 0.8037 
T39_AB_LE −14.6424 7.63877 −1.9169 0.0562* 
T4_GEND 
Intercept −0.636302 0.535222 −1.1889 0.2355 
T4_GEND_return 0.0659431 0.0121105 5.4451 <0.0001*** 
XU100 Index 0.146776 0.0205258 7.1508 <0.0001*** 
RE Sector −0.124159 0.0258175 −4.8091 <0.0001*** 
BUDGET/GDP −5.58678 1.61873 −3.4513 0.0006*** 
IVOL −0.0955215 0.0273968 −3.4866 0.0006*** 
T1_GF_LE 0.126473 0.0701699 1.8024 0.0725* 
T3_AMY_LE −0.88546 0.0108895 −81.3134 <0.0001*** 
T13_TH_LE 0.00429653 0.0117021 0.3672 0.7138 
T16_MG_LE 0.0545234 0.0289845 1.8811 0.0609* 
T18_FSY_LE −0.0284809 0.0334472 −0.8515 0.3952 
T19_GEDG_LE 0.0817022 0.0304205 2.6858 0.0076v 
T20_OYO_LE 0.00503363 0.00847915 0.5936 0.5532 
T21_AP_LE −0.355461 0.0544943 −6.5229 <0.0001*** 
T22_IYM_LE 0.0303927 0.0337568 0.9003 0.3687 
T23_TH_LE −0.197587 0.0833976 −2.3692 0.0185** 
T25_AEP_LE 0.163275 0.0204054 8.0016 <0.0001*** 
T28_GYM_LE −0.11545 0.0445069 −2.5940 0.0100*** 
T29_MG_LE −0.0682919 0.0148652 −4.5941 <0.0001*** 
T5_GYH 
Intercept 7.52579 4.65843 1.6155 0.1073 
T5_GYH_return 0.115002 0.0233337 4.9286 <0.0001*** 
T5_GYH_SIZE −1.07859 0.714873 −1.5088 0.1325 
T5_GYH_MM −8.51657 9.39669 −0.9063 0.3655 
T5_GYH_PBV −1.5789 2.05247 −0.7693 0.4424 
RE Sector 0.0745802 0.0451025 1.6536 0.0993* 
DEBT/GDP −0.0884862 0.113887 −0.7770 0.4378 
IVOL −0.203879 0.0743085 −2.7437 0.0065*** 
T1_GF_LE 0.213481 0.0945079 2.2589 0.0246 
T2_FF_LE −0.157212 0.102539 −1.5332 0.1263 
T4_GEND_LE −0.914325 0.0450733 −20.2853 <0.0001*** 
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T6_GY_LE −0.492602 0.281612 −1.7492 0.0813* 
T7_EY_LE −0.225319 0.162027 −1.3906 0.1654 
T12_VFK_LE 0.0200265 0.0510213 0.3925 0.6950 
T15_KYH_LE 0.0705596 0.0386263 1.8267 0.0688* 
T16_MG_LE 0.00229847 0.101169 0.0227 0.9819 
T18_FSY_LE 0.195602 0.179754 1.0882 0.2774 
T20_OYO_LE 0.0315252 0.0504507 0.6249 0.5326 
T23_TH_LE −0.223384 0.24775 −0.9016 0.3680 
T25_AEP_LE 0.0716381 0.218526 0.3278 0.7433 
T26_CF_LE 0.216144 0.0897136 2.4093 0.0166** 
T28_GYM_LE −0.273196 0.148413 −1.8408 0.0667* 
T36_HOS_LE −0.201437 0.16948 −1.1886 0.2356 
T39_AB_LE 28.7468 17.057 1.6853 0.0930* 
T30_IY_LE −0.109279 0.0989437 −1.1045 0.2703 
T6_GY     
Intercept −1.72196 0.144099 −11.9499 <0.0001*** 
T6_GY_return 0.0881804 0.0300404 2.9354 0.0036*** 
XU100 Index 0.00287074 0.0475417 0.0604 0.9519 
RE Sector 0.070342 0.0324387 2.1685 0.0309** 
T4_GEND_LE −0.0277222 0.0298557 −0.9285 0.3539 
T5_GYH_LE −0.824277 0.0423382 −19.4688 <0.0001*** 
T7_EY_LE −0.172001 0.137159 −1.2540 0.2108 
T12_VFK_LE 0.0264296 0.0172786 1.5296 0.1272 
T17_AYH_LE 0.0520916 0.030985 1.6812 0.0938* 
T19_GEDG_LE 0.0493482 0.0591779 0.8339 0.4050 
T20_OYO_LE −0.134547 0.0370258 −3.6339 0.0003*** 
T34_MZH_LE −0.258852 0.0522276 −4.9562 <0.0001*** 
T7_EY     
Intercept −1.55758 0.232914 −6.6873 <0.0001*** 
T7_EY_return 0.136113 0.0900382 1.5117 0.1317 
XU100 Index 0.106801 0.0735497 1.4521 0.1475 
RE Sector 0.0340942 0.0664262 0.5133 0.6081 
DEBT/GDP −0.0190783 0.0758164 −0.2516 0.8015 
T4_GEND_LE 0.0309851 0.00643341 4.8163 <0.0001*** 
T5_GYH_LE −0.16737 0.0490327 −3.4134 0.0007*** 
T6_GY_LE −0.838287 0.161578 −5.1881 <0.0001*** 
T8_GEDY_LE −0.241322 0.157443 −1.5328 0.1264 
T10_RG_LE 0.00719703 0.130733 0.0551 0.9561 
T21_AP_LE 0.0789416 0.183422 0.4304 0.6672 
T22_IYM_LE 0.048088 0.0894783 0.5374 0.5914 
T35_GYO_LE 0.0500737 0.0936176 0.5349 0.5931 
T36_HOS_LE −0.0316172 0.303807 −0.1041 0.9172 
T8_GEDY     
Intercept 0.318916 1.46878 0.2171 0.8283 
T8_GEDY_LEV −0.578424 0.598069 −0.9672 0.3343 
T8_GEDY_PBV −0.0250933 0.638873 −0.0393 0.9687 
DEBT/GDP −0.11152 0.0409834 −2.7211 0.0069*** 
IVOL −0.0216017 0.025707 −0.8403 0.4014 
T8_GEDY_return 0.0605689 0.0571399 1.0600 0.2900 
T1_GF_LE 0.0651131 0.0527534 1.2343 0.2181 
T7_EY_LE −0.867669 0.0973619 −8.9118 <0.0001*** 
T9_IFK_LE 0.00376352 0.0489347 0.0769 0.9387 
T12_VFK_LE 0.00817907 0.0256844 0.3184 0.7504 
T14_VMK_LE 0.0084872 0.0653466 0.1299 0.8968 
T15_KYH_LE −0.0400741 0.0236316 −1.6958 0.0910* 
T18_FSY_LE −0.0241844 0.073044 −0.3311 0.7408 
T19_GEDG_LE −0.0145677 0.0647817 −0.2249 0.8222 
T27_GG_LE −0.208293 0.157981 −1.3185 0.1884 
T31_AG_LE −0.00676846 0.041241 −0.1641 0.8697 
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T32_AMK_LE −0.0102433 0.112654 −0.0909 0.9276 
T33_ATAG_LE −0.0239665 0.059937 −0.3999 0.6895 
T9_IFK     
Intercept −2.45746 0.602533 −4.0785 <0.0001*** 
XU100 Index 0.142855 0.045642 3.1299 0.0019*** 
RE Sector 0.0206943 0.0612033 0.3381 0.7355 
T9_IFK_return 0.0321117 0.0461338 0.6961 0.4869 
T6_GY_LE −0.0537618 0.0250749 −2.1441 0.0328** 
T8_GEDY_LE −0.776919 0.0888772 −8.7415 <0.0001*** 
T20_OYO_LE 0.0171916 0.0165209 1.0406 0.2989 
T21_AP_LE −0.26831 0.130283 −2.0594 0.0403** 
T22_IYM_LE −0.00288681 0.0431885 −0.0668 0.9468 
T23_TH_LE 0.000439245 0.0420992 0.0104 0.9917 
T25_AEP_LE 0.138295 0.047529 2.9097 0.0039*** 
T35_GYO_LE −0.116484 0.0924459 −1.2600 0.2086 
T9_IFK_PBV 1.5376 0.907534 1.6943 0.0913* 
T11_SFK     
Intercept −2.01629 0.701631 −2.8737 0.0043*** 
T11_SFK_LEV 0.0536782 0.105787 0.5074 0.6122 
T11_SFK_return 0.00283022 0.0373274 0.0758 0.9396 
RE Sector 0.0651081 0.0314245 2.0719 0.0391** 
DEBT/GDP −0.052186 0.0595903 −0.8757 0.3819 
T9_IFK_LE −0.0154789 0.0455198 −0.3400 0.7341 
T10_RG_LE −0.650468 0.0719364 −9.0423 <0.0001*** 
T20_OYO_LE 0.000736354 0.0729096 0.0101 0.9919 
T26_CF_LE −0.100347 0.0515906 −1.9451 0.0527* 
T27_GG_LE −0.161016 0.130717 −1.2318 0.2190 
T32_AMK_LE −0.194483 0.130957 −1.4851 0.1386 
T34_MZH_LE −0.0828524 0.114803 −0.7217 0.4710 
T12_VFK     
Intercept −0.736132 2.09618 −0.3512 0.7257 
T12_VFK_MM −0.759891 1.35772 −0.5597 0.5761 
T12_VFK_return 0.052711 0.0621364 0.8483 0.3969 
XU100 Index 0.0621858 0.0460421 1.3506 0.1778 
IVOL −0.00411381 0.0465688 −0.0883 0.9297 
T1_GF_LE −0.159297 0.0884698 −1.8006 0.0728* 
T5_GYH_LE −0.0163258 0.0473655 −0.3447 0.7306 
T6_GY_LE −0.104555 0.104054 −1.0048 0.3158 
T8_GEDY_LE −0.116109 0.127956 −0.9074 0.3649 
T11_SFK_LE −0.629742 0.127739 −4.9299 <0.0001*** 
T18_FSY_LE −0.105646 0.048617 −2.1730 0.0306** 
T19_GEDG_LE −0.183785 0.108528 −1.6934 0.0914* 
T20_OYO_LE −0.108551 0.0642434 −1.6897 0.0921* 
T22_IYM_LE −0.0366774 0.0955022 −0.3840 0.7012 
T27_GG_LE −0.0389995 0.347422 −0.1123 0.9107 
T35_GYO_LE −0.207766 0.101625 −2.0444 0.0418** 
T13_TH     
Intercept −4.02612 0.315367 −12.7665 <0.0001*** 
T13_TH_return 0.132417 0.0558337 2.3716 0.0183** 
CDS 0.0300343 0.0387105 0.7759 0.4384 
T2_FF_LE 0.293226 0.186077 1.5758 0.1161 
T11_SFK_LE −0.49499 0.20838 −2.3754 0.0182** 
T12_VFK_LE −0.838378 0.0101134 −82.8975 <0.0001*** 
T17_AYH_LE 0.0273882 0.129904 0.2108 0.8332 
T21_AP_LE 0.0571895 0.155397 0.3680 0.7131 
T28_GYM_LE −0.0800855 0.068924 −1.1619 0.2462 
T29_MG_LE −0.115687 0.0692033 −1.6717 0.0956* 
T34_MZH_LE 0.18653 0.226082 0.8251 0.4100 
T35_GYO_LE 0.354711 0.173359 2.0461 0.0416** 
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T14_VMK     
Intercept −8.67744 5.75045 −1.5090 0.1323 
T14_VMK_return 0.00393131 0.0350148 0.1123 0.9107 
Banks Sector 0.0906493 0.0387675 2.3383 0.0200** 
IVOL 0.0873957 0.0745201 1.1728 0.2418 
CDS −0.0267963 0.0264513 −1.0130 0.3118 
T13_TH_LE −0.964606 0.0212392 −45.4164 <0.0001*** 
T18_FSY_LE −0.194755 0.13021 −1.4957 0.1358 
T20_OYO_LE −0.0361368 0.0628511 −0.5750 0.5657 
T14_VMK_PBV 4.96565 5.56627 0.8921 0.3730 
T15_KYH     
Intercept −4.60172 13.2845 −0.3464 0.7293 
T15_KYH_SIZE 0.270793 3.44011 0.0787 0.9373 
T15_KYH_return −0.00900895 0.0486387 −0.1852 0.8532 
XU100 Index 0.105567 0.0786895 1.3416 0.1808 
IVOL 0.0099651 0.0719403 0.1385 0.8899 
TRLIBOR 0.00952471 0.0564341 0.1688 0.8661 
T1_GF_LE 0.0442558 0.144496 0.3063 0.7596 
T9_IFK_LE 0.0841099 0.120969 0.6953 0.4874 
T12_VFK_LE −0.0602718 0.0479161 −1.2579 0.2094 
T14_VMK_LE −0.769902 0.060157 −12.7982 <0.0001*** 
T23_TH_LE −0.0774216 0.143232 −0.5405 0.5892 
T30_IY_LE −0.190317 0.110884 −1.7164 0.0871* 
T16_MG     
Intercept −6.96846 2.33022 −2.9905 0.0030*** 
T16_MG_SIZE 1.52483 1.2759 1.1951 0.2330 
T16_MG_LEV −5.5131 4.31911 −1.2764 0.2028 
Banks Sector −0.0396298 0.0809771 −0.4894 0.6249 
DEBT/GDP −0.1313 0.164196 −0.7997 0.4246 
IVOL 0.19179 0.107125 1.7903 0.0745* 
T16_MG_return 0.0756038 0.0847383 0.8922 0.3730 
T1_GF_LE 0.283956 0.241377 1.1764 0.2404 
T3_AMY_LE 0.0598432 0.0644536 0.9285 0.3540 
T4_GEND_LE −0.0253522 0.0413374 −0.6133 0.5402 
T7_EY_LE −0.590925 0.490768 −1.2041 0.2296 
T11_SFK_LE 0.30076 0.560212 0.5369 0.5918 
T12_VFK_LE −0.0500411 0.0910155 −0.5498 0.5829 
T13_TH_LE 0.0431721 0.535977 0.0805 0.9359 
T14_VMK_LE −0.0335733 0.168393 −0.1994 0.8421 
T15_KYH_LE −0.852761 0.141908 −6.0092 <0.0001*** 
T17_AYH_LE 0.150138 0.286328 0.5244 0.6004 
T18_FSY_LE −0.0482635 0.258072 −0.1870 0.8518 
T19_GEDG_LE −0.0552582 0.254245 −0.2173 0.8281 
T20_OYO_LE −0.067348 0.163074 −0.4130 0.6799 
T22_IYM_LE 0.0146563 0.351687 0.0417 0.9668 
T24_EY_LE −0.442311 0.266178 −1.6617 0.0977* 
T26_CF_LE −0.000388938 0.238944 −0.0016 0.9987 
T29_MG_LE −0.146116 0.196693 −0.7429 0.4582 
T30_IY_LE 0.203764 0.182977 1.1136 0.2664 
T32_AMK_LE −0.311096 0.250691 −1.2410 0.2156 
T35_GYO_LE 0.159645 0.241276 0.6617 0.5087 
T39_AB_LE −30.2088 25.4164 −1.1886 0.2356 
T17_AYH     
Intercept −3.95399 0.324946 −12.1681 <0.0001*** 
T17_AYH_LEV −0.0315065 0.024045 −1.3103 0.1911 
T17_AYH_PBV 0.660691 0.716366 0.9223 0.3571 
T17_AYH_return 0.105636 0.0466133 2.2662 0.0242** 
CDS 0.00321101 0.0186003 0.1726 0.8631 
TRLIBOR −0.00386968 0.042394 −0.0913 0.9273 
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T2_FF_LE 0.0268773 0.029259 0.9186 0.3591 
T4_GEND_LE 0.00583062 0.0448126 0.1301 0.8966 
T12_VFK_LE −0.0214953 0.0263127 −0.8169 0.4146 
T13_TH_LE −0.0407799 0.0331659 −1.2296 0.2198 
T15_KYH_LE 0.0317075 0.113673 0.2789 0.7805 
T16_MG_LE −0.576998 0.0444297 −12.9868 <0.0001*** 
T18_FSY_LE 0.411356 0.117652 3.4964 0.0005*** 
T21_AP_LE −0.15558 0.153716 −1.0121 0.3123 
T22_IYM_LE 0.00722979 0.11863 0.0609 0.9514 
T27_GG_LE 0.0604205 0.334972 0.1804 0.8570 
T33_ATAG_LE 0.117908 0.0574417 2.0527 0.0410** 
T34_MZH_LE −0.129732 0.190543 −0.6809 0.4965 
T18_FSY     
Intercept −3.3948 0.752011 −4.5143 <0.0001*** 
T18_FSY_return 0.0117892 0.0400659 0.2942 0.7688 
XU100 Index −0.107153 0.0495281 −2.1635 0.0313** 
RE Sector 0.0952877 0.0474108 2.0098 0.0454** 
IVOL 0.055229 0.0294883 1.8729 0.0621* 
CDS −0.045616 0.0191869 −2.3775 0.0181** 
T1_GF_LE −0.083686 0.108322 −0.7726 0.4404 
T6_GY_LE 0.0140469 0.203528 0.0690 0.9450 
T8_GEDY_LE 0.0318039 0.309722 0.1027 0.9183 
T9_IFK_LE −0.0382712 0.0688325 −0.5560 0.5786 
T17_AYH_LE −0.796402 0.0494893 −16.0924 <0.0001*** 
T20_OYO_LE −0.026856 0.10204 −0.2632 0.7926 
T24_EY_LE 0.0960137 0.117747 0.8154 0.4155 
T28_GYM_LE −0.0124563 0.0632793 −0.1968 0.8441 
T33_ATAG_LE −0.0468355 0.0514439 −0.9104 0.3633 
T19_GEDG     
Intercept −1.26192 0.22401 −5.6333 <0.0001*** 
T19_GEDG_PBV 0.2383 0.206551 1.1537 0.2495 
T19_GEDG_return 0.0619283 0.0333573 1.8565 0.0644* 
T3_AMY_LE 0.0835692 0.0404591 2.0655 0.039** 
T4_GEND_LE 0.0123242 0.0226278 0.5446 0.5864 
T7_EY_LE −0.234786 0.0762017 −3.0811 0.0023*** 
T8_GEDY_LE −0.103066 0.0343195 −3.0031 0.0029*** 
T9_IFK_LE 0.083316 0.0389043 2.1416 0.0330** 
T12_VFK_LE −0.0214917 0.0208802 −1.0293 0.3042 
T15_KYH_LE 0.000210687 0.0113326 0.0186 0.9852 
T18_FSY_LE −0.857963 0.0224923 −38.1447 <0.0001*** 
T20_OYO     
Intercept −1.99065 0.179027 −11.1193 <0.0001*** 
T38_TK_LE −16.368 26.0958 −0.6272 0.5310 
T23_TH_LE −0.175181 0.0490891 −3.5686 0.0004*** 
T21_AP_LE −0.0734278 0.166279 −0.4416 0.6591 
T19_GEDG_LE −0.822681 0.0655533 −12.5498 <0.0001*** 
T8_GEDY_LE 0.127648 0.100062 1.2757 0.2030 
T20_OYO_return 0.135521 0.0257233 5.2684 <0.0001*** 
T21_AP     
Intercept 11.3729 7.72352 1.4725 0.1420 
T21_AP_return 0.0984201 0.0409891 2.4011 0.0170** 
T21_AP_SIZE −1.94007 1.2235 −1.5857 0.1139 
T21_AP_MM −5.10282 39.5724 −0.1289 0.8975 
XU100 Index 0.146842 0.0784675 1.8714 0.0623* 
IVOL −0.207254 0.0883021 −2.3471 0.0196** 
CDS −0.00479079 0.0265059 −0.1807 0.8567 
T1_GF_LE −0.097867 0.246257 −0.3974 0.6914 
T2_FF_LE −0.0296463 0.120345 −0.2463 0.8056 
T4_GEND_LE 0.0513871 0.0164245 3.1287 0.0019*** 
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T6_GY_LE −0.196169 0.197682 −0.9923 0.3219 
T9_IFK_LE 0.0525132 0.147563 0.3559 0.7222 
T12_VFK_LE 0.0350214 0.0602054 0.5817 0.5612 
T14_VMK_LE −0.14985 0.086279 −1.7368 0.0835* 
T15_KYH_LE −0.112408 0.0517537 −2.1720 0.0307** 
T20_OYO_LE −0.748816 0.0407065 −18.3955 <0.0001*** 
T22_IYM_LE 0.00144864 0.0984003 0.0147 0.9883 
T23_TH_LE −0.00102335 0.0859661 −0.0119 0.9905 
T25_AEP_LE 0.189891 0.0827001 2.2961 0.0224** 
T26_CF_LE 0.0116537 0.109915 0.1060 0.9156 
T27_GG_LE −0.0460641 0.146117 −0.3153 0.7528 
T30_IY_LE −0.189392 0.0532679 −3.5555 0.0004*** 
T31_AG_LE −0.0670974 0.0205968 −3.2577 0.0013*** 
T33_ATAG_LE −0.115474 0.0382546 −3.0186 0.0028*** 
T22_IYM     
Intercept 4.61588 4.21638 1.0947 0.2745 
T22_IYM_DE −0.0754305 0.0508785 −1.4826 0.1393 
T22_IYM_return 0.12552 0.078469 1.5996 0.1108 
Banks Sector 0.00889163 0.0313893 0.2833 0.7772 
RE Sector 0.0264183 0.0350489 0.7538 0.4516 
IVOL −0.00896854 0.0286734 −0.3128 0.7547 
T4_GEND_LE 0.0357235 0.0205644 1.7372 0.0834* 
T8_GEDY_LE −0.170565 0.105908 −1.6105 0.1084 
T13_TH_LE 0.0170102 0.101764 0.1672 0.8674 
T15_KYH_LE 0.035844 0.0199461 1.7970 0.0734* 
T19_GEDG_LE 0.0320466 0.0604468 0.5302 0.5964 
T21_AP_LE −0.750235 0.244784 −3.0649 0.0024*** 
T23_TH_LE 0.00732051 0.0907712 0.0806 0.9358 
T25_AEP_LE 0.0531887 0.136166 0.3906 0.6964 
T26_CF_LE 0.0095004 0.0753351 0.1261 0.8997 
T29_MG_LE −0.0709769 0.0342978 −2.0694 0.0394** 
T31_AG_LE −0.0375897 0.0452943 −0.8299 0.4073 
T23_TH     
Intercept 0.117198 1.33652 0.0877 0.9302 
T23_TH_MM −5.47973 4.24384 −1.2912 0.1976 
T23_TH_return 0.190499 0.0611268 3.1165 0.0020*** 
XU100 Index −0.0453431 0.0835163 −0.5429 0.5876 
RE Sector 0.0258055 0.0774447 0.3332 0.7392 
BUDGET/GDP 1.63921 5.00112 0.3278 0.7433 
IVOL −0.025062 0.0584465 −0.4288 0.6684 
T5_GYH_LE −0.139908 0.0821874 −1.7023 0.0897* 
T8_GEDY_LE −0.253704 0.253662 −1.0002 0.3180 
T22_IYM_LE −0.740556 0.0838179 −8.8353 <0.0001*** 
T29_MG_LE −0.0104078 0.0984906 −0.1057 0.9159 
T36_HOS_LE −0.054758 0.0637367 −0.8591 0.3910 
T24_EY     
Intercept 17.0285 14.0659 1.2106 0.2270 
T24_EY_LEV −17.6578 13.4219 −1.3156 0.1893 
XU100 Index 0.137008 0.0454209 3.0164 0.0028*** 
RE Sector 0.0514783 0.0264117 1.9491 0.0522* 
BUDGET/GDP 1.87839 1.7352 1.0825 0.2799 
T24_EY_return 0.0506503 0.0311262 1.6273 0.1048 
T1_GF_LE −0.0655886 0.0660048 −0.9937 0.3212 
T4_GEND_LE −0.00315677 0.0286746 −0.1101 0.9124 
T7_EY_LE 0.144123 0.229631 0.6276 0.5307 
T8_GEDY_LE −0.077869 0.199916 −0.3895 0.6972 
T15_KYH_LE 0.0760173 0.028357 2.6807 0.0078*** 
T21_AP_LE −0.115065 0.136676 −0.8419 0.4005 
T22_IYM_LE −0.0355058 0.0559657 −0.6344 0.5263 
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T23_TH_LE −0.734486 0.116447 −6.3075 <0.0001*** 
T25_AEP_LE 0.00939861 0.0116878 0.8041 0.4220 
T29_MG_LE 0.0864834 0.0302355 2.8603 0.0045*** 
T35_GYO_LE −0.127478 0.169717 −0.7511 0.4532 
T36_HOS_LE −0.135261 0.0481584 −2.8087 0.0053*** 
T25_AEP     
Intercept −2.06175 0.177193 −11.6356 <0.0001*** 
T25_AEP_return 0.0689939 0.0595527 1.1585 0.2476 
XU100 Index 0.10415 0.191972 0.5425 0.5879 
Banks Sector 0.0125271 0.14533 0.0862 0.9314 
RE Sector −0.0634262 0.0943816 −0.6720 0.5021 
DEBT/GDP 0.0864674 0.0990108 0.8733 0.3832 
CDS 0.0306834 0.0303563 1.0108 0.3130 
TRLIBOR −0.100377 0.0370631 −2.7083 0.0072*** 
T1_GF_LE −0.029362 0.122025 −0.2406 0.8100 
T5_GYH_LE −0.000747289 0.102854 −0.0073 0.9942 
T8_GEDY_LE 0.0932844 0.237379 0.3930 0.6946 
T9_IFK_LE −0.146438 0.106731 −1.3720 0.1711 
T20_OYO_LE 0.00770129 0.0322978 0.2384 0.8117 
T21_AP_LE −0.0043977 0.100497 −0.0438 0.9651 
T22_IYM_LE −0.0181844 0.138655 −0.1311 0.8957 
T23_TH_LE −0.262634 0.0915891 −2.8675 0.0044*** 
T24_EY_LE −0.677983 0.0347911 −19.4873 <0.0001*** 
T35_GYO_LE 0.0750103 0.144955 0.5175 0.6052 
T39_AB_LE −2.98945 5.73071 −0.5217 0.6023 
T26_CF     
Intercept −1.14825 0.541339 −2.1211 0.0347** 
T26_CF_return 0.108591 0.0637253 1.7040 0.0894* 
Banks Sector 0.0102232 0.0441498 0.2316 0.8170 
T26_CF_MM −0.365653 0.711842 −0.5137 0.6079 
CDS −0.0280522 0.0195263 −1.4366 0.1519 
T5_GYH_LE 0.0177665 0.0651364 0.2728 0.7852 
T21_AP_LE −0.0602418 0.112787 −0.5341 0.5937 
T25_AEP_LE −0.761894 0.110631 −6.8868 <0.0001*** 
T28_GYM_LE −0.0860277 0.0907694 −0.9478 0.3440 
T32_AMK_LE −0.0176417 0.192425 −0.0917 0.9270 
T35_GYO_LE −0.0556631 0.0873495 −0.6372 0.5244 
T27_GG     
Intercept −2.09412 0.234405 −8.9338 <0.0001*** 
T27_GG_MM 0.278372 0.373073 0.7462 0.4562 
T27_GG_return 0.0283786 0.0596555 0.4757 0.6346 
CDS −0.00126248 0.0136415 −0.0925 0.9263 
TRLIBOR −0.0861096 0.0436601 −1.9723 0.0495** 
T1_GF_LE −0.0332711 0.0850834 −0.3910 0.6961 
T8_GEDY_LE −0.0847042 0.140433 −0.6032 0.5469 
T12_VFK_LE 0.0228362 0.106339 0.2147 0.8301 
T16_MG_LE 0.0325339 0.117529 0.2768 0.7821 
T19_GEDG_LE −0.126747 0.0866272 −1.4631 0.1445 
T20_OYO_LE 0.00570804 0.0603774 0.0945 0.9247 
T22_IYM_LE 0.0138454 0.162238 0.0853 0.9320 
T23_TH_LE −0.0531979 0.079672 −0.6677 0.5048 
T24_EY_LE −0.125118 0.142863 −0.8758 0.3819 
T25_AEP_LE 0.0312251 0.0894883 0.3489 0.7274 
T26_CF_LE −0.655242 0.185572 −3.5309 0.0005*** 
T32_AMK_LE −0.123151 0.180526 −0.6822 0.4957 
T35_GYO_LE 0.0139577 0.119627 0.1167 0.9072 
T28_GYM     
Intercept −0.256951 0.363271 −0.7073 0.4799 
T28_GYM_LEV −0.10087 0.0472852 −2.1332 0.0337** 
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T28_GYM_return 0.0594876 0.0409834 1.4515 0.1477 
BUDGET/GDP 0.92913 1.66844 0.5569 0.5780 
DEBT/GDP 0.0470197 0.0259413 1.8125 0.0709* 
CDS −0.0121684 0.00776648 −1.5668 0.1182 
T2_FF_LE −0.00130536 0.061864 −0.0211 0.9832 
T3_AMY_LE −0.0426605 0.0704572 −0.6055 0.5453 
T13_TH_LE −0.00195796 0.0129556 −0.1511 0.8800 
T14_VMK_LE 0.00591228 0.0195217 0.3029 0.7622 
T19_GEDG_LE 0.0127467 0.0197369 0.6458 0.5189 
T20_OYO_LE 0.0203391 0.0140239 1.4503 0.1480 
T24_EY_LE 0.0165047 0.0363096 0.4546 0.6498 
T27_GG_LE −0.84518 0.0718349 −11.7656 <0.0001*** 
T29_MG     
Intercept −6.60178 4.91866 −1.3422 0.1806 
T29_MG_SIZE 0.832666 0.90922 0.9158 0.3605 
T29_MG_return 0.179627 0.0504663 3.5593 0.0004*** 
Banks Sector 0.039938 0.0267771 1.4915 0.1369 
BUDGET/GDP −1.44365 3.50399 −0.4120 0.6806 
DEBT/GDP −0.219777 0.0736815 −2.9828 0.0031*** 
TRLIBOR −0.0823629 0.0332216 −2.4792 0.0137** 
T1_GF_LE −0.168696 0.0963458 −1.7509 0.0810* 
T4_GEND_LE 0.0341427 0.0349978 0.9756 0.3301 
T8_GEDY_LE 0.00594566 0.135168 0.0440 0.9649 
T9_IFK_LE 0.0249048 0.0697202 0.3572 0.7212 
T14_VMK_LE −0.0192363 0.0374088 −0.5142 0.6075 
T15_KYH_LE −0.0562828 0.0609448 −0.9235 0.3565 
T19_GEDG_LE 0.0932621 0.120852 0.7717 0.4409 
T20_OYO_LE 0.0126292 0.0492765 0.2563 0.7979 
T21_AP_LE −0.0551196 0.100905 −0.5463 0.5853 
T22_IYM_LE 0.0245402 0.0880024 0.2789 0.7806 
T23_TH_LE −0.0173803 0.0783769 −0.2218 0.8247 
T27_GG_LE −0.119574 0.236244 −0.5061 0.6131 
T28_GYM_LE −0.878883 0.0364561 −24.1080 <0.0001*** 
T30_IY_LE −0.0262225 0.104375 −0.2512 0.8018 
T34_MZH_LE 0.108578 0.181537 0.5981 0.5502 
T35_GYO_LE 0.0435266 0.154252 0.2822 0.7780 
T39_AB_LE −22.4245 11.889 −1.8862 0.0603* 
T30_IY     
Intercept −2.62103 0.425306 −6.1627 <0.0001*** 
T30_IY_LEV 0.689088 0.298359 2.3096 0.0216** 
T30_IY_return 0.050952 0.0405665 1.2560 0.2101 
XU100 Index 0.00109522 0.0414764 0.0264 0.9790 
BUDGET/GDP 0.0912431 3.58853 0.0254 0.9797 
TRLIBOR 0.0619996 0.026066 2.3786 0.0180** 
T1_GF_LE −0.199112 0.0751471 −2.6496 0.0085*** 
T4_GEND_LE −0.0156054 0.00602131 −2.5917 0.0100** 
T6_GY_LE 0.0371437 0.0896418 0.4144 0.6789 
T10_RG_LE 0.0103172 0.164653 0.0627 0.9501 
T13_TH_LE 0.0300765 0.0778853 0.3862 0.6997 
T14_VMK_LE −0.0438324 0.0190208 −2.3044 0.0219** 
T17_AYH_LE −0.0288137 0.113794 −0.2532 0.8003 
T19_GEDG_LE −0.0419505 0.0540733 −0.7758 0.4385 
T24_EY_LE −0.047018 0.0769273 −0.6112 0.5415 
T26_CF_LE −0.0695265 0.0832329 −0.8353 0.4042 
T27_GG_LE 0.171602 0.184558 0.9298 0.3532 
T28_GYM_LE −0.0108596 0.0467276 −0.2324 0.8164 
T29_MG_LE −0.905751 0.115923 −7.8134 <0.0001*** 
T31_AG_LE 0.00232829 0.0127388 0.1828 0.8551 
T34_MZH_LE 0.11607 0.186139 0.6236 0.5334 
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T31_AG     
Intercept −1.69722 0.735992 −2.3060 0.0218** 
T31_AG_PBV −0.551654 0.030041 −18.3634 <0.0001*** 
T31_AG_return 0.128947 0.0225712 5.7129 <0.0001*** 
Budget DEBT/GDP −0.0264427 0.0276158 −0.9575 0.3391 
IVOL 0.0578632 0.0256921 2.2522 0.0250** 
T30_IY_LE −0.798657 0.0553336 −14.4335 <0.0001*** 
T32_AMK     
Intercept 20.7558 8.05136 2.5779 0.0104** 
T32_AMK_SIZE −4.67891 1.57577 −2.9693 0.0032*** 
T32_AMK_PBV −0.487972 0.371051 −1.3151 0.1895 
T32_AMK_return 0.111042 0.0174476 6.3643 <0.0001*** 
BUDGET/GDP 7.51517 7.20488 1.0431 0.2978 
T3_AMY_LE −0.161058 0.133579 −1.2057 0.2289 
T7_EY_LE −0.247787 0.135424 −1.8297 0.0683* 
T13_TH_LE −0.0899986 0.0452101 −1.9907 0.0474** 
T15_KYH_LE −0.0270966 0.150847 −0.1796 0.8576 
T21_AP_LE 0.6975 0.144159 4.8384 <0.0001*** 
T22_IYM_LE −0.529744 0.199223 −2.6591 0.0083*** 
T25_AEP_LE 0.186363 0.0454253 4.1026 <0.0001 
T27_GG_LE −0.30308 0.500849 −0.6051 0.5456 
T31_AG_LE −0.770313 0.0449319 −17.1440 <0.0001*** 
T36_HOS_LE 0.071033 0.0596852 1.1901 0.2349 
T33_ATAG     
Intercept −1.65153 0.115085 −14.3505 <0.0001*** 
T33_ATAG_return 0.0607699 0.0328098 1.8522 0.0650* 
DEBT/GDP 0.0299245 0.0572547 0.5227 0.6016 
T20_OYO_LE −0.0127896 0.0367584 −0.3479 0.7281 
T23_TH_LE 0.136526 0.0942591 1.4484 0.1485 
T31_AG_LE 0.00218668 0.0204927 0.1067 0.9151 
T32_AMK_LE −0.887011 0.0466959 −18.9955 <0.0001*** 
T34_MZH     
Intercept −3.43441 0.984668 −3.4879 0.0006*** 
T34_MZH_LEV −0.785199 0.250561 −3.1338 0.0019*** 
T34_MZH_PBV 3.44332 1.94879 1.7669 0.0783* 
T34_MZH_return 0.075175 0.0462665 1.6248 0.1053 
XU100 Index 0.0209964 0.0748382 0.2806 0.7792 
RE Sector 0.032324 0.0615168 0.5254 0.5997 
DEBT/GDP −0.0311574 0.0816305 −0.3817 0.7030 
IVOL −0.0135007 0.0327832 −0.4118 0.6808 
TRLIBOR 0.0529608 0.0361816 1.4638 0.1443 
T1_GF_LE −0.0968967 0.0245587 −3.9455 <0.0001*** 
T4_GEND_LE 0.0278929 0.00790798 3.5272 0.0005*** 
T8_GEDY_LE −0.0465992 0.187689 −0.2483 0.8041 
T12_VFK_LE 0.00472961 0.0735352 0.0643 0.9488 
T20_OYO_LE −0.0415605 0.0292286 −1.4219 0.1561 
T21_AP_LE −0.0662756 0.137726 −0.4812 0.6307 
T29_MG_LE 0.0480515 0.0619865 0.7752 0.4388 
T33_ATAG_LE −0.674097 0.129598 −5.2014 <0.0001*** 
T35_GYO     
Intercept 24.6581 14.0258 1.7580 0.0798* 
T35_GYO_LEV −22.8905 13.3691 −1.7122 0.0879* 
T35_GYO_PBV −4.01975 2.08419 −1.9287 0.0547* 
T35_GYO_return 0.0469312 0.0787565 0.5959 0.5517 
XU100 Index 0.086248 0.0856239 1.0073 0.3146 
RE Sector 0.0159171 0.0560909 0.2838 0.7768 
BUDGET/GDP −2.93427 3.64211 −0.8057 0.4211 
DEBT/GDP −0.000303167 0.116886 −0.0026 0.9979 
IVOL −0.030019 0.0456965 −0.6569 0.5117 
254 
 
CDS −0.00110318 0.0181501 −0.0608 0.9516 
T6_GY_LE −0.0662785 0.108272 −0.6121 0.5409 
T20_OYO_LE −0.0125901 0.0489467 −0.2572 0.7972 
T23_TH_LE 0.0124714 0.075193 0.1659 0.8684 
T28_GYM_LE −0.074088 0.0438639 −1.6890 0.0923* 
T34_MZH_LE −0.771385 0.0810484 −9.5176 <0.0001*** 
T36_HOS_LE −0.00767634 0.0893884 −0.0859 0.9316 
T36_HOS     
Intercept −2.01534 0.212219 −9.4965 <0.0001*** 
T36_HOS_return 0.131431 0.077809 1.6892 0.0922* 
XU100 Index 0.0999939 0.0566213 1.7660 0.0784* 
T3_AMY_LE −0.0401221 0.054973 −0.7299 0.4660 
T20_OYO_LE −0.00503601 0.0339774 −0.1482 0.8823 
T29_MG_LE −0.035665 0.0563958 −0.6324 0.5276 
T34_MZH_LE −0.0685913 0.0979844 −0.7000 0.4844 
T35_GYO_LE −0.542089 0.0559412 −9.6903 <0.0001*** 
T38_TK     
Intercept −3.32125 3.93453 −0.8441 0.3993 
T38_TK_MM 4.93185 1.31262 3.7573 0.0002*** 
T38_TK_DE 0.0170616 0.0473239 0.3605 0.7187 
T38_TK_return 0.0358641 0.0650343 0.5515 0.5817 
RE Sector 0.00551886 0.0403195 0.1369 0.8912 
DEBT/GDP 0.0438727 0.0689557 0.6362 0.5251 
T1_GF_LE −0.110585 0.108673 −1.0176 0.3097 
T5_GYH_LE 0.00810805 0.0531186 0.1526 0.8788 
T7_EY_LE −0.324862 0.12814 −2.5352 0.0117** 
T14_VMK_LE −0.0298365 0.0582876 −0.5119 0.6091 
T31_AG_LE −0.031906 0.0145343 −2.1952 0.0289** 
T36_HOS_LE −0.873927 0.148843 −5.8715 <0.0001*** 
T39_AB_LE −6.63089 6.41009 −1.0344 0.3018 
 
Abu Dhabi     
 
Value Std. Error t-ratio P-value 
     
(Intercept) -1.23881 0.4092 -3.02739 0.00268 
A1_ADC_log -0.19661 0.06496 -3.02671 0.00269 
AD_Banks_Index 0.12832 0.05686 2.257 0.02472 
A2_ADI_LE 0.12801 0.22586 0.56679 0.57128 
A5_OB_LE -0.93478 0.19808 -4.71923 0 
A9_UOB_LE -0.06205 0.20095 -0.30879 0.75769 
A14_FHP_LE 0.05498 0.07654 0.71831 0.47312 
A20_ADO_LE -0.4493 0.14464 -3.10636 0.00207 
A22_AKI_LE 0.16334 0.07191 2.27145 0.02383 
A30_MT_LE -0.31974 0.0658 -4.85904 0 
A31_INSUH_LE -0.01223 0.23879 -0.05123 0.95918 
3 
    
(Intercept) -2.30002 1.56195 -1.47253 0.14191 
A3_PBV -0.0222 1.83333 -0.01211 0.99035 
ADSMI_Index -0.13586 0.08264 -1.64396 0.10121 
A7_OBR_LE -0.08613 0.1559 -0.55248 0.58102 
A9_UOB_LE 0.06816 0.20492 0.33263 0.73964 
255 
 
A30_MT_LE -0.17807 0.08827 -2.01743 0.04452 
5 
    
(Intercept) -1.24495 0.77628 -1.60374 0.10983 
A5_PBV -0.15038 0.63611 -0.2364 0.81329 
A5_OB_log -0.11492 0.09856 -1.16606 0.24452 
oil 0.05007 0.02513 1.99258 0.04722 
AD_Banks_Index 0.07844 0.06882 1.13989 0.25525 
A1_ADC_LE -0.21189 0.0829 -2.55604 0.01108 
A2_ADI_LE 0.06732 0.06739 0.99891 0.31865 
A8_SI_LE -0.16213 0.27103 -0.59819 0.55017 
A9_UOB_LE -0.0668 0.18999 -0.3516 0.72539 
A18_ABO_LE 0.15938 0.14944 1.06647 0.28708 
A19_EI_LE 0.15295 0.24765 0.61761 0.53731 
A22_AKI_LE 0.15387 0.09456 1.6273 0.10473 
A26_ADT_LE -0.01011 0.05494 -0.18401 0.85413 
A30_MT_LE -0.13038 0.08533 -1.52799 0.12758 
A31_INSUH_LE -0.0741 0.08585 -0.86306 0.3888 
6 
    
(Intercept) -4.55187 1.51605 -3.00245 0.0029 
A6_OBF_log -0.33467 0.15351 -2.18009 0.03001 
A14_FHP_LE -1.09522 0.55036 -1.99 0.04747 
A29_RASK_LE 2.15314 4.00012 0.53827 0.59078 
7 
    
(Intercept) -1.11576 0.22136 -5.04048 0 
A7_OBR_log -0.26484 0.08314 -3.18559 0.0016 
ADSMI_Index 0.08335 0.07214 1.15542 0.24883 
A1_ADC_LE 0.14562 0.12886 1.13007 0.25934 
A2_ADI_LE -0.8695 0.24107 -3.60687 0.00036 
A3_BOS_LE -0.51834 0.19363 -2.67701 0.00783 
A4_CBI_LE -0.73731 0.30874 -2.38814 0.01755 
A8_SI_LE -0.48796 0.17078 -2.8572 0.00457 
A9_UOB_LE 0.08474 0.12638 0.67055 0.50302 
A30_MT_LE 0.21517 0.10841 1.98477 0.04807 
8 
    
(Intercept) -1.32822 0.25238 -5.26272 0 
A5_OB_LE -0.02585 0.16856 -0.15334 0.87823 
A7_OBR_LE -0.47906 0.10283 -4.65852 0 
A9_UOB_LE -0.38806 0.50923 -0.76206 0.44661 
A30_MT_LE -0.19499 0.05959 -3.27226 0.00119 
9 
    
(Intercept) -1.68977 0.34265 -4.93148 0 
A9_UOB_log -0.30169 0.08857 -3.4062 0.00075 
256 
 
oil 0.07249 0.03759 1.92867 0.05472 
ADSMI_Index 0.02391 0.08687 0.27527 0.7833 
A1_ADC_LE -0.54673 0.18259 -2.99434 0.00298 
A2_ADI_LE -0.10237 0.17931 -0.57088 0.56851 
A3_BOS_LE 0.0635 0.11468 0.55375 0.58017 
A5_OB_LE 0.02147 0.15448 0.13901 0.88953 
A8_SI_LE -0.6907 0.18443 -3.74509 0.00022 
A13_IBP_LE -0.24844 0.17076 -1.45491 0.14675 
A14_FHP_LE 0.0644 0.09806 0.6568 0.51181 
A17_AAA_LE 0.39071 0.12611 3.09811 0.00213 
A30_MT_LE -0.01297 0.05644 -0.22987 0.81835 
A31_INSUH_LE 0.41261 0.15431 2.67391 0.00791 
13 
    
(Intercept) 3.87025 3.1383 1.23323 0.21848 
A13_MM 103.9972 76.82727 1.35365 0.1769 
A13_PBV -5.24883 1.91396 -2.74239 0.00648 
A13_IBP_log -0.08253 0.10405 -0.79323 0.42829 
USDAED_Implied_Volatility 1.20718 5.72736 0.21078 0.83321 
ABUD_CDS_USD_5Y -2.88853 1.48798 -1.94124 0.05319 
AD_Banks_Index 0.07409 0.1457 0.50854 0.61146 
AD_RE_Index 0.07259 0.05539 1.31058 0.19103 
A2_ADI_LE -0.15493 0.54358 -0.28502 0.77583 
A4_CBI_LE -0.47451 0.14057 -3.37564 0.00084 
A5_OB_LE 0.50237 0.21763 2.30838 0.02168 
A7_OBR_LE 0.20257 0.36833 0.54998 0.58275 
A8_SI_LE -0.32086 0.24864 -1.29047 0.19791 
A9_UOB_LE -0.21593 0.28344 -0.76182 0.44678 
A16_WT_LE 0.00709 0.07849 0.0903 0.92811 
A17_AAA_LE -0.11955 0.3056 -0.39122 0.69592 
A20_ADO_LE 0.36476 0.19747 1.84712 0.06574 
A23_AW_LE 0.54331 3.90207 0.13924 0.88936 
A24_UnionI_LE 0.19506 0.24852 0.78489 0.43316 
A27_SINSU_LE 1.79055 2.31643 0.77298 0.44016 
A31_INSUH_LE -0.02426 0.2711 -0.08948 0.92876 
14 
    
(Intercept) -4.01536 0.34213 -11.7365 0 
A5_OB_LE -0.90467 0.33089 -2.73406 0.00662 
16 
    
(Intercept) -4.2685 0.44561 -9.57894 0 
A16_WT_log -0.18173 0.13571 -1.33911 0.18153 
ADSMI_Index 0.041 0.1938 0.21153 0.83261 
A23_AW_LE 0.58418 0.04377 13.34696 0 
A29_RASK_LE -0.36175 0.34485 -1.04899 0.29501 
257 
 
A31_INSUH_LE 0.40767 0.48441 0.84158 0.40068 
19 
    
(Intercept) 10.14801 4.09723 2.4768 0.01379 
A19_PBV -9.97914 3.97517 -2.51037 0.01257 
A8_SI_LE -0.41337 0.24859 -1.66284 0.09736 
A11_UAB_LE -0.31353 0.20096 -1.56015 0.11975 
20 
    
(Intercept) 1.9831 2.02818 0.97777 0.32896 
A20_PBV -3.68627 1.49946 -2.4584 0.01451 
ADSMI_Index 0.32611 0.16481 1.97872 0.04874 
A1_ADC_LE -0.53664 0.35577 -1.50837 0.13249 
A24_UnionI_LE -0.07348 0.24125 -0.30457 0.7609 
23 
    
(Intercept) 0.04676 0.08895 0.52576 0.59944 
A23_PBV -0.3707 0.06737 -5.5023 0 
A23_AW_log 0.06847 0.01339 5.11218 0 
ABUD_CDS_USD_5Y 0.18186 0.07373 2.46651 0.0142 
ADSMI_Index 0.01606 0.00462 3.47283 0.00059 
A4_CBI_LE -0.0107 1.59978 -0.00669 0.99467 
A12_OBU_LE 0.00492 0.55021 0.00895 0.99287 
A14_FHP_LE 0.01926 0.00617 3.11936 0.00199 
A16_WT_LE 0.01362 0.01007 1.35243 0.17725 
A31_INSUH_LE 0.03133 0.00679 4.61411 0.00001 
27 
    
(Intercept) -0.00523 0.00124 -4.21761 0.00003 
A27_SINSU_log 1.00992 0.00861 117.2758 0 
28 
    
(Intercept) -161.637 126.6969 -1.27577 0.2031 
A28_size 27.53071 21.33001 1.2907 0.19788 
A28_LEV 3.79447 4.07494 0.93117 0.35257 
A28_PBV -0.02831 0.10818 -0.26166 0.79378 
A28_ADINSU_log 0.61898 0.12786 4.84105 0 
oil 0.00443 0.05013 0.08839 0.92963 
AD_RE_Index 0.0028 0.02964 0.09463 0.92468 
A1_ADC_LE -0.48665 0.23364 -2.08288 0.03817 
A2_ADI_LE -0.13766 0.36306 -0.37916 0.70486 
A3_BOS_LE 0.03373 0.19926 0.16925 0.86572 
A4_CBI_LE -0.09784 0.13326 -0.73421 0.46344 
A5_OB_LE -0.09976 0.2876 -0.34687 0.72895 
A6_OBF_LE 0.06018 0.04894 1.22952 0.21991 
A7_OBR_LE 0.28545 0.17232 1.65654 0.09874 
A8_SI_LE -0.58669 0.42157 -1.3917 0.16512 
A9_UOB_LE 0.14616 0.43222 0.33816 0.73549 
258 
 
A12_OBU_LE 0.15992 0.10322 1.5493 0.12244 
A13_IBP_LE 0.08234 0.12318 0.6685 0.50437 
A14_FHP_LE -0.23319 0.17096 -1.36399 0.17367 
A16_WT_LE 0.14168 0.13837 1.0239 0.30677 
A17_AAA_LE -0.57121 0.10388 -5.49881 0 
A18_ABO_LE -0.39269 0.20556 -1.91032 0.05712 
A19_EI_LE 0.29063 0.47394 0.61323 0.54023 
A20_ADO_LE 0.15225 0.13917 1.09402 0.27489 
A22_AKI_LE -0.20977 0.12663 -1.65647 0.09875 
A23_AW_LE 0.0847 1.26949 0.06672 0.94685 
A24_UnionI_LE 0.05877 0.15674 0.37494 0.70799 
A25_UI_LE -55.1815 165.0455 -0.33434 0.73837 
A26_ADT_LE 0.01064 0.08207 0.12968 0.89692 
A27_SINSU_LE -1.63056 2.61785 -0.62286 0.53388 
A29_RASK_LE 0.26806 0.7755 0.34566 0.72986 
A30_MT_LE 0.25716 0.14758 1.74248 0.08253 
A31_INSUH_LE -0.64352 0.53131 -1.21119 0.22685 
30 
    
(Intercept) 0.98166 1.07203 0.9157 0.36057 
A30_PBV -1.02512 0.34166 -3.00041 0.00293 
UAE_Interest_rate_swap -0.35172 0.43394 -0.81054 0.41828 
AD_Banks_Index -0.00947 0.17532 -0.05402 0.95696 
AD_RE_Index 0.05503 0.07747 0.71029 0.47809 
A1_ADC_LE -0.36973 0.32053 -1.15349 0.24964 
A2_ADI_LE -0.65832 1.02748 -0.64071 0.52221 
A3_BOS_LE -0.19749 0.32028 -0.61663 0.53796 
A4_CBI_LE -0.31054 0.21847 -1.42142 0.15625 
A5_OB_LE -0.05902 0.39878 -0.14799 0.88245 
A8_SI_LE -0.28847 0.52368 -0.55084 0.58216 
A9_UOB_LE -0.89282 0.74234 -1.20271 0.23005 
A11_UAB_LE -0.10282 0.23624 -0.43525 0.6637 
A13_IBP_LE -0.29599 0.18297 -1.61769 0.1068 
A18_ABO_LE -0.66834 0.53538 -1.24835 0.21289 
A20_ADO_LE 0.47807 0.16091 2.971 0.00321 





Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
1     
(Intercept) -0.00545 0.13729 -0.03973 0.96834 
I1_size 0.00105 0.01537 0.06855 0.94539 
I1_DE -0.00011 0.0004 -0.27349 0.78467 
259 
 
I1_BN_log 0.94564 0.05225 18.09969 0 
INDON_CDS_5Y -0.00129 0.00403 -0.31949 0.74958 
JCI_VOL 0.00004 0.00031 0.12687 0.89913 
I2_BON_LE 0.00253 0.01996 0.12697 0.89905 
I4_PTB_LE 0.00299 0.00864 0.34556 0.72992 
I5_BMI_LE 0.00269 0.013 0.207 0.83615 
I13_WOO_LE -0.00002 0.00037 -0.05494 0.95623 
I15_BII_LE 0.00002 0.00051 0.03598 0.97133 
I49_MNC_LE 0.00001 0.00021 0.04342 0.9654 
I54_AD_LE -0.00001 0.00058 -0.01658 0.98679 
I57_WO_LE -0.00001 0.00049 -0.02342 0.98133 
I60_MM_LE -0.00002 0.00214 -0.0079 0.9937 
I64_CI_LE 0.00001 0.00032 0.02375 0.98107 
I72_EVLE_LE 0.00006 0.00053 0.12196 0.90301 
2 
    
(Intercept) -0.00671 0.00098 -6.86296 0 
I2_BON_log 0.9978 0.00269 371.4959 0 
I5_BMI_LE 0.00464 0.00243 1.90903 0.05719 
I13_WOO_LE -0.00538 0.02957 -0.18196 0.85573 
3 
    
(Intercept) -2.10285 0.63343 -3.31977 0.00101 
I10_BCA_LE -1.23843 0.83066 -1.49089 0.13703 
I12_BUKO_LE 0.28583 0.40772 0.70104 0.48382 
I14_DAM_LE 0.08021 0.38401 0.20888 0.83468 
I23_BAG_LE -0.84944 0.54938 -1.54617 0.1231 
I32_NEG_LE -0.20968 0.57085 -0.36732 0.71364 
I40_BHI_LE 0.98767 2.96001 0.33367 0.73886 
I67_ONIX_LE -4.29872 2.21001 -1.94511 0.05268 
4 
    
(Intercept) -0.04055 0.00506 -8.01497 0 
I4_PTB_log 0.97676 0.00755 129.2993 0 
I2_BON_LE 0.03271 0.01299 2.51765 0.01233 
I5_BMI_LE 0.10333 0.02725 3.79159 0.00018 
I6_BQI_LE 0.00099 0.00032 3.1359 0.00188 
I21_EKON_LE -0.00055 0.00081 -0.67186 0.50218 
I59_LES_LE 0.00054 0.00166 0.32448 0.7458 
I6_BQI 
    
(Intercept) -1.09601 0.78096 -1.40341 0.16152 
I6_BQI_log -0.13382 0.11347 -1.17936 0.23918 
I11_BUMI_LE 0.40624 0.42437 0.95729 0.33918 
I24_VIC_LE -1.23036 0.93084 -1.32177 0.18724 
260 
 
I31_OTIO_LE 0.52206 0.47237 1.10518 0.26995 
I35_MITLE_LE -0.99083 0.4285 -2.31229 0.02143 
I37_PANI_LE -1.17879 3.24064 -0.36375 0.7163 
I44_SMM_LE -1.55603 0.3289 -4.73108 0 
7 
    
(Intercept) -17.3649 29.33505 -0.59195 0.55436 
I7_size 1.59325 2.59319 0.6144 0.53945 
I7_PBV -0.33111 0.80519 -0.41122 0.68123 
I7_BM_log -0.10696 0.10059 -1.06336 0.28853 
JCI_INDEX -0.10838 0.13925 -0.77834 0.43702 
Indonesia_F_Index 0.04461 0.09697 0.46002 0.64586 
I2_BON_LE 0.79182 0.85384 0.92736 0.35453 
I3_BP_LE -0.01862 0.09757 -0.19078 0.84883 
I6_BQI_LE 0.17477 0.1793 0.97473 0.33053 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.1311 0.304 -0.43127 0.6666 
I9_PBM_LE -0.2916 0.20372 -1.43142 0.15342 
I10_BCA_LE -0.21759 0.35362 -0.61532 0.53884 
I12_BUKO_LE 0.05313 0.17909 0.29668 0.76693 
I13_WOO_LE -0.1577 0.20202 -0.78065 0.43566 
I14_DAM_LE -0.08118 0.124 -0.65466 0.51322 
I18_KENT_LE -0.14992 0.10959 -1.36801 0.1724 
I20_AGLE_LE 0.03398 0.16614 0.20454 0.83808 
I22_TAB_LE 0.09447 0.21359 0.44232 0.6586 
I32_NEG_LE -0.64174 0.35669 -1.79914 0.07307 
I35_MITLE_LE -0.04284 0.28176 -0.15205 0.87926 
I37_PANI_LE -0.94896 0.6445 -1.4724 0.14203 
I43_DE_LE 3.01305 3.73127 0.80751 0.42005 
I46_PI_LE -0.03856 0.23213 -0.16613 0.86817 
I48_ATP_LE 0.01294 0.08047 0.16083 0.87234 
I53_PTP_LE -0.16342 0.24563 -0.66533 0.50638 
I59_LES_LE 0.03312 0.22623 0.1464 0.88371 
I61_LS_LE 0.12908 0.12344 1.04565 0.29662 
I68_VELEO_LE 0.10082 0.12642 0.79745 0.42586 
I69_CLIP_LE -0.14971 0.16567 -0.90363 0.36696 
I71_TABU_LE -0.2189 0.14506 -1.50902 0.13241 
8 
    
(Intercept) -0.42169 0.66424 -0.63485 0.52602 
I8_PBV -0.12254 0.2631 -0.46576 0.64173 
I8_BlogI_log -0.17856 0.05493 -3.25069 0.00129 
JCI_INDEX 0.02682 0.0684 0.39204 0.69531 
I2_BON_LE 0.68268 0.6532 1.04513 0.29683 
261 
 
I7_BM_LE -0.37227 0.2846 -1.30805 0.19189 
I10_BCA_LE -0.27353 0.27617 -0.99045 0.32278 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.14604 0.24377 -0.5991 0.54957 
I14_DAM_LE -0.11151 0.24715 -0.45117 0.6522 
I15_BII_LE -0.10459 0.18706 -0.55914 0.5765 
I18_KENT_LE -0.00603 0.11105 -0.05434 0.9567 
I20_AGLE_LE -0.01441 0.23588 -0.06108 0.95134 
I23_BAG_LE -0.19693 0.18667 -1.05497 0.29231 
I27_PAN_LE 0.06036 0.14938 0.40407 0.68646 
I31_OTIO_LE 0.14384 0.23788 0.60468 0.54586 
I32_NEG_LE -0.31824 0.28655 -1.11058 0.26766 
I56_YS_LE -0.0707 0.09939 -0.71134 0.47744 
I61_LS_LE -0.23003 0.16045 -1.43362 0.15275 
I71_TABU_LE -0.06785 0.16668 -0.40706 0.68426 
I72_EVLE_LE -0.03187 0.18857 -0.16899 0.86592 
9 
    
(Intercept) 0.59163 1.8448 0.3207 0.74865 
I9_PBV -1.74875 0.78882 -2.21693 0.02736 
I46_PI_LE -0.4938 0.21857 -2.25926 0.02456 
10 
    
(Intercept) 1.04587 1.97639 0.52918 0.5971 
I10_PBV -0.43125 0.55616 -0.77541 0.43875 
I10_BCA_log -0.13091 0.09271 -1.41206 0.15904 
JCI_INDEX 0.02286 0.0637 0.35891 0.71993 
I2_BON_LE 2.14834 1.29477 1.65925 0.09819 
I3_BP_LE -0.02832 0.17123 -0.16539 0.86876 
I7_BM_LE -0.33025 0.22811 -1.44781 0.14879 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.56387 0.26211 -2.15127 0.03231 
I13_WOO_LE -0.07906 0.08418 -0.93915 0.34846 
I14_DAM_LE -0.01639 0.09745 -0.16817 0.86657 
I15_BII_LE 0.00101 0.19186 0.00526 0.99581 
I17_PELE_LE -0.12911 0.17023 -0.75844 0.44882 
I20_AGLE_LE 0.06414 0.18768 0.34174 0.7328 
I21_EKON_LE 0.01657 0.16892 0.09807 0.92194 
I24_VIC_LE -0.12995 0.1282 -1.01368 0.31161 
I32_NEG_LE -0.06059 0.25782 -0.23501 0.81438 
I33_MEST_LE 0.23825 1.10394 0.21582 0.82929 
I38_BAT_LE -0.01725 0.25835 -0.06676 0.94682 
I40_BHI_LE 0.16941 5.11954 0.03309 0.97363 
I44_SMM_LE -0.18908 0.20303 -0.93128 0.35251 
I46_PI_LE -0.03006 0.054 -0.55668 0.57819 
262 
 
I49_MNC_LE -0.00894 0.07869 -0.11355 0.90967 
I51_PAC_LE -0.02686 0.18439 -0.14565 0.8843 
I52_TS_LE -0.13145 0.10744 -1.22345 0.22219 
I56_YS_LE 0.06959 0.05453 1.27627 0.20292 
I57_WO_LE -0.00912 0.08908 -0.10239 0.91852 
I59_LES_LE 0.06758 0.23226 0.29094 0.77131 
I60_MM_LE 0.02891 0.1677 0.1724 0.86325 
I65_BF_LE -0.02015 0.19806 -0.10175 0.91903 
I67_ONIX_LE 0.4766 0.99669 0.47818 0.6329 
I70_BATP_LE -0.30865 0.1777 -1.7369 0.0835 
I71_TABU_LE -0.08636 0.18692 -0.46204 0.64441 
11 
    
(Intercept) -1.50312 0.48163 -3.12091 0.00198 
I15_BII_LE -0.43496 0.58005 -0.74988 0.45392 
I20_AGLE_LE -0.2497 0.40143 -0.62202 0.5344 
I23_BAG_LE -0.69807 0.25879 -2.69745 0.00738 
I24_VIC_LE -0.31026 0.41288 -0.75145 0.45297 
I60_MM_LE -0.26391 0.34669 -0.76125 0.44711 
I63_ED_LE -0.11098 0.15537 -0.71425 0.47563 
I66_BFI_LE -0.47509 0.70178 -0.67698 0.49894 
I67_ONIX_LE 1.55236 1.60093 0.96966 0.333 
I68_VELEO_LE -0.31284 0.21632 -1.44621 0.14917 
I69_CLIP_LE 0.16141 0.38618 0.41797 0.67627 
I71_TABU_LE 0.06582 0.27195 0.24202 0.80893 
I72_EVLE_LE 0.15944 0.29026 0.54932 0.5832 
12 
    
(Intercept) 14.93703 11.57393 1.29058 0.19788 
I12_size -1.36159 1.17015 -1.1636 0.24554 
I12_PBV -2.65353 0.44716 -5.93421 0 
I7_BM_LE -0.42446 0.1806 -2.35032 0.01943 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.06978 0.13361 -0.5223 0.60186 
I10_BCA_LE -0.00718 0.14473 -0.04962 0.96046 
I18_KENT_LE -0.0465 0.06992 -0.66511 0.50651 
I20_AGLE_LE -0.18788 0.10084 -1.86306 0.06347 
I23_BAG_LE -0.26743 0.12494 -2.14038 0.03316 
I25_PMB_LE -0.04574 0.10802 -0.42344 0.67229 
I26_SIO_LE -0.02883 0.11896 -0.24233 0.80869 
I27_PAN_LE -0.11674 0.06486 -1.7998 0.07293 
I31_OTIO_LE 0.02902 0.10247 0.28321 0.77722 
I32_NEG_LE 0.11473 0.1428 0.80343 0.42238 
I43_DE_LE 4.45118 2.30456 1.93147 0.0544 
263 
 
I44_SMM_LE 0.00474 0.10086 0.04698 0.96256 
I54_AD_LE -0.08862 0.0578 -1.53316 0.12633 
I61_LS_LE -0.01414 0.06115 -0.23122 0.81731 
I66_BFI_LE -0.47436 0.08112 -5.84729 0 
I68_VELEO_LE 0.29325 0.06622 4.4283 0.00001 
I69_CLIP_LE -0.04972 0.06342 -0.78393 0.43372 
I71_TABU_LE -0.31575 0.08237 -3.83345 0.00015 
13 
    
(Intercept) -1.5624 0.24781 -6.30478 0 
I7_BM_LE -0.27647 0.33302 -0.83018 0.40709 
I20_AGLE_LE -0.05493 0.38262 -0.14356 0.88595 
I23_BAG_LE -0.96794 0.28881 -3.35148 0.00091 
I24_VIC_LE -0.28425 0.29489 -0.96391 0.33586 
I49_MNC_LE -0.20978 0.07462 -2.8114 0.00525 
I50_TFI_LE -0.27402 0.23957 -1.14383 0.2536 
I66_BFI_LE -0.54707 0.19785 -2.76502 0.00604 
14 
    
(Intercept) 0.92019 0.71285 1.29086 0.19776 
I14_PBV -1.50833 0.5383 -2.80202 0.00541 
I14_DAM_log -0.09184 0.059 -1.55661 0.12063 
JCI_INDEX -0.01867 0.06944 -0.26882 0.78826 
I7_BM_LE -1.0111 0.2642 -3.827 0.00016 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.15106 0.34235 -0.44126 0.65935 
I10_BCA_LE 0.13736 0.30492 0.45048 0.6527 
I15_BII_LE -0.16859 0.16902 -0.99744 0.31936 
I25_PMB_LE -0.10974 0.2216 -0.4952 0.62082 
I29_PEMB_LE -0.44261 0.33724 -1.31244 0.19039 
I30_DIOLE_LE -0.41965 0.43607 -0.96234 0.33666 
I35_MITLE_LE 0.07702 0.15859 0.48567 0.62756 
I43_DE_LE 8.6193 4.37688 1.96928 0.04985 
I48_ATP_LE -0.25478 0.089 -2.86283 0.0045 
I77_SALEA_LE -1.14793 1.35124 -0.84953 0.39627 
15 
    
(Intercept) -0.81308 0.42122 -1.93033 0.05451 
I14_DAM_LE -0.02535 0.15872 -0.1597 0.87323 
I16_BCN_LE -0.49185 0.20471 -2.40273 0.01688 
I27_PAN_LE -0.17368 0.17617 -0.98587 0.32499 
I36_MAYA_LE -0.30652 0.12266 -2.49902 0.01299 
I43_DE_LE -13.7579 6.969 -1.97415 0.04928 
I57_WO_LE 0.08061 0.10145 0.79461 0.42747 
I58_PG_LE -0.12859 0.23318 -0.55147 0.58172 
264 
 
I63_ED_LE -0.10028 0.05788 -1.73266 0.08418 
I64_CI_LE 0.01936 0.0555 0.34889 0.72742 
I69_CLIP_LE -0.09519 0.25453 -0.37396 0.7087 
16 
    
(Intercept) 8.81018 27.62944 0.31887 0.75005 
I16_size -0.89596 2.67778 -0.33459 0.73817 
I7_BM_LE -0.22486 0.22469 -1.00074 0.31777 
I15_BII_LE -0.28954 0.14667 -1.97407 0.0493 
I17_PELE_LE -0.18078 0.1386 -1.30426 0.19316 
I22_TAB_LE -0.27728 0.19129 -1.44949 0.14826 
I24_VIC_LE -0.34471 0.25007 -1.37845 0.1691 
I25_PMB_LE -0.40036 0.20859 -1.91939 0.0559 
I26_SIO_LE -0.01855 0.27459 -0.06756 0.94618 
I27_PAN_LE -0.51216 0.15954 -3.21019 0.00147 
I32_NEG_LE 0.1405 0.1972 0.71248 0.47673 
I40_BHI_LE 0.20409 2.36949 0.08613 0.93142 
I45_NIC_LE -0.21793 0.08906 -2.44709 0.01498 
I57_WO_LE 0.03901 0.12386 0.31492 0.75305 
I69_CLIP_LE -0.03727 0.12165 -0.30637 0.75953 
I71_TABU_LE -0.04823 0.1867 -0.25835 0.79632 
18 
    
(Intercept) -5.72955 2.67836 -2.1392 0.03325 
I18_PBV 1.65299 2.05103 0.80593 0.42094 
I18_KENT_log -0.11281 0.20629 -0.54688 0.58488 
Indonesia_F_Index 0.35552 0.14762 2.40844 0.01664 
I4_PTB_LE 1.11853 1.49659 0.74738 0.45543 
I8_BLEI_LE -1.16506 0.53988 -2.15798 0.03174 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.71233 0.68363 -1.04198 0.29828 
I13_WOO_LE 0.48884 0.33546 1.45724 0.14612 
I17_PELE_LE -1.61405 0.69205 -2.33229 0.02036 
I20_AGLE_LE 0.41566 0.83148 0.49991 0.61752 
I21_EKON_LE -0.2451 0.32074 -0.76416 0.44538 
I23_BAG_LE -0.50346 0.55924 -0.90025 0.36872 
I27_PAN_LE -0.71128 0.59322 -1.19901 0.23149 
I37_PANI_LE 3.49599 1.57723 2.21654 0.02742 
I46_PI_LE 0.37252 0.44938 0.82898 0.40779 
I52_TS_LE 0.96019 0.46211 2.07786 0.03859 
I53_PTP_LE 0.2507 0.52954 0.47344 0.63625 
I61_LS_LE 0.14956 0.30186 0.49546 0.62065 
I64_CI_LE 0.06828 0.127 0.53765 0.59123 
19 
    
265 
 
(Intercept) -1.52799 0.38577 -3.96089 0.00009 
I11_BUMI_LE -0.20711 0.2264 -0.9148 0.36102 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.34846 0.18429 -1.89084 0.05959 
I32_NEG_LE -0.19083 0.17625 -1.08275 0.27977 
I40_BHI_LE 0.39539 2.31143 0.17106 0.86429 
I53_PTP_LE -0.74183 0.64546 -1.1493 0.25133 
I71_TABU_LE -0.16317 0.14692 -1.1106 0.26761 
20 
    
(Intercept) -4.01172 0.98591 -4.06905 0.00006 
I56_YS_LE 0.25327 0.09658 2.62243 0.00916 
22 
    
(Intercept) 11.88238 11.87987 1.00021 0.31804 
I22_size -1.13332 0.98975 -1.14506 0.25313 
I22_LEV -0.46302 0.34735 -1.33298 0.18359 
I22_PBV -0.38712 0.27502 -1.40763 0.16032 
JCI_VOL 0.08011 0.03319 2.41371 0.01641 
I5_BMI_LE 0.85589 0.71133 1.20322 0.22987 
I6_BQI_LE -0.18185 0.04085 -4.45149 0.00001 
I7_BM_LE -0.78972 0.13514 -5.84362 0 
I8_BLEI_LE 0.72393 0.10266 7.05185 0 
I10_BCA_LE -0.44676 0.1681 -2.65773 0.0083 
I11_BUMI_LE 0.25148 0.05441 4.62204 0.00001 
I14_DAM_LE -0.11081 0.1314 -0.84328 0.39977 
I15_BII_LE -0.28718 0.08399 -3.41923 0.00072 
I23_BAG_LE -0.09131 0.11418 -0.79971 0.42453 
I32_NEG_LE 0.01231 0.1323 0.09308 0.92591 
I45_NIC_LE 0.11318 0.04408 2.56773 0.01074 
I46_PI_LE 0.10298 0.04014 2.56577 0.0108 
I48_ATP_LE 0.03388 0.03534 0.95865 0.33854 
I64_CI_LE 0.03573 0.10788 0.33125 0.7407 
I66_BFI_LE 0.03905 0.07139 0.54691 0.58486 
I68_VELEO_LE -0.18598 0.04584 -4.0569 0.00006 
I69_CLIP_LE -0.03447 0.10782 -0.31966 0.74946 
I74_TIFA_LE -0.14893 0.03364 -4.42745 0.00001 
23 
    
(Intercept) -1.12618 0.45605 -2.46945 0.01408 
I3_BP_LE -0.45251 0.19036 -2.3771 0.01807 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.06463 0.29163 -0.22161 0.82476 
I11_BUMI_LE -0.41576 0.26964 -1.54192 0.12413 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.11099 0.28528 -0.38906 0.6975 
I13_WOO_LE -0.22293 0.14037 -1.58821 0.11328 
266 
 
I67_ONIX_LE -0.79026 1.48513 -0.53211 0.59504 
I68_VELEO_LE 0.08664 0.14298 0.60594 0.54501 
24 
    
(Intercept) -0.95183 0.26095 -3.64749 0.00031 
I24_VIC_log -0.28312 0.1029 -2.75149 0.00629 
I10_BCA_LE -0.7464 0.14524 -5.13924 0 
I11_BUMI_LE -0.04484 0.06439 -0.69643 0.4867 
I13_WOO_LE -0.08073 0.09528 -0.84727 0.39752 
I16_BCN_LE -0.11406 0.21546 -0.5294 0.59692 
I53_PTP_LE -0.20763 0.09573 -2.16879 0.03088 
I66_BFI_LE 0.03498 0.1186 0.29491 0.76827 
I67_ONIX_LE -2.39052 0.38843 -6.15434 0 
I71_TABU_LE -0.04671 0.13433 -0.34772 0.72829 
26 
    
(Intercept) -0.85294 0.24154 -3.53118 0.00048 
I26_SIO_log -0.20312 0.16009 -1.26877 0.20551 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.34443 0.10094 -3.41224 0.00073 
I13_WOO_LE -0.17884 0.09969 -1.79392 0.07384 
I16_BCN_LE -0.1507 0.09582 -1.57274 0.11684 
I30_DIOLE_LE -0.68333 0.34861 -1.96018 0.05091 
I33_MEST_LE 0.65674 0.33273 1.9738 0.04933 
I53_PTP_LE -0.23344 0.10532 -2.21643 0.02742 
I57_WO_LE 0.03698 0.07957 0.46478 0.64243 
I65_BF_LE 0.0805 0.09444 0.8524 0.39468 
I66_BFI_LE -0.05416 0.14282 -0.37923 0.70479 
I69_CLIP_LE -0.23518 0.1043 -2.25478 0.02487 
I70_BATP_LE -0.45578 0.23231 -1.96197 0.0507 
I73_LEB_LE -0.22734 0.26129 -0.87006 0.38497 
27 
    
(Intercept) -1.53428 0.31836 -4.81935 0 
I12_BUKO_LE 0.0289 0.30348 0.09523 0.9242 
I15_BII_LE -0.32191 0.3214 -1.00156 0.31741 
I16_BCN_LE 0.13927 0.28501 0.48863 0.62548 
I18_KENT_LE -0.07448 0.16817 -0.44287 0.6582 
I23_BAG_LE -0.11363 0.40166 -0.2829 0.77746 
I24_VIC_LE 0.00523 0.24303 0.02154 0.98283 
I25_PMB_LE 0.04968 0.24802 0.20031 0.84138 
I26_SIO_LE -0.15731 0.34225 -0.45962 0.64614 
I28_PELED_LE 0.18347 0.32895 0.55773 0.57747 
I29_PEMB_LE -0.52396 0.31561 -1.66014 0.09799 
I31_OTIO_LE 0.07948 0.22694 0.35023 0.72642 
267 
 
I43_DE_LE 0.64644 3.50448 0.18446 0.85378 
I45_NIC_LE -0.01528 0.1222 -0.12508 0.90055 
I47_KG_LE 0.06148 0.69583 0.08835 0.92966 
I49_MNC_LE 0.0522 0.10556 0.49454 0.62131 
I50_TFI_LE 0.13257 0.23828 0.55636 0.5784 
I52_TS_LE 0.00564 0.2355 0.02397 0.9809 
I53_PTP_LE -0.57735 0.17905 -3.22457 0.00141 
I57_WO_LE -0.00616 0.14362 -0.04289 0.96582 
I61_LS_LE 0.04852 0.22604 0.21464 0.8302 
I65_BF_LE -0.09678 0.16466 -0.58776 0.55716 
I69_CLIP_LE -0.13274 0.36421 -0.36446 0.71578 
I70_BATP_LE -0.05125 0.40762 -0.12572 0.90004 
I71_TABU_LE -0.12891 0.20388 -0.63231 0.5277 
I72_EVLE_LE -0.04086 0.16953 -0.241 0.80973 
I73_LEB_LE 0.1348 0.5702 0.23642 0.81328 
28I74_TIFA_LE -0.06341 0.33085 -0.19166 0.84815 
28 
    
(Intercept) -1.06559 0.66972 -1.59111 0.11261 
I28_PERD_log -0.53901 0.40351 -1.3358 0.1826 
I65_BF_LE 0.07699 0.05626 1.36844 0.17217 
29 
    
(Intercept) -0.57559 0.25921 -2.22059 0.02712 
I29_PEMB_log 0.14612 0.1435 1.01823 0.30939 
I3_BP_LE -0.32808 0.10569 -3.10408 0.00209 
I8_BLEI_LE 0.19617 0.2011 0.97548 0.33011 
I14_DAM_LE -0.0743 0.17204 -0.43188 0.66614 
I17_PELE_LE -0.45854 0.25946 -1.76726 0.0782 
I25_PMB_LE -0.28885 0.30217 -0.95592 0.33988 
I32_NEG_LE -0.38526 0.23337 -1.65089 0.0998 
I40_BHI_LE 0.22475 1.27554 0.1762 0.86026 
I52_TS_LE -0.06859 0.06597 -1.03971 0.29931 
I70_BATP_LE -0.29153 0.81158 -0.35921 0.71969 
32 
    
(Intercept) -1.36228 0.92915 -1.46616 0.14365 
I32_PBV 0.39453 0.5791 0.68129 0.49621 
I32_NEG_log -0.09737 0.07882 -1.23524 0.2177 
I7_BM_LE -0.38426 0.17032 -2.25611 0.02478 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.20161 0.27233 -0.74032 0.45968 
I10_BCA_LE -0.33354 0.60657 -0.54988 0.58281 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.09347 0.14521 -0.64369 0.52027 
I20_AGLE_LE -0.14361 0.21226 -0.67657 0.4992 
268 
 
I25_PMB_LE 0.02938 0.07523 0.39056 0.6964 
I29_PEMB_LE -0.18262 0.22191 -0.82295 0.41119 
I61_LS_LE -0.19298 0.11726 -1.6458 0.10085 
34 
    
(Intercept) -1.64326 0.63322 -2.59511 0.00991 
I34_MASP_log -0.61613 0.36084 -1.70748 0.08875 
JIIN3M_Index -0.28579 0.35832 -0.79757 0.42574 
I6_BQI_LE -0.11402 0.51158 -0.22288 0.82378 
I28_PELED_LE -1.7076 1.30503 -1.30847 0.1917 
I38_BAT_LE 0.05975 0.50811 0.11759 0.90647 
I56_YS_LE -0.30131 0.35929 -0.83864 0.40233 
I58_PG_LE 0.23474 0.49797 0.47138 0.6377 
35 
    
(Intercept) -0.00206 0.39616 -0.0052 0.99585 
I35_PBV -3.65856 0.47436 -7.71255 0 
I35_MITlog_log 0.37782 0.18519 2.04021 0.04223 
JCI_VOL 0.00007 0.0154 0.00446 0.99644 
I3_BP_LE -0.00006 0.05209 -0.00122 0.99903 
I4_PTB_LE 4.24495 1.83227 2.31677 0.02121 
I6_BQI_LE 0.04984 0.30343 0.16427 0.86963 
I7_BM_LE -0.00012 0.2211 -0.00052 0.99958 
I17_PELE_LE 0.00001 0.07872 0.00014 0.99988 
I19_CAP_LE 0.00004 0.02725 0.00157 0.99875 
I20_AGLE_LE -0.00005 0.09734 -0.00048 0.99962 
I21_EKON_LE 0.00001 0.05092 0.00018 0.99985 
I29_PEMB_LE 0.00012 0.50558 0.00024 0.99981 
I30_DIOLE_LE 0.04804 0.93674 0.05128 0.95914 
I39_BY_LE -1.23742 1.15191 -1.07424 0.28361 
I52_TS_LE 0.00004 0.03532 0.00104 0.99917 
I57_WO_LE 0.00005 0.05189 0.00096 0.99924 
I58_PG_LE -0.31758 0.06808 -4.66503 0 
I63_ED_LE 0.00003 0.04833 0.00053 0.99957 
I73_LEB_LE 0.00007 0.16249 0.00044 0.99965 
I74_TIFA_LE -0.10995 0.40378 -0.27231 0.78558 
36 
    
(Intercept) -1.95552 3.21864 -0.60756 0.54394 
I36_DE -0.11577 0.14086 -0.8219 0.41179 
I36_PBV -2.79139 1.0297 -2.71088 0.0071 
JCI_VOL 0.29506 0.14621 2.01806 0.04448 
I15_BII_LE -0.82549 0.74436 -1.10899 0.26833 
I17_PELE_LE -0.20544 0.62249 -0.33004 0.7416 
269 
 
I25_PMB_LE -0.54868 0.71755 -0.76465 0.44508 
I45_NIC_LE 0.36982 0.16538 2.2362 0.02608 
I51_PAC_LE 0.40965 0.53808 0.76133 0.44706 
I54_AD_LE 0.76846 0.67515 1.1382 0.25595 
I57_WO_LE -0.45018 0.58171 -0.77389 0.43961 
I66_BFI_LE -0.00537 0.52899 -0.01015 0.99191 
I71_TABU_LE -0.26949 0.51314 -0.52518 0.59985 
37 
    
(Intercept) 0 0.05364 0 1 
I37_PANI_log 0.09575 0.08211 1.1661 0.24448 
I5_BMI_LE -4.00075 0.51908 -7.70741 0 
I25_PMB_LE -0.1589 0.17412 -0.91258 0.36218 
I57_WO_LE 0 0.02242 0 1 
I61_LS_LE -0.0672 0.04973 -1.35113 0.17765 
45 Value Std. Error t 
(Intercept) 1.47221 3.46584 0.42478 0.6713 
I45_PBV -39.1339 19.64699 -1.99185 0.04727 
JIIN3M_Index -0.014 0.65704 -0.02131 0.98301 
I3_BP_LE -0.77961 0.551 -1.41491 0.15811 
I14_DAM_LE 0.08615 0.99994 0.08616 0.9314 
46 
    
(Intercept) -3.88227 1.06121 -3.65833 0.0003 
I46_PBV 0.33782 0.12466 2.71007 0.00711 
I9_PBM_LE -2.03522 0.11635 -17.4922 0 
I17_PELE_LE -0.32282 0.13751 -2.3477 0.01953 
I29_PEMB_LE -0.8893 2.32822 -0.38196 0.70275 
I60_MM_LE 0.00136 0.15898 0.00855 0.99319 
47 
    
(Intercept) -1.71146 0.82933 -2.06366 0.03995 
I47_KG_log 0.26427 0.18855 1.4016 0.16212 
JCI_VOL 0.06804 0.04339 1.56807 0.11797 
JCI_INDEX 0.03169 0.09784 0.32393 0.74623 
I6_BQI_LE 0.14235 0.52839 0.26941 0.78781 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.12057 0.34862 -0.34584 0.72972 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.10235 0.34781 -0.29427 0.76876 
I14_DAM_LE -0.04602 0.40595 -0.11336 0.90983 
I16_BCN_LE -0.17577 0.31635 -0.55562 0.57891 
I23_BAG_LE 0.03922 0.45552 0.0861 0.93145 
I24_VIC_LE 0.0712 0.31385 0.22684 0.82071 
I31_OTIO_LE -0.24663 0.25456 -0.96885 0.33344 
I35_MITLE_LE 0.20235 0.28102 0.72005 0.47208 
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I37_PANI_LE -0.13385 1.07153 -0.12491 0.90068 
I45_NIC_LE 0.06187 0.13041 0.47441 0.63557 
I46_PI_LE 0.05313 0.20698 0.25667 0.79762 
I58_PG_LE -0.96196 0.38321 -2.51028 0.01262 
I59_LES_LE 0.16856 0.30012 0.56165 0.57479 
I61_LS_LE 0.03939 0.17357 0.22695 0.82063 
I64_CI_LE -0.22748 0.08975 -2.5346 0.01179 
I65_BF_LE -0.01491 0.08806 -0.16928 0.8657 
I66_BFI_LE -0.05736 0.21808 -0.26302 0.79273 
I67_ONIX_LE -2.11783 2.49762 -0.84794 0.39718 
I68_VELEO_LE -0.24694 0.17902 -1.37943 0.16884 
I70_BATP_LE -0.5276 0.78736 -0.67009 0.50335 
I71_TABU_LE -0.14948 0.26642 -0.56106 0.5752 
I73_LEB_LE -0.71366 0.93957 -0.75957 0.44814 
49 
    
(Intercept) -4.47681 1.80893 -2.47483 0.01389 
I49_PBV 0.62601 0.76932 0.81373 0.41645 
I49_MNC_log -0.31599 0.13086 -2.41468 0.01635 
JCI_INDEX 0.2278 0.14617 1.55841 0.1202 
I8_BLEI_LE 0.50514 0.66236 0.76265 0.44628 
I9_PBM_LE -0.16086 0.32987 -0.48764 0.62616 
I10_BCA_LE -0.08707 0.9163 -0.09503 0.92436 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.02658 0.69038 -0.0385 0.96931 
I13_WOO_LE -1.19478 0.29602 -4.03619 0.00007 
I24_VIC_LE -0.55067 0.62772 -0.87725 0.38106 
I53_PTP_LE -1.24029 0.51702 -2.39892 0.01706 
I68_VELEO_LE -0.15308 0.22849 -0.67 0.50338 
I72_EVLE_LE -0.48046 0.35608 -1.3493 0.17827 
I73_LEB_LE 0.18998 0.84178 0.22568 0.8216 
50 
    
(Intercept) 4.75831 0.88318 5.3877 0 
I50_PBV -6.92339 1.0247 -6.75653 0 
I50_TFI_log 0.29462 0.16416 1.79476 0.07368 
I2_BON_LE 2.54192 0.93026 2.73248 0.00665 
I44_SMM_LE -0.28253 0.16751 -1.68664 0.0927 
I52_TS_LE 0.10603 0.09815 1.08028 0.28087 
I64_CI_LE 0.01331 0.02991 0.445 0.65663 
52 
    
(Intercept) 0.30888 1.20966 0.25535 0.79863 
I52_MM 5.14514 2.64879 1.94245 0.05303 
I52_PBV -3.23364 1.2817 -2.52294 0.01216 
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I52_TS_log -0.1544 0.16069 -0.9609 0.33739 
Indonesia_F_Index 0.14334 0.06497 2.20631 0.02813 
I6_BQI_LE -0.07036 0.15505 -0.45376 0.65033 
I7_BM_LE -0.21707 0.42919 -0.50577 0.6134 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.08328 0.38625 -0.2156 0.82945 
I13_WOO_LE 0.12199 0.25114 0.48575 0.6275 
I18_KENT_LE 0.42509 0.11896 3.57345 0.00041 
I19_CAP_LE -0.2092 0.26668 -0.78448 0.43339 
I21_EKON_LE 0.08406 0.12854 0.65395 0.51365 
I27_PAN_LE -0.31163 0.31502 -0.98925 0.32335 
I31_OTIO_LE 0.10578 0.46501 0.22747 0.82022 
I50_TFI_LE 0.13537 0.72618 0.18641 0.85225 
I63_ED_LE -0.21298 0.14497 -1.46914 0.14286 
53 
    
(Intercept) -0.26403 0.70664 -0.37363 0.70895 
I53_PBV -0.02428 0.27228 -0.08918 0.929 
I7_BM_LE 0.39643 0.31939 1.24122 0.21551 
I17_PELE_LE -0.64938 0.1108 -5.86097 0 
I20_AGLE_LE -0.20529 0.19266 -1.06556 0.28749 
I27_PAN_LE -0.54362 0.22747 -2.38988 0.01748 
I32_NEG_LE -0.41411 0.37231 -1.11226 0.26693 
I33_MEST_LE -0.30436 0.40264 -0.75592 0.4503 
I46_PI_LE 0.22324 0.52687 0.42372 0.67208 
I48_ATP_LE -0.19415 0.2198 -0.88329 0.3778 
I49_MNC_LE -0.11655 0.12526 -0.93049 0.35288 
I54_AD_LE -0.65263 0.51256 -1.27327 0.20392 
I57_WO_LE -0.26511 0.14638 -1.81113 0.07114 
I59_LES_LE 0.09927 0.42808 0.23189 0.81678 
I61_LS_LE -0.05773 0.1918 -0.30102 0.76361 
I67_ONIX_LE -0.65711 1.02895 -0.63862 0.52357 
I69_CLIP_LE -0.00931 0.12894 -0.07222 0.94247 
54 
    
(Intercept) -2.31701 1.13473 -2.04191 0.04203 
JCI_VOL 0.05832 0.05129 1.13719 0.25636 
I3_BP_LE 0.07282 0.10028 0.72614 0.46832 
I8_BLEI_LE 0.12697 0.18032 0.70417 0.48187 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.47263 0.51568 -0.91652 0.36013 
I34_MASP_LE -1.17433 0.28307 -4.14851 0.00004 
I53_PTP_LE -0.47333 0.24807 -1.90807 0.05733 
I59_LES_LE -0.67784 1.81829 -0.37279 0.70956 
I69_CLIP_LE -0.13287 0.11636 -1.14183 0.25443 
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I71_TABU_LE -0.46662 0.30111 -1.54967 0.12227 
I77_SALEA_LE 0.21074 0.27826 0.75733 0.44944 
56 
    
(Intercept) -0.77379 2.66847 -0.28998 0.77203 
I56_PBV -6.53988 5.53497 -1.18156 0.23831 
I56_YS_log -0.39303 0.2325 -1.69041 0.09198 
I11_BUMI_LE -0.67682 1.09 -0.62094 0.53511 
I27_PAN_LE -0.05497 0.5844 -0.09407 0.92512 
I48_ATP_LE -1.29947 0.54518 -2.38356 0.01776 
I50_TFI_LE -0.53034 0.88197 -0.60131 0.54808 
I63_ED_LE -0.14139 0.1753 -0.80655 0.42056 
I71_TABU_LE -1.23405 1.30184 -0.94793 0.34393 
I72_EVLE_LE 0.25918 0.40796 0.6353 0.52571 
57 
    
(Intercept) -6.04917 1.33818 -4.52043 0.00001 
I57_WO_log -0.36476 0.08892 -4.10235 0.00005 
JCI_VOL 0.2018 0.07125 2.83229 0.00494 
I5_BMI_LE -3.98926 1.40278 -2.84382 0.00477 
I12_BUKO_LE 0.08413 0.29248 0.28764 0.77382 
I16_BCN_LE -0.05632 0.25179 -0.22369 0.82315 
I25_PMB_LE 0.11575 0.16379 0.70672 0.4803 
I26_SIO_LE 0.25537 0.28508 0.8958 0.37108 
I32_NEG_LE 0.23422 0.1945 1.20422 0.22946 
I49_MNC_LE -0.01331 0.08215 -0.16206 0.87137 
I50_TFI_LE 0.23902 0.69623 0.34331 0.73161 
I53_PTP_LE -1.15548 0.24625 -4.69232 0 
I60_MM_LE -0.67742 0.20726 -3.2684 0.00121 
I67_ONIX_LE 0.10745 2.79963 0.03838 0.96941 
I71_TABU_LE -0.23149 0.1692 -1.36821 0.17228 
58 
    
(Intercept) -2.00105 0.26575 -7.52993 0 
I58_PG_log -0.35355 0.03771 -9.37599 0 
I47_KG_LE -0.48014 0.29111 -1.64937 0.10009 
59 
    
(Intercept) -1.46628 0.62744 -2.33693 0.02009 
I7_BM_LE -0.22563 0.45162 -0.4996 0.61772 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.14034 0.38617 -0.3634 0.71655 
I26_SIO_LE -0.15511 0.44817 -0.3461 0.7295 
I53_PTP_LE -0.27801 0.17853 -1.55723 0.12045 
I66_BFI_LE -0.05741 0.74207 -0.07737 0.93838 
61 
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(Intercept) -1.41653 0.57014 -2.48452 0.01351 
I15_BII_LE -1.48268 1.18789 -1.24816 0.21293 
I16_BCN_LE -1.06349 0.65098 -1.63367 0.10336 
I25_PMB_LE -0.5132 0.80617 -0.6366 0.52487 
I32_NEG_LE -0.24822 0.58847 -0.42181 0.67346 
I53_PTP_LE -0.50568 0.28456 -1.77703 0.07656 
I59_LES_LE -0.17305 0.58189 -0.2974 0.76637 
I69_CLIP_LE 0.11152 0.49151 0.22688 0.82067 
62 
    
(Intercept) 0 0.30917 0 1 
I62_LEV 0 0.26727 0 1 
I62_PAV_log 0.97078 0.00705 137.7462 0 
I4_PTB_LE 0 0.26209 0 1 
I13_WOO_LE 0 0.00067 0 1 
I21_EKON_LE 0 0.00078 0 1 
I25_PMB_LE 0 0.0005 0 1 
I60_MM_LE 0 0.00075 0 1 
63 
    
(Intercept) -0.68427 3.67776 -0.18606 0.85253 
I63_PBV -5.1265 5.12402 -1.00048 0.31788 
I63_ED_log -0.37083 0.15961 -2.32336 0.02083 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.08926 0.91084 -0.09799 0.922 
I14_DAM_LE -0.31403 0.80686 -0.3892 0.6974 
I28_PELED_LE 0.06851 0.49693 0.13786 0.89044 
I35_MITLE_LE -0.25607 0.39467 -0.64883 0.51695 
I44_SMM_LE -0.42413 0.6662 -0.63664 0.52484 
I51_PAC_LE 0.39742 0.43465 0.91434 0.36127 
I52_TS_LE -0.61302 1.50602 -0.40704 0.68427 
I66_BFI_LE -0.18331 0.5877 -0.31191 0.75533 
I78_VIC_LE -0.57939 0.86287 -0.67147 0.50244 
66 
    
(Intercept) -1.76799 0.70641 -2.50277 0.01286 
I2_BON_LE 1.35966 2.06023 0.65996 0.50979 
I11_BUMI_LE -0.11263 0.31317 -0.35964 0.71937 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.44897 0.52127 -0.8613 0.38977 
I13_WOO_LE -0.62808 0.21587 -2.90956 0.00389 
I22_TAB_LE -0.27457 0.38937 -0.70517 0.48126 
I24_VIC_LE 0.18624 0.32137 0.5795 0.56269 
I40_BHI_LE -0.04778 31.25915 -0.00153 0.99878 
I45_NIC_LE -0.08276 0.17147 -0.48267 0.62969 
I53_PTP_LE 0.03789 0.20791 0.18222 0.85553 
274 
 
I59_LES_LE 0.01449 0.28585 0.05068 0.95962 
I60_MM_LE -0.25584 0.26679 -0.95895 0.33836 
I67_ONIX_LE -0.23998 1.79032 -0.13404 0.89346 
I73_LEB_LE -0.17413 0.71905 -0.24216 0.80882 
67 
    
(Intercept) -0.39679 0.03804 -10.4314 0 
I67_ONIX_log 0.09922 0.17093 0.58046 0.56203 
JIIN3M_Index -0.01124 0.01722 -0.65261 0.51449 
I43_DE_LE -0.492 2.69974 -0.18224 0.85551 
I78_VIC_LE -0.00707 0.00735 -0.96298 0.33632 
68 
    
(Intercept) 1.66258 1.39174 1.1946 0.23318 
I68_VERO_log -0.3248 0.08443 -3.84714 0.00015 
INDON_CDS_5Y -2.24862 0.6657 -3.3778 0.00083 
I16_BCN_LE 0.13938 0.33446 0.41672 0.67718 
I20_AGLE_LE -0.57824 0.36858 -1.56886 0.11773 
I21_EKON_LE 0.13777 0.20383 0.67589 0.49963 
I23_BAG_LE -1.0096 0.73492 -1.37375 0.17054 
I34_MASP_LE -0.1838 0.86319 -0.21293 0.83152 
I40_BHI_LE 0.2508 11.32219 0.02215 0.98234 
I66_BFI_LE 0.03936 0.1429 0.27543 0.78318 
I70_BATP_LE -0.73241 0.21412 -3.42053 0.00071 
69 
    
(Intercept) -0.20977 0.44132 -0.47534 0.6349 
I69_MM -5.41878 3.26706 -1.65861 0.09825 
I11_BUMI_LE -0.46377 0.22262 -2.08319 0.03809 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.33034 0.39714 -0.83179 0.40619 
I15_BII_LE -0.03854 0.5136 -0.07504 0.94023 
I16_BCN_LE -0.15254 0.44582 -0.34216 0.73247 
I25_PMB_LE 0.04213 0.2665 0.1581 0.87448 
I26_SIO_LE -0.59158 0.3808 -1.55351 0.12136 
I27_PAN_LE -0.33155 0.41458 -0.79972 0.42451 
I43_DE_LE 1.99356 9.52517 0.20929 0.83436 
I54_AD_LE -0.48644 0.30958 -1.57127 0.11718 
I61_LS_LE -0.18372 0.12552 -1.46367 0.14434 
I64_CI_LE 0.04429 0.10045 0.4409 0.6596 
I67_ONIX_LE 1.01783 1.36544 0.74542 0.45661 
70 
    
(Intercept) -1.50793 0.6261 -2.40845 0.0166 
I13_WOO_LE -0.18324 0.64146 -0.28566 0.77533 
71 
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(Intercept) -1.48538 0.27508 -5.3998 0 
I7_BM_LE -0.90336 0.28785 -3.13828 0.00187 
I8_BLEI_LE -0.19013 0.22465 -0.84633 0.39803 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.0569 0.21762 -0.26147 0.79391 
I16_BCN_LE -0.31057 0.15153 -2.04951 0.04127 
I20_AGLE_LE -0.13728 0.22332 -0.61471 0.53921 
I25_PMB_LE -0.47822 0.34139 -1.40079 0.1623 
I45_NIC_LE 0.04357 0.21124 0.20624 0.83674 
I56_YS_LE -0.08137 0.07643 -1.06467 0.28787 
73 
    
(Intercept) -1.85579 0.28542 -6.502 0 
I73_logB_log -0.23082 0.0997 -2.31508 0.02126 
77 
    
(Intercept) 0.61341 0.3343 1.83491 0.06755 
I77_MM -2.00602 0.24461 -8.20084 0 
I77_SARA_log 0.52327 0.19755 2.64872 0.00852 
INDON_CDS_5Y -0.10663 0.20423 -0.52208 0.60202 
JCI_VOL -0.0255 0.01585 -1.60889 0.10873 
Indonesia_F_Index 0.0291 0.01291 2.25443 0.02492 
I4_PTB_LE 2.5492 0.60254 4.23078 0.00003 
I6_BQI_LE 0.00183 0.06317 0.02901 0.97688 
I9_PBM_LE 0.04103 0.0855 0.47991 0.63166 
I12_BUKO_LE -0.0418 0.07492 -0.55796 0.5773 
I14_DAM_LE -0.32717 0.13047 -2.50769 0.0127 
I16_BCN_LE -0.11139 0.06927 -1.60796 0.10894 
I23_BAG_LE 0.00806 0.05854 0.13773 0.89055 
I25_PMB_LE 0.01092 0.05211 0.20949 0.83421 
I27_PAN_LE -0.00164 0.0536 -0.03062 0.97559 
I44_SMM_LE 0.02383 0.06019 0.39592 0.69246 
I45_NIC_LE -0.03295 0.02108 -1.56332 0.11907 
I52_TS_LE 0.06235 0.05185 1.2025 0.23016 
I54_AD_LE -0.11281 0.04279 -2.63602 0.00884 
I55_HD_LE -1.0557 0.44476 -2.37361 0.01827 
I64_CI_LE -0.01272 0.02098 -0.60656 0.54462 
I73_LEB_LE -0.08032 0.06838 -1.17465 0.2411 
I78_VIC_LE -0.22271 0.1422 -1.56623 0.11839 
78 
    
(Intercept) -0.00068 0.00124 -0.54963 0.583 
I78_PBV -4.38248 0.14137 -31.0001 0 
I78_VIC_log -0.64147 0.05463 -11.7412 0 
JIIN3M_Index -0.00017 0.00087 -0.19851 0.84279 
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I4_PTB_LE -0.99725 0.5255 -1.89771 0.05875 
I6_BQI_LE 0.07289 0.04128 1.76559 0.07854 
I13_WOO_LE -0.00002 0.00053 -0.03926 0.96871 
I21_EKON_LE -0.00001 0.00152 -0.00813 0.99352 
I23_BAG_LE 0.00013 0.00093 0.14411 0.88552 
I25_PMB_LE -0.00008 0.002 -0.0408 0.96748 
I27_PAN_LE 0.00008 0.00153 0.04958 0.9605 
I28_PELED_LE -0.04469 0.07855 -0.56894 0.56985 
I29_PEMB_LE -0.00012 0.0103 -0.01195 0.99047 
I30_DIOLE_LE 0.39876 0.10644 3.74636 0.00022 
I32_NEG_LE -0.00007 0.00242 -0.02712 0.97838 
I33_MEST_LE 1.06978 0.29531 3.62257 0.00035 
I35_MITLE_LE 0.02949 0.061 0.48347 0.62913 
I36_MAYA_LE 0.00004 0.00039 0.10394 0.91729 
I37_PANI_LE -0.34785 0.52462 -0.66305 0.50784 
I40_BHI_LE -0.08083 0.01037 -7.795 0 
I55_HD_LE 0.66365 0.42923 1.54617 0.12318 
I56_YS_LE -0.00013 0.00701 -0.01889 0.98494 
I59_LES_LE 0.00015 0.00627 0.02432 0.98061 
I60_MM_LE -0.00006 0.00222 -0.02759 0.97801 
I63_ED_LE -0.00012 0.03964 -0.00298 0.99762 
I68_VELEO_LE -0.00007 0.00226 -0.03156 0.97485 
I70_BATP_LE -0.00023 0.00153 -0.14838 0.88215 
I74_TIFA_LE 0.0253 0.05024 0.50363 0.61492 




Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
1     
(Intercept) -3.39322 2.82179 -1.20251 0.23014 
D1_DE -0.01 0.03555 -0.28132 0.77866 
D1_MM 2.30916 37.10195 0.06224 0.95042 
D1_DIB_log -0.34547 0.18721 -1.84541 0.06599 
oil -0.07628 0.06716 -1.13581 0.25696 
Dubai_Banks_Index 0.2379 0.12523 1.89966 0.05846 
USDAED_VOL 4.91714 5.15366 0.95411 0.34082 
D4_MB_LE 0.84183 0.80883 1.0408 0.29883 
D5_NBD_LE -0.17095 0.38817 -0.44039 0.65998 
D8_DI_LE -0.08189 0.49546 -0.16529 0.86883 
D9_SHC_LE -0.01499 0.19091 -0.07849 0.93749 
D11_DF_LE -0.18238 0.44153 -0.41305 0.67987 
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D12_GGI_LE -0.01275 0.18518 -0.06885 0.94516 
D14_IAI_LE -0.26127 0.3253 -0.80319 0.42252 
D17_DOI_LE 0.08103 0.28016 0.28923 0.77261 
D19_OIC_LE -0.1017 0.20256 -0.50208 0.61599 
D22_DI_LE -0.06269 0.29352 -0.21359 0.83102 
D24_TE_LE 0.08157 0.20025 0.40734 0.68406 
D25_DALE_LE 0.12547 0.17213 0.72894 0.46662 
2 
    
(Intercept) -1.8814 5.45316 -0.34501 0.73033 
D2_CB_log -0.25827 0.2248 -1.14891 0.25151 
oil 0.10668 0.1428 0.74706 0.45561 
Dubai_Banks_Index 0.1841 0.0792 2.32449 0.02077 
UAE_Interest_rate_swap -0.57722 1.38813 -0.41583 0.67783 
ABUD_CDS 1.72405 1.12048 1.53867 0.12494 
D5_NBD_LE 0.12318 0.28144 0.43767 0.66194 
D11_DF_LE -0.02253 0.27513 -0.08188 0.9348 
D14_IAI_LE -0.2359 0.31752 -0.74294 0.4581 
D16_DIC_LE 0.44367 0.58059 0.76416 0.44537 
D18_OG_LE 0.22216 0.10363 2.14381 0.03285 
D23_OI_LE -18537.7 81869.5 -0.22643 0.82102 
4 
    
(Intercept) 0.31066 40.17839 0.00773 0.99384 
D4_size -0.05116 6.37784 -0.00802 0.99361 
D4_LEV 0.00446 2.57869 0.00173 0.99862 
D4_DE 0.00019 0.26468 0.0007 0.99944 
D4_MM -0.05848 70.26634 -0.00083 0.99934 
D4_PBV 0.01782 0.2062 0.08643 0.93119 
D4_MB_log 0.99832 0.50398 1.98088 0.04859 
oil 0 0.00106 -0.00018 0.99985 
Dubai_Banks_Index 0.00002 0.00238 0.00961 0.99234 
Budget_Balance_GDP 0.00085 0.15497 0.00549 0.99562 
DFMGI_Index -0.00002 0.00185 -0.0107 0.99147 
UAE_Interest_rate_swap -0.00017 0.0195 -0.00896 0.99286 
USDAED_VOL -0.00007 0.10117 -0.0007 0.99944 
ABUD_CDS 0.00012 0.04649 0.00261 0.99792 
D1_DIB_LE 0.00002 0.00493 0.00507 0.99596 
D2_CB_LE 0.00001 0.0065 0.00179 0.99857 
D5_NBD_LE -0.00001 0.00468 -0.00271 0.99784 
D6_AJ_LE -0.00001 0.00461 -0.00147 0.99883 
D8_DI_LE 0.00005 0.00594 0.00774 0.99383 
D9_SHC_LE 0.00002 0.00334 0.00526 0.99581 
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D10_EMI_LE 0.09234 7.19627 0.01283 0.98977 
D11_DF_LE -0.00004 0.00567 -0.00639 0.99491 
D12_GGI_LE 0.00002 0.00281 0.0067 0.99466 
D14_IAI_LE 0 0.00465 0.00004 0.99997 
D15_ALL_LE 9.18653 2730.865 0.00336 0.99732 
D16_DIC_LE 0.00002 0.01008 0.00183 0.99854 
D17_DOI_LE -0.00001 0.00388 -0.00205 0.99837 
D18_OG_LE -0.00001 0.00197 -0.00327 0.9974 
D19_OIC_LE 0.00001 0.00585 0.00184 0.99853 
D20_ALEABS_LE 0 0.00533 0.00047 0.99962 
D22_DI_LE -0.00005 0.00468 -0.01051 0.99162 
D23_OI_LE -111.327 7647.314 -0.01456 0.9884 
D24_TE_LE 0 0.00279 -0.00076 0.99939 
D25_DALE_LE -0.00001 0.0029 -0.002 0.99841 
6 
    
(Intercept) -1.97279 0.63702 -3.09691 0.00214 
D6_AJ_log -0.32711 0.06316 -5.17903 0 
UAE_Interest_rate_swap 0.26186 0.19575 1.33771 0.18201 
D1_DIB_LE 0.02048 0.33377 0.06137 0.9511 
D4_MB_LE 1.74009 0.66787 2.60545 0.00963 
D8_DI_LE -0.00506 0.17197 -0.02941 0.97656 
D9_SHC_LE -0.0847 0.17075 -0.49607 0.62021 
D11_DF_LE -0.27553 0.18614 -1.4802 0.13987 
D12_GGI_LE 0.06849 0.14295 0.47912 0.6322 
D19_OIC_LE -0.0583 0.107 -0.54485 0.58626 
D22_DI_LE -0.15826 0.18368 -0.86161 0.38959 
D24_TE_LE -0.06564 0.10553 -0.62199 0.53442 
D25_DALE_LE -0.21259 0.10837 -1.96175 0.05072 
8 
    
(Intercept) 5.72224 6.91551 0.82745 0.40868 
D8_DE -0.0989 0.23969 -0.4126 0.68021 
D8_MM -7.78387 11.81467 -0.65883 0.51054 
D8_PBV -0.43131 0.74164 -0.58156 0.56133 
D8_DI_log -0.0669 0.06271 -1.06672 0.28701 
oil 0.035 0.05295 0.66095 0.50919 
Dubai_Banks_Index -0.2382 0.12538 -1.89976 0.05849 
Dubai_RE_Index -0.22621 0.14399 -1.57104 0.1173 
Budget_Balance_GDP -0.0144 0.20616 -0.06984 0.94437 
DFMGI_Index 0.47877 0.27329 1.75186 0.08089 
UAE_Interest_rate_swap -0.97353 0.6313 -1.54211 0.12417 
USDAED_VOL 2.95291 2.13887 1.38059 0.1685 
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ABUD_CDS -0.31198 1.46708 -0.21265 0.83175 
D1_DIB_LE -0.48574 0.19969 -2.43253 0.01562 
D2_CB_LE 0.38718 0.25781 1.50181 0.13427 
D4_MB_LE -2.01441 0.94088 -2.14098 0.03314 
D5_NBD_LE 0.0137 0.19705 0.06954 0.94461 
D6_AJ_LE 0.34597 0.17972 1.92507 0.05523 
D9_SHC_LE 0.09238 0.07625 1.21158 0.22669 
D11_DF_LE -0.99636 0.18164 -5.48547 0 
D14_IAI_LE -0.04849 0.18639 -0.26015 0.79494 
D15_ALL_LE 47078.32 39195.65 1.20111 0.23072 
D16_DIC_LE 0.08523 0.43264 0.197 0.84397 
D17_DOI_LE -0.11281 0.1263 -0.89317 0.37253 
D18_OG_LE 0.04978 0.06667 0.74678 0.45582 
D19_OIC_LE -0.2992 0.10558 -2.8338 0.00493 
D20_ALEABS_LE -0.05882 0.65891 -0.08926 0.92894 
D22_DI_LE -0.15183 0.18871 -0.80458 0.42174 
D23_OI_LE -10038.5 43754.96 -0.22942 0.81871 
D24_TE_LE -0.08455 0.09367 -0.90265 0.36748 
D25_DALE_LE 0.13947 0.097 1.43784 0.15159 
9 
    
(Intercept) 235.7101 423.8461 0.55612 0.57857 
D9_size -43.7782 68.67458 -0.63747 0.52434 
D9_LEV 25.92447 14.23643 1.821 0.06968 
D9_MM -4.58484 10.44472 -0.43896 0.66103 
D9_PBV -0.16699 1.45424 -0.11483 0.90866 
D9_SHC_log -0.21478 0.06998 -3.06904 0.00236 
oil 0.0333 0.08865 0.37564 0.70747 
Dubai_Banks_Index -0.22169 0.19688 -1.12606 0.26111 
Dubai_RE_Index -0.12316 0.22075 -0.55789 0.57737 
Budget_Balance_GDP -0.68944 0.82689 -0.83378 0.40512 
DFMGI_Index 0.4856 0.43224 1.12346 0.26221 
UAE_Interest_rate_swap -0.25573 1.23898 -0.2064 0.83663 
USDAED_VOL 6.15839 5.6752 1.08514 0.2788 
ABUD_CDS -4.56782 2.83436 -1.61159 0.10819 
D1_DIB_LE -0.12783 0.28804 -0.44378 0.65755 
D2_CB_LE -0.11956 0.21616 -0.5531 0.58064 
D4_MB_LE -23.1848 7.31651 -3.16883 0.0017 
D5_NBD_LE -0.58649 0.22017 -2.66385 0.00818 
D6_AJ_LE -0.01694 0.33011 -0.05133 0.9591 
D8_DI_LE -0.30496 0.25195 -1.21037 0.22716 
D10_EMI_LE -172.076 58.33805 -2.94963 0.00345 
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D11_DF_LE -0.00374 0.19468 -0.01923 0.98467 
D12_GGI_LE -0.15754 0.1166 -1.35107 0.17777 
D14_IAI_LE 0.02258 0.205 0.11013 0.91239 
D15_ALL_LE 27224.13 53970.46 0.50443 0.61436 
D16_DIC_LE 0.23158 0.51662 0.44826 0.65431 
D17_DOI_LE 0.14839 0.15282 0.97103 0.33238 
D18_OG_LE 0.06937 0.32329 0.21456 0.83027 
D19_OIC_LE -0.16165 0.15513 -1.04201 0.29831 
D20_ALEABS_LE 0.12094 1.10937 0.10902 0.91326 
D22_DI_LE -0.21858 0.14084 -1.55195 0.12181 
D23_OI_LE 407107.9 83804.36 4.85784 0 
D24_TE_LE -0.13383 0.11894 -1.12523 0.26146 
D25_DALE_LE -0.01061 0.13064 -0.0812 0.93534 
10 
    
(Intercept) 0.00063 0.06185 0.01021 0.99186 
D10_LEV -0.00013 0.01113 -0.01147 0.99086 
D10_DE 0.00002 0.0007 0.02206 0.98241 
D10_MM -0.00259 0.12983 -0.01992 0.98412 
D10_EMI_log 0.99942 0.35125 2.84534 0.00474 
D4_MB_LE 0.00013 0.09098 0.00138 0.9989 
11 
    
(Intercept) -430.903 175.1578 -2.46008 0.01446 
D11_size 73.53414 30.06555 2.44579 0.01503 
D11_LEV -73.2028 34.49173 -2.12233 0.03463 
D11_DF_log -0.18357 0.07889 -2.32703 0.02063 
DFMGI_Index 0.09894 0.04946 2.00061 0.04634 
D1_DIB_LE -0.54297 0.33412 -1.62509 0.1052 
D6_AJ_LE -0.12839 0.24646 -0.52093 0.6028 
D8_DI_LE -0.66491 0.23878 -2.78465 0.0057 
D9_SHC_LE -0.13916 0.16404 -0.84833 0.39694 
D12_GGI_LE -0.24422 0.13494 -1.80986 0.07133 
D14_IAI_LE -0.28998 0.10493 -2.76359 0.00607 
D20_ALEABS_LE 0.31709 1.67764 0.18901 0.85022 
D23_OI_LE -14134.8 17741.52 -0.79671 0.42626 
D25_DALE_LE -0.10335 0.09885 -1.04549 0.29665 
12 
    
(Intercept) -5.77221 2.73063 -2.11388 0.03536 
D12_PBV -1.17587 0.50054 -2.34924 0.01947 
D12_GGI_log -0.13004 0.13267 -0.98016 0.32781 
DFMGI_Index 0.11715 0.14589 0.80304 0.42259 
USDAED_VOL 6.01697 7.06449 0.85172 0.39506 
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D5_NBD_LE -0.11553 0.476 -0.24271 0.8084 
D6_AJ_LE -0.26254 0.37317 -0.70353 0.48228 
D8_DI_LE 0.1753 0.42438 0.41307 0.67986 
D9_SHC_LE -0.34406 0.6447 -0.53367 0.59397 
D11_DF_LE -0.46704 0.62426 -0.74814 0.45497 
D16_DIC_LE 0.36612 3.19187 0.1147 0.90876 
D18_OG_LE 0.29984 0.7011 0.42767 0.6692 
D20_ALEABS_LE 0.09557 3.50042 0.0273 0.97824 
D22_DI_LE -0.10107 0.38414 -0.26311 0.79265 
D23_OI_LE 44859.44 31534.61 1.42255 0.15592 
D24_TE_LE -0.10569 0.24202 -0.43669 0.66266 
15 
    
(Intercept) -5.31283 0.9557 -5.55908 0 
D15_ALL_log -58323 30848.71 -1.89061 0.05961 
Budget_Balance_GDP 0.20092 0.16029 1.25345 0.21099 
D19_OIC_LE -0.03333 0.25091 -0.13285 0.8944 
23 
    
(Intercept) -1.17509 64.38655 -0.01825 0.98545 
D23_size -0.31853 10.80318 -0.02949 0.9765 
D23_OI_log 37049.34 72968.51 0.50774 0.61199 
24 
    
(Intercept) -0.00002 0 -23.22 0 
D24_DE 0 0 -2.35868 0.01898 
D24_PBV 0 0 1.82848 0.06847 
Budget_Balance_GDP 0 0 -46.3605 0 
D6_AJ_LE 0 0 -0.73556 0.46257 
D10_EMI_LE -0.00002 0 -7.55065 0 
D12_GGI_LE 0 0 0.88055 0.37927 
D14_IAI_LE 0 0 0.23614 0.81348 
D18_OG_LE 0 0 0.01543 0.9877 
D19_OIC_LE 0 0 0.09324 0.92578 
D22_DI_LE 0 0 -0.64674 0.51829 







Value Std.Error t-ratio p-value 
M5_AMM     
282 
 
(Intercept) -0.70559 0.16944 -4.16422 0.00004 
M5_AMM_log 0.07549 0.05978 1.26279 0.20766 
Budget_Balance_GDP -0.51795 0.82973 -0.62424 0.53295 
FTFBMPM 0.13783 0.04133 3.33475 0.00096 
M3_BIMB_LE 0.20729 0.06585 3.14801 0.00181 
M4_HLF_LE -0.52009 0.13951 -3.72795 0.00023 
M6_CIM_LE -0.28436 0.13707 -2.07465 0.03888 
M7_MAL_LE -0.33829 0.21956 -1.54076 0.12444 
M8_PUB_LE 0.13212 0.23698 0.5575 0.5776 
M9_RHB_LE -0.60859 0.07172 -8.48615 0 
M10_ALL_LE -0.03241 0.15642 -0.2072 0.836 
M13_BUR_LE -0.11684 0.12072 -0.96782 0.33392 
M20_MB_LE -0.01089 0.06749 -0.16132 0.87195 
M22_HWA_LE 0.15183 0.13231 1.14749 0.25211 
M31_TIH_LE -0.20113 0.11427 -1.76016 0.07941 
M6_CIM 
    
(Intercept) -0.84601 1.52253 -0.55566 0.57887 
M6_CIM_log -0.05889 0.11893 -0.49514 0.62088 
FBMKLCI_Index 0.00003 0.00089 0.03926 0.96871 
FTFBMPM -0.09562 0.12749 -0.74999 0.45387 
M2_AFF_LE -0.60528 0.24157 -2.50564 0.01277 
M3_BIMB_LE 0.06468 0.20776 0.3113 0.7558 
M4_HLF_LE -0.00247 0.35096 -0.00704 0.99439 
M5_AMM_LE -0.29032 0.31194 -0.93067 0.35279 
M7_MAL_LE 0.02249 0.33544 0.06706 0.94658 
M8_PUB_LE -0.01579 0.3272 -0.04825 0.96155 
M9_RHB_LE -0.34042 0.14442 -2.35708 0.01908 
M11_RCE_LE -0.07655 0.21984 -0.34821 0.72793 
M12_OSK_LE 0.12173 0.12524 0.97199 0.33186 
M13_BUR_LE -0.38251 0.33956 -1.1265 0.26088 
M14_APEX_LE -0.44602 0.17537 -2.54324 0.0115 
M19_ACS_LE 0.23198 0.17713 1.30966 0.19134 
M22_HWA_LE -0.08916 0.25997 -0.34296 0.73187 
M29_AM_LE 0.00031 0.21203 0.00146 0.99883 
M31_TIH_LE -0.22943 0.22162 -1.03524 0.30141 
M33_SYA_LE -0.11936 0.18296 -0.65234 0.5147 
M9_RHB 
    
(Intercept) -0.52149 0.1311 -3.97765 0.00009 
FTFBMPM 0.07813 0.05457 1.43173 0.15326 
M4_HLF_LE 0.01843 0.13414 0.13739 0.89081 
M5_AMM_LE -0.14473 0.08035 -1.80119 0.07267 
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M6_CIM_LE -0.28017 0.31459 -0.89059 0.37386 
M7_MAL_LE 0.03836 0.26127 0.14681 0.88338 
M10_ALL_LE -0.3358 0.13332 -2.51883 0.01229 
M11_RCE_LE -0.01325 0.19262 -0.0688 0.94519 
M29_AM_LE 0.15589 0.12672 1.23023 0.21957 
M10_ALL 
    
(Intercept) -0.48164 1.23405 -0.39029 0.69661 
M10_ALL_MM 1.21098 11.28962 0.10726 0.91465 
M10_ALL_PBV -0.21931 0.60453 -0.36278 0.71703 
M10_ALL_log -0.14003 0.08473 -1.6526 0.09948 
CDS_USD 0.2124 0.4962 0.42805 0.66893 
FTFBMPM 0.05326 0.05435 0.97984 0.32797 
M2_AFF_LE 0.0513 0.13175 0.38939 0.69727 
M4_HLF_LE -0.46381 0.24888 -1.86359 0.06338 
M5_AMM_LE -0.26884 0.2374 -1.13248 0.25836 
M7_MAL_LE -0.54722 0.28158 -1.94339 0.05293 
M8_PUB_LE 0.06132 0.55215 0.11106 0.91164 
M13_BUR_LE -0.59892 0.17584 -3.40606 0.00075 
M18_KUD_LE -0.09846 0.14618 -0.67359 0.5011 
M20_MB_LE -0.11425 0.11372 -1.00467 0.31589 
M24_KNN_LE 0.22005 0.1361 1.61684 0.10699 
M25_PET_LE -0.11066 0.3599 -0.30746 0.75871 
M26_MAA_LE 0.04353 0.1313 0.33149 0.74051 
M29_AM_LE -0.17963 0.23606 -0.76095 0.4473 
M11_RCE 
    
(Intercept) -1.46085 0.31585 -4.62507 0.00001 
FTFBMPM 0.23075 0.1321 1.74677 0.0817 
M2_AFF_LE 0.18112 0.23975 0.75546 0.45057 
M3_BIMB_LE 0.13074 0.32559 0.40153 0.68831 
M5_AMM_LE 0.16793 0.37653 0.446 0.65592 
M6_CIM_LE -0.88031 0.23674 -3.71845 0.00024 
M8_PUB_LE -1.3398 2.6167 -0.51202 0.60901 
M17_JH_LE -0.23422 0.2075 -1.12876 0.2599 
M24_KNN_LE 0.02497 0.20747 0.12037 0.90427 
M27_PAC_LE -0.05315 0.11503 -0.46205 0.64438 
M12_OSK 
    
(Intercept) -1.70653 0.68457 -2.49285 0.01322 
M12_OSK_PBV -0.7083 0.9723 -0.72848 0.4669 
M12_OSK_log -0.32739 0.09731 -3.3645 0.00087 
M1_HL_LE 0.34412 0.65552 0.52496 0.60001 
M3_BIMB_LE -0.02492 0.29248 -0.08521 0.93216 
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M14_OSK_LE 0.06981 0.59453 0.11742 0.90661 
M14_APEX_LE -0.15469 0.1411 -1.09629 0.27385 
M15_KAF_LE -0.32288 0.25168 -1.28292 0.20053 
M16_HLC_LE 0.14158 0.29553 0.47908 0.63224 
M17_JH_LE -0.15366 0.23265 -0.66047 0.50947 
M21_ECM_LE -0.06176 0.40237 -0.15348 0.87813 
M22_HWA_LE -0.89555 0.37722 -2.37407 0.01823 
M23_ELK_LE 0.48542 0.31728 1.52994 0.1271 
M24_KNN_LE -0.14512 0.36825 -0.39407 0.69381 
M26_MAA_LE -0.03702 0.39154 -0.09455 0.92473 
M27_PAC_LE -0.14541 0.24599 -0.59112 0.55489 
M13_BUR 
    
(Intercept) -0.00859 0.57846 -0.01484 0.98817 
FBMKLCI_Implied_Volatiltity -0.09365 0.05013 -1.8681 0.06275 
CDS_USD 0.03938 0.47047 0.08369 0.93336 
FTFBMPM 0.12775 0.07451 1.71449 0.0875 
M1_HL_LE -0.69379 0.45651 -1.51976 0.12965 
M2_AFF_LE 0.38347 0.14438 2.65592 0.00834 
M3_BIMB_LE -0.13755 0.17143 -0.80237 0.42299 
M5_AMM_LE 0.23858 0.23484 1.01594 0.3105 
M6_CIM_LE -0.06899 0.14917 -0.46252 0.64405 
M10_ALL_LE -0.64567 0.19715 -3.27507 0.00118 
M14_OSK_LE -0.01909 0.11312 -0.16872 0.86613 
M15_KAF_LE -0.11085 0.15504 -0.71494 0.47522 
M16_HLC_LE 0.02076 0.1366 0.15195 0.87933 
M18_KUD_LE -0.0971 0.14333 -0.67745 0.49866 
M23_ELK_LE 0.0605 0.16702 0.36224 0.71743 
M24_KNN_LE -0.00557 0.13417 -0.04151 0.96692 
M26_MAA_LE 0.05743 0.07689 0.74688 0.45574 
M27_PAC_LE -0.27087 0.22911 -1.18226 0.23806 
M14_OSK 
    
(Intercept) 0.63671 1.4163 0.44956 0.65336 
M14_OSK_log -0.11924 0.12706 -0.93846 0.34878 
FBMKLCI_Implied_Volatiltity -0.04159 0.13088 -0.3178 0.75086 
CDS_USD -0.4395 1.53505 -0.28631 0.77485 
Budget_Balance_GDP 5.10102 2.48537 2.05242 0.04102 
FTFBMPM 0.2422 0.10686 2.26651 0.02415 
M3_BIMB_LE -0.27975 0.24103 -1.16062 0.24674 
M7_MAL_LE 0.48756 0.69494 0.70159 0.48349 
M9_RHB_LE -0.8138 0.51031 -1.59471 0.11185 
M12_OSK_LE 0.05737 0.19153 0.29952 0.76475 
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M15_KAF_LE 0.06562 0.27731 0.23662 0.81312 
M16_HLC_LE -0.14408 0.07718 -1.86688 0.06292 
M17_JH_LE -0.09566 0.15766 -0.60672 0.54451 
M19_ACS_LE 0.08173 0.2687 0.30415 0.76123 
M23_ELK_LE 0.01878 0.47683 0.03938 0.96861 
M27_PAC_LE 0.03737 0.29537 0.12653 0.8994 
M30_MHB_LE 0.28768 0.29751 0.96694 0.33437 
M31_TIH_LE -0.48402 0.32681 -1.48106 0.13967 
M14_APEX 
    
(Intercept) -1.32615 0.18594 -7.13235 0 
FTFBMPM 0.1247 0.06925 1.80066 0.07277 
M6_CIM_LE 0.11331 0.28773 0.39379 0.69402 
M7_MAL_LE -0.67597 0.60696 -1.11369 0.26631 
M8_PUB_LE 0.02989 0.26406 0.11319 0.90996 
M12_OSK_LE -0.2672 0.14724 -1.81468 0.07058 
M13_BUR_LE 0.08552 0.30912 0.27664 0.78225 
M17_JH_LE -0.00604 0.11846 -0.05098 0.95937 
M19_ACS_LE -0.55644 0.22016 -2.52747 0.01201 
M27_PAC_LE 0.01412 0.18165 0.07775 0.93808 
M29_AM_LE 0.10447 0.14357 0.72763 0.46741 
M30_MHB_LE -0.19078 0.12255 -1.55669 0.12061 
M31_TIH_LE -0.22125 0.12659 -1.74782 0.08152 
M15_KAF 
    
(Intercept) -0.62664 0.22143 -2.82994 0.00498 
M15_KAF_SIZE -0.43717 0.09843 -4.44166 0.00001 
M15_KAF_log -0.23407 0.06966 -3.36007 0.00088 
FTFBMPM 0.09939 0.0482 2.06225 0.04006 
M7_MAL_LE 0.09513 0.45835 0.20754 0.83573 
M8_PUB_LE -1.00672 0.51441 -1.95702 0.05129 
M13_BUR_LE -0.34452 0.23049 -1.49478 0.13604 
M14_APEX_LE -0.18846 0.12189 -1.54619 0.12313 
M16_HLC_LE 0.02694 0.2078 0.12963 0.89695 
M19_ACS_LE -0.03916 0.16543 -0.23672 0.81304 
M21_ECM_LE -0.0328 0.14025 -0.23386 0.81525 
M24_KNN_LE -0.10673 0.22006 -0.48499 0.62804 
M26_MAA_LE -0.21141 0.15661 -1.34991 0.17808 
M27_PAC_LE -0.0435 0.20516 -0.21203 0.83223 
M29_AM_LE -0.03255 0.21429 -0.1519 0.87937 
M33_SYA_LE 0.55914 0.13102 4.26744 0.00003 
M17_JH 
    
(Intercept) -1.50518 0.27397 -5.49397 0 
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M17_JH_log -0.29415 0.09252 -3.17931 0.00163 
FTFBMPM 0.08206 0.14256 0.5756 0.56533 
M3_BIMB_LE -0.24119 0.36162 -0.66698 0.50531 
M4_HLF_LE 0.17603 0.33653 0.52307 0.60132 
M7_MAL_LE 0.34687 0.51346 0.67555 0.49986 
M11_RCE_LE -0.06665 0.33728 -0.1976 0.8435 
M12_OSK_LE -0.13888 0.17301 -0.80273 0.42278 
M14_APEX_LE -0.40841 0.15538 -2.62847 0.00903 
M16_HLC_LE -0.11978 0.18242 -0.65662 0.51194 
M19_ACS_LE -0.49419 0.20505 -2.41015 0.01656 
M22_HWA_LE -0.19654 0.45938 -0.42784 0.66908 
M24_KNN_LE -0.27215 0.256 -1.06306 0.28863 
M27_PAC_LE -0.2263 0.42846 -0.52817 0.59778 
M28_LPI_LE 0.53125 0.4917 1.08043 0.28084 
M29_AM_LE -0.70364 0.17956 -3.91862 0.00011 
M32_MPHB_LE -0.38544 0.62167 -0.62 0.53574 
M18_KUD 
    
(Intercept) -0.7686 0.45976 -1.67175 0.09562 
M18_KUD_log -0.24983 0.11259 -2.21897 0.02724 
Budget_Balance_GDP 1.85524 1.95204 0.95041 0.34267 
FTFBMPM 0.09098 0.0773 1.17695 0.24015 
M3_BIMB_LE -0.26538 0.09423 -2.81639 0.00518 
M9_RHB_LE -0.68557 0.16707 -4.10354 0.00005 
M12_OSK_LE -0.01332 0.1545 -0.08623 0.93134 
M14_APEX_LE 0.06032 0.26565 0.22708 0.82051 
M17_JH_LE -0.30381 0.17312 -1.75499 0.08028 
M24_KNN_LE 0.2179 0.14384 1.51492 0.13085 
M27_PAC_LE -0.62739 0.26717 -2.34825 0.01951 
M19_ACS 
    
(Intercept) 7.66805 3.40791 2.25008 0.02518 
M19_ACS_DE -9.67899 3.61611 -2.67663 0.00785 
M19_ACS_MM 8.45989 4.66721 1.81262 0.07091 
M19_ACS_log 0.07144 0.0744 0.96026 0.33771 
Budget_Balance_GDP 3.50283 2.48042 1.41219 0.15895 
FTFBMPM 0.09459 0.12834 0.73703 0.46169 
M6_CIM_LE -0.02643 0.32948 -0.08023 0.93611 
M9_RHB_LE -0.06185 0.31684 -0.1952 0.84537 
M14_APEX_LE 0.20382 0.14949 1.36344 0.17378 
M17_JH_LE -0.08193 0.08913 -0.91925 0.35871 
M18_KUD_LE -0.19576 0.23704 -0.82586 0.40955 
M26_MAA_LE -0.11327 0.19674 -0.57574 0.56523 
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M27_PAC_LE -0.43086 0.18535 -2.32454 0.02078 
M30_MHB_LE -0.49382 0.2367 -2.08628 0.03781 
M31_TIH_LE -0.13764 0.1536 -0.89608 0.37094 
M32_MPHB_LE -0.16473 0.54188 -0.304 0.76134 
M20_MB 
    
(Intercept) 2.38434 5.33633 0.44681 0.65534 
M20_MB_MM -39.4258 63.47894 -0.62108 0.53502 
FBMKLCI_Index -0.00203 0.00285 -0.71285 0.4765 
CDS_USD 0.03721 0.72482 0.05134 0.95909 
FTFBMPM 0.1866 0.13418 1.39062 0.16538 
M2_AFF_LE 0.00496 0.38069 0.01304 0.9896 
M3_BIMB_LE -0.40464 0.34354 -1.17783 0.23981 
M4_HLF_LE 0.14237 0.37034 0.38444 0.70093 
M7_MAL_LE -0.11293 0.59901 -0.18854 0.85059 
M9_RHB_LE -0.53818 0.28225 -1.90675 0.05752 
M10_ALL_LE -0.71706 0.48093 -1.49097 0.13703 
M12_OSK_LE -0.02397 0.23638 -0.10141 0.91929 
M24_KNN_LE -0.39965 0.31115 -1.28442 0.19999 
M33_SYA_LE -0.97794 0.66441 -1.47188 0.14211 
M22_HWA     
(Intercept) -0.83638 0.41656 -2.00786 0.04555 
FTFBMPM 0.11555 0.12359 0.93492 0.35058 
M2_AFF_LE 0.10234 0.16042 0.63798 0.52397 
M3_BIMB_LE -0.40285 0.23045 -1.74809 0.08147 
M12_OSK_LE -0.16429 0.12837 -1.27976 0.20162 
M14_APEX_LE 0.09685 0.17195 0.56322 0.57371 
M15_KAF_LE 0.10459 0.15085 0.69334 0.48863 
M17_JH_LE -0.06556 0.08805 -0.74458 0.45711 
M24_KNN_LE -0.13033 0.15449 -0.8436 0.39957 
M26_MAA_LE -0.09441 0.15817 -0.59691 0.55102 
M28_LPI_LE -0.29262 0.62057 -0.47152 0.63761 
M23_ELK 
    
(Intercept) -0.89868 0.31557 -2.84776 0.0047 
M29_AM_LE -0.95639 0.36883 -2.59305 0.00997 
M27_PAC 
    
(Intercept) 4.18095 2.77893 1.50452 0.13353 
M27_PAC_PBV -5.86251 2.28106 -2.57008 0.01067 
M27_PAC_log -0.08504 0.12265 -0.69336 0.48864 
FBMKLCI_Index 0.0007 0.00109 0.64057 0.52231 
Budget_Balance_GDP 3.91012 2.13305 1.83311 0.06781 
FTFBMPM 0.04121 0.09497 0.43389 0.66469 
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M3_BIMB_LE 0.03954 0.26163 0.15113 0.87998 
M5_AMM_LE 0.02209 0.2053 0.10761 0.91438 
M7_MAL_LE -0.88014 0.44192 -1.99161 0.04735 
M11_RCE_LE -0.61997 0.19231 -3.22375 0.00141 
M13_BUR_LE -0.19056 0.66147 -0.28809 0.77348 
M14_OSK_LE 0.04558 0.35711 0.12763 0.89853 
M15_KAF_LE -0.11079 0.31387 -0.35297 0.72436 
M16_HLC_LE -0.06996 0.22481 -0.31118 0.75589 
M18_KUD_LE -0.04367 0.22332 -0.19553 0.84511 
M19_ACS_LE 0.02646 0.16042 0.16495 0.8691 
M28_LPI_LE 0.23852 0.49654 0.48036 0.63133 
M29_AM_LE -0.03361 0.32659 -0.10291 0.91811 
M30_MHB_LE -0.3618 0.40415 -0.8952 0.37142 
M33_SYA_LE -0.26436 0.18224 -1.45062 0.14796 
M28_LPI 
    
(Intercept) -0.11084 0.34405 -0.32216 0.74756 
M28_LPI_PBV -0.09343 0.0639 -1.46221 0.14474 
M28_LPI_log 0.18017 0.06902 2.61047 0.0095 
FTFBMPM 0.07158 0.05779 1.23852 0.2165 
M4_HLF_LE -0.30629 0.15909 -1.9253 0.05514 
M6_CIM_LE -0.22839 0.20017 -1.14097 0.2548 
M8_PUB_LE 0.06193 0.38869 0.15933 0.87352 
M13_BUR_LE -0.0868 0.36385 -0.23855 0.81162 
M16_HLC_LE -0.05106 0.19904 -0.25654 0.79771 
M17_JH_LE 0.02666 0.06248 0.42668 0.66992 
M22_HWA_LE -0.29284 0.12508 -2.34122 0.01988 
M24_KNN_LE 0.08839 0.0675 1.30949 0.19138 
M33_SYA_LE -0.13449 0.09939 -1.35313 0.17704 
M32_MPHB 
    
(Intercept) -0.09594 0.55639 -0.17244 0.86321 
M32_MPHB_MM -0.14798 2.3776 -0.06224 0.95042 
M32_MPHB_PBV -1.52745 0.14408 -10.6017 0 
M32_MPHB_log 0.01492 0.10325 0.14451 0.88519 
FBMKLCI_Index 0.00006 0.00037 0.17063 0.86463 
FTFBMPM -0.00098 0.02275 -0.04326 0.96552 
M4_HLF_LE -0.0018 0.06411 -0.02808 0.97761 
M7_MAL_LE -0.04826 0.13139 -0.36731 0.71366 
M8_PUB_LE -1.18687 0.3987 -2.97688 0.00316 
M11_RCE_LE 0.01095 0.10221 0.10716 0.91473 
M14_APEX_LE -0.14548 0.40921 -0.3555 0.72247 
M16_HLC_LE 0.01208 0.06345 0.19042 0.84911 
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M17_JH_LE -0.02245 0.02881 -0.77918 0.43651 
M19_ACS_LE -0.00389 0.06528 -0.05964 0.95249 
M25_PET_LE -0.00182 1.18534 -0.00153 0.99878 
M29_AM_LE -0.09766 0.05245 -1.86202 0.0636 
M30_MHB_LE 0.00119 0.05166 0.02301 0.98166 
M31_TIH_LE 0.00494 0.49402 0.01 0.99203 
M33_SYA_LE -0.01156 0.07367 -0.1569 0.87544 
M33_SYA 
    
(Intercept) -2.02873 0.74575 -2.72038 0.00691 
M33_SYA_PBV 0.29685 0.09359 3.17192 0.00167 
M33_SYA_log 0.0416 0.0448 0.92851 0.3539 
CDS_USD -0.25948 0.37297 -0.69571 0.48716 
Budget_Balance_GDP -1.02644 1.8962 -0.54132 0.5887 
FTFBMPM 0.11246 0.04908 2.29112 0.02266 
M3_BIMB_LE -0.07628 0.2178 -0.35025 0.7264 
M6_CIM_LE 0.28094 0.09024 3.11315 0.00203 
M8_PUB_LE -0.09354 0.20685 -0.4522 0.65145 
M15_KAF_LE 0.25136 0.19376 1.29729 0.19554 
M19_ACS_LE -0.40726 0.19355 -2.10418 0.03621 
M20_MB_LE -0.2445 0.05573 -4.38732 0.00002 
M22_HWA_LE 0.03283 0.11049 0.29717 0.76654 
M30_MHB_LE -0.21839 0.17651 -1.23725 0.21698 
M31_TIH_LE -0.2861 0.12774 -2.23965 0.02586 
M34_MANH 
    
(Intercept) -1.20541 0.30221 -3.98865 0.00008 
M34_MANH_log -0.24509 0.0671 -3.65278 0.00031 
FTFBMPM 0.10439 0.08973 1.16338 0.24559 
M2_AFF_LE -0.04516 0.15244 -0.29622 0.76726 
M13_BUR_LE -0.21004 0.22469 -0.93478 0.35064 
M16_HLC_LE -0.4654 0.07007 -6.64169 0 




Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
B1_AUB     
(Intercept) 1.76342 1.65899 1.06295 0.28866 
B1_AUB_PBV -0.80484 0.51121 -1.57437 0.11646 
B1_AUB_log 0.24369 0.13908 1.75211 0.08078 
BHSEASI 0.47634 0.18514 2.57285 0.01057 
IMP_VOL -0.06868 0.16181 -0.42443 0.67156 
B3_BIB_LE 0.14494 0.39679 0.36528 0.71516 
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B6_TBB_LE 0.13308 0.18947 0.70236 0.483 
B9_IB_LE -0.0117 0.43772 -0.02673 0.97869 
B10_ALB_LE 0.025 0.08167 0.30614 0.75971 
B14_EI_LE -253.984 221.9872 -1.14414 0.25348 
B15_SAI_LE 1.09077 3.42192 0.31876 0.75013 
B20_BK_LE -0.16979 0.73827 -0.22999 0.81826 
B2_AB 
    
(Intercept) -2.59366 0.42971 -6.03578 0 
BHSEASI 0.93823 0.22288 4.20967 0.00003 
B4_BBK 
    
(Intercept) 3.23466 1.87606 1.72418 0.08568 
B4_BBK_PBV -3.30088 1.42567 -2.31531 0.02125 
BHSEASI 0.18389 0.15824 1.16213 0.24609 
B8_ASB_LE -0.18616 0.10776 -1.7276 0.08507 
B5_GFH 
    
(Intercept) -3.31829 1.61871 -2.04996 0.04122 
B5_PBV -0.15738 0.36551 -0.43057 0.66709 
BHSEASI 1.39202 0.60063 2.31761 0.02113 
B2_ABC_LE -2.08991 2.4329 -0.85902 0.391 
B9_IB_LE -4.44161 3.04634 -1.45802 0.14586 
B7_UGB 
    
(Intercept) 2.33709 13.48271 0.17334 0.8625 
B7_LEV 0.08696 0.60332 0.14414 0.88549 
B7_DE -0.02543 0.2402 -0.10588 0.91575 
B7_MM -0.65939 3.85581 -0.17101 0.86433 
B7_PBV -1.3305 2.56539 -0.51864 0.6044 
B7_UGB_log 0.0877 0.26122 0.33575 0.7373 
BHSEASI 0.16291 0.24698 0.65961 0.51002 
B2_ABC_LE 0.02806 0.35264 0.07958 0.93662 
B4_BBK_LE -0.25754 0.39829 -0.64662 0.51838 
B8_ASB_LE -0.4735 0.34853 -1.35857 0.17532 
B11_KHC_LE 0.04299 0.42114 0.10208 0.91877 
B14_EI_LE -444.045 391.1136 -1.13534 0.25716 
B17_INVB_LE -1.84442 0.80589 -2.28868 0.0228 
B19_AHLINS_LE -0.05374 0.67327 -0.07981 0.93644 
B20_BK_LE 0.0271 0.52205 0.05191 0.95864 
B9_IB 
    
(Intercept) -2.23236 12.72434 -0.17544 0.86085 
B9_DE -0.0479 0.20792 -0.23037 0.81796 
B9_MM 7.16781 12.49938 0.57345 0.56676 
B9_PBV -0.30534 0.47815 -0.63859 0.52357 
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BHSEASI 0.91129 0.22868 3.98498 0.00008 
B3_BIB_LE -0.75439 0.43897 -1.71854 0.08672 
B7_UGB_LE -0.52881 0.37812 -1.39854 0.16297 
B20_BK_LE 0.26753 0.63924 0.41851 0.67587 
B10_ALB 
    
(Intercept) -2.29245 0.40408 -5.67319 0 
BHSEASI 0.37688 0.1994 1.89003 0.05969 
B4_BBK_LE -0.06876 0.0632 -1.08804 0.27743 
B11_KHC 
    
(Intercept) -9.43589 6.0042 -1.57155 0.11715 
B11_DE 0.20582 0.11732 1.75428 0.08044 
B11_MM 28.4356 46.79314 0.60769 0.54387 
B11_PBV -47.4185 13.95429 -3.39813 0.00077 
B11_KHC_log -0.20324 0.10485 -1.93835 0.05355 
BHSEASI 0.64916 0.31509 2.06025 0.04027 
IMP_VOL 1.67582 0.42587 3.93504 0.0001 
B23_ARINS_log 0.09202 0.94907 0.09695 0.92283 
B1_AUB_LE 0.23684 0.44485 0.53241 0.59485 
B3_BIB_LE -0.3317 2.01172 -0.16488 0.86915 
B4_BBK_LE 0.10882 0.20196 0.53883 0.59042 
B6_TBB_LE -0.04981 0.33118 -0.1504 0.88055 
B7_UGB_LE 0.01318 0.20177 0.06533 0.94795 
B9_IB_LE -0.25688 0.48647 -0.52804 0.59788 
B11_KHC_LE 0.44506 0.41951 1.0609 0.28962 
B12_OB_LE -2.40125 3.74102 -0.64187 0.52147 
B13_BME_LE 0.32218 0.30259 1.06472 0.28789 
B14_EI_LE 2470.301 901.2113 2.74109 0.00651 
B15_SAI_LE -17.6561 12.19005 -1.4484 0.14859 
B16_UG_LE -8.84009 18.87717 -0.4683 0.63993 
B17_INVB_LE 0.70523 0.58326 1.20912 0.22761 
B18_BCOM_LE 0.22202 0.83558 0.26571 0.79065 
B12_OB 
    
(Intercept) 1389.422 685.5775 2.02664 0.04364 
B12_size -227.541 113.411 -2.00634 0.04578 
B12_LEV -6.45128 3.99731 -1.6139 0.10767 
B12_DE -0.27612 0.1532 -1.80239 0.07256 
B12_MM -107.504 23.98521 -4.48208 0.00001 
B12_PBV -9.08061 3.37966 -2.68684 0.00764 
B12_OB_log 0.17847 0.10507 1.69861 0.0905 
BA_POLICY_RATE -89.925 53.40836 -1.68373 0.09335 
BHSEASI 0.37255 0.10042 3.70981 0.00025 
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IMP_VOL 0.138 0.31818 0.43371 0.66483 
B23_ARINS_log 0.08381 0.44986 0.18629 0.85235 
B1_AUB_LE 0.03785 0.12085 0.31321 0.75436 
B2_ABC_LE 0.0102 0.12915 0.07901 0.93708 
B3_BIB_LE 0.13034 0.47262 0.27578 0.78292 
B4_BBK_LE 0.07248 0.14705 0.4929 0.62247 
B6_TBB_LE 0.14349 0.08406 1.70711 0.08891 
B7_UGB_LE 0.01313 0.02123 0.61862 0.53666 
B8_ASB_LE 0.03682 0.06606 0.5573 0.57776 
B9_IB_LE -0.00481 0.15974 -0.03009 0.97602 
B10_ALB_LE -0.0733 0.06004 -1.22093 0.22313 
B12_OB_LE 3.205 29.1165 0.11008 0.91243 
B13_BME_LE 0.09983 0.11402 0.87553 0.38203 
B14_EI_LE -137.908 292.2358 -0.4719 0.63736 
B15_SAI_LE -0.89265 4.8616 -0.18361 0.85445 
B16_UG_LE 0.05042 0.54109 0.09318 0.92583 
B17_INVB_LE 0.07886 0.29159 0.27043 0.78703 
B18_BCOM_LE -0.01682 0.13021 -0.12921 0.89728 
B19_AHLINS_LE -0.10135 0.22133 -0.45793 0.64736 
B20_BK_LE 0.02479 0.1107 0.22396 0.82295 
B21_BO_LE 0.3939 49.26347 0.008 0.99363 
B13_BME 
    
(Intercept) 0.00002 0.00304 0.0062 0.99506 
B13_DE 0 0.00005 0.00001 0.99999 
B13_PBV 0 0.00314 -0.00015 0.99988 
B13_BME_log 1.01771 0.00964 105.6125 0 
B18_BCOM_LE 0 0.14678 0 1 
B14_EI 
    
(Intercept) 5.63238 4.15986 1.35398 0.17674 
B14_PBV -7.2539 3.56022 -2.03749 0.04246 
IMP_VOL -0.19927 0.30577 -0.65169 0.51509 
B3_BIB_LE -1.32447 0.59106 -2.24083 0.02575 




Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
P1_COM     
(Intercept) -9.06633 10.42486 -0.86968 0.38519 
P1_COM_PBV 1.09839 1.19452 0.91953 0.35858 
P1_COM_LEV -0.06992 0.07865 -0.88894 0.37477 
P1_COM_log -0.01691 0.13651 -0.12388 0.9015 
293 
 
Pakistan_Index 0.07923 0.07984 0.99227 0.32189 
KSE_VOL 0.021 0.03234 0.64924 0.51669 
PK_INT_RESV 1.86992 2.34995 0.79573 0.42683 
P2_AB_LE 0.22848 0.1707 1.33847 0.18178 
P4_HMB_LE -0.49827 0.17397 -2.86404 0.00448 
P5_OBP_LE 0.20833 0.18248 1.1416 0.25455 
P6_MBL_LE -0.26891 0.20155 -1.33422 0.18317 
P7_BAL_LE -0.02334 0.1722 -0.13557 0.89226 
P8_UB_LE -0.37123 0.1026 -3.61821 0.00035 
P9_ALB_LE -0.14032 0.22101 -0.6349 0.52599 
P13_MCB_LE 0.09202 0.18351 0.50146 0.61643 
P14_NIB_LE -0.12975 0.12135 -1.06918 0.28587 
P17_HB_LE -0.14564 0.16622 -0.87619 0.38165 
P20_FBL_LE -0.25562 0.13115 -1.94917 0.05223 
P2_AB 
    
(Intercept) 4.4869 6.44428 0.69626 0.48682 
P2_AB_PBV -1.7515 0.89043 -1.96703 0.05012 
P2_AB_LEV -0.20207 0.31303 -0.64553 0.51909 
P2_AB_log -0.10156 0.12753 -0.79638 0.42646 
Pakistan_Index 0.01096 0.12182 0.08998 0.92836 
P1_COM_LE 0.3289 0.61171 0.53767 0.59121 
P3_SB_LE -0.19622 0.16338 -1.20101 0.23072 
P4_HMB_LE -0.39465 0.19364 -2.03806 0.04244 
P6_MBL_LE -0.33857 0.32982 -1.02653 0.30549 
P7_BAL_LE -0.22253 0.40433 -0.55037 0.58248 
P9_ALB_LE 0.2779 0.50396 0.55144 0.58175 
P10_BOP_LE -0.45521 0.2245 -2.02763 0.0435 
P13_MCB_LE 0.06898 0.32396 0.21294 0.83152 
P14_NIB_LE -0.49442 0.24557 -2.0133 0.045 
P16_SC_LE 0.06776 0.33629 0.20149 0.84045 
P17_HB_LE -0.41172 0.61637 -0.66796 0.50468 
P19_SIL_LE 0.18794 0.19119 0.983 0.32642 
P20_FBL_LE -0.13276 0.3338 -0.39771 0.69113 
P3_SB 
    
(Intercept) -74.468 54.09947 -1.3765 0.16975 
P3_SB_PBV -7.73145 2.96974 -2.60341 0.00971 
P3_SB_size 11.14041 7.04498 1.58133 0.11491 
P3_SB_LEV -1.52501 1.26878 -1.20194 0.23038 
P3_SB_DE 1.74311 0.93879 1.85677 0.06438 
P3_SB_log 0.0086 0.11958 0.07193 0.94271 
Pakistan_Index -0.02301 0.12127 -0.1897 0.84968 
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KSE_VOL 0.12598 0.11004 1.14485 0.25323 
PK_TBILL_RATE -0.25785 0.43952 -0.58667 0.55789 
PK_10Y_BOND 0.39683 0.72815 0.54498 0.58619 
PK_POLICY_RATE 0.05197 0.46171 0.11255 0.91046 
PK_INT_RESV 3.37499 4.60592 0.73275 0.46431 
P1_COM_LE 0.33072 0.84911 0.38949 0.6972 
P2_AB_LE -0.05583 0.37783 -0.14777 0.88263 
P4_HMB_LE 0.0218 0.25296 0.08618 0.93139 
P5_OBP_LE -0.39106 0.44598 -0.87686 0.3813 
P6_MBL_LE -0.8129 0.27875 -2.91623 0.00382 
P8_UB_LE 0.3315 0.4663 0.71091 0.47772 
P9_ALB_LE 0.09162 0.65307 0.14029 0.88853 
P10_BOP_LE -0.30341 0.23253 -1.30481 0.19301 
P13_MCB_LE -0.08049 0.51047 -0.15768 0.87482 
P14_NIB_LE -0.03018 0.27209 -0.11092 0.91176 
P16_SC_LE -0.80665 0.27229 -2.9625 0.00331 
P17_HB_LE 0.0135 0.46663 0.02894 0.97693 
P19_SIL_LE 0.03278 0.25519 0.12846 0.89788 
P20_FBL_LE -0.74351 0.32581 -2.28206 0.02322 
P4_HMB 
    
(Intercept) -57.9307 55.05217 -1.05229 0.29356 
P4_HMB_PBV -2.39449 2.63 -0.91045 0.36335 
P4_HMB_size 8.37508 7.09551 1.18033 0.23885 
P4_HMB_DE -0.51951 2.42681 -0.21407 0.83064 
P4_HMB_MM 5.90042 21.63565 0.27272 0.78527 
P4_HMB_log -0.1604 0.16572 -0.96792 0.33391 
Pakistan_Index 0.12385 0.11502 1.07676 0.2825 
KSE_VOL 0.04694 0.14008 0.33507 0.73782 
PK_TBILL_RATE -0.35775 0.49611 -0.72111 0.47143 
PK_10Y_BOND 0.13086 0.35281 0.37092 0.71098 
PK_POLICY_RATE 0.09023 0.3631 0.2485 0.80393 
PK_INT_RESV -1.17058 2.10182 -0.55694 0.57801 
P1_COM_LE -0.75205 0.34701 -2.16724 0.03104 
P2_AB_LE -0.20315 0.21909 -0.92725 0.35458 
P3_SB_LE 0.05517 0.27727 0.19899 0.84241 
P5_OBP_LE -0.04783 0.30739 -0.15559 0.87646 
P6_MBL_LE 0.1142 0.37779 0.30227 0.76266 
P7_BAL_LE -0.06492 0.3106 -0.20903 0.83458 
P8_UB_LE -0.07882 0.3944 -0.19984 0.84175 
P10_BOP_LE -0.04481 0.20712 -0.21632 0.82889 
P13_MCB_LE -0.0803 0.38334 -0.20946 0.83424 
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P14_NIB_LE 0.46167 0.19933 2.31608 0.02126 
P16_SC_LE -0.41913 0.31107 -1.34737 0.17893 
P17_HB_LE -0.0917 0.44056 -0.20815 0.83526 
P19_SIL_LE -0.37931 0.37938 -0.99981 0.31825 
P20_FBL_LE 0.11508 0.2352 0.4893 0.625 
P5_OBP 
    
(Intercept) -0.51598 0.46622 -1.10674 0.26929 
P4_HMB_LE -0.23689 0.26751 -0.88554 0.37657 
P7_BAL_LE -0.93103 0.34646 -2.68729 0.0076 
P8_UB_LE -0.17839 0.14184 -1.25774 0.20946 
P9_ALB_LE 0.07821 0.36864 0.21217 0.83212 
P13_MCB_LE -0.22437 0.25956 -0.86442 0.38804 
P16_SC_LE -0.64721 0.39089 -1.65575 0.09882 
P17_HB_LE 0.1342 0.39676 0.33823 0.73542 
P19_SIL_LE -0.21437 0.1852 -1.1575 0.24799 
P20_FBL_LE -0.0288 0.2557 -0.11264 0.91039 
P6_MBL 
    
(Intercept) -1.31757 0.21761 -6.05476 0 
P1_COM_LE -0.06324 0.21183 -0.29857 0.76547 
P7_BAL_LE -0.2783 0.02598 -10.7118 0 
P9_ALB_LE -0.28278 0.14697 -1.92404 0.05528 
P13_MCB_LE -0.03963 0.09605 -0.41261 0.68018 
P7_BAL 
    
(Intercept) -0.55676 1.06187 -0.52433 0.60045 
P7_BAL_DE 0.06781 0.11793 0.57499 0.56574 
P7_BAL_log -0.08576 0.04903 -1.74929 0.08129 
KSE_VOL -0.00171 0.06373 -0.0269 0.97856 
P1_COM_LE -0.22944 0.21203 -1.08214 0.28008 
P2_AB_LE 0.02577 0.14617 0.17634 0.86015 
P3_SB_LE 0.05331 0.12089 0.44095 0.65958 
P4_HMB_LE -0.03436 0.06677 -0.51452 0.60728 
P5_OBP_LE -0.82273 0.23595 -3.48684 0.00056 
P6_MBL_LE -0.49131 0.33915 -1.44865 0.14851 
P8_UB_LE -0.15225 0.24989 -0.60926 0.54283 
P9_ALB_LE -0.0678 0.24537 -0.2763 0.78251 
P10_BOP_LE -0.14272 0.08275 -1.72458 0.08566 
P13_MCB_LE 0.23101 0.25777 0.89619 0.37089 
P14_NIB_LE -0.13547 0.11824 -1.14568 0.25286 
P16_SC_LE -0.21795 0.16814 -1.29623 0.19591 
P17_HB_LE -0.23409 0.26304 -0.88993 0.37423 




    
(Intercept) 15.69103 7.87579 1.99231 0.04726 
P8_UB_PBV -2.18695 1.12211 -1.94897 0.05224 
P8_UB_DE 1.29208 1.60101 0.80704 0.42029 
P8_UB_log -0.02666 0.09497 -0.28072 0.77912 
PK_INT_RESV -3.49941 1.91047 -1.83169 0.068 
P1_COM_LE -0.39952 0.22047 -1.81213 0.07098 
P3_SB_LE 0.12265 0.16134 0.76019 0.44775 
P4_HMB_LE -0.37585 0.21511 -1.74725 0.08163 
P5_OBP_LE -0.27013 0.11751 -2.29876 0.02222 
P7_BAL_LE 0.01107 0.21705 0.05101 0.95935 
P9_ALB_LE -0.04486 0.35533 -0.12624 0.89963 
P10_BOP_LE -0.16798 0.21646 -0.77602 0.43836 
P13_MCB_LE -0.22209 0.48251 -0.46027 0.64566 
P14_NIB_LE -0.16993 0.14167 -1.1995 0.23129 
P17_HB_LE -0.74311 0.42628 -1.74324 0.08233 
P9_ALB 
    
(Intercept) 12.50305 5.66861 2.20566 0.02818 
P9_ALB_PBV 0.19923 0.21672 0.9193 0.35869 
P9_ALB_size -0.72744 0.49811 -1.46039 0.14524 
P9_ALB_log -0.18263 0.04506 -4.05326 0.00006 
PK_INT_RESV -1.91946 0.68277 -2.81127 0.00526 
P1_COM_LE -0.70604 0.15674 -4.50447 0.00001 
P6_MBL_LE -0.02474 0.10184 -0.24288 0.80826 
P7_BAL_LE -0.15667 0.09726 -1.61078 0.10829 
P8_UB_LE -0.34409 0.09636 -3.57099 0.00041 
P10_BOP_LE 0.07187 0.07575 0.94876 0.34351 
P13_MCB_LE -0.12391 0.09891 -1.2528 0.21127 
P14_NIB_LE -0.03047 0.11055 -0.2756 0.78304 
P16_SC_LE 0.03406 0.08031 0.42415 0.67177 
P17_HB_LE -0.17263 0.23522 -0.73392 0.46358 
P20_FBL_LE -0.0839 0.07517 -1.11606 0.2653 
P16 
    
(Intercept) 4.15E+00 5.39E+00 7.70E-01 0.44 
P16_SC_DE 1.47E+01 6.27E+00 2.34E+00 0.02 
PK_POLICY_RATE 1.03E-01 2.89E-01 3.58E-01 0.72 
PK_INT_RESV -3.18 1.88E+00 -1.69E+00 0.09 
P3_SB_LE -0.26 1.33E-01 -1.95E+00 0.05 
P6_MBL_LE 0.13 2.00E-01 6.69E-01 0.50 
P9_ALB_LE -0.64 1.73E-01 -3.68E+00 0.00 
P17_HB_LE -0.15 2.82E-01 -5.18E-01 0.61 
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Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
O1_OT     
(Intercept) -24.7268 20.17221 -1.22579 0.22128 
O1_OT_PBV 2.4667 1.41485 1.74343 0.08232 
O1_OT_size 3.74253 3.53256 1.05944 0.29028 
O1_OT_MM 2.46645 6.20858 0.39726 0.69147 
O1_OT_log -0.18056 0.10204 -1.76949 0.07787 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index -0.02895 0.11647 -0.24858 0.80386 
O2_DHO_LE -0.30667 0.20981 -1.46166 0.14492 
O3_SOH_LE 0.04529 0.09851 0.45978 0.64602 
O5_HSBC_LE -0.06121 0.1434 -0.42685 0.6698 
O6_MUS_LE -0.71468 0.25066 -2.85114 0.00467 
O7_FIN_LE 0.01846 0.05783 0.31921 0.7498 
O9_MUS_LE -0.1312 0.20195 -0.64968 0.51641 
O11_ANW_LE -0.00207 0.08178 -0.02526 0.97987 
O13_OEH_LE 0.01258 0.08104 0.15526 0.87673 
O16_UF_LE -0.31543 0.10195 -3.09409 0.00217 
O18_OFC_LE -0.23376 0.16174 -1.44526 0.14947 
O19_AMF_LE -0.34427 0.38544 -0.89317 0.37251 
O20_SHQ_LE 0.2122 0.896 0.23683 0.81295 
O21_TFC_LE 0.06034 0.11453 0.52685 0.5987 
O22_TAG_LE -0.04383 0.21652 -0.20241 0.83974 
O24_OOL_LE 0.16963 0.14365 1.18082 0.23864 
O26_DHO_LE 0.10749 0.21545 0.4989 0.61823 
O2_DHO 
    
(Intercept) -2.07672 0.6323 -3.28439 0.00114 
O2_DHO_PBV 0.24616 0.34909 0.70515 0.48127 
O2_DHO_log -0.00622 0.13461 -0.04617 0.9632 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index 0.22333 0.15237 1.46577 0.14377 
O1_OT_LE -0.27956 0.18491 -1.51188 0.13162 
O6_MUS_LE 0.00297 0.24957 0.01192 0.9905 
O10_SEC_LE 0.02355 0.39147 0.06017 0.95206 
O16_UF_LE 0.20127 0.11927 1.68749 0.09256 
O22_TAG_LE -0.20812 0.08808 -2.36273 0.01878 
O25_OI_LE -0.0858 0.39752 -0.21585 0.82926 
O26_DHO_LE -0.31333 0.26439 -1.18511 0.23692 
O27_DHOIS_LE -0.09375 0.09464 -0.99067 0.32265 




    
(Intercept) -1.02228 0.59993 -1.70399 0.08942 
O3_SOH_log -0.27053 0.13976 -1.9356 0.05386 
O1_OT_LE -0.71418 0.45383 -1.57365 0.11663 
O6_MUS_LE -0.62063 0.33112 -1.87433 0.06186 
O8_BAT_LE -0.18528 0.11497 -1.61151 0.10813 
O11_ANW_LE 0.21153 0.15754 1.34275 0.18038 
O13_OEH_LE -0.30904 0.13882 -2.22625 0.02675 
O14_OI_LE 0.01814 0.23311 0.07782 0.93802 
O16_UF_LE 0.1326 0.15447 0.85844 0.39134 
O17_AB_LE -0.17387 0.13082 -1.32906 0.18485 
O18_OFC_LE -0.42018 0.23415 -1.79452 0.07374 
O23_GINV_LE -0.08149 0.16508 -0.49363 0.62193 
O29_OUI_LE -0.17772 0.19289 -0.92132 0.35763 
O4_NIZ 
    
(Intercept) -1.27928 0.5477 -2.33574 0.02017 
O4_NIZ_log -0.31918 0.10297 -3.09969 0.00212 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index -0.35091 0.21473 -1.63423 0.10326 
O2_DHO_LE -0.64332 0.32947 -1.95261 0.0518 
O5_HSBC_LE 0.27528 0.21786 1.26354 0.20738 
O8_BAT_LE -0.2879 0.28469 -1.01127 0.31271 
O11_ANW_LE 0.08905 0.16399 0.54301 0.58753 
O12_MADI_LE -0.05814 0.23989 -0.24238 0.80865 
O13_OEH_LE -0.7001 0.1969 -3.5556 0.00044 
O21_TFC_LE -0.30353 0.18975 -1.59964 0.11073 
O23_GINV_LE -0.43646 0.1424 -3.06506 0.00237 
O29_OUI_LE 0.19792 0.27512 0.71939 0.47246 
O5_HSBC 
    
(Intercept) -2.36644 0.26042 -9.08687 0 
O5_HSBC_log -0.17111 0.09275 -1.8448 0.06606 
O1_OT_LE -1.0197 0.33288 -3.06323 0.00239 
O2_DHO_LE 0.18132 0.12895 1.40616 0.16072 
O4_NIZ_LE -0.30122 0.42628 -0.70663 0.48035 
O8_BAT_LE 0.07638 0.0603 1.26659 0.20629 
O12_MADI_LE 0.08084 0.10539 0.76701 0.44369 
O13_OEH_LE 0.12517 0.13976 0.89561 0.37119 
O17_AB_LE -0.02831 0.11908 -0.23772 0.81227 
O19_AMF_LE 0.40892 0.07162 5.70959 0 
O23_GINV_LE -0.36969 0.10073 -3.67007 0.00029 
O24_OOL_LE 0.17635 0.07343 2.4015 0.01694 
O25_OI_LE -0.1754 0.19087 -0.91892 0.35888 
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O27_DHOIS_LE -0.17484 0.13962 -1.25222 0.21147 
O6_MUS 
    
(Intercept) -1.19905 0.77324 -1.55069 0.12203 
O6_MUS_PBV 0.31317 0.65111 0.48098 0.63088 
O1_OT_LE -0.38834 0.2032 -1.91114 0.05694 
O3_SOH_LE 0.00218 0.11289 0.01933 0.98459 
O13_OEH_LE 0.05732 0.07293 0.78594 0.43252 
O14_OI_LE -0.14405 0.1629 -0.88427 0.37726 
O16_UF_LE 0.02678 0.08897 0.30095 0.76366 
O17_AB_LE -0.14327 0.18411 -0.77816 0.43709 
O23_GINV_LE -0.17742 0.10741 -1.65174 0.09964 
O25_OI_LE -0.28421 0.19096 -1.48834 0.13771 
O26_DHO_LE -0.4794 0.23875 -2.00795 0.04555 
O29_OUI_LE -0.02399 0.16389 -0.14636 0.88374 
O7_FIN 
    
(Intercept) -1.89706 7.18233 -0.26413 0.79187 
O7_FIN_PBV 2.80607 0.64965 4.31938 0.00002 
O7_FIN_LEV -4.57094 3.99315 -1.14469 0.25326 
O7_FIN_log -0.09564 0.3016 -0.31712 0.75138 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index -0.49259 0.30227 -1.62961 0.10425 
MSM30_VOL 0.08689 0.07404 1.17359 0.2415 
O1_OT_LE -0.35285 0.50436 -0.6996 0.48473 
O9_MUS_LE -0.23222 0.29991 -0.7743 0.43937 
O10_SEC_LE 0.02468 0.45934 0.05373 0.95719 
O14_OI_LE -0.14638 0.4165 -0.35145 0.7255 
O15_GF_LE -0.09408 0.26027 -0.36149 0.71799 
O16_UF_LE -0.42101 0.5794 -0.72662 0.46803 
O17_AB_LE 0.11989 0.38066 0.31496 0.75301 
O18_OFC_LE 0.39408 0.39176 1.00591 0.31528 
O25_OI_LE -0.51536 0.58141 -0.88639 0.37613 
O26_DHO_LE 0.28476 0.51457 0.5534 0.58041 
O8_BAT 
    
(Intercept) -5.03756 1.54084 -3.26937 0.00121 
O8_BAT_PBV 1.77375 0.92578 1.91596 0.05635 
O8_BAT_MM -0.71718 3.14689 -0.2279 0.81988 
O8_BAT_log -0.46094 0.07839 -5.87989 0 
Repo_Rate 1.61361 1.51326 1.06631 0.28717 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index 0.43602 0.17823 2.44644 0.01502 
O1_OT_LE 0.27594 0.46139 0.59805 0.55027 
O3_SOH_LE -0.0911 0.44927 -0.20278 0.83945 
O4_NIZ_LE -0.14311 0.61297 -0.23348 0.81556 
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O9_MUS_LE 0.08406 0.1694 0.49622 0.62011 
O10_SEC_LE -0.26753 0.15187 -1.76151 0.07921 
O12_MADI_LE -0.37845 0.19997 -1.89257 0.05941 
O13_OEH_LE -0.19275 0.26099 -0.73854 0.46078 
O14_OI_LE 0.13271 0.32712 0.40568 0.68528 
O15_GF_LE -0.1895 0.16924 -1.11967 0.26378 
O17_AB_LE 0.08474 0.37203 0.22778 0.81998 
O19_AMF_LE 0.45331 0.44601 1.01637 0.3103 
O22_TAG_LE 0.1755 0.04847 3.62056 0.00035 
O23_GINV_LE -0.07354 0.24042 -0.30587 0.75993 
O27_DHOIS_LE -0.69988 0.38668 -1.81 0.07133 
O29_OUI_LE 0.14068 0.33696 0.41749 0.67663 
O9_MUS 
    
(Intercept) -194.131 165.2426 -1.17483 0.24105 
O9_MUS_PBV 16.49836 7.8412 2.10406 0.03625 
O9_MUS_size 38.97365 41.12622 0.94766 0.34411 
O9_MUS_LEV -0.28525 6.51261 -0.0438 0.9651 
O9_MUS_log -0.30343 0.28451 -1.06653 0.28709 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index -0.06076 0.21557 -0.28185 0.77826 
O1_OT_LE -0.2396 0.45652 -0.52483 0.60011 
O2_DHO_LE 0.04711 0.35541 0.13254 0.89465 
O5_HSBC_LE -0.03794 0.37538 -0.10107 0.91956 
O7_FIN_LE 0.09667 0.30083 0.32134 0.74819 
O8_BAT_LE 0.06545 0.11355 0.57637 0.56482 
O12_MADI_LE 0.16071 0.15267 1.05268 0.29338 
O13_OEH_LE 0.03951 0.18517 0.21335 0.83121 
O15_GF_LE 0.11685 0.18402 0.63497 0.52596 
O16_UF_LE 0.14453 0.32016 0.45144 0.65202 
O17_AB_LE 0.05231 0.32483 0.16105 0.87217 
O18_OFC_LE 0.16841 0.32152 0.52379 0.60083 
O19_AMF_LE -0.09751 0.82059 -0.11883 0.9055 
O20_SHQ_LE -5.71225 6.0231 -0.94839 0.34374 
O21_TFC_LE 0.06412 0.23454 0.27337 0.78477 
O23_GINV_LE 0.17549 0.16719 1.04969 0.29475 
O24_OOL_LE -0.70112 0.44706 -1.56829 0.11793 
O25_OI_LE -0.63102 0.32196 -1.9599 0.05098 
O26_DHO_LE 0.25411 0.39448 0.64418 0.51998 
O27_DHOIS_LE -0.38246 0.22516 -1.69857 0.0905 
O28_MUH_LE 0.30738 0.20299 1.51427 0.13107 
O29_OUI_LE -0.39724 0.14045 -2.82839 0.00501 
O10_SEC 
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(Intercept) -4.00592 1.61478 -2.48079 0.01366 
O10_SEC_LEV 0.04523 1.04001 0.04349 0.96534 
O10_SEC_DE 0.4237 2.22708 0.19025 0.84924 
O10_SEC_log -0.37216 0.10566 -3.52226 0.00049 
Repo_Rate -4.78702 0.92094 -5.19798 0 
O9_MUS_LE 0.21072 0.07985 2.63887 0.00875 
O15_GF_LE 0.22112 0.11322 1.95291 0.05176 
O16_UF_LE -0.14931 0.10709 -1.39434 0.16425 
O17_AB_LE -0.58341 0.25623 -2.27687 0.0235 
O18_OFC_LE 0.22858 0.12901 1.77179 0.07745 
O25_OI_LE -0.16844 0.47 -0.35839 0.7203 
O28_MUH_LE 0.78503 0.04923 15.94744 0 
O11_ANW 
    
(Intercept) -0.63447 1.13426 -0.55937 0.57634 
O11_ANW_MM 2.72512 8.47398 0.32159 0.748 
O11_ANW_log -0.23011 0.11457 -2.00854 0.04551 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index 0.00063 0.20072 0.00314 0.9975 
MSM30_VOL -0.11454 0.10792 -1.06137 0.28941 
O1_OT_LE -0.47744 0.49445 -0.9656 0.33505 
O3_SOH_LE -0.45497 0.28837 -1.57772 0.11572 
O6_MUS_LE -0.44866 0.52551 -0.85376 0.39394 
O12_MADI_LE -0.13257 0.14732 -0.89991 0.36891 
O13_OEH_LE 0.23071 0.21435 1.07635 0.28267 
O14_OI_LE -0.598 0.37907 -1.57752 0.11576 
O15_GF_LE -0.15215 0.22933 -0.66348 0.50755 
O16_UF_LE -0.00057 0.21264 -0.0027 0.99784 
O17_AB_LE -0.4682 0.30231 -1.54875 0.12253 
O20_SHQ_LE 1.37577 1.35345 1.01649 0.31024 
O21_TFC_LE 0.06017 0.30788 0.19544 0.84518 
O22_TAG_LE 0.00623 0.378 0.01647 0.98687 
O23_GINV_LE -0.34353 0.23929 -1.43563 0.15219 
O24_OOL_LE 0.16818 0.19904 0.84494 0.39884 
O27_DHOIS_LE -0.26911 0.40623 -0.66245 0.50821 
O29_OUI_LE 0.32988 0.28549 1.15548 0.24885 
O12_MADI 
    
(Intercept) -4.62465 4.59616 -1.0062 0.31516 
O12_MADI_size 0.25572 1.02142 0.25036 0.80249 
O12_MADI_log -0.44224 0.22679 -1.94998 0.05214 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index 0.07579 0.32825 0.23091 0.81755 
O3_SOH_LE -0.55627 0.633 -0.87878 0.38025 
O5_HSBC_LE -0.01949 0.909 -0.02144 0.98291 
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O6_MUS_LE -0.5016 0.94216 -0.53239 0.59486 
O8_BAT_LE -0.22091 0.3474 -0.63589 0.52535 
O11_ANW_LE -0.42271 0.45892 -0.92109 0.35777 
O13_OEH_LE 0.0901 0.55468 0.16243 0.87108 
O14_OI_LE -0.0875 0.41665 -0.21002 0.8338 
O15_GF_LE 0.35741 0.50188 0.71215 0.47694 
O16_UF_LE 0.31043 0.68154 0.45549 0.6491 
O18_OFC_LE -0.40227 0.62584 -0.64277 0.52088 
O19_AMF_LE 0.21398 0.73547 0.29094 0.7713 
O20_SHQ_LE 1.78276 2.25944 0.78903 0.43074 
O24_OOL_LE 0.03844 0.2644 0.14537 0.88452 
O25_OI_LE -0.10265 0.97542 -0.10524 0.91626 
O26_DHO_LE -1.24502 0.75453 -1.65006 0.10001 
O29_OUI_LE 0.11023 0.61819 0.17831 0.8586 
O13_OEH 
    
(Intercept) -2.72561 0.3662 -7.44293 0 
O13_OEH_log -0.04795 0.08294 -0.57813 0.56361 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index 0.38627 0.13653 2.82918 0.00498 
O3_SOH_LE 0.10919 0.2244 0.48657 0.62692 
O4_NIZ_LE -0.25001 0.27465 -0.91027 0.36342 
O6_MUS_LE -0.23288 0.29365 -0.79307 0.42837 
O9_MUS_LE 0.08168 0.36407 0.22435 0.82264 
O11_ANW_LE -0.21234 0.15911 -1.33454 0.18305 
O14_OI_LE -0.69131 0.1989 -3.47572 0.00059 
O15_GF_LE -0.17402 0.10341 -1.68287 0.09345 
O18_OFC_LE 0.47253 0.2215 2.13329 0.03372 
O23_GINV_LE -0.19375 0.09338 -2.07483 0.03886 
O25_OI_LE -0.22338 0.22822 -0.97879 0.32848 
O29_OUI_LE -0.00512 0.1164 -0.04402 0.96492 
O14_OI 
    
(Intercept) 0 0.38028 0 1 
O14_OI_size -0.30763 0.0861 -3.57293 0.00041 
O14_OI_MM -2.28651 2.3007 -0.99383 0.32113 
O14_OI_log -0.15313 0.04914 -3.11612 0.00202 
O2_DHO_LE -0.0532 0.14029 -0.37922 0.7048 
O3_SOH_LE -0.03929 0.14269 -0.27537 0.78323 
O6_MUS_LE -0.30134 0.28222 -1.06776 0.28652 
O7_FIN_LE -0.24145 0.0907 -2.6622 0.0082 
O8_BAT_LE -0.05886 0.09231 -0.63763 0.52422 
O9_MUS_LE 0.13449 0.29832 0.45083 0.65245 
O11_ANW_LE -0.09196 0.14101 -0.65213 0.51483 
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O12_MADI_LE 0.03995 0.08 0.4994 0.61788 
O13_OEH_LE -0.34554 0.08874 -3.89365 0.00012 
O15_GF_LE 0 0.08204 0 1 
O17_AB_LE -0.17076 0.11551 -1.47827 0.14042 
O19_AMF_LE 0.19014 0.14515 1.30992 0.19126 
O20_SHQ_LE 0.67984 0.67794 1.00279 0.3168 
O23_GINV_LE -0.00472 0.20127 -0.02347 0.98129 
O25_OI_LE -0.23741 0.21552 -1.1016 0.27155 
O27_DHOIS_LE 0.07216 0.15919 0.45331 0.65067 
O29_OUI_LE -0.36258 0.14655 -2.47408 0.01393 
O15_GF 
    
(Intercept) -3.74568 0.75098 -4.98772 0 
O15_GF_log -0.38777 0.16472 -2.35415 0.01921 
O2_DHO_LE 0.81167 0.37427 2.16868 0.03089 
O11_ANW_LE -0.43954 0.28343 -1.55078 0.12201 
O13_OEH_LE 0.05588 0.28876 0.19353 0.84668 
O14_OI_LE 0.28523 0.45379 0.62856 0.53011 
O17_AB_LE -0.05432 0.64309 -0.08447 0.93274 
O23_GINV_LE 0.04858 0.21372 0.22731 0.82034 
O25_OI_LE -0.67852 0.6063 -1.1191 0.26399 
O29_OUI_LE -0.49863 0.36492 -1.36641 0.17283 
O16_UF 
    
(Intercept) -2.71801 0.66557 -4.08376 0.00006 
O16_UF_log -0.406 0.17991 -2.25668 0.02474 
O6_MUS_LE -0.15189 0.5486 -0.27686 0.78207 
O11_ANW_LE -0.39211 0.2693 -1.45602 0.14642 
O12_MADI_LE -0.0018 0.11721 -0.01538 0.98774 
O26_DHO_LE -0.41481 0.61725 -0.67204 0.50207 
O27_DHOIS_LE -0.14834 0.25969 -0.57122 0.56827 
O29_OUI_LE -0.11822 0.50877 -0.23237 0.81641 
O17_AB 
    
(Intercept) -2.26463 1.33664 -1.69428 0.09127 
O17_AB_PBV -0.05255 0.9244 -0.05685 0.9547 
O17_AB_log -0.0275 0.1514 -0.18166 0.85597 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index 0.10317 0.19215 0.53692 0.59173 
O6_MUS_LE -0.11121 0.4314 -0.25779 0.79675 
O10_SEC_LE -0.02285 0.17445 -0.13099 0.89587 
O11_ANW_LE 0.02149 0.18713 0.11487 0.90863 
O14_OI_LE -0.12504 0.30972 -0.40373 0.6867 
O16_UF_LE -0.00472 0.20486 -0.02302 0.98165 
O21_TFC_LE 0.03027 0.25797 0.11734 0.90667 
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O22_TAG_LE -0.10217 0.1357 -0.75292 0.4521 
O23_GINV_LE -0.04864 0.21718 -0.22394 0.82296 
O24_OOL_LE 0.11052 0.36907 0.29946 0.7648 
O26_DHO_LE -0.06531 0.30219 -0.21613 0.82903 
O27_DHOIS_LE -0.14868 0.37128 -0.40046 0.68911 
O29_OUI_LE 0.07056 0.23809 0.29635 0.76717 
O18_OFC 
    
(Intercept) -11.6591 3.63014 -3.21174 0.00146 
O18_OFC_PBV 9.06002 3.44541 2.62959 0.00899 
O18_OFC_log -0.35021 0.23761 -1.47388 0.14155 
O7_FIN_LE -0.02589 0.46212 -0.05602 0.95536 
O12_MADI_LE -0.10583 0.11483 -0.92163 0.35746 
O16_UF_LE -0.55484 0.58238 -0.95271 0.3415 
O17_AB_LE 0.13318 0.40635 0.32776 0.74332 
O21_TFC_LE 0.02858 0.23838 0.11989 0.90465 
O19_AMF 
    
(Intercept) -3.72653 37.70394 -0.09884 0.92134 
O19_AMF_PBV 11.0609 3.68972 2.99776 0.00297 
O19_AMF_size -7.50041 9.39185 -0.79861 0.4252 
O19_AMF_LEV 9.17206 3.31856 2.76387 0.0061 
O19_AMF_MM -40.6672 19.15099 -2.1235 0.0346 
O19_AMF_log -0.47154 0.20584 -2.29076 0.02273 
Repo_Rate 6.91961 3.95097 1.75137 0.08099 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index 0.0029 0.1459 0.01985 0.98418 
MSM30_VOL 0.03499 0.0836 0.41849 0.67592 
O1_OT_LE -0.26937 0.31506 -0.85499 0.3933 
O2_DHO_LE -0.08684 0.31224 -0.27814 0.78112 
O3_SOH_LE -0.0431 0.36101 -0.11939 0.90506 
O4_NIZ_LE -0.02421 0.29759 -0.08136 0.93521 
O5_HSBC_LE 0.02361 0.21193 0.11138 0.91139 
O7_FIN_LE -0.06132 0.17214 -0.35623 0.72194 
O8_BAT_LE 0.04921 0.1033 0.47636 0.63419 
O9_MUS_LE 0.14256 0.08783 1.62324 0.10568 
O10_SEC_LE 0.15479 0.20603 0.7513 0.45311 
O11_ANW_LE 0.10944 0.21957 0.49842 0.61859 
O12_MADI_LE 0.08689 0.14931 0.58192 0.56109 
O13_OEH_LE -0.04078 0.14888 -0.27389 0.78437 
O14_OI_LE 0.07089 0.34778 0.20383 0.83864 
O15_GF_LE -0.01007 0.16167 -0.0623 0.95037 
O16_UF_LE -0.11537 0.23932 -0.48208 0.63013 
O17_AB_LE 0.09979 0.35574 0.28052 0.77929 
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O18_OFC_LE -0.07582 0.23742 -0.31936 0.7497 
O20_SHQ_LE 0.77895 1.55859 0.49978 0.61763 
O21_TFC_LE 0.04311 0.2998 0.1438 0.88577 
O22_TAG_LE 0.10572 0.19229 0.5498 0.5829 
O24_OOL_LE 0.09912 0.25436 0.38971 0.69706 
O25_OI_LE 0.09286 0.43033 0.21579 0.82931 
O26_DHO_LE -0.12716 0.22677 -0.56074 0.57543 
O27_DHOIS_LE 0.08585 0.22956 0.37398 0.70871 
O28_MUH_LE 0.06939 0.48396 0.14337 0.8861 
O29_OUI_LE -0.25049 0.30164 -0.83044 0.40701 
O20_SHQ 
    
(Intercept) -0.00742 0.00055 -13.6106 0 
O20_SHQ_size 0.00181 0.00015 12.13558 0 
O20_SHQ_log 1.0187 0.00048 2126.985 0 
O15_GF_LE 0 0 0.77618 0.43824 
O21_TFC 
    
(Intercept) -3.21847 0.58377 -5.51326 0 
O8_BAT_LE -0.03182 0.19884 -0.16005 0.87295 
O14_OI_LE -0.18168 0.28366 -0.64048 0.52233 
O23_GINV 
    
(Intercept) -24.2635 35.62999 -0.68099 0.49643 
O23_GINV_size 5.20169 8.38453 0.62039 0.53549 
O23_GINV_DE 7.40905 4.9415 1.49935 0.13487 
O23_GINV_log -0.3027 0.07352 -4.11731 0.00005 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index 0.12847 0.15416 0.83335 0.40533 
O3_SOH_LE -0.24079 0.3918 -0.61459 0.53931 
O4_NIZ_LE 0.06717 0.18886 0.35565 0.72236 
O5_HSBC_LE -0.21954 0.15032 -1.46044 0.14525 
O6_MUS_LE -0.66639 0.61616 -1.08151 0.28037 
O8_BAT_LE -0.15878 0.16082 -0.98731 0.32432 
O11_ANW_LE -0.15563 0.15509 -1.00348 0.31647 
O13_OEH_LE -0.29187 0.1701 -1.71589 0.08725 
O14_OI_LE -0.04983 0.25956 -0.192 0.84788 
O15_GF_LE -0.15891 0.12851 -1.23661 0.21723 
O17_AB_LE 0.15105 0.25129 0.60108 0.54826 
O18_OFC_LE 0.16804 0.32851 0.51152 0.60938 
O19_AMF_LE 0.34316 0.36381 0.94324 0.34635 
O24_OOL_LE -0.59206 0.46012 -1.28674 0.19921 
O25_OI_LE 0.05369 0.29548 0.1817 0.85594 
O26_DHO_LE 0.02577 0.62669 0.04111 0.96723 
O28_MUH_LE -0.60698 0.21098 -2.87696 0.00431 
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O29_OUI_LE -1.24272 0.41252 -3.0125 0.00282 
O24_OOL 
    
(Intercept) -7.11697 3.3702 -2.11173 0.03553 
O24_OOL_PBV 4.28209 3.03174 1.41242 0.15886 
O24_OOL_log -0.36644 0.29792 -1.23 0.21966 
O3_SOH_LE -0.3493 0.36912 -0.9463 0.34476 
O6_MUS_LE -0.47547 0.65259 -0.72859 0.46682 
O7_FIN_LE 0.32857 0.13248 2.48007 0.01368 
O9_MUS_LE -0.257 0.37897 -0.67814 0.4982 
O17_AB_LE 0.55987 0.34701 1.61342 0.1077 
O23_GINV_LE -0.14597 0.15152 -0.96339 0.33613 
O26_DHO_LE 0.16254 0.60274 0.26967 0.7876 
O25_OI 
    
(Intercept) -1.59304 0.17086 -9.32344 0 
O6_MUS_LE 0.04212 0.22595 0.18643 0.85223 
O11_ANW_LE 0.021 0.04232 0.49616 0.62014 
O14_OI_LE -0.57794 0.17425 -3.31662 0.00102 
O26_DHO_LE -0.2603 0.11772 -2.21115 0.02776 
O26_DHO 
    
(Intercept) -8.33472 2.37114 -3.51507 0.00051 
O26_DHO_PBV 2.64869 0.95671 2.76855 0.00601 
O26_DHO_LEV -1.04463 1.12678 -0.92709 0.35467 
O26_DHO_MM 9.594 3.11035 3.08454 0.00224 
O26_DHO_log -0.1471 0.07454 -1.97337 0.04943 
Repo_Rate -1.68447 0.35975 -4.6823 0 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index -0.02496 0.0481 -0.51893 0.60422 
MSM30_VOL 0.03622 0.02586 1.40058 0.16244 
O1_OT_LE -0.3296 0.11171 -2.95063 0.00344 
O2_DHO_LE -0.13204 0.10715 -1.23233 0.21886 
O3_SOH_LE 0.11607 0.14997 0.77392 0.43963 
O4_NIZ_LE 0.07912 0.07769 1.01843 0.30935 
O5_HSBC_LE 0.27052 0.10624 2.54618 0.01142 
O6_MUS_LE -0.26147 0.11329 -2.30803 0.02172 
O7_FIN_LE 0.05114 0.02423 2.11051 0.0357 
O9_MUS_LE 0.09708 0.06091 1.59379 0.11211 
O10_SEC_LE -0.12858 0.04885 -2.63209 0.00896 
O12_MADI_LE -0.14865 0.04192 -3.54645 0.00046 
O13_OEH_LE -0.20707 0.08231 -2.51562 0.01244 
O15_GF_LE 0.06894 0.064 1.07727 0.28228 
O16_UF_LE -0.02451 0.04327 -0.56636 0.5716 
O17_AB_LE -0.08124 0.08806 -0.92258 0.35702 
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O18_OFC_LE 0.03717 0.09584 0.38782 0.69844 
O19_AMF_LE -0.06227 0.35861 -0.17365 0.86227 
O20_SHQ_LE 3.12307 0.3655 8.54459 0 
O22_TAG_LE -0.21194 0.1188 -1.78405 0.07549 
O24_OOL_LE 0.06543 0.13551 0.4828 0.62962 
O25_OI_LE -0.08352 0.11712 -0.7131 0.47637 
O27_DHOIS_LE -0.22728 0.11204 -2.02865 0.04344 
O28_MUH_LE -0.25035 0.08616 -2.90568 0.00396 
O27_DHOIS 
    
(Intercept) -1.84834 0.21432 -8.62416 0 
O27_DHOIS_log -0.17027 0.13239 -1.28614 0.19937 
O8_BAT_LE -0.36183 0.11716 -3.08848 0.0022 
O14_OI_LE -0.34082 0.14537 -2.34451 0.01969 
O15_GF_LE 0.06153 0.09894 0.62183 0.53452 
O16_UF_LE -0.34248 0.23933 -1.43101 0.15345 
O29_OUI 
    
(Intercept) -0.47629 0.62963 -0.75646 0.44998 
Muscat_Securities_MSM_30_Index 0.15845 0.14391 1.10105 0.27177 
MSM30_VOL -0.09232 0.05511 -1.67503 0.09498 
O1_OT_LE 0.1798 0.23613 0.76144 0.447 
O2_DHO_LE -0.56332 0.42438 -1.3274 0.1854 
O3_SOH_LE 0.19024 0.15543 1.22395 0.22194 
O6_MUS_LE 0.28375 0.32145 0.88273 0.3781 
O8_BAT_LE -0.06442 0.13578 -0.47444 0.63554 
O11_ANW_LE -0.11118 0.15928 -0.69803 0.48571 
O13_OEH_LE -0.49206 0.10052 -4.89506 0 
O14_OI_LE -0.10848 0.14303 -0.75845 0.44879 
O17_AB_LE -0.13759 0.23656 -0.58166 0.56124 
O22_TAG_LE -0.16477 0.24056 -0.68495 0.49391 
O23_GINV_LE -0.15253 0.1441 -1.05848 0.2907 
O27_DHOIS_LE -0.37001 0.26846 -1.37824 0.16917 
 
Jordan 
Jordan     
 Value Std. Error t-ratio p-values 
J1_AB     
(Intercept) -1.49398 0.7399 -2.01917 0.04438 
I1_PBV 0.57915 0.84465 0.68567 0.49346 
J1_AB_log -0.1917 0.06787 -2.82438 0.00506 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.21067 0.0629 3.34917 0.00092 
J2_JKB_LE 0.01524 0.12205 0.12488 0.9007 
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J5_CA_LE -0.37704 0.16815 -2.24223 0.02569 
J6_CB_LE -0.07575 0.26142 -0.28977 0.77219 
J10_BAE_LE -0.14387 0.09576 -1.50231 0.13409 
J11_JIB_LE 0.01663 0.16809 0.09893 0.92126 
J12_CIG_LE 0.07952 0.08082 0.98388 0.32599 
J14_JDI_LE -0.07928 0.21502 -0.36871 0.71261 
J18_SJ_LE -0.04655 0.0618 -0.75321 0.45193 
J20_OP_LE -0.38835 0.06868 -5.65466 0 
J23_JE_LE 0.10063 0.07086 1.42006 0.15665 
J31_IBF_LE -0.11844 0.12702 -0.93243 0.35188 
J32_TCI_LE -0.06448 0.18514 -0.34827 0.72789 
J35_FF_LE -0.08419 0.1308 -0.64368 0.52029 
J37_NC_LE 0.04845 0.03249 1.49108 0.13702 
J2_JKB 
    
(Intercept) -1.0537 0.27356 -3.85185 0.00014 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.15602 0.14413 1.08245 0.2799 
J5_CA_LE -0.44551 0.37181 -1.19823 0.23175 
J13_UI_LE -0.13954 0.20318 -0.6868 0.49273 
J16_AFI_LE -0.52255 0.35623 -1.46686 0.14344 
J3_BOJ 
    
(Intercept) 3.75773 2.60106 1.44469 0.14957 
I3_PBV -3.91334 2.3251 -1.68308 0.09339 
J1_AB_LE -0.34055 0.36043 -0.94484 0.34549 
J11_JIB_LE -0.04636 0.45002 -0.10302 0.91802 
J16_AFI_LE -0.2831 0.17771 -1.59303 0.11219 
J25_AM_LE -0.08362 0.20396 -0.40998 0.68211 
J29_BIND_LE -0.36446 0.12293 -2.96467 0.00327 
J4_ABC 
    
(Intercept) 19.57174 6.65168 2.94237 0.00353 
I4_DE -0.07783 0.19117 -0.40714 0.68421 
I4_MM -11.4157 27.2083 -0.41957 0.67512 
I4_PBV -16.6085 4.12426 -4.02704 0.00007 
J4_ABC_log -0.08971 0.17442 -0.51437 0.6074 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX -0.03766 0.07857 -0.4794 0.63202 
Inter_bank_rate -0.35332 0.33286 -1.06144 0.28939 
J2_JKB_LE 0.06436 0.33829 0.19026 0.84924 
J6_CB_LE -0.15655 0.23449 -0.66763 0.50492 
J7_JC_LE 0.15957 0.10216 1.56188 0.11943 
J8_HB_LE 0.20576 0.60465 0.34029 0.73389 
J10_BAE_LE -0.35798 0.23676 -1.51199 0.13165 
J11_JIB_LE -0.39795 0.31506 -1.2631 0.20759 
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J12_CIG_LE 0.04898 0.18167 0.2696 0.78767 
J13_UI_LE 0.07442 0.16564 0.44927 0.65358 
J14_JDI_LE -0.07724 0.12612 -0.61239 0.54077 
J15_JI_LE 0.20848 0.14648 1.42327 0.15576 
J18_SJ_LE -0.1667 0.14425 -1.15564 0.2488 
J21_EFF_LE -0.00202 0.08126 -0.02483 0.98021 
J22_UFI_LE -0.14987 0.16203 -0.92497 0.35577 
J24_SG_LE 0.0417 0.14647 0.28467 0.77611 
J26_ZARA_LE -0.0639 0.16488 -0.38757 0.69863 
J28_ISRA_LE 0.02898 0.19989 0.14497 0.88484 
J29_BIND_LE -0.06186 0.14823 -0.4173 0.67677 
J32_TCI_LE -0.25715 0.19281 -1.33369 0.18338 
J33_AMAL_LE -0.03968 0.11239 -0.35303 0.72433 
J35_FF_LE -0.08183 0.24987 -0.32749 0.74354 
J36_BI_LE 0.01116 0.61102 0.01827 0.98543 
J5_CA 
    
(Intercept) 0.3094 1.07995 0.2865 0.7747 
I5_PBV -1.47906 0.78744 -1.87832 0.06131 
J5_CA_log -0.22655 0.07564 -2.99501 0.00297 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX -0.1023 0.09137 -1.11959 0.26379 
JOR_IMP_VOL 0.07004 0.03135 2.23434 0.0262 
J1_AB_LE -0.16084 0.14068 -1.14332 0.25382 
J2_JKB_LE -0.2428 0.10123 -2.39852 0.01707 
J3_BOJ_LE -0.09729 0.22076 -0.44072 0.65973 
J9_JAB_LE -0.48288 0.14946 -3.23092 0.00137 
i -0.44173 0.14869 -2.97087 0.00321 
J15_JI_LE -0.11947 0.24207 -0.49353 0.622 
J31_IBF_LE -0.12919 0.12693 -1.01779 0.3096 
J7_JC 
    
(Intercept) 0.11543 1.00367 0.11501 0.90852 
I7_PBV -2.08214 0.9029 -2.30605 0.02181 
J7_JC_log -0.27176 0.1225 -2.21841 0.02729 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.28021 0.19226 1.45744 0.14606 
J2_JKB_LE -0.47701 0.82212 -0.58022 0.56221 
J3_BOJ_LE 0.3604 0.44119 0.81687 0.41466 
J5_CA_LE -0.2816 0.73519 -0.38303 0.70197 
J15_JI_LE 0.07501 0.55165 0.13597 0.89194 
J16_AFI_LE -0.05909 0.14277 -0.41386 0.67928 
J19_SAQ_LE -0.40623 1.61692 -0.25123 0.80181 
J21_EFF_LE 0.17566 0.10826 1.62261 0.10575 
J25_AM_LE -0.05429 0.32478 -0.16717 0.86735 
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J26_ZARA_LE 0.07391 0.31173 0.2371 0.81274 
J27_AEFR_LE 0.1297 0.28981 0.44752 0.65483 
J30_JLG_LE -0.25907 0.32723 -0.79172 0.42916 
J31_IBF_LE -0.21897 0.08646 -2.53266 0.01184 
J36_BI_LE 0.05935 1.84251 0.03221 0.97432 
J37_NC_LE 0.1325 0.11211 1.18181 0.23824 
J7_JC 
    
(Intercept) 0.04004 0.50856 0.07872 0.93731 
I7_PBV -0.81143 0.55297 -1.46742 0.14334 
J7_JC_log 0.02643 0.04204 0.62868 0.53005 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.12697 0.04975 2.55218 0.01121 
J2_JKB_LE 0.0824 0.13523 0.60936 0.54276 
J3_BOJ_LE -0.09052 0.31073 -0.29132 0.77101 
J5_CA_LE 0.10155 0.17646 0.57547 0.56542 
J15_JI_LE 0.00343 0.05945 0.05776 0.95398 
J16_AFI_LE 0.08221 0.09846 0.83497 0.40442 
J19_SAQ_LE -0.00054 0.05077 -0.01056 0.99159 
J21_EFF_LE 0.05734 0.05138 1.11596 0.26536 
J25_AM_LE 0.09833 0.15649 0.62837 0.53025 
J26_ZARA_LE 0.01591 0.14264 0.11152 0.91128 
J27_AEFR_LE 0.00842 0.13973 0.06023 0.95202 
J30_JLG_LE 0.09434 0.10163 0.92826 0.35403 
J31_IBF_LE -0.07866 0.06375 -1.23384 0.21825 
J36_BI_LE 0.00493 0.00509 0.96817 0.33376 
J37_NC_LE -0.02657 0.06093 -0.43601 0.66315 
J9_JAB 
    
(Intercept) 2.4564 1.75034 1.40338 0.16158 
I9_MM 5.93371 6.21376 0.95493 0.34042 
I9_PBV -4.75849 1.89074 -2.51673 0.01239 
J9_JAB_log -0.05255 0.09636 -0.54533 0.58595 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.28354 0.06487 4.37114 0.00002 
JOR_IMP_VOL 0.05118 0.06042 0.84703 0.39768 
Tbill_Monthly_Interest_rate -0.09207 0.12038 -0.76481 0.44501 
J1_AB_LE 0.0568 0.21499 0.26419 0.79183 
J2_JKB_LE -0.22201 0.20389 -1.08887 0.27713 
J5_CA_LE -0.36456 0.19604 -1.85967 0.06395 
J6_CB_LE 0.21439 0.16425 1.30528 0.19284 
J8_HB_LE -0.2775 2.35453 -0.11786 0.90626 
J11_JIB_LE -0.00168 0.31269 -0.00536 0.99573 
J12_CIG_LE 0.0732 0.19212 0.38099 0.70349 
J14_JDI_LE 0.0045 0.2491 0.01807 0.98559 
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J20_OP_LE -0.16389 0.11066 -1.48102 0.1397 
J21_EFF_LE -0.11355 0.13299 -0.85377 0.39394 
J22_UFI_LE -0.05284 0.24326 -0.2172 0.82821 
J23_JE_LE -0.09161 0.13976 -0.65551 0.51266 
J25_AM_LE 0.01275 0.08041 0.15851 0.87417 
J27_AEFR_LE -0.34164 0.11776 -2.90101 0.00401 
J28_ISRA_LE 0.02523 0.085 0.29683 0.76681 
J34_FAR_LE 0.02847 0.0728 0.39104 0.69605 
J36_BI_LE -0.05833 0.02002 -2.91423 0.00385 
J10_BAE 
    
(Intercept) 1.30884 1.06646 1.22727 0.22068 
J10_PBV -4.13377 1.47174 -2.80876 0.0053 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.20741 0.0847 2.44891 0.0149 
J1_AB_LE 0.02375 0.2826 0.08405 0.93308 
J11_JIB_LE -0.66802 0.35961 -1.85761 0.0642 
J13_UI_LE 0.18747 0.12295 1.52478 0.12837 
J16_AFI_LE -0.3242 0.3209 -1.01027 0.31318 
J18_SJ_LE 0.18083 0.2142 0.84424 0.39921 
J23_JE_LE -0.09193 0.17724 -0.51865 0.60439 
J24_SG_LE -0.32385 0.29002 -1.11663 0.26505 
J27_AEFR_LE -0.16673 0.15593 -1.06924 0.28582 
J11_JIB 
    
(Intercept) 1.07112 0.62444 1.71534 0.08734 
J11_PBV -0.91769 0.38379 -2.39114 0.01743 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX -0.02765 0.10387 -0.26617 0.7903 
J1_AB_LE -0.13698 0.15314 -0.89448 0.3718 
J4_ABC_LE -0.44824 0.31883 -1.40588 0.16081 
J9_JAB_LE -0.18563 0.19558 -0.94909 0.34335 
J10_BAE_LE -0.08559 0.19452 -0.44003 0.66024 
J13_UI_LE -0.05851 0.09236 -0.63349 0.52691 
J14_JDI_LE -0.29069 0.15903 -1.82791 0.06858 
J15_JI_LE -0.06749 0.05219 -1.29323 0.19695 
J25_AM_LE -0.42468 0.25489 -1.66609 0.09676 
J27_AEFR_LE -0.30806 0.117 -2.63306 0.00891 
J28_ISRA_LE -0.33154 0.16348 -2.02804 0.04346 
J29_BIND_LE -0.11722 0.13159 -0.89079 0.37377 
J31_IBF_LE 0.06164 0.03012 2.04639 0.04161 
J35_FF_LE 0.22539 0.14701 1.53318 0.12631 
J36_BI_LE -0.00246 0.07131 -0.03453 0.97248 
J12_CIG 
    
(Intercept) -2.66556 0.39725 -6.71007 0 
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J12_CIG_log 0.17085 0.11993 1.42457 0.1553 
J16_AFI_LE -0.60371 0.46848 -1.28868 0.19848 
J18_SJ_LE -0.19177 0.17602 -1.08949 0.27679 
J13_UI 
    
(Intercept) -1.77108 0.672 -2.63552 0.00885 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.14728 0.11939 1.23365 0.21832 
Tbill_Monthly_Interest_rate 0.03892 0.08285 0.46974 0.63889 
J2_JKB_LE -0.31982 0.47168 -0.67805 0.49827 
J4_ABC_LE -0.17957 0.42296 -0.42456 0.67147 
J5_CA_LE -0.21692 0.24622 -0.88099 0.37904 
J10_BAE_LE 0.19873 0.21074 0.94299 0.34646 
J11_JIB_LE -0.21131 0.42828 -0.49339 0.6221 
J14_JDI_LE 0.05835 0.244 0.23915 0.81115 
J15_JI_LE -0.02896 0.36373 -0.07961 0.9366 
J16_AFI_LE -0.29768 0.15108 -1.97034 0.04973 
J18_SJ_LE -0.24914 0.09827 -2.53524 0.01175 
J20_OP_LE 0.03431 0.07787 0.44063 0.6598 
J23_JE_LE -0.14112 0.18645 -0.75691 0.44971 
J33_AMAL_LE -0.3179 0.20557 -1.54645 0.12307 
J37_NC_LE 0.01151 0.07978 0.14424 0.88541 
J14_JDI 
    
(Intercept) -292.336 298.597 -0.97903 0.32846 
J14_size 57.98887 58.7668 0.98676 0.32466 
J14_LEV 4.32927 1.67005 2.59229 0.01006 
J14_DE -3.09155 1.26934 -2.43555 0.01553 
J14_MM 773.9854 290.367 2.66554 0.00816 
J14_PBV -22.6339 7.47252 -3.02895 0.0027 
J14_JDI_log 0.00365 0.15322 0.02385 0.98099 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.15879 0.18473 0.85962 0.39078 
JOR_IMP_VOL -0.44158 0.15151 -2.91455 0.00387 
Inter_bank_rate 1.34644 0.70509 1.9096 0.05726 
Tbill_Monthly_Interest_rate -0.3528 0.30382 -1.16121 0.2466 
J1_AB_LE 0.04435 0.27881 0.15906 0.87374 
J2_JKB_LE 0.18004 0.18589 0.96855 0.33365 
J3_BOJ_LE -0.03313 0.24366 -0.13596 0.89196 
J4_ABC_LE 0.20339 0.30265 0.67204 0.50214 
J5_CA_LE -0.07339 0.22341 -0.3285 0.74279 
J6_CB_LE -0.30277 0.32838 -0.92201 0.35736 
J7_JC_LE -0.04988 0.14943 -0.33379 0.7388 
J8_HB_LE 0.3114 0.58735 0.53018 0.59643 
J9_JAB_LE 0.03918 0.30271 0.12943 0.89712 
313 
 
J10_BAE_LE -0.02058 0.28704 -0.07171 0.94289 
J11_JIB_LE 0.04669 0.39852 0.11715 0.90683 
J12_CIG_LE 0.17799 0.30668 0.58036 0.56216 
J13_UI_LE -0.34905 0.16164 -2.15936 0.03172 
J15_JI_LE 0.47592 0.22862 2.08172 0.03833 
J16_AFI_LE 0.11704 0.34522 0.33902 0.73486 
J18_SJ_LE -0.04899 0.10502 -0.46648 0.64125 
J19_SAQ_LE 0.1667 0.20796 0.80161 0.4235 
J20_OP_LE 0.18474 0.15671 1.17884 0.23952 
J21_EFF_LE 0.0669 0.10621 0.62992 0.52929 
J22_UFI_LE 0.13218 0.21873 0.60429 0.54617 
J23_JE_LE -0.00193 0.15398 -0.01257 0.98998 
J24_SG_LE -0.04069 0.17072 -0.23835 0.81179 
J25_AM_LE 0.04714 0.17552 0.26859 0.78846 
J26_ZARA_LE -0.09395 0.15074 -0.62326 0.53365 
J27_AEFR_LE 0.02089 0.16922 0.12347 0.90183 
J28_ISRA_LE 0.10624 0.23718 0.44792 0.65458 
J29_BIND_LE 0.00729 0.10131 0.07198 0.94267 
J30_JLG_LE -0.01914 0.18864 -0.10148 0.91924 
J31_IBF_LE -0.13007 0.08843 -1.4708 0.14253 
J32_TCI_LE 0.14325 0.23017 0.62236 0.53424 
J33_AMAL_LE -0.20957 0.11644 -1.79975 0.07304 
J34_FAR_LE -0.1864 0.21384 -0.87169 0.38416 
J35_FF_LE -0.06572 0.19731 -0.33309 0.73933 
J36_BI_LE 0.01333 0.04064 0.328 0.74317 
J37_NC_LE -0.14463 0.06992 -2.06841 0.03957 
J15_JI 
    
(Intercept) -0.90299 0.53458 -1.68917 0.09221 
Inter_bank_rate -0.28467 0.21644 -1.31526 0.18941 
J6_CB_LE -0.86006 0.15565 -5.52576 0 
J13_UI_LE -0.50124 0.38561 -1.29985 0.19463 
J33_AMAL_LE -0.02363 0.49541 -0.0477 0.96199 
J16_AFI 
    
(Intercept) -0.3882 0.69469 -0.55881 0.57671 
I16_DE -0.03681 0.18406 -0.2 0.84162 
I16_MM -0.83225 5.72065 -0.14548 0.88443 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.22048 0.3287 0.67077 0.50289 
J1_AB_LE -0.63519 0.3531 -1.79892 0.07305 
J10_BAE_LE -0.56203 0.4735 -1.18699 0.23618 
J11_JIB_LE 0.18411 0.64691 0.2846 0.77615 
J12_CIG_LE -0.20762 0.19075 -1.08847 0.27727 
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J13_UI_LE -0.23617 0.23537 -1.00344 0.31647 
J15_JI_LE 0.24048 0.24645 0.97577 0.32997 
J20_OP_LE -0.14282 0.46616 -0.30638 0.75953 
J23_JE_LE -0.30136 0.33095 -0.91058 0.36325 
J25_AM_LE -0.12825 0.41742 -0.30724 0.75888 
J33_AMAL_LE -0.41581 0.35008 -1.18775 0.23588 
J18_SJ 
    
(Intercept) -2.41886 1.31958 -1.83305 0.06781 
I18_MM -2.77421 2.56041 -1.0835 0.27947 
J18_SJ_log -0.0747 0.08649 -0.8636 0.38851 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.00945 0.18841 0.05015 0.96003 
Tbill_Monthly_Interest_rate 0.31595 0.16464 1.919 0.05595 
J10_BAE_LE 0.28409 0.26128 1.08727 0.27781 
J12_CIG_LE -0.10896 0.18495 -0.58912 0.55623 
J13_UI_LE -0.00947 0.23309 -0.04064 0.96761 
J14_JDI_LE 0.32029 0.51341 0.62384 0.53322 
J15_JI_LE 0.13267 0.12191 1.08829 0.27736 
J21_EFF_LE -0.06268 0.13625 -0.46005 0.64582 
J22_UFI_LE -0.21983 0.24258 -0.90621 0.36557 
J29_BIND_LE -0.07972 0.76347 -0.10442 0.9169 
J31_IBF_LE -0.19738 0.18916 -1.04343 0.29761 
J32_TCI_LE -0.67258 0.43503 -1.54606 0.12317 
J34_FAR_LE -0.6238 0.1075 -5.8028 0 
J36_BI_LE 0.0157 0.12933 0.1214 0.90345 
J19_SAQ 
    
(Intercept) 100.6971 42.97405 2.34321 0.01977 
I19_LEV -102.445 42.413 -2.41542 0.01631 
I19_PBV 1.00157 1.19202 0.84023 0.40145 
J19_SAQ_log 0.04417 0.30032 0.14709 0.88316 
Inter_bank_rate 0.87284 0.409 2.1341 0.03365 
J7_JC_LE 0.04117 0.2672 0.1541 0.87764 
J8_HB_LE 1.58563 0.53594 2.95859 0.00334 
J10_BAE_LE -0.21133 0.43151 -0.48974 0.62468 
J25_AM_LE -0.51905 0.1588 -3.26862 0.00121 
J33_AMAL_LE -0.34279 0.28705 -1.19417 0.23336 
J34_FAR_LE 0.05251 0.34054 0.1542 0.87756 
J20_OP 
    
(Intercept) -2.46671 1.9644 -1.2557 0.21025 
I20_PBV -1.82787 1.50516 -1.2144 0.2256 
J20_OP_log 0.18878 0.24262 0.77811 0.43715 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.51285 0.38503 1.33199 0.18392 
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Inter_bank_rate 0.14905 0.56795 0.26243 0.79318 
J1_AB_LE 0.26853 0.67057 0.40044 0.68913 
J3_BOJ_LE 0.44735 2.02791 0.2206 0.82556 
J5_CA_LE 0.29907 0.78539 0.38079 0.70364 
J6_CB_LE -0.10026 0.93349 -0.1074 0.91454 
J8_HB_LE 1.34115 3.42208 0.39191 0.69542 
J9_JAB_LE -1.06911 0.73957 -1.44558 0.14939 
J10_BAE_LE -0.43868 0.67751 -0.6475 0.51783 
J12_CIG_LE -0.34663 0.73287 -0.47297 0.6366 
J13_UI_LE 0.05168 0.56468 0.09152 0.92714 
J14_JDI_LE 0.10168 0.47024 0.21622 0.82897 
J16_AFI_LE -0.10162 0.65907 -0.15418 0.87758 
J18_SJ_LE -0.36696 0.24767 -1.48161 0.13954 
J22_UFI_LE 0.33846 0.32277 1.04861 0.29524 
J23_JE_LE 0.29213 0.62901 0.46442 0.6427 
J27_AEFR_LE 0.42159 0.40457 1.04207 0.29826 
J30_JLG_LE -0.05086 0.57003 -0.08922 0.92897 
J31_IBF_LE -0.3665 0.38396 -0.95451 0.34063 
J33_AMAL_LE -0.41743 0.18397 -2.26903 0.02401 
J36_BI_LE 0.10425 0.2055 0.50732 0.61232 
J37_NC_LE -0.21806 0.13235 -1.64753 0.10055 
J21_EFF 
    
(Intercept) -2.55655 0.76361 -3.34795 0.00092 
I21_PBV 0.0216 0.28506 0.07576 0.93966 
J13_UI_LE -0.07434 0.20857 -0.35645 0.72175 
J18_SJ_LE 0.2232 0.12696 1.75802 0.07974 
J33_AMAL_LE -0.08995 0.18692 -0.48123 0.6307 
J22_UFI 
    
(Intercept) -2.71308 0.33992 -7.98142 0 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.14775 0.19042 0.77591 0.4384 
J4_ABC_LE -1.52464 0.67193 -2.26904 0.02396 
J33_AMAL_LE -0.09247 0.13842 -0.66804 0.50461 
J24_SG 
    
(Intercept) -1.72635 0.39334 -4.389 0.00002 
J24_SG_log -0.01364 0.19654 -0.0694 0.94472 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.43496 0.19741 2.20336 0.02832 
J6_CB_LE -0.11961 0.26964 -0.44358 0.65766 
J10_BAE_LE -0.51981 0.39393 -1.31955 0.18797 
J26_ZARA_LE -0.4652 0.21938 -2.12053 0.03477 
J29_BIND 
    
(Intercept) -0.91774 0.87656 -1.04698 0.29596 
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I29_MM 3.33604 2.86523 1.16432 0.24522 
JOR_IMP_VOL -0.11196 0.12125 -0.92341 0.35654 
J3_BOJ_LE 0.03322 0.20898 0.15897 0.8738 
J4_ABC_LE -0.6593 0.42845 -1.53879 0.12491 
J6_CB_LE 0.25025 0.27334 0.91554 0.36065 
J8_HB_LE 0.21451 0.99266 0.21609 0.82906 
J11_JIB_LE -0.44184 0.41611 -1.06182 0.28917 
J14_JDI_LE 0.1861 0.45427 0.40968 0.68233 
J21_EFF_LE -0.16492 0.05956 -2.76894 0.00598 
J24_SG_LE -0.05389 0.1253 -0.43005 0.66747 
J25_AM_LE -0.4961 0.24643 -2.01313 0.045 
J33_AMAL 
    
(Intercept) -3.26621 1.21089 -2.69735 0.00738 
JOR_MARKET_INDEX 0.01819 0.40088 0.04536 0.96385 
J2_JKB_LE 0.26719 0.70305 0.38005 0.70418 
J3_BOJ_LE 0.45319 1.4666 0.30901 0.75753 
J13_UI_LE -0.50686 0.18527 -2.73572 0.0066 
J16_AFI_LE -0.03127 0.54113 -0.05779 0.95396 
J19_SAQ_LE -0.70088 0.22677 -3.0907 0.00218 
J20_OP_LE -0.16553 0.63248 -0.26171 0.79372 
J21_EFF_LE 0.34962 0.23578 1.48284 0.13917 
J22_UFI_LE 0.20574 0.31155 0.66039 0.50951 
J25_AM_LE 0.22265 0.434 0.51301 0.60832 
 
